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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Personal prologue 
The story of this research is a kind of existential adventure that in many 
respects has changed my life. I was not a historian, I had never travelled to 
Central Asia before and when I entered my PhD course at IMT Lucca in February 
2013, I had other ambitions. I had worked as a political analyst in Moscow and 
I had followed the debates on the strategic issues related to the former Soviet 
area. Thus, I wanted to continue my studies focusing on the geopolitical role of 
post-Soviet Central Asia in the 21st century and I had a vague idea of how to 
start. Hence, I went to Turin to speak with a famous scholar specializing in 
Central Asian history. He was a well-known historian and smiled at my 
ambitious and naïve words. Nevertheless, he kindly invited me to study the 
basic literature and to understand the limitations of the research in this field. 
My solid convictions became weak ideas in less than one hour. However, I felt 
very excited by the possibility of adding something new to the field. Thus, I 
devoured most of the existing literature with the aim of understanding the 
main features of the Central Asian context. The more I read the more I realized 
that the answers I was claiming to have were just simplistic.  
The process of intellectual growth is not obvious and requires time, 
dedication and above all a guide to understand the right path to take. I had no 
idea where to start. On a cold sunny day in April 2013, I found myself in Lucca 
where I attended a seminar on the history of revolutions. I already knew of the 
discussant, not least by reputation. A famous Italian scholar specializing in 
Soviet history, I had studied his books and indeed had already met him on one 
formal occasion. After his seminar, we had a small chat and then he invited me 
to have lunch together to discuss it further. I was very shy and, frankly, quite 
nervous. Nevertheless, I was fascinated by the enthusiasm he had showed in 
seminars and in particular the interest he took in the subjects that I and my 
classmates were studying. He was very forthcoming with further questions to 
the many queries we posed to him. Apparently, he was not challenging our 
expertise but rather provoking our curiosity. Thus, in spite of my bashful 
character, I accepted his invitation to lunch without reservation and with few 
expectations. Little did I realize my life was about to change that day. Not 
II 
 
expecting him to take too much interest in my work, I was taken aback when 
he asked me over lunch “what would you like to do in the future?” I stuttered 
something related to my previous job in Moscow etc. and unexpectedly I 
responded with a childish affirmation: “I want to study something that I am 
interested in.” Apparently, I was wasting an occasion to be serious and to some 
extent I felt ashamed at appearing so flippant. Nevertheless, he gave credit to 
my vague reply and said: “well, and do you know what would you like to study?” 
Somehow liberated by his encouragement, I simply said: “No Sir, I don't...” 
Effectively, I had no idea of my research, and looking at my colleagues I realized 
that I was not alone. Everyone who starts a PhD is full of vague notions and 
conjectures, waiting for Godot to find inspiration or a guide who might explain 
the basics of the research in its ethical and ontological nature.  
During our lunch, he talked about the work of the historian with the 
persuasion of those who really believe in what they say. Honestly, I respected 
the historians but I had never considered this a vocation I would be interested 
in. Historians, after all, seem to be too focused on meticulous details, on old 
documents, on dingy places like archives and on re-covering well-trodden 
ground. I was still hoping to be the next Kissinger and I did not believe I had any 
potential for adding anything to the existing historiography. Despite my 
misgivings, he seemed to understand my feelings. Thus, he told me “only 
geniuses are self-taught and do not need any guide... however, I never met one 
in my whole life. Do not hesitate to write me if you need some advice.” I was 
glad of his consideration and encouragement. However, I could not understand 
why this person was treating me with the same devotion with which a doctor 
might attend a dying patient. I couldn’t understand what would motivate this 
kind of humanity and concern for the wellbeing of a junior scholar. Sometime 
later, he explained it to me: “you know, this is just my job and I did it many 
times. It is a matter of professionalism towards students to give them a chance 
and to follow their steps. Someone did it for me, now I do it for you and 
hopefully you will do for the next generation.” 
Basically, he asked me to consider the potential of history and to reflect on 
a research vocation in which every day would hold the possibility of some 
amazing discovery, where every file in an archive might be a treasure trove and 
where every apparent dead end might prove over time to be a new avenue of 
discovery. I was impressed by his description of a career in which I would find 
intellectual challenge and intellectual honesty in equal measure.  Little did I 
realize at the time that from that day, this person would become a mentor for 
me, one with whom I would come to share the enthusiasm, the victories and 
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defeats of the best profession and existence I could ever imagine. As I reach 
the end of this particular journey, I am unable to mention every person who 
has contributed to the end result, although many have done so. 
Thus, in the summer of 2013, my journey learning the basics of the 
methodologies of the historiographer began. I also had to formulate a concrete 
research proposal. I was naively attracted to some ‘charming’ topics, such as 
the Niyazov regime in Turkmenistan, the congress of Baku in 1920 and the saga 
of Mikhail Frunze and Enver Pasha in the early ‘20’s. I explored all these 
possibilities and I discussed them with a very important expert in cold war 
history who communicated his doubts. In his view, most of these themes were 
‘suggestive’ but hardly worthy of an extended research effort. I was 
disappointed by this apparent setback, but his reasons were convincing and the 
criticism was helpful to my intellectual growth. Then he made a suggestion: 
“why not focus on the opaquest period of Soviet history at the end of 
Brezhnevism?” Some months later, my Russian supervisor would 
enthusiastically comment Brezhnevism as a crucial and - for many aspects - 
revelatory period to research on, in order to find the roots of the present post-
Soviet societies. Hence, I posed all this to above mentioned ‘mentor’ in the 
hope he would be able to help me sort through my options. He pondered on 
this quietly at some length and then, looking at his white hairy cat, said: “have 
you have ever heard about the ‘cotton scandal’ in Uzbekistan?” 
His question prompted some vague recollection from my readings about 
inflated cotton data, vicious party purges, mafiya stories and a media 
controversy. Really, I knew very little about that episode but I bade him 
continue: “It was really quite significant”, he told me, “a real Soviet 
‘Tangentopoli’!1 However, there is no specific literature on this issue and I think 
that you might go and do a preliminary search for material in Moscow. Go, and 
let me know what you find. If you find enough primary sources to begin, we can 
think about. Nothing may turn up, of course, but … give it a shot! Believe me, 
you will have fun!” I was a little skeptical about this topic and scared about the 
lack of literature. Where to begin? Some weeks later, I went to discuss this idea 
with the Turinese professor. He was excited and mocked me saying: “Well, it 
                                                          
1 Tangentopoli (Bribesville) is a journalistic term indicating the period of judicial 
investigation into political corruption in Italy during the early the 1990s. David Nelken, 
“A Legal Revolution? The Judges and Tangentopoli,” in The New Italian Republic: From 
the Fall of the Berlin Wall to Berlusconi, ed. Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker (London-
New York: Routledge, 1996). 
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will be an uphill climb; I doubt you will find anything. Anyway, good luck, I want 
to be your first reader.” Then I left his office and went straight to apply for a 
Russian visa. 
So, in November 2013, I set out on my preliminary archival mission. With 
less than a month in various archives I quickly realized that there was 
something there, ‘there’. I returned to Rome and I organized with my IMT 
supervisor a program to collect primary sources in Moscow. After giving me the 
methods of political history, he was enthusiastic about the possibility lying in 
the archives and recounted a sentence that I will never forget: “Being the first 
to lay a hand on some newly declassified material is a great responsibility… and 
this is the dream of every historian... I envy you, onwards to success!” His kind 
way of heartening my research encouraged me to make this leap in the dark.  
Finally, I arrived in Moscow where I spent a year between 2014-2015 to 
collect all sources I could find. At that time, I was based at the HSE where I 
could expand the scope of my research, enriching it with social sciences 
methods and new ideas. On that occasion, I had coordinated my work under 
the advice of a famous Russian scholar specialized in public administration. His 
accurate and friendly way of prompting challenging questions and his 
mathematic attitude warned me of the risks of making axiomatic conclusions. 
Then, he invited me to open new fronts of the research evaluating the 
biographic context and the interpersonal phenomena among the elites. He 
affirmed: “well, to understand the dynamics of the purges one must evaluate 
not simply the top of the bureaucratic organization but also - and perhaps 
mostly - its lower levels. This is where the clearest answers are to be found.” 
From that helpful moment, I kept extending the base of my research and its 
ambitions.  
Hence, in 2014-2015, I also spent time in Russia, Uzbekistan, USA and 
Europe to extend as much as possible the horizons of the research and to 
collect newly declassified unpublished sources and to conduct oral history. The 
more time I spent in Moscow/Tashkent, the more it became possible to find 
new sources, and to explore new themes. Most importantly of all, this wide 
ranging research gave me the horizons to extend one famous case of 
corruption into a story tracking the consolidation and the crisis of Soviet order 
in Uzbekistan as well as the emergence of an anti-Soviet national myth when 
Uzbekistan finally became independent in 1991. This process, in many respects, 
is still ongoing. 
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PREFACE 
 
Ҳар бир халкга тарих керак ва ҳар бир 
тарихга ҳужжат керак - ЎзРМДА2 
 
Synopsis and Research Questions 
This research – entitled “The crisis of Soviet power in Central Asia: The 
'Uzbek cotton affair', 1975-1991” – aims at reconstructing and interpreting the 
final phases of Soviet political history and its effects in Uzbekistan. To this end, 
the reconstruction of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ – a judicial and political case 
linking the falsification of cotton production data and corruption that involved 
thousands of party and state officials in the republic – is something of a case 
study in evaluating Moscow’s grip on the ‘periphery’ of its empire. This case 
tracks the life story of Uzbekistan from its consolidation as a Soviet republic, 
through crisis and ultimately its transition into an independent state. Thus, we 
can identify ‘the Uzbek cotton affair’ as a critical3 reason for the 
transformations within republican political society.4 At the same time, it can be 
read as a symptom of a greater incurable disease within the whole Soviet Union 
itself, a system that collapsed when this kind of top-down hierarchical order – 
led by ideology, elite politics, social forces and interest groups and even 
administrators and bureaucrats5 –  cracked down.  
                                                          
2 "Every people needs a history and every history needs a document." This sentence was 
reported on a banner in the Tashkent based archive TsGARUz.  
3 In its German-tradition connotation, the term crisis can be intended as a challenging 
moment of transformation, implying positive and negative implications. Melvin Richter 
and Michaela W. Richter, “Introduction: Translation of Reinhart Koselleck’s ‘Krise,’ in 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2 (2006): 343–56. 
4 This case is useful to interpret the Soviet history of Uzbekistan; but it is a marginal 
issue in the whole USSR where the systemic crisis was determined in terms of relations 
among the elites, the administration, the economic system and cultural patterns. 
5 Steven Solnick proposes a theory that even considers the role of bureaucrats and 
administrators in a “neo-institutional” approach. Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State, 
Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (London & Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
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This dissertation is divided in three parts with a total of seven chapters. The 
first part is introductory and aims to contextualize the Uzbek ‘periphery’ within 
the Soviet state, at both the political and at socio-economic level. In the first 
chapter, I introduce the political features that determined the consolidation of 
Soviet power in the UzSSR. After the formation of Uzbekistan, the Stalinist 
terror and the destalinization transition, the Soviet leadership transitioned to 
a peaceful, decentralized and tolerant pattern of control over the farthest 
regions of the USSR. During the 70s, the Moscow leadership and the republican 
party cadres built a patrimonial system that relied on local figures who could 
ensure loyalty to the central state. This led to the creation of autonomous 
client networks inside the republic and the mediation of the FS CPUz between 
Moscow and the national elites. This approach was particularly evident during 
the long ‘reign’ of the FS CPUz Sharaf Rashidov (1959-1983), a controversial 
figure at the center of the Cold War who – as we will see in the second chapter 
– turned Uzbekistan into a ‘cotton republic.’ In fact, the UzSSR became the 
main supplier of ‘white gold’ and from the ‘60s it essentially doubled down on 
cotton monoculture as a strategic task for ‘building communism’: for the tenth 
FYP (1976-1981), Soviet planners demanded an annual production of six million 
tons of raw cotton from Tashkent and reaching this target at any cost became 
a matter of political stability and legitimacy for the Uzbek ruling elite. 
The second part is argumentative and focuses on the three phases of the 
‘Uzbek cotton affair.’ Hence, the third chapter analyzes the context of the 
second economy in the USSR and the features related to corruption and 
falsification of cotton production data in Uzbekistan. The rise of Andropov and 
his ‘moralization campaign’ would see an attempt to legalize, cleanse and – 
ultimately – revitalize a system in which stagnation and fraud had reached 
unprecedented levels. In 1983, the so called ‘Bukhara affair’ exposed the level 
of ‘official corruption’ and overwhelmed the higher echelons of the party and 
state of the UzSSR. Nevertheless, this ‘silent phase’ – characterized by 
preliminary inquiries, the preservation of power structures in Uzbekistan and 
general institutional silence – culminated in the death of Rashidov, the 
subsequent struggle among local elites and a nominal transformation of the 
patrimonial system. Thus, in the fourth chapter we analyze the ‘systemic 
phase’ of the Uzbek affair (1984-1985), when Moscow’s moralizing campaign 
was extended during the XVI plenum CPUz to map on to discord within the 
national party elites, the donos (complaints) wars and the internal struggles 
within the bureaucracy in post-Rashidovian Uzbekistan. The fifth chapter 
analyzes Moscow’s subsequent ‘trusteeship’ over the republic, reflected in the 
IX 
 
‘krasnyi desant’ campaign endorsed by the CC CPSU, the derashidovization 
crusade, and the zenith of internal struggles in the wake of the ouster of the FS 
CPUz Usmankhodzhaev and his replacement with the Moscow loyalist 
Nishanov who attempted and failed to destroy local patrimonial networks. 
Third and final part is aimed at evaluating the results of the Uzbek cotton 
affair in the center and in the periphery, and see if this story became a factor 
determining the collapse of the Soviet system as in Moscow as in Tashkent. The 
sixth chapter focuses on the investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov who became a 
symbol of the prosecution of the ‘big fish’ and alleged prominent members of 
the CC CPSU – and even Gorbachev – of being in collusion with the ‘Uzbek 
mafiya.’ The case, the related media circus and the political campaign of the 
two radical mavericks threatened the credibility of Gorbachev and the 
legitimacy of the CPSU, the state and its survival in a time of serious changes 
and great internal challenges. Democrats and the inner opposition to the 
Gensek in the CPSU exploited the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’, and the whole case 
became a symptom of the collapsing system. The seventh chapter deals with 
the myth-building of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ in early Karimov’s Uzbekistan, 
where the story was narrated using critical discourse – such as ‘colonial,’ 
‘purge,’ ‘terror,’ ‘new 1937,’ and even ‘genocide’ – in a Republic that had once 
been considered one of the most loyal within the Soviet system. Thus, the 
‘Uzbek affair’ became a crucial event of Karimov’s ‘ideological shift’ from 
communism to Mustaqillik – the ideology based on the values of the Uzbek 
independence – and a sensitive identity issue of revenge/resistance against the 
former rulers, investing in a post-colonial trauma that contributed to legitimize 
the president’s regime and his relations with local power networks.  
Thus, dealing with recent Soviet times still represents a great challenge for 
contemporary historiography. The last decades of USSR history are still 
debated, defining a period that needs more work still to understand the 
characteristics, the limits and the contradictions that led to the end of the 
Soviet system. In that sense my primary goal in reconstructing these crucial and 
still obscure events here has been historiographical and it is intended at using 
primary unpublished sources, literature and oral history to uncover opaque 
aspects of the past. Relatedly, this research aims at offering a non-centrally 
oriented historiographical reconstruction of the final decades of the Soviet 
system, analyzing the evolutions of patrimonialism in USSR and the impact of 
perestroika, the dynamics of the purges and the symptoms of the collapse in 
the periphery of the empire in order to fill a gap that has been well described 
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by Laruelle when she affirmed that “research on perestroika in Central Asia is 
[…] practically nonexistent.”6 
Furthermore, this research aims to recompose the framework of the ‘Uzbek 
cotton affair’ beyond its existence as a ‘simplistic label’ created by the media 
and too often related to the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ only. Nevertheless, the case 
proceeded at different levels involving the party, prokuratura, MVD, KGB and 
soviets at the local and even at the central level, while only a part of the 
corruption and the other ‘negative phenomena’ revealed in the republic were 
related to cotton and a great part of the involved officials were not Uzbeks. 
Finally, this research aims at interpreting the last decades of Soviet history 
through a new interpretative key to understand how collapse-symptoms that 
had been exploited in Moscow and in Tashkent in order to avow the split from 
the USSR.  
Methodology 
Studying a one-party system implies the inevitable evaluation of the role of 
the Communist party in events. Thus, it is useful to proceed through the tools 
of political history, “leaving out the independent relevance of ideologies, 
languages and mental worlds that guide humans in the interpretation of 
material reality.”7 To this end, we must consider the party’s political discourse, 
ideology, doctrine, and policy as key enablers of a “public space” that, in a 
context of deprivation of liberty, constituted a political system8 ‘from above.’ 
The transition “from the history of the parties to the history of the political 
space” – which reconnects the three analytical areas of “geographical 
dimension of politics,” “permanent political conflicts,” and “the changing 
relevance of the subjects acting in the political arena”9 – is worthless in the 
Soviet context. In fact, all these dimensions are found within the same entity  – 
                                                          
6 Marlène Laruelle, “What We Have (Not) Learned about Twentieth-Century Central 
Asian History,” Demokratizatsiya 20, no. 3 (2012): 222. 
7 Giovanni Orsina, “Il Dito E La Luna. Politica, Cultura E Società Nella Storiografia Inglese 
Degli Anni Novanta,” in Fare Storia Politica. Il Problema Dello Spazio Pubblico Nell’età 
Contemporanea, ed. Giovanni Orsina (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2000), 116. 
8 Ibid., 163.  
9 Gaetano Quagliariello, “La Storia Dei Partiti Politici Nella Contemporaneistica Italiana 
Del Secondo Dopoguerra,” in Fare Storia Politica. Il Problema Dello Spazio Pubblico 
Nell’età Contemporanea, ed. Giovanni Orsina (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2000), 
112. 
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the CPSU. Therefore, this political history must have the party as its main 
protagonist becoming the narrative device we use to introduce such a complex 
phenomenon. However, party events are not one-dimensional facts and it will 
be necessary to consider elements of economic, social and cultural history as a 
fundamental – albeit indirect – part of this story. 
To proceed with scientific historiographical research about this topic, it was 
necessary to collect (mostly unpublished) materials abroad. As mentioned, I 
spent over two years in archives and libraries in Russia, Uzbekistan, Denmark 
and the United States. Contrary to what is typically pursued to make a national 
historiography, this research led to additional difficulties regarding the subject. 
In fact, this topic is still very sensitive in Uzbekistan where the last decades of 
Soviet history were characterized by judicial and political persecutions against 
a socioeconomic (and political) elite that was then restored and to some extent 
rules the country to this very day. Thus, even considering its illiberal regime, 
primary sources related to this investigation in Uzbekistan are still classified – 
as are many other political issues after the ‘30s – and most of the relevant 
documents are contained in the inaccessible APRUz and O'zROSJA archives. 
Meanwhile, during a visiting to Tashkent in spring 2015, it was possible for me, 
after a very long procedure, to access the collection of the TsGARUz where I 
found documents of the SM UzSSR.10 In parallel, in Uzbekistan I could evaluate 
the contemporary memory and historiography in those rare publications 
available in NLU and FATi or in the MMVR. Conducing oral history in Uzbekistan 
was made very difficult by the fact of the non-liberal regime, where even 
common people typically refrain from talking about political issues or against 
those cadres that are still in charge. 
The best solution to define this research was therefore in the former 
imperial center11 where such a sensitive case could be carefully approached. 
Considering the common ‘difficulties’ involved in contemporary historical 
research, I was implementing this task in Moscow – where I spent two visiting 
research periods in May-December 2014 and September-December 2015 – 
using all the available sources for a historiographical reconstruction. In fact, the 
                                                          
10 Since 1987, the TsGARUz fond related to SM UzSSR does not contain the justice 
department documents. 
11 It is also necessary to keep in mind the shape of the former Soviet system, a hyper-
centralized structure that was ruling peripheries from above and by the center: in facts, 
most of Soviet official sources are still living in Russia (especially in Moscow) and a 
relevant part of materials is available and declassified. 
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research has been structured on three main pillars: primary, secondary and 
tertiary sources. 
For primary sources, I mainly drew on materials available in the Russian 
archives, such as the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) that keeps 
valuable information in the form of state administration documents and where 
is possible to find political papers and information in attachments.12 Another 
important archive is RGANI that collects the CC CPSU materials since 1953 and 
where is it possible to find political materials in f. 1 (CPSU Congress materials), 
2 (CPSU Plenum materials), 5 (CC CPSU Commission for Agriculture Affairs) and 
89 (mixed materials until 1991). Unfortunately, most declassified material 
reaches only 1964. Indeed, working on the Brezhnev period (and the late Soviet 
period in general), requires patience and time to find good documents among 
those few declassified materials. Up to 1984, fond 5 is partially declassified in 
its Central Asian, agriculture and propaganda sections. The f. 89 is crucial for 
its collection of interesting miscellaneous political files mostly from the period 
1985-1991. Since 2013, RGANI even started to open personal fonds of those 
key figures of the ‘70s and ‘80s – such as Brezhnev (f. 80), Suslov (f. 81), 
Andropov (f. 82) and Chernenko (f. 83) – that are partially declassified and 
where it is possible to find personal correspondence of these leaders, their 
notes and communications to the CC CPSU organs and notes about their 
personal activities. 
Against all expectations, the best party sources were in RGASPI, an archive 
that mostly collects political documents of the comintern, cominform and CC 
CPSU up to 1953. Nevertheless, this archive contains some excellent 
‘exceptions’ to the chronological order: its f. 71 contains the materials of the 
ideological departments associated to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and 
its regional branches. Also f. 653 (personal fond “N.I. Ryzhkov”) contains 
extensive documents related to the former chairman of the SM USSR (1985-
1991). Above all, f. 17 keeps materials of the ‘CC CPSU organizational 
department – information office’, containing the reports from local parties and 
surprisingly protocols from republican parties (such as the CPUz), oblasts and 
also, on the occasion of party congresses, raikom and gorkom (for the years 
1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991). Every inventory (opis) of f. 17 is structured in 
                                                          
12 GARF keeps a variety of information about the CC CPUz and the UzSSR in fonds: Р-
5446 (SM USSR), Р-7523 (SS USSR), Р-8131 (Prokuratura USSR), Р-9492 (MJ USSR), Р-
9527 (PCC), Р-9654 (CPDSU) and even in the fonds 10115, 10147, A-259, A-260, A-358, 
Р-4459, Р-5674, Р-7522, Р-7676, Р-8009, Р-8300, Р-9474, Р-9501, Р-9606. 
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two volumes, one dedicated to the RSFSR and the second to the other 
Republics. In every opis thousands of dela are listed and no description of 
material. Therefore, working on this fond required time and patience, because 
protocols had to be checked one by one. Apart from the very interesting 
plenums and congresses, 90% of these protocols were just ‘empty’ 
bureaucratic papers, that nonetheless occasionally contained small treasures – 
such as the buro, secretariats, special commissions debates’ transcripts 
(stenogrammy). Unfortunately, f. 17 is no longer accessible; since August 2015 
it has been officially “na ekspertisu” (under examination). I had the occasion to 
work intensively on the 1983-1991 period, meanwhile I could just take a quick 
look at the period 1975-1982. Technical data and official production indexes 
were found in the RGAE; while in the Gorbachev Fond (GF) there were few 
materials among those memoirs and notes of Mikhail Gorbachev, and minutes 
taken during the politburo session of CC CPSU (1985-1991) by Anatoly 
Chernyaev, Vadim Medvedev, Georgy Shakhnazarov in the period 1985-1991. 
A part of these materials has been published in a volume,13 while the other five 
parts are still waiting for publication and were not accessible for consultation. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to work in the APRF since special permits 
and a legitimate and motivated interest are required to gain access. 
For secondary sources, I considered all the accessible publications14 in 
English, Russian, Uzbek, French and Italian. Unfortunately, there is no scientific 
historiography, and the available literature is very biased. However, the 
memoirs and the journalistic accounts provide chronological reconstruction 
and can be considered as sources of information. Other important sources are 
newspapers, journals and periodicals15 from the Soviet era in order to 
                                                          
13 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS... (Moskva: Gorbachev Fond, 2008). 
14 On the topic, there is a limited literature in English, while there are dozens of 
interesting books in Russian and Uzbek languages, that I have mostly collected in RSL 
and SPHLR in Moscow, NLU in Tashkent, AUL in Aarhus, Harry Elkins Widener Memorial 
Library, Grossman Library, Pusey Library in Harvard, Library of Congress and Gelman 
Library in Washington DC, Biblioteca di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea and 
Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome. 
15 The mainly interesting newspapers in which I found hundreds of interesting articles 
for the period 1983-1991 were: Argumenty i Fakty, Bakinskiy Rabochiy, Delovoy Mir, 
Ekonomika i Zhizn,' Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Ekho Litvy, Ekspress Kronika, Izvestiya, 
Inzhenernaya Gazeta, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Knizhnoye Obozreniye, Kommersant, 
Kommunist, Kommunist Tadzhikistana, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, Leningradskaya 
Pravda, Lesnaya Promyshlennost', Literaturnaya Gazeta, Narodnoye Slovo, 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moskovskie Novosti, Pravda, Pravda Vostoka, Pravda Ukrainy, 
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reconstruct the events and their evolution even if they are often lacking 
analytical substance or extensive quantities of data. 
For tertiary sources, I consulted all the available published memoirs of 
Soviet leaders, online materials – such as commentaries and published 
interviews – oral history (from the main living witnesses) and personal 
interviews. Trying to get in touch with these personalities was one of the 
hardest tasks in this research. First, I had to search for published interviews – 
even online – and publications to find contact details. Then, I wrote to the 
editors publishing the interviews and in around 30 per cent of cases I was 
successful in locating my target interviewee. I had the occasion to contact some 
of them directly and personally by phone (as with Gdlyan, Ivanov, Sboev).  
On a couple of occasions, fate played a hand and I simply stumbled upon 
them (Gorbachev in GF in December 2013 and Ryzhkov at an exhibition in 
RGASPI in December 2014). In Uzbekistan, it was useful to draw on informal 
connections – through scholars, members of FATi, or other institutions – for 
introductions and first contacts with the people to interview. Anyway, it was 
then important to establish a basic level of trust and confidence to proceed 
with questions. Interviews were important because they provided an 
important point of view and a direct testimony of the events. Unfortunately, 
these sources are, obviously, extremely biased, inaccurate and often do not go 
beyond those official versions that were already confirmed in their previous 
memoirs and statements.  
The complexity, the diversity and the reliability of these sources, need to 
be analyzed in terms several methodological problems. In fact, dealing with 
late Soviet history is a difficult task and I had to critically analyze all the 
collected sources. For this task, I could use the Graziosi’s critical method16 that 
analyzes the problems related to archival materials in Russia and identified 
three main critical fields. 
                                                          
Rabochaya Tribuna, Sel'skaya Molodezh, Sel'skaya Zhizn', Smena, Sovetskaya 
Belorussiya, Sovetskaya Kirgiziya, Sovetskaya Kul'tura, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Sovetskaya 
Torgovlya, Sovetskaya Estoniya, Sotsial'naya Industriya, Trud, Turkmenistanskaya 
Iskrai; and all the available Uzbek local press as Ishonch, Komsomolets Uzbekistana, 
Sovet O’zbekiston, Tashkenskaya Pravda, Qishloqhaqiqati, Yosh leninchi, Positsiya, 
Dialog Narod I Demokratsiya etc. In Uzbekistan, it was seriously dangerous to search for 
the opposition publications of Birlik, Erk, Erkin yosh and Tumaris. 
16 Andrea Graziosi, “The New Soviet Archival Sources,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe : Russie, 
Empire Russe, Union Soviétique, États Indépendants 40, no. 1–2 (1999): 13–63. 
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First, I had to deal with the problem of the lacunae of sources. 
Unfortunately, there is no possibility to get any political document after the 
coup of August 1991 and it is still hard to get most material from the CPSU 
Politburo of the perestroika years. Then, I had to critically compensate for 
these lacunae using all the other available sources. Further, it was hard to face 
the problem of “legendary documents” that would confirm or dispel some 
mythical events (such as something proving Rashidov’s murder or suicide) or 
to reconstruct the kind of informal episodes that had not been documented or 
that the regime tried not to report. Quite often, I had also to deal with those 
common “official lacunae,”, when I was critically reviewing formal information 
covering other facts not reported or presenting another truth to the public. In 
these cases, it was important to confront the information (and even the 
speeches) matching newspapers, party material and transcripts and using 
analytically the testimonies and memoirs of those people who were acting in 
that period. 
The second field of problems I had to face relates to biases. The ideological 
biases are a hard trouble, because I had always to keep in mind that I was 
reading something that was typically the output of an intentional distortion of 
reality. In a totalitarian system such as the Soviet one, “official lies” were 
common instruments to cover the truth and where – unfortunately - were 
often the only available resources. Furthermore, the hyper ideologization of its 
structures led to serious misinterpretations of the reality. Just to give one 
example, in June 1989, after the clashes in Fergana valley, the KGB was 
seriously convinced that these manifestations were solely due to “bandits and 
hooligans”, ignoring the ethnic tension among the communities. Then, I had 
always to consider that I was reading about a season of political struggle, 
ideological shifts and the moralistic ridiculing of public figures as caricatures, 
where words, concepts and interpretations were intentionally exaggerated, 
reduced and distorted (such as the idea of ‘godfathers’ or ‘Uzbek genocide”).  
In this field of ideological biases, I also had to be careful when considering 
‘Solzhenitsyn’s surprises’, those situations when we spend our time, searching 
among the papers, for non-existent ‘conspiracy truths’ that are the results of 
other counter-biases. The second family of biases is related to the ‘nature of 
the compiler’ and to the bureaucracy’s characteristics, interests and the 
cultures of the redactors of those documents. For example, Uzbek society had 
a strong Muslim tradition (deeply compromised during the Soviet experience), 
but I should not to be surprised that in Uzbek documents, even if there were 
several references to Uzbek culture and society (as the makhalla), there was 
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never a cultural reference related to Islamic values. This kind of attitude is clear 
if we follow the ideological developments of the Republic, and its official 
rhetoric from Soviet communism to Independence (Mustaqillik). These 
bureaucratic biases were influential also considering the different legal 
framework to describe the same events. For example, to describe these 
criminal cases, KGB referred to “theft of socialist property”, while the 
Prokuratura and ministry of justice were using the terms ‘additions’ and 
‘falsification,’ and the political organs were just commenting on ‘negative 
phenomena.’ Even those social structures based on patronage and kinship that 
had been discovered in Uzbekistan are described with different terms. Soviet 
authorities were describing them as ‘clans,’ while Uzbeks elite defined these as 
‘loyalties/trustees’ and the journalists and political actors (such as Gdlyan in his 
first books) with the popular word ‘mafiya.’  
The third family of biases deals with the economic and other data. Thinking 
about this falsification case that presents a huge mass of fake/corrupted data 
– sometimes even overlapping or contradictory – we must analyze critically the 
information we have, understanding who produced it, when and to whom it 
was referred. Another problem is related to the value of some quantitative 
data. For example, is it necessary to understand the value of money in the 
USSR, a non-market system where it was not always possible to buy 
consumption goods, but where money was paradoxically a matter of social 
status. Thus, dealing with the USSR can be tricky using the market efficiency 
perspective. It was very interesting to see how the final price of cotton was 
determined, without knowing anything about its production costs, which does 
not permit us to evaluate that system as a loss or a surplus. More reliable and 
very interesting are the demographic data that, during the whole Soviet 
experience, had been extensively reported to the party and the state 
apparatuses. Related to the “Uzbek affair” – the result of a huge falsification 
and hidden system that last until 1984 in the party and state apparatuses – it 
is evident that I had to read and compare the data before and after the 
moralization campaign as the cause and the consequence of this case.  
The third field of critical analysis of sources is related to the limited 
individual dimension in the USSR. Considering the nature of the Soviet system, 
this means that there is a general lack of private – of, from and about people – 
sources and materials because most of the information is institutional-
bureaucratic in nature. In the former Soviet Union, there was a general lack of 
private archives, such as those ones of unions, civil society organizations, 
religious associations etc. that we find in abundance in the Western world. 
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However, during the perestroika transformation, Soviet society started to 
experience “civil society” initiatives. From this period on, then, I could find 
many interesting letters, petitions, complaints and demands containing 
interesting information and interpreting the people’s feelings. However, all this 
material coming from people had to be critically evaluated. It was interesting 
to weigh the anonymous letters often biased and full of strongly defamatory 
tones – denouncing presumed sex scandals, drug addictions, luxury lifestyles 
and other ‘immoralities’ – which were symptomatic of the morality campaigns 
and the political struggle within the party and the state in the last decade of 
the USSR. 
To face these historiographical troubles, I had to find several remedies 
related to general critical consciousness, that should always contextualize the 
sources and the facts and has to consider biases and point of views of the 
documents’ compilers. Matching information and proceeding with a cross-
evaluation among bureaucracies and witnesses was a useful way to find a 
conclusion that confirms, denies, or evaluates those facts. 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND EXPRESSIONS 
 
ACP(B)  All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - Всесоюзная 
Коммунистическая Партия (Большевиков) ВКП(б) - was the 
name of CPSU before 1952 
AN Academy of Sciences (Akademia Nauk, in Russian Академия 
Наук) 
APRF Archive of the President of the Russian Federation - Архив 
Президента Российской Федерации (АПРФ), Moscow, Russia 
APRUz  Archive of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan - Архив 
Президента Республики Узбекистан (АПРУз), Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan 
ASSR  Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union 
(Russian: Автономная Советская Социалистическая 
Республика, АССР) 
Arik Small canal 
Avlod Uzbek word translatable as ‘clan’ 
AUL Aarhus University Library, Aarhus, Denmark 
Blat  Practice of informal exchange/procurement of favors 
Buro Bureau 
CC CPSU  Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Центральный комитет Коммунистиической партии 
Советского Союза – ЦК КПСС 
CC CPUz  Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, in 
Russian: Центральный комитет Коммунистиической партии 
Узбекистана – ЦК КПУз, in Uzbek: Oʻzbekiston KomparƟyasi 
Markaziy Qo'mitasi 
Chistka  Purge (in Russian Чистка) 
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Cominform  Communist Information Bureau  
Comintern  the international communist organization called “Communist 
International” or the “Third International” (1919-1943) 
CPC Committee of Party Control (in Russian: Комитет партийного 
контроля) 
CPDSU Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union (Съезд 
народных депутатов СССР), the highest body of state authority 
of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991. 
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Коммунистическая 
партия Советского Союза, КПСС 
CPUz Communist Party of Uzbekistan; in Russian: Коммунистическая 
партия Узбекистана (КПУз); in Uzbek: Oʻzbekiston 
Kommunistik Partiyasi (OʻzKP) 
CSD Central Statistical Directorate (Russian: Центральное 
статистическое управление - ЦСУ) 
d. delo (дело), archival file 
Dessiatina Russian measure of land, roughly 1.1 hectares 
Donos Complaint 
FATi Institute of History of Academy of Sciences of Republic of 
Uzbekistan - Tarix instituti O'zbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar 
Akademiyasi, Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
f. fond (фонд), archival fond 
FS First Secretary (in Russian: Первый секретарь) 
FYP Five-Year Plan (in Russian: Пятилетний План) 
GARF State Archive of the Russian Federation - Государственный 
архив Российской Федерации (ГАРФ), Moscow, Russia 
Genprokuror Prosecutor General of USSR, the attorney general who headed 
the system of official prosecution (Prokuratura) in courts 
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Gensek General Secretary of the CPSU, in Russian Генеральный 
секретарь (Генсек) 
GF Gorbachev Fond, Moscow, Russia 
GKChP State Committee on the State of Emergency. Государственный 
комитет по чрезвычайному положению, ГКЧП 
Gorispolkom  Executive committee of city soviet - городской 
исполнительный комитет 
Gorkom City communist party committee 
Gorpromtorg office of the municipal industrial trade (Горпромторг) 
Goskhoz Specialized sovkhoz for seed-growing and cattlebreeding 
Goskomtsen State Committee on Prices (Russian: Государственный комитет 
цен при Совете Министров СССР - Госкомцен) 
Gosplan State Planning Committee, (in Russian: Государственный 
комитет по планированию - Госплан) 
GSE The Great Soviet Encyclopedia 
Ishan Title given to the leader of a local Sufi group 
Khlopkorob Cotton grower 
KM Cabinet of Ministers, Kabinet Ministrov 
Kolkhoz Collective farm 
Komsomol All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Russian: 
Всесоюзный ленинский коммунисти́ческий сою́з молодёжи 
- ВЛКСМ) 
Korenizatsiya “Nativization/indigenization” policy: “korenization” 
Krasnij desant Red troopers, referred to russification of the local party and the 
administration 
Khlopkarob Cotton grower (хлопкароб), to not confuse with the pun 
khlopkarab (хлопкараб) that means Cotton slave 
Krugovaya poruka  mutual protection 
L. list (лист), archival sheet 
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Makhalla Uzbek quarter, neighborhood 
Mafiya Mafia 
MCC Ministry of Cotton Cleaning industry, Министерство 
хлопкоочистительной промышленности 
MID Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Министерство Иностранных Дел 
MJ Ministry of Justice, in Russian: Министерство юстиции 
Millat The urban Muslim community 
Mestnichestvo localism 
MMVR Museum of “Memory of Victims of Repression” - “Qatag'on 
qurbonlari xotirasi” muzeyi, Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs, Министерство Внутренних Дел 
Mustaqillik Independence (in Uzbek) 
ND People’s Deputy, member of CPDSU 
Nomenklatura  Soviet-era elite linked to party appointment system 
Nachalnik Bureaucratic superintendent 
NLU National Library of Uzbekistan named after Alisher Navoi - 
Alisher Navoiy Nomidagi O‘Zbekiston Milliy Kutubxonasi, 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
NSA National Security Archive, Washington DC, USA 
Oblispolkom Executive committee of oblast (regional) soviet - Областной 
Исполнительный Комитет 
OBKhSS Agency for fighting the theft of socialist property and 
speculation. In Russian: Отдел по Борьбе с Хичениями 
Социалистической собственности и Спекуляцией (ОБХСС) 
Obkom regional (oblast) communist party committee 
Okrug territorial circumscription 
op. opis (опись), archival inventory 
OrgOtdel Secretariat's Organization and Instruction Department, in 
Russian: Организационный отдел (Орготдел) 
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O'zROSJA  Archive of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan - 
O'zbekiston Respublikasi Oliy Sudi Joriy Arkhivi, Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan 
O'zSE The Uzbek Soviet encyclopedia (in Uzbek: O'zbek Sovet 
Entsiklopediyasi) 
PCC People's Control Committee (in Russian: Комитет народного 
контроля) 
Pokrovitel’stv Patronal protection (Покровительств) 
Prokuratura Procuracy 
Pripiska Distortion of the data (in Russian: приписка) 
PV Pravda Vostoka was the main newspaper of the UzSSR and 
official organ of CC CPUz, Supreme Soviet UzSSR and Soviet 
Ministrov UzSSR. 
Qawm  The tribal community 
Raikom district (raion) communist party committee 
Raispolkom  Executive committee of raion (district) soviet - Районной 
Исполнительный Комитет 
RAPO District Agro-industrial Unit 
RGAE Russian Government Archive of Economic History - Российский 
государственный архив экономики (РГАЭ), Moscow, Russia 
RGANI Russian State Archive of Contemporary History - Российский 
государственный архив новейшей истории (РГАНИ), 
Moscow, Russia 
RGASPI Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History - Российский 
государственный архив социально-политической истории 
(РГАСПИ), Moscow, Russia 
Rodstva Kinship 
Rodstvenniki Relatives or/and people from the same place 
RoU Republic of Uzbekistan 
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RSFSR  Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian: 
Российская Советская Федеративная Социалистическая 
Республика) 
RSL  Russian State Library - Российская государственная 
библиотека, Moscow, Russia 
SC Supreme Court, in Russian: Верховный суд 
Semeistvennost’ Nepotism 
Shefstvo Informal use of armed forces in the civil administration and 
productive system. 
Sharafrashidovshina derogatory expression used as a synonym for nepotism, 
corruption, clientelism, self-celebration, etc. meant to say “at 
the Sharaf Rashidov's way” (in Russian: Шарафрашидовщина) 
SM Soviet Ministrov, Council of Ministers 
SN Soviet of Nationalities, the lower chamber of the SS USSR 
Sovkhoz State-owned farm 
Sovnarkhoz  Regional Economic Soviet, Совет Народного Хозяйства 
(Совнархоз), literally Soviet of National Economy 
SPHLR  State Public Historical Library of Russia - Государственная 
Публичная Историческая Библиотека России, Moscow, Russia 
SS Supreme Soviet, in Russian: Верховный Совет 
SSR  Soviet Socialist Republic, in Russian: Советская 
Социалистическая Республика 
TaASSR Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, in Russian: 
Таджикская Автономная Социалистическая Советская 
Республика 
TaSSR Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, in Russian: Таджикская 
Советская Социалистическая Республика, in Tajik: 
Республикаи Советии Социалистии Тоҷикистон 
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Tolkach Pusher, middleman – now, these figures are mainly known as 
‘reshala’ (resolvers) 
TsGARUz Central State Archive of the Republic of Uzbekistan - 
Центральный Государственный Архив Республики 
Узбекистан (ЦГАРУз), Tashkent, Uzbekistan 
Tufta/tukhta Falsification of work results 
Turkvodkhoz Turkestan Board of Water Management 
TuSSR Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic, in Russian: Туркменская 
Советская Социалистическая Республика, in Turkmen: 
Türkmenistan Sowet Sotsialistik Respublikasy 
Urugh clan, descent group (in Uzbek) 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in Russian: Союз Советских 
Социалистических Республик (СССР) 
UVD Internal Affairs Directorate, local police command. In Russian: 
Управление Внутренних Дел (УВД) 
UzSSR  Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, in Russian: Узбекская 
Советская Социалистическая Республика (УзССР), in Uzbek: 
O`zbekiston Sovet Sotsialistik Respublikasi (O`zSSR) 
VBA Vladimir Bukovsky Archive 
Verst Russian unit of length, roughly 1066.8 meters 
VSNKh  Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (Высший Совет 
Народного Хозяйства, ВСНХ) 
Vzyatochnik  Bribetaker 
Zastoya Stagnation 
Zemlyachestvo Friendly society of people united by belonging to the same place 
of origin 
Zindan Persian word for "prison" or "dungeon", used in Russian to 
intend the traditional underground gaols or pits used to 
imprison hostages 
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1 THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET POWER 
IN THE UZSSR 
In this first chapter, it is necessary to introduce some essential points in 
order to contextualize the political history of the UzSSR prior to 1975. The main 
aim is to define a framework that, in spite of the different stages of Soviet 
history, has evolved following some specific trends. In fact, the narrative about 
Soviet rule in Uzbekistan had been characterized by different moments that 
closely correspond to the various phases of Soviet Union history. However, 
there are some specific peculiarities that should be presented in the next 
paragraphs. Hence, we want to understand whether the Soviet system in 
Uzbekistan can be considered a historical continuum, or if it represents an 
evolution of Soviet history. To a large extent, we suppose that the peculiarities 
of rashidovian patrimonialism were not to be found in the cultural framework 
of Uzbek society but rather in the political culture spread during Brezhnevism. 
1.1 Making Uzbekistan: The birth of the UzSSR 
Despite a rooted tradition and a millenary cultural history, a state or a 
nation now known as Uzbekistan never existed before the USSR.1 Until the 
Russian colonial expansions in Central Asia – that were justified through a 
defensive and civilizing mission narrative2 – in the XIX century during the so 
                                                          
1 Cf. Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the 
Present : A Cultural History (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1990). In his recent book Adeeb 
Khalid argues that Uzbekistan emerged in the intersection between Soviet national 
policies and the aspirations of the Central Asian Muslim intelligentsia. Cf. Adeeb Khalid, 
Making Uzbekistan. Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015); Grigol Ubiria, Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia: The Making 
of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations (London & New York: Routledge, 2015). 
2 A memorandum that Aleksander Gorchakov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, 
wrote to his diplomats in November 1864 – when the Central Asian conquest was 
entering its most active phase – stated: "The situation of Russia in Central Asia is similar 
to that of all civilized states that come into contact with half-savage nomadic tribes 
without a firm social organization. In such cases, the interests of border security and 
trade relations always require that the more civilized state have a certain authority over 
its neighbors, whose wild and unruly customs render them very troublesome. It begins 
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called ‘Great Game’3, there were three khanates – Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara 
– that ruled their territories and populations autonomously. Due to the Russian 
conquest of Tashkent (1865), Saint Petersburg created a new administrative 
entity called Russian Turkestan, a Governorate-General of the Russian Empire 
that was established in 1867 and comprised mainly the territories of the former 
Kokand Khanate.4 Then in 1873, after a successful military campaign, Russian 
diplomacy was able to formalize protectorates on what remained of the 
Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva-Khorezm.5 These two entities 
preserved a certain degree of independence and were not to be entirely 
submerged under Russian influence until Soviet rule in the ‘20s.6 Thus, the 
                                                          
first by curbing raids and pillaging. To put an end to these, it is often compelled to 
reduce the neighboring tribes to some degree of close subordination. Once this result 
has been achieved, the latter take on more peaceful habits, but in their turn they are 
exposed to the attack of tribes living farther off [...] The state therefore must make a 
choice: either to give up this continuous effort and doom its borders to constant unrest, 
which would make prosperity, safety, and cultural progress impossible here, or else to 
advance farther and farther into the heart of the savage lands, where the vast distances, 
with every step forward, increase the difficulties and hardships it incurs. Such has been 
the fate of all states placed in a similar situation. The USA, France in Africa, Holland in 
its colonies, England in the East Indies—they all were inevitably driven to choose the 
path of onward movement, not so much from ambition as from dire necessity, where 
the greatest difficulty lies in being able to stop." This translation is reported in Claire 
Mouradian, “The Origins of a Colonial Vision of Southern Russia From the Tsars to the 
Soviets: About Some Imperial Practices in the Caucasus,” in Development in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus. Migration, Democratisation and Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. 
S. Hohmann et al. (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 25–26; Andreas Kappeler and 
Alfred Clayton, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (Harlow: Longman, 2001). 
3 Martin Ewans, The Great Game: Britain and Russia in Central Asia (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2004); Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central 
Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1992); Karl Meyer, Tournament of Shadows: 
The Great Game and Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 
1999). 
4 Vladimir Nalivkin, Histoire Du Khanat de Khokand (Paris: E. Leroux, 1889). 
5 Khorezm is the Russian transliteration of Хорезм, the large oasis and historical region 
on the Amu Darya delta. This region has also been known as Khwarezm, Chorasmia, 
Khwarezmia, Khwarizm, Khwarazm, Khoresm, Khorasam, Kharazm, Harezm, Horezm, 
and Chorezm. 
6 N. Abduprakhimova, “Uzbekistan v Sostave Rossijskoj Imperii,” in Ocherki Po Istorii 
Gosudarstvennosti Uzbekistana, ed. D A Alimova and Eȩ V Rtveladze (Tashkent: Shark, 
2001); Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-
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Turkestan Krai became a territory under direct control of the Russian Empire, 
and it was then divided in to five oblasts.7 
1.1.1 The early Soviet Uzbekistan 
The outbreak of the Russian Revolution, the systemic crisis,8 and the civil 
war divided peasants and urban societies,9 colonizers and colonized, during a 
temporary vacuum of authority that lasted until the restoration of Russian 
authority10 throughout a phase that was defined by Marco Buttino as the 
“Revolution upside down.”11 The Bolshevik military campaigns during the 
Russian civil war (1917–1924) and the repression of the Basmachestvo12 barely 
                                                          
1924 (London & New York: Routledge, 2009); Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of 
the Russian Empire (London & New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003). 
7 After 1899, Turkestan was divided in to five oblasts: Syr-Darya Oblast (Capital: 
Tashkent); Fergana Oblast (New Margelan/Skobelev, which was part of the Kokand 
Khanate until 1876); Semirechye Oblast (Verny, which until 1882–1899 was part of the 
Governor-Generalship of the Steppes); Samarkand Oblast (Samarkand - until 1886); 
Zeravsh okrug (in the occupied east territories of the Emirate of Bukhara), and; the 
Transcaspian Oblast (Askhabat, which until 1898 was part of Caucasus Governorate-
General). 
8 Cf. P. Alekseyenkov, “Natsional’naya Politika Vremennogo Pravitel’stva v Turkestane v 
1917 G.,” Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya 8, no. 79 (1928); Marco Buttino, “Study on the 
Economic Crisis and Depopulation in Turkestan 1917—1920,” Central Asian Survey 9, 
no. 4 (1990); Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of 
Crisis, 1914-1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); Hasan Oraltay, “The 
Alash Movement in Turkestan,” Central Asian Survey 2 (1985); Edward Sokol, The Revolt 
of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954). 
9 Andrea Graziosi, La Grande Guerra Contadina in URSS. Bolscevichi E Contadini, 1918-
1933 (Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1998). 
10 Alexander Garland Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957). 
11 Marco Buttino, La Rivoluzione Capovolta. L’Asia Centrale Tra Il Crollo Dell’impero 
Zarista E La Formazione dell’URSS (Napoli: L’Ancora del Mediterraneo, 2003). 
12 The Basmachi revolt against Russian/Soviet rule began in 1917. These groups of 
nationalists, Muslim traditionalists, and “bandits” challenged the Red Army in Central 
Asia, settling primarily in the Ferghana valley and in the Pamir mountains. They 
managed to gain credit for the cause of Pan-Turkism, recalling even the intervention of 
Enver Pasha who died in Central Asia in 1922. At the end of the Russian Civil War, the 
Red Army was able to better regroup and launched a massive military campaign to 
“reconquer” Central Asia. By 1926, the Basmachis had been officially suppressed, 
although the final uprisings were tamed only in 1931. Cf. Stephen Blank, “The Contested 
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restored Russian authority and introduced a Soviet system13 through the 
creation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Republic on 30 April 1918. Then, 
the successful military campaigns of the Red Army led to the annexation of the 
remaining parts of Khiva and Bukhara – reconstituted as the Bukharan SSR and 
the Khorazmian SSR14 – and the proclamation of the Turkestan ASSR on 24 
September 1920. This new entity had a recognized constitutional status within 
the RSFSR, becoming in 1922 part of the USSR. 
                                                          
Terrain: Muslim Political Partecipation in Soviet Turkestan, 1917—19,” Central Asian 
Survey 6, no. 4 (1987); Marie Broxup, “The Basmachi,” Central Asian Survey 2, no. 1 
(1983); Marco Buttino, “Ethnicité et Politique Dans La Guerre Civile: À Propos Du 
Basmacestvo Au Fergana,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe et Soviétique 38, no. 1–2 (1997); 
Joseph-Antoine Castagné, Les Basmatchi: Le Mouvement National Des Indigènes d’Asie 
Centrale Depuis La Révolution d’Octobre 1917 Jusqu’en Octobre 1924 (Paris: Éditions E. 
Leroux, 1925); Helene Aymen de Lageard, “The Revolt of the Basmachi According to Red 
Army Journals (1920—1922),” Central Asian Survey 6, no. 3 (1987); Walter Darnell 
Jacobs, Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz, 1885–1925 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969); 
Richard Lorenz, “Economic Bases of the Basmachi Movement in the Ferghana Valley,” 
in Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and 
Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1994); Alexander Marshall, “Turkfront: Frunze and the 
Development of Soviet Counter-Insurgency in Central Asia,” in Central Asia. Aspects of 
Transition, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003); Martha Brill 
Olcott, “The Basmachi or Freemen’s Revolt in Turkestan, 1918-24,” Soviet Studies 33, 
no. 3 (1981); Hasan Bülent Paksoy, “The Basmachi Movement from within: An Account 
of Zeki Velidi Togan,” Nationalities Papers 23, no. 2 (1995). 
13 Cf. Akmal’ Akramov and Kulmamat Avliyakulov, V.I. Lenin, Turkkomissiya I Ukrepleniye 
Sovetskoy Vlasti v Sredney Azii (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1991); V. Lopukhov and Sh. 
Murayevskiy, “Iz Istorii Kommunisticheskoy Partii Turkestana: Vtoroy Turkestanskiy 
S"yezd RSDRP,” Kommunist. Organ TSK Kompartii Turkestana 7–8 (1922); V.P. 
Nikolaeva, “Turkkomissiya Kak Upolnomochennyy Organ TSK RKP(b),” Voprosy Istorii 
KPSS 2 (1958); Emmanuel Aronovich Voskoboinikov and Aleksandr Izrailevich Zevelev, 
Turkkomissiia VTSIK I Sovnarkoma RSFSR I Turkbiuro TsK RKP(b) v Borඁbe Za Ukreplenie 
Sovetskoi Vlasti v Turkestane : M.V. Frunze, V.V. Kuibyshev, L.M. Kaganovich v 
Turkestane (Tashkent: Gos. izd-vo UzSSR, 1951). 
14 Cf. Glenda Fraser, “Alim Khan and the Fall of the Bokharan Emirate in 1920,” Central 
Asian Survey 7, no. 4 (January 13, 1988): 47–61; Ḫwārizmı ̄ Mūnis, Firdaws Al-Iqbāl : 
History of Khorezm (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999); A.M. Malikov, “The Russian Conquest of the 
Bukharan Emirate: Military and Diplomatic Aspects,” Central Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (May 
27, 2014): 180–98; Svatopluk Soucek, A History of Inner Asia (Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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Following the X Congress of the CPSU in 1921, the Soviet regime 
encouraged the policy of korenizatsiya (nativization) in order to include 
indigenous people in prominent positions in the party, government, 
agriculture, and industry. In fact, Buttino remarks how “the [Soviet] regime 
wanted to prevent posts of power and responsibility from being covered 
exclusively by Russians, so as to avoid an openly colonial position in the 
Republic. Therefore, it had no alternative but to involve the natives.”15 In 
Central Asia, the communist parties had a rural base16 and imposed the 
‘proletarization’ of the cities and the massive collectivization of the rural areas. 
As we will analyze in the second chapter, this ‘ruralization’ proceeded together 
with indigenization: “the result […] was that the social base of the party cadres 
transferred from the town to the countryside [… and] urbanization tended to 
operate mainly in favor of ‘Europeans’.”17 This policy enforced the first 
distinction between a rural community – constituted by natives – and an urban 
society supported by the old and new ‘colonizers’18 from the rest of the 
country. 
Korenizatsiya played a central role in the determination of an Uzbek 
national consciousness. Meanwhile, the Soviet regime repressed and physically 
eliminated a community of native elites – the famous campaign against the so-
called jadids19 in the 1920-30s – replacing them with the first generation of 
                                                          
15 Marco Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi (Rome: Viella, 2015), 
23. 
16 Regarding the rural dimension of CPUz is interesting to note the peasant participation 
within party and state institutions. Alimov offers some interesting figures: "of the total 
number of 58,826 deputies to the local Soviets of Uzbekistan who were elected in March 
1959, nearly 10,000 are workers and about 27,000 are peasants; more than 20,000 are 
women. Of the 444 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Republic, who also 
were elected last March, nearly half are workers or peasants directly engaged in 
production." Arif Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward (London: Soviet 
Booklets, 1960), 24. 
17 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), 103. 
18 Cf. Albert Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
19 The Jadids were part of Turkestan’s native intelligentsia, and like those of the Pan-
Turkist movement, were inspired by nationalist, Islamic, and reformist principles. They 
were gradually ostracized, purged, and physically eliminated by the Soviet regime. Cf. 
Ravshan Madjidovich Abdullaev, Natsionalඁnye PoliƟcheskie Organizatsii Turkestana v 
1917-1918 Gody (Tashkent: Izdatel഻stvo Navro’z, 2014); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, 
Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia (London: Tauris, 
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natives who were directed by Moscow and who could loyally serve the Soviet 
cause. The empowerment of this new indigenous elite implemented a vertical 
relationship with Moscow that was cemented through Marxist–Leninist 
ideology and facilitated by material benefits for the participants. After 1924, 
the implementation of the Soviet “affirmative action”20 policy and the 
endorsement of national consciousness21 led to the creation of national 
republics in order to strengthen the national identity and the role of the titular 
groups within defined borders.22 Therefore, Uzbekistan was so created – 
through the direct intervention of Stalin – with the aim of including those ‘other 
                                                          
1988); Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, Ref́orme et Rev́olution Chez Les Musulmans de 
l’Empire Russe, Bukhara, 1867-1924 (Paris: A. Colin, 1966); Stéphane A. Dudoignon and 
François Georgeon, “Le Réformisme Musulman En Asie Centrale. Du ‘premier 
Renouveau’ À La Soviétisation 1788-1937,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe 37, no. 1–2 
(January–June) (1996); Gero Fedtke, “Jadids, Young Bukharans, Communists and the 
Bukharan Revolution: From an Ideological Debate in the Early Soviet Union,” in Muslim 
Culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the Early 20th Centuries. Vol. 2, Inter-
Regional and Inter-Ethnic Relations, ed. Michael Kemper, Anke von Kügelgen, and Allen 
J Frank (Berlin: Schwarz, 1998); Shoshana Keller, To Moscow, Not Mecca: The Soviet 
Campaign Against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941 (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Adeeb 
Khalid, “Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia: The Transformation of Jadidism, 
1917-1920,” in A State of Nations. Empire and Nation Making in the Age of Lenin and 
Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); 
Adeeb Khalid, “Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan,” Slavic 
Review 55, no. 2 (1996); Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism 
in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Buttino, Samarcanda. 
Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi. 
20 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 
1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 
21 Joseph Stalin, Marksizm I Natsionalඁno-Kolonialඁnyii Vopros: Sbornik Izbrannykh Stateii 
I Rechei (Moskva: Partizdat TsK VKP (b), 1937). 
22 Sergey Abashin et al., “Soviet Rule and the Delineation of Borders in the Ferghana 
Valley,” in Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S Frederick Starr (New York: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2011); Evgenia Grigorevna Belen’kaa, Istoria Uzbekistana. Obrazovanie 
Uzbeckoj SSR Postroenie, Uprochenie I Razvitie Socialisticheskogo Obshestva v 
Uzbekistane : Ukazatel’ Sovetskoj Literatury 1924-1985 Gg. (Tasǩent: Fan, 1987); A.M. 
Bogoutdinov, Istoria Kommunisticheskih Organizacij Srednej Azii (Tasǩent: Uzbekistan, 
1967); Boris Vladimirovich Lunin, Istoria Uzbekistana v Istochnikah (Tasǩent: Fan, 1984); 
Kamilla Vasil’yevna Trever, Aleksandr Jur’evic Yakubovskij, and Maksimilian 
Emmanuilovich Voronets, Istoria Narodov Uzbekistana (Taskent: AN UzSSR, 1950). 
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Turks’ regions that could be considered culturally ‘Uzbek’,23 giving preferential 
treatment to indigenes that "fostered the elevation of local national executives 
officers in newly created national–administrative units."24 Then, on 27 October 
1924, the Turkestan ASSR was partitioned into two SSRs – the UzSSR and the 
TuSSR. Hence, Uzbekistan was thus formally created as a national entity for the 
Uzbek people with the full status of a constituent republic.25 On 13 May 1925 
at the III Congress of Soviets of the USSR, Uzbekistan was officially incorporated 
as a constitutive republic of the Union. Thus, its constitutive status and the 
territorial delimitations were reiterated in the Soviet constitution of 1936.26 
1.1.2 The Uzbek Sovietization 
The UzSSR rapidly became a subject of the sovietization process that, 
through a series of stages, also imposed in this new republic the same forms of 
organization of public and political life, “the same institutional system of 
political rituals, the same official culture, and the same information and 
propaganda.”27 As in many other regions of the former Russian Empire, the 
new Soviet system secularized the traditional costumes and swept away many 
pre–Soviet institutions, thus imposing an infrastructure that fused party and 
state through communist ideology. In 1925 the Communist Party of Uzbekistan 
                                                          
23 The conceptualized territory of Uzbekistan had to include the “Uzbek parts of 
Bukhara”, Fergana, Andijan, Namangan, and Tashkent (formerly part of the Khanate of 
Kokand), and Khorezm (formerly part of the Khivan Khanate). Cf. “Notes of I.V. Stalin 
about Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan” (June 1, 1924) and “On national delimitation of 
Central Asia” (9 October 1924) in RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 467. Karakalpakstan was 
integrated into the UzSSR on December 5, 1936, with the status of an ASSR. 
24 Tetsuro Chida, “‘Trust in Cadres’ and the Party-Based Control in Central Asia during 
the Brejnev Era,” in Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Migration, 
Democratisation and Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. Sophie Hohmann et al. 
(London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 47. 
25 At the same time, the UzSSR was incorporating vast areas that were inhabited by 
ethnic Tajiks who were mainly concentrated in the autonomous republic of TaASSR. On 
5 December 1929, the TaASSR was separated from the UzSSR and upgraded to the 
status of a SSR. However, the UzSSR kept important regions that were densely 
populated by Tajik ethnics, such as Bukhara, Samarkand, and Surkhandarya. Cf. Rahim 
Masovich Masov, Istoria Topornogo Razdelenia (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1991). 
26 Art 26 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution declares: “The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, Ferghana, and Khorezm Regions, and the 
Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”. 
27 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 23. 
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(CPUz) was established as a national branch of the CPSU, becoming the only 
ruling party of the UzSSR.  
Through the party, Moscow was able to maintain effective and precise 
control on the peripheries of the state through the selection of party leaders 
and by directing the cadre machine to select trustees with an acute sense of 
the internal balances of power among Uzbek social groups.28 The party was 
prominent in the system - more politically powerful than the state apparatus - 
and deeply rooted at each administrative level. Hence, it had a republican base 
that was even locally branched in obkoms, gorkoms, raikoms, kolkhozes and 
villages, creating a vertical, hierarchical structure.29 Every territorial branch was 
territorially organized into subunits: its main core organ was the Central 
Committee (CC) of the CPUz, while below there was a network of local 
committees that reached and connected all parts of the country. At each 
                                                          
28 In fact, Moscow was able to directly choose its trustees reflecting the balance of 
power among Uzbek territorial clans: Akmal Ikramovich Ikramov, (from Tashkent) 
became the Uzbek FS in 1929, Fayzulla Khojaev (from Bukhara) served as chairman of 
the Council of People’s Commissars of the UzSSR, and Yoldosh Okhunboboyev (from 
Fergana) was President of the SS of the UzSSR. After Stalinist purges, Tashkent and 
Fergana elites became the main providers of native cadres in the Party and the state 
apparatus. Usmon Yusupov (from Fergana) became the FS of the CPUz in September 
1937 and Abdujabbor Abdurahmonov from Tashkent became the Chairman of the SM 
UzSSR in 1938. Both remained in their posts until 1950 when they were transferred to 
Moscow. During this period, cadres from Samarkand and Bukhara were appointed only 
to secondary positions. In 1947, during Yusupov's tenure, Amin Niyazov (who was from 
Fergana) became the President of the Supreme Soviet, becoming the FS of the CPUz 
from 1950 to December 1955, when he was replaced by Nuriddin Akramovich 
Mukhitdinov (from Tashkent) with the support of Khrushchev. Cf. Donald S. Carlisle, 
“Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation, ed. William Fierman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); 
Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan. Back to the Future?,” in Patterns in 
Post-Soviet Leadership, ed. T J Tucker and R C Colton (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
29 In the UzSSR, as in the other SSRs (with the exclusion of the RSFSR), there was a 
republican party ruled by its CC. The decision-making and highest organ of the party was 
the buro of the CC, headed by the FS. The membership of the buro was generally 
conferred on the Secretariat of the CC, the Chairman of the SM and his deputies, the 
top local military figure, and the Chairman of the Presidium of the SS. Below the buro 
were, in descending order, the CC Secretariat (and its subordinate organs for political, 
economic, social, and cultural affairs and control of the execution of central plans and 
directives), the obkoms (with the inclusion of the Tashkent gorkom); the other gorkoms, 
and; the raikoms of urban and rural districts. 
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administrative level, an appropriate executive body of the party (buro) was 
assigned to “originate policies, distribute tasks, select and distribute personnel 
and maintain strict supervision over the execution of its orders.”30 The more 
the unit was dimensionally ‘local’, the more it was representative of the ethnic 
configuration of the territory. 
At the top of the republican party, there was the First Secretary (FS) who 
had the function of coordinating the local organs with the central CPSU 
directives, supervising the activities of the national party, and representing, 
symbolically, the republic as a sort of ‘chief of state.’31 The Second Secretaries 
had a lower profile, assuming the powers of the FS in his absence. However, 
their role was far from being marginal. In fact, these supervisors could be 
considered as a sort of the ‘party watch-dogs’ that were directly responding to 
Moscow: therefore, especially after Brezhnev’s recentralization attempts in 
1971,32 these figures became generally non–native (mainly ethnic Slav) 
appointees of the CC CPSU who maintained powerful control over the FSs, the 
republican party apparatus, and the state administration through the system 
of nomenklatura.33 Furthermore, the second were reporting information 
                                                          
30 Cf. Bureau of Social Science Research, “Handbook of Central Asia, Vol. III” (New 
Haven: Human relations Area Files Inc, 1956), 824. 
31 Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects. Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
32 Christian Dueval, “Changing Patterns in the Top ‘Watchdog’ Appointments to the 
Union Republics,” Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 365 (1976). 
33 The nomenklatura was the system regulating the appointment of thousands of cadres 
to key positions in the soviet system, from the central government to the local soviets. 
The “names” were managed by the CPSU through two lists regulating the appointment 
and transfer of party officials at any central republican or obkom level: the first was the 
basic list (osnovnoi) for key positions that the committee and its department had 
responsibility for filling; and the second registered (uchetnyi) list for potential 
candidates suitable for those positions. Basically, the system of nomenklatura allowed 
for permanent control of the ruling elite "from above", at every level of power, creating 
what Milovan Djilas defined as a "new class" of ruling bureaucrats. The key to 
maintaining loyal supporters was to control the nomenklatura, thus encouraging the 
patronage of those who had the power of appointment and their clients/affiliates in a 
pyramidal system where an official could be both a client (in relation to higher-level 
patron officials) and a patron (to other lower-level client officials). Thomas Henry Rigby, 
“Staffing USSR Incorporated: The Origins of the Nomenklatura System,” Soviet Studies 
40, no. 4 (November 6, 1988); Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the 
Communist System (New York: Praeger, 1957). 
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continuously to Moscow and controlling ‘strategic sectors’.34 Despite 
korenizatsiya, the party was led by non–native figures35 until 1929, when Akmal 
Ikramovich Ikramov, an Uzbek ethnic from Tashkent, became the FS of the 
CPUz. From that moment, the dominance of political influential groups from 
Tashkent/Ferghana began and the party increasingly reinforced its territorial 
ties at regional level. 
During the ‘30s, the Stalinist ‘revolution from above’ also imposed on 
Central Asia a planned economic system through industrialization (in 1913, 
heavy industry represented 2% of Uzbek economy but 1940 it represented 13% 
of economic output),36 collectivization, urbanization, cotton intensive 
monoculture, and a new society that was eradicating the previous one through 
the ‘dekulakization’, ‘denomadization’, and ‘sedentarization’ of locals.37 During 
the first FYP (1928–1932) there was an “assault on traditional classes [that] 
created new social clusters. The early victims were the Muslim version of 
Russia's kulaks” and the notables generally as the bai, manap, and kishlak.38 In 
their place new figures were imposed from above on the newly established 
collectivist society. Hence, in a rural scenario such as the UzSSR, the kolkhozes' 
social order was imposed, creating “a soviet–oriented rural aristocracy”, 
                                                          
34 From the second secretary depended, as a rule, strategic sectors such as the local 
apparatus of the KGB, the industry executives and other key sectors. Cf. Viktor 
Zaslavsky, Il Consenso Organizzato. La Società Sovietica Negli Anni Di Brežnev (Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 1981), 158; John Miller, “Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas. Recruitment of 
CPSU First and Second Secretaries in Non-Russian Republics of the USSR,” Soviet Studies 
29, no. 1 (1977): 3–36. 
35 Between 1925 and 1929 there was a rapid succession in the party leadership, with 
four Russian ethnics in the position of General Secretary of the CPUz: Vladimir Ivanovich 
Ivanov (1925–1927); Kuprian Osipovich Kirkizh (1927–1929), Nikolay Fyodorovich Gikalo 
(April–June 1929), Isaak Abramovich Zelensky (June – December 1929). 
36 William Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” in Soviet Central Asia. 
The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 19. 
37 In contrast to other traditionally nomadic Central Asian societies – such as the Kazakh, 
Turkmens and the Kyrgyz -, Uzbeks became mainly sedentary from the XVI century 
onwards, developing an allegiance to the land they inhabited. In Central Asian history, 
the forced sedentarization of nomads is arguably the most tragic aspect of Kazakh 
sovietization and there is an interesting historiographical debate about the nature of 
what was defined as the “Kazakh genocide”. Niccolò Pianciola, Stalinismo Di Frontiera. 
Colonizzazione Agricola, Sterminio Dei Nomadi E Costruzione Statale in Asia Centrale 
(1905-1936) (Roma: Viella, 2009). 
38 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 99. 
11 
 
meanwhile Mullahs and Ishans were replaced by nachalniki.39 Indeed, as in 
many other peripheral regions of the USSR, the Stalinist period coincides with 
a time of the ‘forced modernization’ of Uzbek society and the development of 
the major cities and industrial areas of the country, pursuing the needs of the 
planned economy and changing the urban social framework. In 1930, the 
UzSSR capital was relocated from Samarkand to Tashkent, enforcing even more 
the dominance of the ruling Tashkent–Ferghana leadership at political and 
administrative levels.40 This political move encouraged the development of the 
new capital that would double the number of its inhabitants within a decade.41 
These urban transformation processes42 were followed by social changes, 
while korenization proceeded until the great purges of 1937-1938. 
During this period of massive terror, the Soviet system eliminated the first 
generation of native Uzbek elites that grew within the party-state system.43 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 
40 Oliver Roy adds: "The relative balance between regions disappears with the new team 
of 1937: now the Ferghana faction takes charge. The following key figures all had a 
Ferghana background: Osman Yussupov, first secretary of the party (1937-50); Amin 
Nyazov, president of the Supreme Soviet from 1947 to 1950 and then first secretary of 
the Communist Party from 1950 to 1955; two successive presidents of the Council of 
Ministers, S. Segizbayev (1937-8) and A. Abdurrahmanov (1938-50); and the man who 
was the president of the Supreme Soviet up until 1943, Akhundbabayev. Such a 
homogeneity cannot be purely fortuitous. The Ferghana group established an alliance 
with the group from Tashkent, an alliance which still makes sense today; so it was that 
Siraj Nuritdinov entered the seraglio (born in Tashkent in 1911, he became first 
secretary of the province of Tashkent in 1947 and joined the Politburo of the Uzbek 
Communist Party in 1949). This is not the expression of a ‘traditional’ alliance. One can 
only say that these two regions embody the most ‘Uzbek’ and least Persian part of the 
country.” Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, 110. 
41 In the period 1926-1939 the urban population of Tashkent rose from 314,000 to 
556,000 inhabitants. In the same period, Samarkand had a more modest population 
increase from of 105,000 to 136,000 inhabitants. Cf. Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una 
Città Dal 1945 a Oggi; A.S. Sadikov et al., Tashkent Geograficheskiy Atlas (Moskva: 
GUGK - Glav. upr. geodezii i kartografii pri Sovete ministrov SSSR, 1984); GSE, 
“Tashkent,” The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Vol. XXV) (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 393; 
GSE, “Samarkand,” The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Vol. XXII) (New York: Macmillan, 
1980), 574–75. 
42 Marco Buttino, Changing Urban Landscapes: Eastern European and Post-Soviet Cities, 
since 1989 (Roma: Viella, 2012). 
43 John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
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The Stalinist purges of 1937-1938 were so severe that a large part of the 
republican establishment – even Ikramov and his predecessors44 – was 
eliminated and replaced with Stalinist loyalists. In sum, Moscow was gradually 
centralizing its control over Uzbekistan, blocking the autonomy of elites and 
increasing the patrimonial cooptation of loyalists. 
In this phase, there was a campaign of Russification of the native elites45 
that would last – assuming different tones, modes, and speeds – for the whole 
Soviet period.46 In fact, at the end of the ‘30s, Moscow slowed down 
korenizatsiya and reinforced its control over the party, even doubling the 
number of non–Central Asian members in the CPUz buro from five in 1937 to 
nine in 1940.47 Therefore, the post–1937 system was structured on a top–
down/center–periphery pattern where the ‘central Soviets’ – mainly Slavs – 
preserved a fundamentally important role, occupying the key positions in the 
party, in Komsomol, and in the bureaucracy of every SSR. Besides these 
supervisory central positions, “higher authorities placed only outsiders at the 
top of certain sensitive offices [...including] those of the attorney general, CP 
organizations, CP administrative agencies and [...later the] KGB throughout 
Central Asia. Considering the pervasiveness and persistence of that parallel 
system, Central Asians seemed relegated to superficially prestigious token 
positions.”48 The new Uzbek leadership, which emerged after the great purges, 
                                                          
44 Ivanov, Zelensky, Ikramov and Khojaev were arrested in 1937, and tried in the last of 
the “Moscow Trials” (the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" or "the 
Trial of the Twenty-One"). Gikalo was accused of plotting against the Soviet state and 
executed on 25 April 1938. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Isaac Deutscher and Tamara Deutscher, The 
Great Purges (Oxford-New York: Blackwell, 1984); John Arch Getty, Origins of the Great 
Purges : The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985); Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Di Lenin E Stalin. Storia dell’Unione 
Sovietica, 1914-1945 (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007); Vladimir Khaustov and Lennart 
Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD I Repressii 1936-1938 Gg. (Moskva: Rosspen, 2009); Aleksandr 
Isayevich Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago Three 1918-1956 : An Experiment in 
Literary Investigation., vol. I–II (New York: Harper & Row, 1973). 
45 Speaking Russian was a prerequisite for elites in order to be integrated into the 
system. Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, 109. 
46 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 100. 
47 Donald S. Carlisle, “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83),” 
Central Asian Survey 5, no. 3–4 (1986): 130–32. 
48 Edward A. Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” in Central Asia: One Hundred Thirty 
Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview (Durham: Duke University Press, 
13 
 
had the same geographical origins as their disgraced predecessors 
(Tashkent/Fergana).49 However this new generation of leaders assumed a 
wider discretion in the selection of the subordinate cadres through the 
appointment system of nomenklatura and a hierarchized party system, albeit 
remaining under vertical control by the center in economic and political 
decision-making.50 Basically, the patrimonial scheme was much more enforced 
within the party-led system, and Moscow legitimized the loyal local 
establishment that could provide stability to the regime.  
The Second World War51 also helped to change the political, economic, and 
social framework of the UzSSR. As in the rest of the USSR, war had a tragic 
impact in terms of the number of deaths in Uzbekistan. Despite its distance 
from the front, the republic took its share of sacrifice with some 300-500 
thousand soldiers52 dying on the European battlefields. Furthermore, due to 
the advance of the German army into Soviet territory, more than 100 
productive complexes and industries which were originally located west of the 
Ural Mountains were repositioned to Uzbekistan.53 This process therefore 
contributed to the industrialization of Central Asia and reshaped the social 
framework of the Uzbek urban context. Almost two million evacuated Russian 
refugees were relocated with industry, settling in Uzbek cities and altering the 
demographics of the main industrial cities as Tashkent, Bukhara, and 
Samarkand.54 Additionally, thousands of those accused by Stalin of disloyalty 
and collaboration with the enemy during wartime were deported to 
Uzbekistan. These masses of exiled Koreans, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian 
                                                          
1995), 553; Michael Rywkin, “Russian Party Apparatus in a Muslim Republic. The Case 
of Uzbekistan,” Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, no. 2 (1987): 226–67. 
49 After the purges, the new FSs were Usman Yusupov – who ruled from 27 September 
1937 to 7 April 1953 – and Amin Niyazov, who emerged as a late Stalinist and remained 
in power until 22 December 1955. 
50 Z. Mieczkowski, “The Economic Regionalization of the Soviet Union in the Lenin and 
Stalin Period,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 8, no. 1 (May 5, 1966): 117–22. 
51 “The same date for the opening of [Tamerlane's] tomb in Samarkand and the invasion 
by Germany of the territory of the USSR was a coincidence that assumed symbolic 
importance among the general public because of the long historical associations 
between bad luck and opening the tomb, which was forbidden.” Timur Dadabaev, 
Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s Soviet Past (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2015), 63. 
52 Ibid., 64. 
53 Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” 19. 
54 Ibid. 
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Turks, Volga Germans, and Chechens55 constituted large communities of 
minorities within the UzSSR. The war had also implications in terms of culture 
and identity, uniting together the peoples of the USSR behind a common cause 
and contributing further towards the ‘Sovietization’ of the Uzbek people. New 
external actors were further complicating an already complex system. 
1.1.3 The post-war period in Uzbekistan 
Despite minor successive purges56, we could say that the ‘Great Purges’ and 
the ‘Great Patriotic War’ represented the final episodes of massive state–
violence in Soviet Uzbekistan. In fact, the post–war period was characterized 
by a stabilization of the party and a resumption of korenizatsiya,57 creating new 
opportunities for native elites. Then, Stalin’s death inexorably led to the end of 
the terror machine and the implementation of a more peaceful pattern of 
regulating the party life of a republic, defining its political, economic, social, 
demographic and territorial framework. Stalin's death thus coincided with the 
end of a system based on violence.58 
Khrushchev’s subsequent leadership encouraged a new climate of détente 
through destalinization, the end of terror (and mass purges) and concessions 
                                                          
55 The 1967 general amnesty for many of those convicted of ‘treason’ – allowing them 
to go back to their homelands – did not apply to Crimean Tatars and Meskhetians who 
were forced to remain in Uzbekistan until 1989. Alexander C. Diener, Homeland 
Conceptions and Ethnic Integration among Kazakhstan’s Germans and Koreans 
(Lewiston: E. Mellen, 2004); Daniel Kim, Formulating Missiological Approaches through 
the Analysis of the Korean Minority Identity in Uzbekistan (Deerfield: Trinity 
International University, 2008); John H. Miller, “Putting Clients in Place: The Role of 
Patronage in Cooption into the Soviet Leadership,” in Political Leadership in the Soviet 
Union, ed. Archie Brown (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989); Aleksandr Nekrich, The 
Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second 
World War (New York: Norton, 1978); J. Otto Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-
1949 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999); Tom Trier and Andrei Khanzhin, The 
Meskhetian Turks at a Crossroads : Integration, Repatriation or Resettlement? (Münster 
& London: Lit, 2007); Brian Williams, The Crimean Tatars: From Soviet Genocide to 
Putin’s Conquest, 2015. 
56 Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Vital഻evich Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling 
Circle, 1945-1953 (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
57 Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, 102. 
58 Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: 
Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties (New York: Macmillan, 1968). 
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of more autonomy to the native elites within all SSRs. In Khrushchev’s times, 
instead of terror and direct control, the UzSSR was ruled by a regime of 
‘controlled autonomy’ in which local and central powers were balanced. This 
new political pattern was also harmonizing power among the most influential 
groups that were balancing their representation and interests within party and 
state. This policy eased Moscow’s burden on the peripheries by starting a slow 
and gradual decentralization process in different fields and to a large extent 
restoring patrimonial dynamics and local autonomies. 
A crucial element was the decentralization of the planned economy and the 
struggle against ministerial ‘departmentalism’ that led to the replacement of 
the central ministries with local authorities. In May 1957, regional economic 
soviets (sovnarkhozy)59 were introduced and local party organs started to play 
“a stop–gap role, chasing up inputs for local producers”60 and implementing a 
certain decentralization of economic decision–making.61 This economic 
decentralization process had implications in the political framework inasmuch 
it was conceding more management power to local leaders.62 Thus, this 
passage represented a key moment in Soviet history, resulting in the 
reaffirmation of a central determinant of the neo–patrimonial system in the 
                                                          
59 Khrushchev reorganized and reduced the number of ministries and the USSR was 
divided into 105 economic regions, where sovnarkhozes became the operational and 
planning organs. Paul Cocks, Robert Vincent Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, The 
Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 111; Philip 
Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR From 
1945 (London: Longman, 2003), 58. 
60 Peter Rutland, The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union: The Role of 
Local Party Organs in Economic Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 75; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ordzhonikidze’s Takeover of Vesenkha: A Case Study in 
Soviet Bureaucratic Politics,” Soviet Studies 37, no. 2 (1985); Oleg Khlevniuk, “Sistema 
Tsentr-Regiony v 1930-1950-E Gody. Predposylki Politizacii Nomenklatury,” Cahiers Du 
Monde Russe : Russie, Empire Russe, Union Soviétique, États Indépendants 44, no. 2–3 
(2003): 253–68; Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London: Penguin Books, 
1989). These new entities were subordinated to the SS of the National Economy 
(VSNKh) that was reestablished in 1963 under the SM USSR. 
61 David Tredwell Cattell, “Local Government and the Sovnarkhoz in the USSR, 1957-
1962,” Soviet Studies 15 (1964): 430–32. 
62 “Under Khrushchev local communist leaders were allowed to plan their industrial 
development according to their real needs. [This] decentralization increased industrial 
production in Central Asia”. Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or 
Nationalism? (London: Zed Books, 1995), 62–63. 
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Soviet Union, as well as events related to agriculture that will be analyzed in 
next chapters. However, the reforms proposed by Khrushchev did not give the 
expected results and were opposed by the ‘Stalinist old guard.’ Therefore, it 
was necessary for the Soviet leader to proceed with a reshuffle of power, 
ensuring the loyalty of leading cadres, ousting possible opponents and 
renewing a system that, after the Stalinist terror, had not been able to reform 
itself.  
At the end of ‘50s, with the emergence of the disruptive ‘Ryazan Affair’63 
and with Khrushchev's anger at not being supported in his ‘small leap 
forward’,64 there was a harsh campaign conducted by the Soviet leader against 
nationalism, zemlyachestvo, corruption, and clientelism in the USSR that 
presented a perfect opportunity to purge and replace a large part of the 
leadership that had emerged under Stalin. This campaign assumed a systemic 
level in Central Asia,65 especially during the purges of the Tajik leadership, 
                                                          
63 The “Ryazan Affair” (also called the "Ryazan Miracle") was a scandal that testifies to 
the arrogance of propaganda and the limits of the Soviet planned economy. The 
purposes of “Catch up and overtake America”, announced by Khrushchev in 1957, had 
to be realized also through the implementation of a prior medium-term goal: to triple 
the amount of meat production in the USSR over the next three years. In 1958, Alexei 
Larionov, the FS of the Ryazan obkom, promised publicly to reach this goal within the 
next year. This initiative drew enthusiasm from Khrushchev, who gave to the oblast 
several awards in advance (such as the Order of Lenin in February 1959). These high 
expectations were betrayed at the end of 1960, when the agricultural failures in the 
Ryazan region and in the country as a whole compelled Khrushchev to repudiate the 
‘meat leap-forward’. “In many regions, including Ryazan, checks began to be made that 
uncovered massive cheating. Larionov could not cope with his unmasking and killed 
himself. In October 1964 the Ryazan scandal would be one of the accusations laid 
against Khrushchev as he was removed from power.” Oleg Khlevniuk, “The Economy of 
Illusions: The Phenomenon of Data Inflation in the Khrushchev Era,” in Khrushchev in 
the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964, ed. Jeremy Smith 
and Melanie Ilic (London: Routledge, 2011), 171. 
64 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 191–241. 
65 After the ‘Baltic affairs’ in 1956-1959, there were intensive political purges in Central 
Asia that removed the Turkmen FS S. Babaev on 14 December 1958, Kamalov in 
Uzbekistan in March 1959, and then were followed in April-May 1961 with the dismissal 
of the Moldavian FS Z.T. Serdyuk, the Kyrgyz FS I Razzakov and the Tajik FS T. 
Uldzhabaev. “Only in the Tajik republic did the purge extend to other leading party and 
state officials” Jeremy Smith, “Leadership and Nationalism in the Soviet Republics, 
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which was uprooted and discredited66 during a campaign against corruption, 
nepotism, and cheating in cotton production.67 This was one example of a 
broader intervention by Moscow in seeking to address serious systemic issues 
at this time, even at the local level.68  
The Khrushchevian decentralization also had effects on the inclusion 
policies of the national elite. Indeed, this new course coincided with a revival 
of korenization, legitimizing the native leadership at the FS level. By the early 
‘60s, the nativization of cadres was implemented in all Central Asian republics, 
appointing a new generation of indigenous leaders who would rule their 
republic for around a quarter of a century.69 In fact, pursuing the narrative of 
                                                          
1951-1959,” in Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet Union, 
1956-1964, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (London: Routledge, 2011), 89. 
66 Nazarov reports the discredit against these figures as appeared on the literature of 
that time: “Former Secretaries of the CC Uldzhabaev and Obnosov and Chair of the 
Council of Ministers, Dodukhov did a poor job managing agriculture. At the same time, 
they began to deceive the Party and State, admitting to misrepresenting reports on plan 
implementation and creating the appearance of prosperity. In 1961, the CC CPSU 
exposed and suppressed the anti-party, anti-state activities of the former republic 
leaders” in Ravshan Nazarov and Pulat Shozimov, “The Ferghana Valley in the Eras of 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev,” in Ferghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, ed. S Frederick 
Starr (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2011), 159; Bobodzhan Gafurovich Gafurov and Boris 
Anatol’yevich Litvinskiy, Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda, vol. 3 (Moskva: Akademia Nauk 
Tadzhiskoi SSR, 1965), 157. 
67 According to Khlevniuk, already under Khrushchev "cheating over cotton in the 
Central Asian republics was significant. Thus, just in Tajikistan, the revealed cheating 
amounted to 28,700 tonnes in 1958, 37,100 the following year, and 55,600 in 1960. The 
overall delivery of cotton according to the official figures was 4.34 million tonnes in 1958 
and 4.65 million in 1959. Thus the Tajik cheating alone represented about 12 per cent 
of the overall growth of cotton production in 1959 over 1958". Khlevniuk, “The Economy 
of Illusions: The Phenomenon of Data Inflation in the Khrushchev Era,” 184–85. Cf. 
RGANI, f. 3, op. 12, d. 907, l. 23. 
68 Then, in July 1961 with a decree of the Presidium of the SS of the USSR, the agency 
Goskontrol was established in order to check the systemic inefficiencies and waste and 
to eradicate “corruption, falsification, mestnichestvo” in order to create a direct 
connection with prokuratura. For the same purpose, the party control commission was 
also provided with greater powers. Pravda, 23 July 1961, p. 1. 
69 The UzSSR was the only Central Asian Republic entrusted with a native FS after 1929. 
In the other Central Asian republics, Dinmukhamed Konayev became the FS of the 
Communist Party of Kazakhstan (in office 19 January 1960 – 26 December 1962; and 7 
December 1964 – 16 December 1986); Dzhabar Rasulov the FS of the Communist Party 
18 
 
destalinization, the new Soviet leader endorsed a change of leadership, 
replacing the old Stalinist establishment with loyal native figures.70 Thus, 
following the korenization process, by the time of the XX Congress of the CPSU, 
seven of 14 republican party FSs were replaced (as well as 41 of 69 obkom FSs 
within the RSFSR).71  
The promotion of loyal native figures had wider implications at local levels 
and became the key to encouraging a patronage system, considering that the 
new generation of FSs in power brought their clique (or ‘clan’ affiliates), who 
had previously served in the same obkom or raion, to the republic level. 
Furthermore, it is fundamental to note that the system started to devolve more 
economic authority from the State to party figures, enforcing the Republican 
and obkom FSs with more managerial powers than ever before. Therefore, the 
local FSs started to control the economy and the distribution of supplies and 
resources from the center,72 also circumventing the prerogatives of the Second 
Secretaries in relation to appointments – as even factory and kolkhoz managers 
– through the nomenklatura system.73 
In Uzbekistan, this new framework reinforced the power of FS’s networks 
within party and state institutions, defining an immense power for a figure who 
                                                          
of Tajikistan (12 April 1961 - 4 April 1982); Turdakun Usubaliev the FS of the Communist 
Party of Kirghizia (9 May 1961 - 2 November 1985), and; Muhammetnazar Gapurov the 
FS of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan (24 December 1969 - 21 December 1985).  
70 In this substitution campaign, Khrushchev was mostly promoting his loyal “clients” as 
three of the republican FSs and six of the obkom FSs were his former subordinates from 
Ukraine. Cf. Gordon Smith, “Gorbachev and the Council of Ministers: Leadership 
Consolidation and Its Policy Implications,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 14, no. 3 
(1987): 343–363. 
71 Considering the career of Khrushchev and his successor Brezhnev, it is interesting to 
note that the "Ukrainian" group had been strengthened, becoming a dominant 
component in the Soviet leadership from the ‘60s. In 1951 no Ukrainians were in the 
Politburo, whereas in 1971 there were four ethnic Ukrainians out of 14 voting members. 
Cf. Thomas Henry Rigby, “The Soviet Politburo: A Comparative Profile 1951–71,” Soviet 
Studies 24, no. 1 (November 6, 1972). 
72 Hough, The Soviet Prefects. Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making. 
73 The second secretaries were still working as the (effective) junction between the CC 
CPSU and the local party. Also in Uzbekistan in 1980, the republican second secretary 
and all but one of the obkoms’ second secretaries were non-native. Ben Fowkes, “The 
National Question in the Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev: Policy and Response,” in 
Brezhnev Reconsidered, ed. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 79. 
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acted as an intermediary between Moscow and the republican apparatus and 
who, at the same time, enjoyed a wide autonomy that allowed him to assert 
his clients within the state and party organs. The implementation of 
destalinization74 policies and research for new loyal figures overwhelmed also 
the CPUz. Khrushchev, returning from his Asian tour with Bulganin in December 
1955, supported the replacement of Niyazov, and appointed Nuritdin 
Mukhitdinov75 as the FS of the CPUz,76 accelerating korenization and endorsing 
destalinization at the local level. The main aim replacing the previous 
generation of Stalinist obkom FSs.77 Hence, Mukhitdinov was considered as a 
‘client’ and an open supporter of Khrushchev’s candidature: he opposed 
Khrushchev’s attempted demotion in 1957 and, in return, he rose “rapidly to 
posts that no Central Asian politician had reached before him”,78 becoming in 
                                                          
74 Polly Jones, The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change 
in the Khrushchev Era (London & New York: Routledge, 2006); Donald A. Filtzer, Soviet 
Workers and De-Stalinization: The Consolidation of the Modern System of Soviet 
Production Relations 1953-1964 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Donald 
A. Filtzer, The Khrushchev Era: De-Stalinization and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 
1953-1964 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993). 
75 Nuritdin Akramovich Mukhitdinov (6/19 November 1917 – 27 August 2008) started 
his political career in the ‘30s in Uzbekistan and then within the Soviet army. During 
WW2, he was wounded during the Battle of Stalingrad where he had the opportunity 
to get closer to Khrushchev. After his demobilization in 1946, he returned to Uzbekistan 
where he served as FS of the Namangan obkom (1948-1950) and the Tashkent obkom 
(1950-1951). In 1951, Mukhitdinov was officially reprimanded by Stalin for poor 
management of cotton crop. He became member of the CC CPUz (1952-1956) and, on 
18 May 1951, he started to serve as chairman of the SM UzSSR until 6 April 1953 when 
he was demoted by Lavrenti Beria, one of his major opponents. He took that post back 
on 18 December 1954 and, after a Khrushchev visit in Tashkent, he was promoted to FS 
CPUz in December 22, 1955. On 27 February 1956 he became a Candidate member of 
the 20th Presidium CC CPSU, becoming a full member that (on 17 December 1957) and 
a member of the 20th Secretariat until 17 October 1961. His rise was due to his 
proximity to Khrushchev and he became the first Uzbek to reach such a high rank in the 
USSR, representing the major Central Asian minority in the Presidium of the party. 
76 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 104. 
77 Destalinization of local elite also involved the replacement of the key Obkom FSs: Arif 
Alimovich Alimov became the FS of Samarkand obkom (1957-1958), Tursun K. 
Kambarov FS of Ferghana obkom (1954–1965), Sirodzh Nurutdinov of Tashkent obkom 
(1956–1961) and Rasul Gulyamov the FS of Tashkent gorkom. 
78 Idil Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A 
Comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 59.  
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1957 the first Uzbek full member of the CPSU Presidium and the secretary 
responsible for Central Asia within the CC CPSU. 
In this period, Mukhitdinov started to promote ethnic Uzbeks to higher 
party and state offices – maintaining a predominance of figures from Tashkent 
and Ferghana in the CC CPUz – and encouraging heavily use of the Uzbek 
language for official purposes.79 However, in a context of decentralization, the 
Uzbek leadership also had to deal with possible internal threats. In order to 
weaken the weight of possible opponents and internal competitors – such as 
the Tashkenters Sirodzh Nuritdinov (FS of the Tashkent obkom), his wife Yadgar 
Nasriddinova (deputy chairwoman of the SM UzSSR),80 Sabir Kamalov81 
(chairman of the SM UzSSR), and Mansur Mirza–Ahmedov (first deputy 
chairman of the SM UzSSR) – Mukhitdinov sought to hold off rivals within his 
own regionalist faction by colluding and co–opting personalities from ‘rival’ 
                                                          
79 In Moscow, Mukhitdinov was supposed to better defend the Uzbek cause and on 1 
July 1959 he proposed in the Presidium the use of the Uzbek language as the official 
language of the UzSSR. In so doing, he acknowledged that this would demand use of 
both languages if put into effect administratively. However, this proposal was largely 
symbolic in practice, and Russian remained the main language of communication within 
the CPUz branches. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fursenko, Arkhivi Kremlya, Prezidium TsK 
KPSS 1954-1964. Chernovye Protokol’nye Zapisi Zasedanii. Stenogrammy. Tom 1 
(Moskva: Rosspen, 2015), 387. 
80 Yadgar Sadikovna Nasriddinova (26 December 1920 - 7 April 2006), was the wife of 
Sirodzh Nurutdinov (1911-1966). She was appointed first secretary of the Tashkent 
Obkom in 1946, serving on the CC CPUz for much of the 1940s, then first secretary of 
Kirov raikom in Tashkent and Minister of Industry and Building Materials for the UzSSR 
in 1952. She finally became the deputy chairwoman of the SM UzSSR (1955-1959), then 
she succeeded Rashidov as Chairwoman of the Presidium of the SS of the UzSSR (24 
March 1959 - 25 September 1970). Rashidov was accused of plotting against her though 
a sex scandal, sending Mikoyan Nasriddinova's adopted daughter, who told Moscow 
that she had been raped by her foster mother’s husband, to Anastas. 
81 Sabir Kamalovich Kamalov (1910-1990) was an exponent of the Tashkent/Fergana 
group who entered the CC in 1950. He was appointed chairman of the SM UzSSR in 1955 
and finally became the FS of the CPUz in 1957. The new Chairman of the SM, Mirza-
Akhmedov, created a sort of countervailing power in 1959, by expanding the authority 
of Presidium of the SM UzSSR, composing it of all vice chairmen, including the vice 
chairman of Gosplan and the Ministers Finance and Agriculture. Cf. Robert C. Tucker, 
“Field Observations on Soviet Local Government,” The American Slavic and East 
European Review 18, no. 4 (1959): 526–38. 
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groups,82 such as the prominent writer Sharaf Rashidov (from Jizzak)83 who was 
affiliated with the Samarkanders. According to Carlisle, at that time Rashidov 
appeared as a weak figure in the hands of an expert leader such as Mukhitdinov 
who thought that he could manage him as a puppet.84 However, the story took 
a different course.  
In December 1957 Mukhitdinov was transferred to Moscow in order to 
cover higher positions, and Sabir Kamalov took his place as the FS of the CPUz 
for fifteen months. At the end of the ‘50s the destalinization process was close 
to being completed , considering that in 1959 the CC CPUz buro had 
dramatically changed and only four members – Alimov, Murtazaev, 
Rakhimbabeva, and Rashidov – of the previous 1956 group remained; this had 
the effect of  increasing the presence of Samarkanders and doubling the 
number of Slavic members from three in 1956 to six in 1959.85 In this phase of 
great transformations - defining a complex relationship between 
decentralization, patrimonialization and replacement of administrative cadres 
- there was no such thing as foregone conclusion. 
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83 Rashidov was one of those Uzbek writers emerged in the ‘50s – as well as Zulfia, 
Abdulla Kahhar, Gafur Gulyam and Musa Aibek – who have won recognition in Soviet 
Union and even abroad. 
84 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 108. 
85 The CC CPUz buro in 1956 was composed of: A. Abdurazakov (from Tashkent); A. 
Alimov (Tashkent); A.P. Byzov (Non-native); S.K. Kamalov (Tashkent); A.A. Luchinskii 
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Abdurazakov (Namangan); G. A. Gabril'yants (Non-native); Z.R. Rakhimbabayeva 
(Andijan); Ya.S. Nasriddinova (Ferghana); A. A. Alimov (Tashkent); R. G. Gulamov (n.a.); 
G. F. Naimushin (Non-native); I.I. Fedyuninskii (Non-native from Sverdlovsk); A. N. Rudin 
(Non-native); K.M. Murtazaev (Kashkadarya); I. P. Burmistrov (Non-native). Cf. Carlisle, 
“The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83),” 130–32. 
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1.2 The ‘reign’ of Sharaf Rashidov 
On 14 March 1959, during the XI plenum of the CC CPUz,86 the chairman of 
the SM UzSSR, Manzur Mirza–Akhmedov, was dismissed in response to 
allegations of malfeasance, nepotism, and abuses of power. He was replaced 
by Arif Alimov. On that occasion, the FS CPUz Sabir Kamalov was also removed 
from his post and replaced by Sharaf Rashidov,87 one of the most prominent 
leaders to have emerged from the new and young generation of figures that 
arose during wartime. He was not a technician or an industrial worker, but 
rather – like Usabaliev, Ovezov and Gapurov – he was an ideological worker 
with a pedagogical career. 
1.2.1 Rashidov’s rise to power 
Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov was born in Jizzak on 6 November 1917 – the 
day before the October Revolution – in a “poor peasant family.”88 He was 
strongly encouraged by his uncle Hamid to continue in literary studies and after 
graduating at the Jizzak Pedagogical School in 1935, he worked as a teacher in 
the local secondary school. In 1937–1941, he served as executive secretary, 
deputy chief editor, and editor of the Samarkand regional newspaper Lenin 
Yolu (Lenin’s way) and in 1939 he joined the ACP(B). In these years, Rashidov 
started to write his first poems, which were devoted to Uzbek cotton farmers 
and builders.89 In 1941, Rashidov graduated from the Faculty of Philology of 
the Uzbek State University in Samarkand and in 1948 from the Higher Party 
School of the CC of the ACP(B) though a correspondence course. 
In November 1941, he joined the Soviet Army, fighting in the Battle of 
Moscow in the North–Western sector, and on the Volkhov front. At the end of 
1942 he was seriously wounded on the battlefield and, after a long recovery at 
the Sverdlovsk evacuation hospital, he was finally demobilized from the front 
in 1943. In 1944 he served as secretary of the Samarkand obkom and in 1947 
became the editor of the republican newspaper Қizil O’zbekiston (“Red 
Uzbekistan”) in Tashkent. As in the journalistic and literary spheres, Rashidov’s 
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advance in the political sphere was clear, and he became secretary of the 
Samarkand obkom and chairman of the Union of Writers of Uzbekistan (1949–
1950) under the protection of the FS of Yusupov.90 In the early ‘50s, Rashidov 
was able to establish himself as a writer committed to the dissemination of 
culture and modernization of Uzbek society, receiving praise from the party 
establishment. In 1950, he was appointed secretary of the CC CPUz and on 
August 21, 1950, he became Chairman of the Presidium of the SS of the UzSSR 
and Deputy chairman of the Presidium of the SS of the USSR, beginning to 
assert his political role and prominence within the CPUz buro. After 1956 
Rashidov became a candidate member of the CC CPSU and a delegate at the 
CPSU Congresses, receiving the appreciation of Khrushchev for his charming, 
erudite manners. 
His appointment to the post of FS of the CPUz in 1959 was a compromise 
achieved by coopting the support of rival clans’ figures – such as Murtazaev 
(Kashkadarya), Abdurazakov (Namangan), Gulyamov, Sarkisov, and Alimov 
from Tashkent – with the support of the Jizzak–Samarkand group. Backing from 
that group drew heavily on those people with whom Rashidov had established 
work connections and relationships of mutual support developed while at the 
Samarkand obkom. Norling reconstructs the entity of this group, listing: 
the Minister of Internal Affairs Khaidar Yakhyaev served as department head in 
the obkom in 1944 when Rashidov held the cadre portfolio. Likewise, the KGB 
head Leon Melkumov was stationed there as secretary of Komsomol together 
with Rashidov but when Yusupov was dismissed in 1950 he was dispatched to 
Moscow. A year after Rashidov came to office in 1959, Melkumov returned to 
Uzbekistan and was instated KGB officer in [the] Samarkand oblast. Bektash 
Rakhimov, First Secretary of [the] Samarkand oblast in the 1970s, had been a 
co–worker with Rashidov in the obkom 30 years earlier. And N. Makhmudov 
from Kokand in [the] Ferghana Valley, one of Rashidov’s closest confidantes, 
was yet another acquaintance from this time. Also a writer, Makhmudov, 
penned articles for Shavot Khakikati in the 1930s and was First Secretary of 
Samarkand in the decade thereafter (1943–48). In 1963, with Rashidov’s 
patronage, he assumed the post of First Secretary of Syr Darya obkom which he 
held until 1969, when he was put in charge of the People’s Control Commission 
(Komiteta Narodnogo Kontrolya).91 
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Substantially, Rashidov proceeded in the same way as Brezhnev did when 
he included in his clique individuals from Dnepropetrovsk. Furthermore, his 
literature background was a fundamental element in his rise to power, making 
possible and credible his candidacy against stronger competitors and careerists 
such as Nuritdinov, Kamalov, or Mirza–Akhmedov.92 Despite the opposition of 
technocrats93 and of a fragmented group of Tashkenters, his appointment in 
1959 was the result of a ‘general compromise’94 among the factions that was 
changing the geopolitics of the UzSSR. In fact, Rashidov was able to break the 
Tashkent–Fergana monopoly95 that had ruled since the ‘30s, thus finally 
becoming a promoter of an alliance between Samarkand (a minority faction)96 
and some members of the capital. 
Rashidov was considered a patriot and a loyal communist whose agenda 
was aimed at “the one–sided development of [the] Central Asia[n] region, 
employment problems and the need to create jobs and, last but not least, 
irrigation.”97 His balance among his soft nationalism, patriotism and devotion 
to the Soviet cause, and intellectual profile were functional to Khrushchev as 
well: according to Roy, it seems that Moscow wanted to reshuffle the power 
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was laid out: "Rashidov in fact knows neither agriculture nor industry nor construction, 
since he never worked before in lower party, Soviet and economic organizations. His 
level of knowledge and experience is ill-suited to the post of first secretary." After 
Rashidov’s rise, Mukhamedzhanov was 'exiled' to Afghanistan as an advisor for 
agriculture and irrigation. He also criticized Rashidov for the unfair dismissal of Khabib 
Abdullaev, the president of the AN of the UzSSR in 1962, and for selecting his cadres on 
the basis of "kinship, homeland and personal loyalty." RGANI f.5, op. 60, d. 3, ll. 94-103 
and Chida, “‘Trust in Cadres’ and the Party-Based Control in Central Asia during the 
Brejnev Era,” 66–67. 
94 Rizaev reconstructs the days before Rashidov’s appointment, underlining a general 
consensus among the decision-makers, with the exception of the Deputy Chairman of 
the SM UzSSR, Mirzaali Valiyevich Muhammadjonov, who supported the candidacy of 
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balance in the republic in order to avoid the development of hegemonies 
within the CPUz. For this reason, Khrushchev supported the appointment of 
the Samarkander ‘outsider’ at the same time as his main adversary 
Nasriddinova took his previous post as Chair of the Presidium of the SS of the 
UzSSR. Rashidov grew rapidly in his political career even at the central level: in 
fact, he became a member of the CC CPSU, a candidate member of the 
Presidium of the CC CPSU on 31 October 1961 – keeping this position in the 
Politburo until his death in 1983 – and a member of the Presidium of the SS of 
the USSR in 1970. 
At the internal level, Rashidov’s rise to power was a slower and a more 
complicated process. In fact, in 1961, on the occasion of the XVI congress of 
the CPUz, Rashidov’s role was not dominant and he still had to face those 
opponents within the party buro that were slowing his consolidation of power. 
In that year, the enmity with Nuritdinov and his wife Nasriddinova was 
enflamed, and on 27 September 1961 he had to find a compromise with the 
former ruling group, accepting the appointment of Rakhmankul Kurbanov98 as 
Chairman of the SM UzSSR in order to respect the balance of power. 
Meanwhile the role of Mukhitdinov was going in to rapid decline.99 In 
October 1961 Rashidov had the occasion to bring the contest to an end, even 
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with his predecessor Sobir Kamolov, who was relegated to the Fergana 
obispolkom until January 1962, when his political career effectively ended.100 
However, his main opponents were still powerful and active: besides 
Nasriddinova and Kurbanov, there was also the expert secretary of the 
Tashkent gorkom, Kayum Murtazaev,101 and the young chairman of the 
Tashkent gorispolkom, Rafik Nishanov.102 Conversely, his major allies were the 
Narmakhonmadi Khudaiberdyev,103 Kallibek Kamalov,104 Nazar Matchanov,105 
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In 1963 he was appointed secretary of the CC CPUz and in 1966 was elevated as a buro 
member. However, in 1970 he was removed and exiled form his posts. 
103 Narmakhonmadi D. Khudaiberdyev was a Samarkander close to Rashidov's group. In 
1955, he was the deputy chairman of Bukhara oblispolkom and then the FS of the 
Bukhara obkom (1955-1957). In 1957, he was appointed as head of the agricultural 
department in the CC CPUz and in 1959 he became the second secretary of the Bukhara 
obkom. In 1960 he was appointed deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR and in 1961 he 
became the FS of the Surkhandarya obkom. In 1962 he was elevated to the secretariat 
of the CC CPUz and in 1965 he became minister of agriculture of the UzSSR. In 1970, 
Khudaiberdyev became the FS of the Syrdarya obkom and on 25 February 1971 he was 
finally elevated as chairman of the SM UzSSR. 
104 Kallibek Kamalov had been deputy chairman of the SM Karakalpak ASSR (1951-1952) 
and chairman of the Nukus gorispolkom (1952-1953), after which he became Minister 
of Public Utilities (1953-1956), and Minister of Road Transport and Highways (1956-
1958) of the Karakalpak ASSR. In 1958 he became the secretary of the Karakalpak 
obkom and in 1959 chairman of the SM of the Karakalpak ASSR. On March 1963 he 
became the FS of the Karakalpak obkom covering that position until March 1984 when 
he was "exiled" as a General Consul in Constanta, Romania. 
105 Nazar Matchanov was a khorezmian who became chairman of the Bukhara 
oblispolkom in 1961, then FS of the Bukhara obkom (1962-1965), and finally Chairman 
of the Presidium the SS of the UzSSR (1970-1978). 
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Nasir Makhmudov,106 Mirzamakhmud Musakhanov,107 and, later, Asadilla 
Khodzhaev,108 who was rising steadily in the 1970s.109  
As we have seen, Rashidov’s rise had the full support of Khrushchev. 
However, Rashidov directly contributed to his ouster in 1964 by criticizing the 
leader for his errors in economic planning.110 Khrushchev’s dismissal and the 
consequent de–khrushchevization process triggered a domino effect that even 
affected the FS of the CPUz. In fact, in December 1964 during a Tashkent obkom 
conference, Vali Usmanov, the deputy head of the Organizational–Party 
Department of the Tashkent obkom gave a 25-minute speech where he 
denounced the attachment of Rashidov to Khrushchev, and his clientelism and 
zemlyachestvo.111 In response, several participants intervened, including a 
member of the SS of the UzSSR, Akhmad Kadyrov, defending Rashidov as an 
honest man, defining his critics as demagogues, and trashing the charges 
against him. Rashidov, too, defended himself, explaining that the controversial 
appointments had come directly from the CPSU.112 
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107 Mirzamakhmud. M. Musakhanov was a Tashkenter who rose through the ranks of 
the republican profsoyuz until 1961 when he became chairman of the SS of the UzSSR 
and first deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR in 1965. In 1970 he became FS of the 
Tashkent obkom, keeping the post until January 1985. 
108 Asadilla Ashrapovich Khodzhaev (1920-1983), who had served in many key posts in 
the republic, became FS of the Namangan obkom (1968-1973) and FS of the Tashkent 
gorkom (1973-1978). 
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Committee; and his brother Sahib Rashidov, head of the Party-State Control 
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from Rashidov’s native Jizzak.” Norling, “Myth and Reality: Politics in Soviet 
Uzbekistan,” 188. 
112 Rizaev, Sharaf Rashidov. Shtrikhi K Portretu, 48–63; Fedor Razzakov, Korruptsiya v 
Politbyuro: Delo “Krasnogo Uzbeka” (Moskva: Eksmo, 2009). 
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Rashidov is widely reported to have been a favored ‘client’, a protégé and 
a close friend of Leonid Brezhnev who reserved for him the “kid–glove” 
treatment.113 However, this famous interpretation is not supported with any 
kind of substantial empirical evidence . There were surely cordial and friendly 
relations between Rashidov and Brezhnev, much evidence of which can be 
found in the personal correspondence between the two figures.114 However, 
the Uzbek leader was not in a particularly strong position within the top 
leadership and he never became an influential figure within the CC CPSU. He 
remained a lower-profile candidate member of the Politburo, excluded from 
the deep core of Soviet power and based outside of Moscow.115 We can 
support this interpretation also considering the internal debates within the 
politburo in which the opinion of Rashidov was required only on those issues 
closely linked to the Central Asian context or to his diplomatic missions.116 
However, his close connection with Brezhnev was undeniable.117 According to 
Chazov – the ‘Kremlin’s doctor’ – it seems more likely that Rashidov was 
indirectly linked to Brezhnev118 though having very close ties with some of his 
most trusted collaborators, such as Podgorny, Suslov, and perhaps 
Chernenko,119 thus making him as an important background figure within the 
Soviet regime.120 Substantially, Rashidov was able to opportunistically follow 
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117 Ligachev reports that, despite his minor role, Rashidov did not have to wait in the 
waiting room to see Brezhnev and directly came in. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s 
Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 213. 
118 According to Willerton, there were 6 people within politburo and CC CPSU secretariat 
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General Secretary." Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR, 51, 107, 277. 
119 Evgeniy Ivanovich Chazov, Zdorov’ye I Vlast’. Vospominaniya «kremlevskogo Vracha» 
(Moskva: Novosti, 1992), 23–24. 
120 It is interesting to note the tone of the letters that Rashidov wrote to the politburo 
members in order to evaluate the intimacy of their relations. He addressed Brezhnev as 
"Dorogoi Nash Leonid Ilich" ("Our Dear Leonid Ilich"), and took a very pandering tone 
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the course of Soviet political developments, and to catch the winds of 
destalinization in his favor.121 According to Carlisle: 
[Rashidov] had benefited from Mukhitdinov's anti–Stalinist campaign and now 
he harvested the fruits of his predecessor's earlier efforts [by playing...] the end 
of de–Stalinization to his advantage and [by using…] the fall of Mukhitdinov and 
Khrushchev to consolidate his position locally.122 
Such a task was working even in the official narrative of the CPUz. In fact, 
since the beginning of the ‘60s, Rashidov proceeded in the way of 
destalinization, rehabilitating those prominent figures who had been part of 
Uzbek political history in previous decades. In the first official history of the 
CPUz published in 1964,123 the purges of 1937–1938 were presented, 
rehabilitating Ikramov and Khodzhaev and denouncing Yusupov as the main 
culprit of Stalinist terror in the UzSSR. However, this figure would be 
rehabilitated during the “de–destalinization” of Brezhnev’s years124, as well as 
another prominent Stalinist like Abdurakhmanov who received in the second 
half of the ‘60s a ministerial post.125 This dual rehabilitation of victims of 
Stalinism – and then of its culprits – was in line with the Brezhnevian partial 
rehabilitation of Stalin.126 In fact, from the second half of the ‘60s, 
destalinization was assuming less emphasis and Brezhnevian ‘inclusiveness’ 
started to reinterpret, at least informally, the Stalinist era. Here, the inclusion 
of both Stalinists and anti–Stalinists occurred to ensure a wider basis of power 
                                                          
with Suslov and Chernenko, addressing them as "Dorogoy brat" ("Dear Brother"). 
Meanwhile he was more formal towards Andropov, whom he addressed as "Dorogoy 
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124 In fact, the sins of Yusupov disappeared in the second edition of the volume in 1974, 
and the Stalinist leader was presented as a “devoted son of the party". Then, the party 
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legitimation in a period that sought to present Soviet history as a continuous 
stream of success.127 
‘Inclusiveness’ in the UzSSR was also a consequence of the minority 
legitimation base from which Rashidov emerged, implying his need to establish 
a broader consensus for his rule, even co–opting members of the rival group. 
This attitude would last until the end of the ‘60s, when a series of dramatic 
events afforded Rashidov the opportunity to strengthen his power and to 
gradually marginalize his opponents, mainly represented by the 
Fergana/Tashkent clique led by Nasriddinova an Kurbanov. Hence, Rashidov 
was able to promote Samarkand/Jizzak figures within the party and state 
apparatus, to reinforce the influence of his group, and to support the rise of his 
closest ally Khudayberdyev. Then, during the XVII Congress of the CPUz (3–5 
March 1966), Rashidov further strengthened his position, reserving a greater 
share of power for his group and replacing almost a quarter of the members of 
the CC CPUz and several obkom secretaries, even as he consolidated support 
from among the surviving members of the buro.128 However, the real political 
opportunity arrived with one of the most dramatic episodes of contemporary 
Uzbek history. 
1.2.2 The 1966 Tashkent earthquake’s spillovers 
On 26 April 1966, a 7.5-magnitude earthquake struck. With its epicenter in 
the center of Tashkent, it caused massive destruction to over 80% of the city 
and 78,000 homes, officially killing 15 people and leaving 300,000 homeless 
and razing most of the historic quarter of the city (which predated 1917)129 that 
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was mostly inhabited by Uzbeks.130 In the immediate aftermath, Rashidov was 
invested in the recovery operations and even Brezhnev and Kosygin flew to 
Tashkent to evaluate the condition of the city. However, such a disastrous 
situation was also an important political occasion for the Uzbek leader to affirm 
his operations and to get consensus from Moscow. Indeed, the reconstruction 
of Tashkent was an opportunity for Rashidov to weaken the opposition131 and 
to leave his own trace in order to rebuild the city in a more modern Soviet style, 
with large boulevards, parks, monuments, large apartment block complexes, 
and even the first subway system in the whole of Central Asia.132 The 
reconstruction program brought forth the idea of a new "Tashkent 
Renaissance."133 The reconstruction campaign and the efforts that the party 
brought to this task were publicized to great fanfare, accrediting Rashidov as a 
thoughtful leader who was sensitive to the needs of the population and a 
devoted communist for Moscow. 
In fact, the Tashkent earthquake of 1966 – and the subsequent 
reconstruction of the city – had a wide media reach that sensitized Soviet public 
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opinion and the central authorities, bringing the forces of the whole Soviet 
system to the task of reconstruction. The CPSU was directly invested in this 
task, issuing resolution n° 456 of the CC CPSU–SM USSR (14 June 1966), “On 
the assistance of the Uzbek SSR in the aftermath of the earthquake in 
Tashkent.” The resolution was welcomed by Rashidov who was thankful for the 
aid from other republics as “an expression of fraternal feelings from 
throughout the republics towards our country.”134 
In the summer of 1966, ‘battalions of fraternal peoples’ were recalled to 
rebuild Tashkent and thousands of workers and urban planners from the other 
SSRs came to Uzbekistan to assist in the reconstruction. After that moment, 
Tashkent consolidated even more its multiethnic shape, improving a social 
safety net that was absorbing problems of housing and social exclusion across 
the whole USSR. Indeed, a great part of the thousands of ‘volunteers’ that came 
to rebuild Tashkent settled in the very apartments that they were supposedly 
building for Uzbeks,135 creating a climate of mistrust and disaffection between 
local communities and new settlers.136 As observed by Hanks, “the 
improvements in these aspects of life did not offset the repressed resentment 
many Uzbeks felt toward not only the Soviet system but in some cases toward 
Slavs themselves.”137 Therefore, the reconstruction process was felt not only in 
the transformations that Tashkent underwent at an architectural level but also 
in the political and social dynamics that it was creating. The earthquake 
challenged but also strengthened Rashidovian patrimonialism as a successful 
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135 On the aftermath of the earthquake, in Tashkent about 100,000 new homes were 
built by 1970. Sadikov et al., Tashkent Geograficheskiy Atlas, 60–64. 
136 Comparing the pre (footnote 130) and post-earthquake data we can observe that, 
despite an effective increase of non-native settlers after the 1966 earthquake, the share 
of native and Muslim population grew with faster rates. In fact, in 1970, the Tashkent 
population reached a total of 1,384,509 people from which 46.9% (649,715) were 
Muslims (Uzbeks 512,962, Tatars 98,834, Kazakhs 15,231, Tajiks 7.999, Uighurs 5,884, 
Bashkirs 3,806, Azeris 3.411, Karakalpaks 1,488) and 53.1% (740,794) non-Muslims 
(Russians 564,584, Jews 55,758, Ukrainians 40,716, Armenians 13,364, Byelorussians 
5,924, Mordvinians 9,343, others 51,105). Therefore, besides the positive demographic 
trends in each group, the Muslim population was evidently growing faster than the non-
Muslim, and changing the share of Tashkent demographics. Bennigsen and Wimbush, 
Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, 56. 
137 Reuel Hanks, Central Asia: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2005), 32. 
33 
 
system of leadership in solving problems. Nevertheless, from this premise 
comes the third dramatic event. 
In the spring of 1969, during the so called ‘Pakhtakor incidents’138 there 
were a series of violent clashes in Tashkent among Uzbeks, Russians, and other 
Slav groups that lasted for several weeks.139 The events started on April 4, 1969 
during the football match between Pakhtakor Tashkent and Dynamo Minsk in 
the Pakhtakor stadium when banners appeared with nationalist slogans (such 
as Russkie von! – Russians out!), gestures which were exacerbated by verbal 
skirmishes between supporters.140 After the match – lost by the local team with 
the score 0–1 – there were fights among supporters, and groups of Uzbeks that 
were blocking the traffic on the main Navoi avenue – located next to the 
stadium – and assaulting ‘Europeans’ or Uzbeks that were dressed in Western 
clothes. Pogroms against ‘Slavs’ continued for several days, while the police 
operations to suppress the riots were late and ineffective, necessitating the 
intervention of the MVD and army troops that arrested more than 150 rioters 
for “petty hooliganism.”141 Similar events took place on 8 April, after a football 
match between Pakhtakor Tashkent and Spartak Moscow, and in September 
27 during the match between Pakhtakor Tashkent and Krylya Sovetov Samara. 
Despite the gravity of the events, further manifestations of intolerance were 
recorded in the following years.142 
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The Pakhtakor episodes remained in the memory of the Tashkent citizens, 
but were not disclosed by the media and created deep embarrassment for the 
Uzbek leader, who complained about the loopholes in the security system and 
proceeded with a series of purges and replacements of top police officials.143 
Consequently, the secretary of ideology at the CC CPUz Rafiq Nishanov – a 
member of the Kurbanov–Nasriddinova group – tried to shift responsibility to 
Rashidov for the incidents in order to oust the FS. As Simis had remarked, in 
this phase "the main tactic employed by both sides […] was sending revelatory 
denunciations to Moscow."144 Conversely, the FS took the opportunity to 
blame his strongest opponents,145 such as Nasriddinova146, Nishanov147 – who 
were removed from their post and ‘exiled’ to Moscow. The list of his enemies 
also included Kurbanov, who was accused of misusing his official position and 
illegal activities, and was finally sentenced to ten years in prison for fomenting 
violence.148 Rashidov’s main allies were put in their place: Nazar Matchanov 
became the new chairman of the presidium of the SS of the UzSSR on 25 
September 1970 and Narmakhonmadi Khudayberdyev the chairman of the SM 
UzSSR on 25 February 1971, keeping that post until 1984. With this maneuver, 
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the Uzbek leader could offer the highest offices of the state to his major allies 
and to finally consolidate his power within the UzSSR institution, by ousting 
those figures who had been the main opponents to his rise and relegating the 
Tashkent/Fergana group to secondary positions. As Carlisle reminds us: 
thus, by 1971, Rashidov and allies held the three key native positions in the 
leadership [thus becoming] the completely dominant Uzbek political figure. The 
Buro appointments announced at the 1971 and 1976 Congresses reflect this.149 
In the mid–’70s, Rashidov was also able to promote his ally Asadilla A. 
Khodzhaev to the position of FS of the Tashkent gorkom (1973–1978), which 
saw him emerge as Rashidov's possible successor, becoming as he did a sort of 
‘second FS’150 in the political life of the republic. In 1978 he became secretary 
of the CC CPUz and on 14 March 1980 Chairman of the SS of the UzSSR. 
However, his rise would be slowed by the emergency of an external figure: on 
22 December 1978, Nazar Matchanov resigned from his post for health 
reasons, and was replaced as the chairman of the Presidium of the SS of the 
UzSSR by Inamdzhan Usmankhodzhaev, an outsider from the Fergana elite who 
had never served in the Uzbek Secretariat posts.151 However, thanks to his 
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father’s fame,152 his name was not new within the Uzbek political scene and his 
centrally-oriented credentials made him an important f connection between 
the Uzbek elite and  the cadres of the CC CPSU. Indeed, as we will analyze in 
the next chapters, Usmankhodzhaev played a key role in the last decade of the 
UzSSR’s history. 
1.2.3 Rashidov’s literary factor 
Besides the power struggles within the CPUz, the Rashidov period was in 
line with the rest of the USSR in terms of the process of nativization renewal. 
In fact, in the UzSSR there was also a general softening on national cadres’ 
appointment which – until then – had assured the direct control of the central 
government. Indeed, korenization was functional to the regime’s stability. It 
was based on a loyal political and administrative corpus consisting of natives 
inserted in a system that was co–opting sovietized elites and traditional social 
forces in that cultural context typical of the late soviet period. This process 
sought to endorse national culture within the Soviet internationalist 
framework and the narrative of ‘devoted national elites serving the Soviet 
cause’ became a legitimizing issue endorsed even by the Uzbek FS in his literary 
works. In fact, paralleling his political rise, Rashidov continued a prominent 
literary career that presented the triumphs of Uzbekistan within the Soviet 
framework. 
Just to mention his major works, in 1945 he published his first collection of 
poems entitled Moy gnev (“My anger”) and in 1950 a collection of journalistic 
articles entitled Prigovor Istorii (“The verdict of history”), in which the 
compatibility and integration of Uzbek national traditions within the Soviet 
framework was a major leitmotiv. In fact, Rashidov was rediscovering national 
cultural roots at a time when it was finally becoming possible to encourage 
                                                          
Saidkarimovich Ziyadullaev, Usmankhodzhaev died in 2011. N.YA Petrakov, Nabi S. 
Ziyadullaev, and M.A. Lukichev, Said-Karim Ziyadullayev. Epokha I Sovremennost’ 
(Moskva: Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk. Otdeleniye Obshchestvennykh nauk. Sektsiya 
Ekonomiki, 2014). 
152 His father, Buzrukkhodzha Usmankhodzhaev (1896-1977) was considered as a 
respected luminary in the Fergana Valley. He served as chairman of the Fergana 
obispolkom, as a member of the CC CPUz and, between 1952-1977, he became the 
director of the Great Fergana canal, the main irrigation system of Uzbekistan. Carlisle, 
“Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 113, 126. 
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Uzbek as a language of literature153 and as a consolidated aspect of the 
integration of the UzSSR within the great socialist family. His devotion to his 
national culture led the Uzbek leader to recover the memory of Amir Timur, 
Ulug–bek and Babur and to restore the role of some pre–revolutionary 
traditional institutions such as the makhalla, which after 1959 even 
consolidated a minor part in the raispolkom.154 
In 1951 Rashidov published the first book of his trilogy: Pobediteli (“The 
Victors”),155 which was probably his most famous novel, covered three main 
characters during the war and the post–war ‘conquest’ of virgin lands. In this 
book Rashidov presented communism as the most important development for 
Uzbek society, a system which allowed the country to hold on to its traditional 
peculiarities while also enabling it to become ‘modern’. Rashidov’s cloying 
narrative was indicative of his utopian ideology, strongly focused on the 
communist project as the only way for the Uzbek people to redeem their 
backwardness. In describing the miracle of electrification, one of his character’s 
exclaims: 
Look at all those lights!' [...] 'How bright they are! It's the light of communism 
shining on us from tomorrow. Oh, Alimjan–aka, all this happiness is ours!156 
In 1956 he published the romantic novel Kashmirskaya pesnya (“Song of 
Kashmir”)157 – reflecting on the struggle for the liberation of the Indian people 
                                                          
153 Although the great majority of Uzbeks spoke the national language, "Uzbek was used 
during Soviet times as a literary language, instead of Chagatay Turkic or Persian, [and] 
Russian was [...] favored in the media. About 80 per cent of all scientific and technical 
articles were in Russian. One-third of the more than 200 newspapers published in 
[Uzbekistan] were in Russian." Therefore, the colonial language remained the preferred 
by the national intelligentsia and upper classes and the first great manifestation of 
language nationalism emerged only in the late 80s. Martin C. Spechler, The Political 
Economy of Reform in Central Asia: Uzbekistan under Authoritarianism (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 13; William Fierman, Language Planning and National 
Development the Uzbek Experience (Berlin-New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991). 
154 David Abramson, “Identity Counts: The Soviet Legacy and the Census in Uzbekistan,” 
in Census and Identity the Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Census, 
ed. David Kertzer and Dominique Arel (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
155 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, The Victors (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 
1958). 
156 Ibid., 201. 
157 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Song of Kashmir (Tashkent: Gafur Gulyam Literature 
and Art Publishers, 1983). 
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– and in 1958 the second part of the trilogy entitled Sil'neye buri (“Stronger 
than the storm”) that reconsidered the personalities of Pobediteli in their rural 
dimension. In 1964, Rashidov published the novel Moguchaya volna (“The 
Mighty Wave”),158 dedicated to the heroism of the Soviet people during the 
Great Patriotic War and in 1967 a book entitled Znamya druzhby (“The Banner 
of Friendship”),159 a collection of his critical articles dealing with topical issues 
of Soviet literature, particularly in the frame of the ‘brotherhood’ among Soviet 
peoples. Finally, in 1971 he composed Zrelost' (“Maturity”), the final part of the 
trilogy, and, in 1979 he published an opera omnia of all his works in five 
volumes.160 This final collection of Rashidov’s works had a circulation of 
150,000 copies, establishing a typical case of ‘sekretarskaya literatura’.161 His 
final book, Sovietsky Uzbekistan (1982), was dedicated to the conquests of 
socialism in the republic162 and can be considered a political testament to the 
Uzbek leader.  
Even though his literary contribution was arguably a great and positive 
contribution to his political one, and although his novels were continuously 
proposed and played on radio, in theaters, and on television, the quality of his 
literary work was inevitably exaggerated by Uzbek literary society and its 
reception heavily influenced by his status. However, he was considered both 
as a promoter and as a protector of national literature. On this regard, Allworth 
commented: 
                                                          
158 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Moguchaia Volna (Moskva: Sov. pisatel഻, 1965). 
159 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, The Banner of Friendship (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1969). 
160 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Sobraniye Sochineniy v 5 Tomakh (Moskva: 
Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1979). 
161 'Sekretaskaya Literatura' is a term used to indicate those books – usually with print 
runs of hundreds of thousands of copies – that were written by prominent political 
figures. However, in a non-market system, the literature offer was not determined by 
effective demand but depended on the level of promotion that the party wanted to 
pursue. Therefore, thousands of copies were printed, sold to libraries and bookshops, 
and massively abandoned in the shelves, waiting for readers who would never arrive. 
This system was very expensive, totally inefficient, and produced a negative economic 
and ecological impact with thousands of rubles and tons of paper wasted. At the same 
time, the writers received royalties for the printed copies that were not based on the 
final purchase but on the selling price to bookshops, feeding the writer’s political caste. 
Lev Dmitrevich Gudkov and Boris V. Dubin, Literatura Kak Socialඁnyj InsƟtut : Statඁi Po 
Sociologii Literatury (Moskva: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 1994). 
162 Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan. 
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While politician–Rashidov rose in the hierarchy, author–Rashidov decreased his 
literary output. […] Regardless of Rashidov’s tenuous claims to literary respect, 
on his death in the autumn of 1983, more than one UzSSR writer expressed fears 
[…] that the first secretary’s demise would inflict a painful blow to Uzbek authors 
and poets, who regarded Rashidov as an ally and protector.163 
Thus, Rashidov had given much space to art and literature as a vehicle for 
ideological promotion. In fact, at both the political and literary level, he also 
had the great responsibility for balancing and encouraging the different 
national components of UzSSR culture. He was considered a ‘patriot’ who – 
following the lines of the post–war korenization revival – sponsored the 
‘Uzbekization’ of cadres in the key posts of party and state. On this matter, it is 
important to reveal some demographic trends which can be derived from 
statistical data. 
1.2.4 The ‘Uzbekization’ of cadres 
From the mid–’60s, Soviet life expectancy began to fall dramatically and 
the ethnic composition of the country also began to shift accordingly.164 Uzbek 
society itself saw the first stage of a demographic boom that, in less than 30 
years, would more than double the population of the UzSSR.165 A comparison 
between the UzSSR and the RSFSR is instructive. Between 1970 and1980 the 
population of the UzSSR increased 33.6% compared with a 6.4% increase in 
Russia. This posed a tremendous demographic challenge, which even 
Khudayberdyev and the whole SM UzSSR could not ignore. From the early ‘80s, 
central investments in industrial development were sought and demands for 
"prompt action" from the center (in the form of aid from the USSR Gosplan) 
                                                          
163 Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present : A 
Cultural History, 266. 
164 Between 1959-1979, the percentage of Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) 
had dropped from 76.2% to 72.2% while that of 'Muslims' (such as Uzbeks, Kazakhs and 
Azerbaijanis) grew from 6 to 9.4%. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia 
dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 328, 394. 
165 The UzSSR population amounted to 6.551 million in 1940, 8.119 in 1959, 11.799 in 
1970, 15.389 in 1979 and 19.810 in 1989. The percentage growth rate was 23.9% in 
1940-59, 89.6% in 1959-79 and 28.7% in 1979-89. Nancy Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic 
and Demographic Trends,” in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), 38. 
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were presented in order to provide social services166 in one of the most 
backward republics of the USSR.167 Therefore, as the table below shows, the 
portion of the population that was considered ‘Uzbek’ rose from 62.1% in 1959 
to 71.4% in 1989, as the share of ‘Russians’ declined from 13.5% to 8.3% during 
the same period. The disparities within the ethnic demographic trends were 
the result of birth rates among Uzbeks - almost double those of Russian families 
in the UzSSR168 - and due to the first flows of Slavs emigrating from Uzbekistan 
in the early ‘70s.  
This situation would inevitably produce significant social and political 
consequences, even considering that in 1970 half of the UzSSR population was 
less than 16 years old and the presence of Uzbek nationals in institutions, 
schools, and the academy was rising faster than for Russians,169 implying that 
a new generation of educated native elites had more cause to access the party 
and the top managerial posts in the Republic. Furthermore, following the 
korenization revival of the ‘60s, these new demographic trends implied a 
reshuffle – in terms of national belonging – also within the party and state 
apparatus in the UzSSR. 
As already mentioned, the phenomenon of ‘Uzbekization’ was not a new 
trend, and it had different stages. In the CPUz, the membership of Uzbeks 
accelerated in the late ‘20s – reaching a highpoint of 64% – but fell during the 
purges of late ‘30s to 47%.  During World War II it stood at 34%170, when the 
CPUz was in fact deliberately over-populated with Russians by the imposition 
                                                          
166 Jan Ațke Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural 
Resources (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 16, 90–91. 
167 In 1970 the average national income per capita was 805 rubles in Uzbekistan, 1558 
in Russia and 1382 in the USSR. Also investments per capita in the UzSSR rose from 265 
rubles (1970) to 365 (1982) while in Russia they almost doubled, from 375 rubles in 1970 
to 644 in 1982. Additionally, the share of the employed population (of the total) in the 
UzSSR was only 36% in 1970 and 40.8% in 1979 including 38.4% of the female population 
and 37.7% of the rural population. Ibid., 56, 146, 156–57. 
168 In 1979 in Uzbekistan the average family size was 5.5 people. But in Uzbek families 
the rate was 6.2 per family, while Russian families on average contained 3.3 people. 
Further, while the percent of families with seven or more children overall was 32.2%, 
43.2% of Uzbek families and just 1.7% of Russian families in Uzbekistan had seven or 
more children. Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” 47. 
169 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 27. 
170 Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison 
of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 57. 
41 
 
of centrally-appointed cadres. In the post–war period, this figure grew again, 
reaching 49% in 1959 and reaching a majority in 1960 with 51%. During 
Rashidov’s reign there was a faster acceleration of Uzbekization that led 
Uzbeks to represent almost 59% of the CPUz membership in 1978171 – 70% if 
considered alongside other Central Asians172 – and 61% in 1981, confirming a 
positive and increasing trend even during the ‘80s.173 In terms of leader figures 
– FSs and chairmen of state and public organizations – the share of Uzbeks and 
other Central Asians was even more marked.174
                                                          
171 Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” 25. 
172 Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” 551. 
173 In 1986, 71% of newly accepted members of CPUz were Uzbeks, and in 1990 Uzbeks 
accounted for 66 percent of the party ranks. Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and 
Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 57. 
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Nationality Composition of the UzSSR in 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989175 
 
 In thousands In percentage of Total  Percentage Variations 
 1959 1970 1979 1989 1959 1970 1979 1989 1959–1970 1970–1979 1979–1989 
Uzbeks 5038 7725 10569 14142 62.1 65.5 68.7 71.4 153 137 133.8 
Karakalpaks 168 230 298 412 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.1 137 130 138.3 
Russians 1092 1473 1666 1653 13.5 12.5 10.8 8.3 135 113 99.3 
Tatars 445 574 649 657’ 5.5 4.9 4.2 3.4 129 113 101.2 
Kazakhs 343 476 620 808 4.2 4.0 4.0 4.1 139 130 130.3 
Tajiks 331 449 595 934 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.7 144 133 157.0 
Koreans 138 148 163 183 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.9 107 110 112.3 
Ukrainians 88 112 114 153 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.8 127 102 134.6 
Kirgiz 93 111 142 175 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 119 128 123.0 
Jews 94 103 1002 65 0.2 0.9 0.6 0.3 104 97 88.6 
Turkmen 55 71 92 122 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 129 130 131.7 
Other176 254 328 381  –– 3.0 2.7 2.6 –– 129 116 –– 
                                                          
175 Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” 43. 
176 Other nationalities include Byelorussians, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians, Bashkir, Uyghurs, Moldavians, Chuvash, Germans, Turks, 
Ossetians, peoples of Dagestan, and Gypsies. 
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Conversely, in 1950-1978 the share of Russian members decreased from 31 
to 20%.177 However, this figure remained anyway higher than the real share of 
the population and similar trends are observed within the republican 
institutions.178 In fact, until the mid–’60s the representation of non–native 
deputies in soviets was proportional (around 15%) and reflected their share 
within the republican population. This trend would be reversed in the ‘70s 
when the Uzbeks would have an even greater representation within the soviets 
than the non–natives.179 In sum, the political representation of the national 
groups within the party was not reflecting the real ethnic composition of the 
UzSSR. In the next table, Buttino180 estimates the national composition of the 
CPUz, demonstrating a general positive trend toward Uzbek representation. 
National Composition of the CPUz: Members & Candidates 
Years Total Slavs181  in % Uzbeks in % Others182 in % 
1940 63,847 17,550 27.49 31,952 50.04 14,345 22.47 
1945 82,505 23,609 28.62 35,205 42.67 23,691 28.71 
1946 96,981 50,732 52.31 44,057 45.43 2,192 2.26 
1950 132,336 41,076 31.04 57,901 43.75 33,359 25.21 
1955 143,878 41,373 28.76 67,679 47.04 34,826 24.21 
1960 202,865 53,268 26.26 102,663 50.61 46,934 23.14 
1965 314,279 80,215 25.52 163,982 52.18 70,082 22.30 
1970 412,321 96,680 23.45 226,357 54.90 89,284 21.65 
1975 472,342 102,991 21.80 271,736 57.53 97,615 20.67 
1978 518,350 106,029 20.46 306,324 59.10 105,997 20.45 
                                                          
177 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 328. 
178 In a memorandum of CC CPUz to the CC CPSU (2 February 1982), it was indicated 
that the ethnic division within the UzSSR where more than 120 nationalities live that in 
local soviets there were: 73% Uzbeks, 8.3% Russians, 4.4% Kazakhs, 3.7% Tajiks, 3.1% 
Tatars, 2.7 Karakalpaks and others. In the SS of the UzSSR, 69% Uzbeks, 18% Russians, 
1,4% Tatars and others. In the apparatus of the CC CPUz, 55% Uzbeks, 36% Russians and 
Ukrainians. Among the top managers of ministries and republic institutions, 61% 
Uzbeks, 25% Russians and Ukrainians. RGANI, f. 5, op. 88, d. 119, ll. 3-4. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 329. 
181 Slavs: Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians 
182 Others: Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kirgiz, Turkmen, Tatars, Jews. 
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Rashidov encouraged an ‘Uzbekization’ of the elites and was aware of the 
multiethnic situation in the republic. Nevertheless, he did not endorse a pure, 
exclusive and radical Uzbek nationalism. Rather, he was incorporating the 
influences – and individuals – coming from other national groups in order to 
approve an inclusive and larger interpretation of Uzbek nationality, coopting 
and including the ethnic minority groups in a system that was prioritizing the 
titular nationality. However, the consequence was a further Uzbekization of 
non–Uzbeks. As Roy comments: “the Bukhara and Samarkand factions, albeit 
more ‘Persian’ […] pursued a policy of Uzbekisation to the detriment of the 
Tajik identity.”183 
As mentioned, the Rashidovian soft nationalist attitude was also due to his 
faith in Soviet ‘internationalism’ that sought to implement a lowest common 
denominator between the USSR populations under the banner of brotherhood 
between peoples. In fact, the revisions of the Uzbek–Kazakh borders in the 
early ‘60s – apparently in favor of Uzbekistan – also followed the aspirations of 
Khrushchev to eliminate national borders in a future communist society184 and 
were not indicated as a recognized conquest of the Uzbek nation but were 
welcomed by Rashidov who was devoted to the ‘Soviet national cause’ and 
honestly accepted the role of the Russian language as a meeting point between 
nations. Thus, following the guidelines of the XXIV Congress of the CPSU (1971) 
sanctioning the birth of a new historical community of “the Soviet people,” the 
reference to the ‘fusion of nationalities’ which held that peoples of the USSR 
were going to “flourish and to approach” progressively in a non–specified 
manner was lost.185 Hence, there was a renewal of the Russification policy – 
due to the major campaign for the ‘fusion of peoples’ launched in 1956 – 
trusting that it was a vehicular factor of sovietization.186 On this matter, even 
Rashidov had an active role in implementing the cultural “soft–russification”187 
                                                          
183 Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations, 110. 
184 This attitude towards Kazakhstan would persist even in later years. During the 
celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the Kazakh SSR and the Kazakh communist 
party in Almaty, where Rashidov gave a speech referring to the friendship between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the framework of communism. He exclaimed: "our 
peoples for centuries remained in poverty, [and] feudalism and tsarism strangled and 
uncoupled them. A real friendship shines only now, in the soviet period". PV, 19377, 
200, 30 August 1980, p. 3. 
185 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 305. 
186 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 23. 
187 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 393. 
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of Uzbek society, sponsoring the role of Russian language in Uzbekistan as a 
“language of friendship and brotherhood” that created convergence among 
nations.188 On 30 January 1978, he even wrote to the secretary of the CC CPSU 
Ivan V. Kapitonov reminding him of the importance of the Russian language as 
“a value in international communication and for strengthening the friendship 
and brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR”, confirming his commitment to 
enforce the teaching of Russian language in the schools, universities, 
kolkhozes, and sovkhozes, and in the army of the republic.189 Substantially, 
Rashidov acknowledged that the Russian language was the main condition to 
access the highest posts, determining a typical post–colonial situation where 
even the most devoted localists were forced to use – or simply become 
accustomed to using – the colonial language. The Russification campaign in 
Uzbekistan was finally formalized in October 1978, when SM USSR approved 
the decree "on measures for further improving the study and teaching of the 
Russian language in the Union Republics."190 Such a measure was very 
welcomed by Rashidov who, in his political testament, recognized the Russian 
primacy within the Union. In his words: 
The role of the Russians in the fraternity of equal nations is determined in the 
first place by the fact that the Russian nation carried the brunt of the struggle 
against tsarism and the bourgeois-landowner system, the struggle for social 
progress and the happiness of mankind. The Russian people shed much blood 
and made many sacrifices for the common cause. The invaders who sought to 
destroy the freedom and sovereignty of our country were crushed by joint 
efforts of all nations, and first of all the Russian nation. The Russian people have 
provided the best examples of selfless aid to other nations big and small. They 
were the main force in the building of socialism in our country and are the main 
contributor to the building of communism. The Russian nation led by the 
Communist Party was the cementing force that Consolidated the friendly family 
of all Soviet nations. It was Russia that made the groundwork of the united 
multinational state of a new type, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The 
unity of the peoples of our country, their indestructible friendship, is a major 
accomplishment of Soviet power, the Communist Party.191 
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190 John Staples, “Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The 
Uzbekistan Case,” Past Imperfect 2 (1993): 40; Roman Solchanyk, “Russification to Be 
Stepped Up,” Soviet Analyst 9 (1980). 
191 Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan, 82–83. 
46 
 
In the end, Rashidov endorsed a Soviet (inclusive) interpretation of the 
(mild) Uzbek nation that reflected that ‘compromise’ between nations, ethnic 
communities, language groups, and clans. This approach was demagogically 
publicizing Uzbekistan as a model of integration between peoples of USSR – 
and even for other countries – but at the same time it strengthened the 
characteristics of a colonial society whose level of sovietization was the 
highest. This model was presented as a success, a beacon of modernity. 
1.3 The ‘Uzbek modernity’ model abroad 
 
The figure of Sharaf Rashidov as an intellectual native integrated in the 
communist system and the UzSSR as an example of a modern, Muslim and 
eastern country were key arguments of the Soviet political discourse, and the 
narrative of ‘Uzbek modernity’ was also functional to Soviet foreign policy 
during the Cold War. As Baku in 1920 claimed to be the reference point for 
those Eastern peoples oppressed by colonialism and struggling against 
imperialism, through to the Bolshevik example, in the Cold War scenario 
Tashkent claimed to assume the same role for those Third World countries 
emerged from the decolonization process. 
1.3.1 Rashidov’s Cold War 
In fact, the launch of the ‘Soviet Central Asia model’ of economic and 
cultural development became even more emphasized after the mid–’50s, 
when Khrushchev was publicizing the progress of these republics as an 
archetypal model for the developing countries and a response to those critics 
that emerged in Bandung Conference against the USSR and its ‘colonial’ 
policies for Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Due to the Marxian interpretation, 
the word 'empire' assumed a negative connotation – of political, economic and 
cultural exploitation and referred to the czarist past or the present Western 
capitalist world192 – and communism publicized its anti–colonial struggle, 
                                                          
192 Dominic Lieven, Empire. The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven & London: 
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sponsoring the myth of socialist progress and the USSR under the banners of 
“friendship between peoples” and “incubator of nations.”193 
Substantially, Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate that the USSR was not a 
colonial system but something that was remaking the human experience and 
that could represent a model of multinational integration for a common 
humanistic cause. In this task, the non–Slav elite within the CC CPSU would play 
a key role to demonstrate how Muslim peoples mattered in the Soviet system. 
Functional to this strategy was the already mentioned promotion of Nuritdin 
Mukhitdinov as a full member of Politburo194 in order to guarantee a power 
quota in the main political organ of CPSU that was representing Muslim Central 
Asia and a way for Soviet power to get accreditation to the Muslim third world. 
As Kalinovsky comments: 
the new international situation meant that Moscow needed someone at the 
center who knew how to reach out to the world’s Muslims. [Rashidov as well] 
lobbied for more investment in the restoration of mosques and other 
architectural sites by pointing out that they could be used to counter western 
propaganda aimed at Muslim countries that portrayed the USSR as oppressing 
religion.195 
This ‘external task’ of Rashidovism clearly functioned to enforce the 
internal patrimonial system and coopting the traditional elite. Furthermore, 
after his visits to Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Burma in the mid–’50s, 
Rashidov also had an active role in this process. He had the idea that, due to 
Anglo–American propaganda, 
people were under the impression that the USSR repressed religion, ignored 
national culture, and trampled on people’s rights. One of the best ways to 
counter this would be to open Central Asia to people from these countries, to 
show them mosques, madrasas, and other religious institutions, and to revive 
publications about Soviet Muslims such as the outlet of the Spiritual 
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194 Rashidov had the support of Khrushchev and when Mukhitdinov lost his place in the 
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Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan and Central Asia, suspended in 
1948.196 
In this task, Rashidov’s mission was clear. In fact, the Uzbek leader started 
to organize several meetings at an international level in order to show that 
religious freedom and practice survived in the Soviet context197 where 
impressive funds were invested at central and republic level, for restorations 
of monuments and for developing those academic institutions that studied 
local cultures198 and endorsed non–conformist art.199 From 1964, Tashkent 
became the emblem of the Brezhnevian positive entente between socialism 
and Islam200 representing a major tolerance towards underground Islamic 
organizations.201 Van Gorder adds: 
Tashkent became a mecca for international Arab and Muslim students as well 
as a show–case city for the USSR to show its toleration to Muslim Central Asia. 
[However, this process was] largely superficial. By 1980, only 200 masjids had 
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Peyrouse (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 162. 
201 Ashirbek Muminov, Uygun Gafurov, and Rinat Shigabdinov, “Islamic Education in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” in Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its 
Successor States, ed. Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika, and Stefan Reichmuth (London: 
Routledge, 2010). 
49 
 
been opened across the area—a mere fraction of the more than 20,000 masjids 
that had been in operation before the Soviet revolution.202 
Furthermore, after the years of strengthening atheism, in 1970 the Soviet 
regime did not hinder Shaikh Ziauddin Babakhan, the mufti of the Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia assisted by the Council of Ulemas, to 
organize in Tashkent the first international Islamic conference in Soviet 
history.203 The event was even publicized by Rashidov, who wanted to show 
the tolerant Muslim face of the USSR. This appeasement between Islam and 
USSR would be seen as credible up until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
which severely damaged the reputation of the Soviet Muftis: in fact, the 
Tashkent conference to celebrate the fifteenth century of the Hejira in 
September 1980 was generally boycotted and only 76 of over 500 invitees 
attended the event.204 
The Rashidovian approach would be evident even with the special status he 
accorded other Islamic countries and its leaders. In fact, the FS of the CPUz 
became the main reference of the Persian, Afghan, Pakistani and Arab 
communists who had often a landmark in Tashkent before facing the center of 
the USSR. The Afghan leader Babrak Karmal, for example, had very close ties 
with Rashidov, especially during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when the 
FS CPUz became a great sponsor of the Saur Revolution and the UzSSR became 
the main logistic point for approaching the country. In fact, from 1979, 
Tashkent was the command–control–communication center of the Red Army 
involved in the Afghan war and Termez the main entry point of the Soviet 
ground troops though the ‘Friendship Bridge’ on the Amu Darya river. 
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During his reign, Rashidov conducted a number of business trips abroad, 
visiting some 33 countries205 and conducting key missions that would redefine 
the Cold War scene. One of his main results was his involvement in ‘Operation 
Anadyr’: on 29 May 1962, Sharaf Rashidov arrived in Havana for a ten day 
mission with a Soviet delegation of agricultural and irrigation experts.206 
However, the group also included the Soviet Ambassador Alekseev, the 
Marshal Sergei Biryuzov – commander of the strategic rocket forces (RVSN) 
who went by the name of ‘Engineer Petrov’ – and the Lt. General of the Soviet 
Air Force Sergei Ushakov.207 Indeed, Rashidov's delegation covered the military 
officials who came to Cuba to discuss the deployment of Soviet short and 
intermediate range ballistic missiles, medium–range bombers, and a division 
of mechanized infantry to Cuba. He also had a direct role in negotiations with 
Castro,208 trying to convince the Cuban leader about such an opportunity.209 It 
seemed that “Rashidov was confident that the missiles could be hidden, 
claiming that they could be placed so as to blend in with the palm trees.”210 
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Castro responded that the idea was “interesting” but he had to consult with his 
group before providing a final answer. The epilogue of this story is well 
known.211 The friendly relations between Castro and Rashidov were also 
confirmed during the latter’s 40-day trip in the USSR, which included a stop in 
Uzbekistan (May 8–10 1963).212 Castro visited Tashkent, the ancient wonders 
of Samarkand, the ‘modern wonders’ of the Virgin Lands and of mechanized 
agriculture near Yangiyer. After this last trip, the Lider Maximo suggested 
renaming the Hungry Steppe the “Steppe of Abundance” and declared in 
Uzbek, “Long live the Kzyl Kolkhoz of Uzbekistan!” before leaving Uzbekistan 
for Siberia.213 
1.3.2 Tashkent and the Third World 
At the same time, the Uzbek leader encouraged in third world countries the 
Soviet cause of anti–imperialism. Already at the 1957 Afro–Asian Solidarity 
Conference in Cairo, Rashidov was able to present the USSR as an anti–
imperialist force and a friendly ally of decolonizing peoples.214 In this 
framework, Sharaf Rashidovich labelled himself as a powerful leader from 
Central Asia who could represent the values of internationalism abroad, 
presenting the experience of the UzSSR as a model for the cultural, political, 
and economic development215 of the third world bloc and becoming a 
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prominent political figure in those para–diplomatic missions of the USSR that 
were aimed at bringing the world of non–aligned countries closer to the Soviet 
bloc. Such a struggle for liberation against international imperialism had to 
assume, according to the Uzbek leader, revolutionary tones. As was stated in a 
CIA secret report, “Rashidov unveiled the particularly militant definition that 
Moscow’s peaceful coexistence doctrine did not apply in the underdeveloped 
world where people are fighting for their ‘liberation.’”216 In a Jakarta speech in 
late May 1965, he voiced the calls of Brezhnev and Brezhnevism’s chief 
ideologist Suslov217 for united action of all “anti–imperialist forces”218 and even 
during his second visit to Cuba he reaffirmed this line during the inauguration 
of the Tricontinental Conference of People's Solidarity – between Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America – in Havana (On 3 January 1966) where he was at the head 
of the Soviet delegation and stated: 
We believe that relations between sovereign states with different social 
structures should be based on peaceful coexistence. However, it is quite clear 
that there is no peaceful coexistence, nor can there be peaceful coexistence 
between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors – the colonialists and the 
imperialists, between the imperialist aggressors and their victims.219 
On that occasion, he praised the armed struggle of the Venezuelan, 
Peruvian, Colombian, and Guatemalan “patriots” against the lackeys of 
imperialism. He also expressed the solidarity of his government with the 
peoples of British, French and Dutch Guyana, as well as with the Antilles in 
general, and Puerto Rico. Also he said that his country was providing aircraft, 
ammunitions, and artillery to the guerrillas of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. 
Sharaf Rashidov reiterated Soviet support for Cuba and asked the 
representative delegates from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to form a 
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“United front” against the common enemy: international imperialism, led by 
the United States of America.220 
Rashidov also played a key role with India,221 the main ally of the USSR in 
southern Asia, relaunching the role of Tashkent – a city that had already been 
fundamental to the development of Indian communism222 – as a base for 
regional diplomacy. In fact, the FS CPUz – who had already accompanied 
Khrushchev in India during an official visit in 1955223 and who had dedicated to 
Indian romance the novel Kashmirskaya Pesnya in 1956 – proposed that 
Tashkent host a peace mediation between India and Pakistan on 4 January 
1966. The Chairman of the SM USSR Alexei Kosygin moderated the negotiations 
between the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri224 and the Pakistani 
President Muhammad Ayub Khan, ending with the Tashkent Declaration. Thus, 
the peace agreement signed on 10 January 1966 resolved the Indo–Pakistani 
War of 1965. The positive effect of this mediation was only temporary225 but 
would have produced a positive spillover in Uzbekistan because its political 
leader was affirmed as a promoter of regional peace. Similarly, Rashidov also 
played the role of mediator during the Mozambican civil war: in fact, in 10–15 
November 1981 he arrived in the African country to meet the FRELIMO leaders 
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on an official visit “over a level of fraternal cooperation [that was] aimed at 
sharing experiences in building a socialist political party and to discuss 
international questions.”226 Even then, the effect would not have been 
decisive. 
More important were the international cultural platforms that Rashidov 
initiated in Tashkent. In fact, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was even 
competing culturally with the capitalist world in order to draw credit from the 
non–aligned third world. In this task, the Uzbek capital became an 
internationally recognized landmark: in 1958 Tashkent hosted the 
International Meeting of Writers of Asia and Africa,227 in 1968 the first 
International Film Festival of Asia and Africa – that in 1976 became the Asian, 
African, and Latin American Film Festival228 – and several international 
meetings and seminars of intellectuals, writers, poets, and journalists from the 
third world that had a very high political content.229 Furthermore, due to 
Rashidov’s initiative, Tashkent was even selected to host the XI meeting of the 
Presidium of AAPSO – the Asia and Africa Peoples' Solidarity Organization – in 
October 1982. On that occasion, presented in the press with great fanfare, the 
Uzbek leader proclaimed the USSR to be the very picture of peace, 
brotherhood, and solidarity among peoples and socialism as a universal value 
uniting people without depersonalizing them as was often claimed in the 
west.230 This ideological–narrative package would be part of our protagonist’s 
attitude until his last day. 
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1.4 Clans, regionalism and neopatrimonialism 
The description of the Rashidovian power framework was functional to 
arrive at the conclusions offered by Buttino who underlines how nativization 
(and the parallel process of sovietization), nomenklatura, selection and 
appointment powers, cooptation of clan affiliates, patronage, and political 
legitimation were very inter–related issues, determining a typical power 
scheme of the Brezhnevian system.231 There is a wide literature and an 
interesting theoretical debate232 that proposes that this re–elaborated 
‘colonial–like’ system was something that was limiting the totalitarian nature 
of the Soviet regime in Central Asia, where traditional informal power practices 
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and logics survived.233 Indeed, despite the systemic upheavals that the Soviet 
regime introduced in Central Asia, clan politics persisted, diminishing and even 
subverting “the primacy of party loyalty and Leninist doctrine in cadre 
appointments and promotions.”234 In order to face this issue, we should remind 
ourselves of the two main socio–political approaches to inquiry on the informal 
power relations in Uzbekistan and Central Asia: the first one focuses on the 
concept of ‘clan’; the second analyzes ‘patronage–client’ relations. 
1.4.1 ‘Clan politics’ 
The term ‘clan’ generally refers to a group united by kinship, denoting some 
kin–based division of society. However, considering Central Asian societies as 
complex phenomena, the categorization of ‘clan’ is often contested. In fact, 
this terminology appears misleading because it is denatured in a general 
interpretation that comprehends many different kinds of relationships such as 
political, social, and business networks, family and kin relationships, 
neighborhood, zemlyachestvo,235 and other forms of local ties. Following this 
corollary, elite groups are not typical territorially-based clans, but networks 
established among the ruling class to maximize the interests of the 
participants. Instead, at lower levels of Uzbek society, ‘clans’ are an affiliation 
among a small territorial community – village or makhalla – involving 
“horizontal linkages and […] based on solidarity among people from the same 
locality [...] or region [creating] affiliation”.236 A first major contribution in this 
debate arrived in 1986 with the American scholar Donald S. Carlisle237 who 
identified regionally-based power groups in Uzbekistan, defining them as 
‘regional group politics’ – rather than ‘clans’ –based on “local loyalties and 
regional roots.”238 In his essay, the author matched biographical and career 
data of Uzbek officials, evidencing the political dynamics within specific 
territorial groups corresponding to the regions of Tashkent, Ferghana Valley, 
                                                          
233 David Gullette, “Theories on Central Asian Factionalism: The Debate in Political 
Science and Its Wider Implications,” Central Asian Survey 26, no. 3 (September 14, 
2007). 
234 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 104. 
235 Collins defines “zemlyachestvo” as the “practice of appointing and promoting one’s 
trusted friends and kinsmen” Ibid., 354. 
236 Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison 
of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 70. 
237 Carlisle, “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83).” 
238 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 92. 
57 
 
Samarkand–Bukhara, Khorezm–Karakalpakya, and Kashkadarya–
Surkhandarya. These issues were then reconsidered by Olivier Roy239, who 
investigated the dynamics of the ‘solidarity groups’ – mainly place–based in the 
local dimensions of millat, qawm, makhalla, or avlod – in Central Asia. These 
concepts have been deepened by Kathleen Collins – who contributed to the 
evaluation of what she defined as ‘clan politics’240 – and Pauline Jones Luong, 
who formulated a theory of ‘regionalism’,241 defining the transformation of the 
pre–revolutionary tribal society into a system that was managed by obkom FSs. 
Following these interpretations, clans are not simple actors within the system, 
but become an essential part of it. 
1.4.2 The Patronage relations 
The second approach draws on an aspect widely studied in both Sovietology 
and political science: patron–client relationships.242 This macro–field takes into 
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account the study of all those connections and links among vertically-organized 
elite figures. These relations involve loyalties, reciprocal favoritism, and 
protégé network ties, friendships etc. As will be explicated in the next 
paragraphs, in the USSR these relations were functional to the stability of the 
cadres’ careers and were based on personal connections, professional ties, 
neighborhood, zemlyachestvo and other kinds of localism and developed 
especially in the post–war period.243 Then, these groups differ from the ‘clan’ 
interpretations because there is not a necessary kinship or affiliation in 
solidarity groups and they can be based on a simple ‘exchange of favors’ in 
purely functional relationships. 
Both interpretations are relevant in the UzSSR context: although the clan 
dynamics are a typical aspect of Central Asian societies, the patronage relations 
were held throughout the whole the USSR, a non–competitive system where 
the struggle for scarce goods, services and resources was held within the party 
and far from market logics. Therefore, it can be argued that the Uzbek/Central 
Asian phenomenon was nothing more than a reflection of the larger Soviet 
reality – a closed, non–competitive, extremely statist and party-dominated 
system based on personal ties. These typically Soviet phenomena can be 
detected in the neo–traditional doctrine244 that interprets the Soviet power 
system as a structure based on those ‘archaicizing phenomena’ as “petitioning, 
patron–client networks, the ubiquity of other kinds of personalistic ties like 
blat, ascribed status categories, ‘court’ politics in the Kremlin, the mystification 
                                                          
Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; John P. Willerton, “Patronage Networks and Coalition 
Building in the Brezhnev Era,” Soviet Studies 39, no. 2 April (1987); Willerton, Patronage 
and Politics in the USSR. 
243 Hosking, “Patronage and the Russian State,” 315; Joel Moses, “Regionalism in Soviet 
Politics: Continuity as a Source of Change, 1953-1982,” Soviet Studies 37, no. 2 April 
(1985): 201; Daniel T. Orlovsky, “Political Clientelism in Russia: The Historical 
Perspective,” in Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and 
Yugoslavia, ed. Thomas Henry Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983), 174–99; Michael E. Urban and Russell B. Reed, “Regionalism in a Systems 
Perspective: Explaining Elite Circulation in a Soviet Republic,” Slavic Review 48, no. 3 Fall 
(1989): 426–27; Willerton, “Patronage Networks and Coalition Building in the Brezhnev 
Era,” 177. 
244 Ken Jowitt, “Soviet Neotraditionalism: The Political Corruption of a Leninist Regime,” 
Soviet Studies 35, no. 3 (November 6, 1983): 275–97; Terry Martin, “Modernization or 
Neo-Traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet Primordialism,” in Stalinism: New 
Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London & New York: Routledge, 2000). 
59 
 
of power and its projection through display, and so on.”245 Phenomena that 
affected the entire Soviet history and, depending on the spatiotemporal 
contexts, were modulated in various Soviet eras as in Latvia as in Uzbekistan, 
but assuming, every time, a different guise. In fact, patronage networks 
pervaded in all areas of the state and party246 in the USSR and were an 
instrument to vertically control the nomenklatura through loyal and affiliate 
figures. Furthermore, in the UzSSR, the above mentioned ‘party rurality’ would 
be a determinant in these dynamics at the microscopic level and can be 
interpreted as a dominant characteristic of the CPUz political culture, 
influencing the whole history of the communist party in Uzbekistan.247 
Nevertheless, patrimonialism cannot be confined solely to the party element. 
It became a system that ruled even the administrative, social and cultural 
institutions. 
1.4.3 The Neo-patrimonial approach 
Thus, both interpretations are suggestive and can be partially used as keys 
to read the developments of political history in Soviet Uzbekistan. However, 
they suggest several questions in terms of their empirical application in the 
Uzbek context. In fact, ‘clan’ is a tribal concept which is claimed to apply to an 
elite community – especially at the highest levels – with a territorial dimension. 
However, this could work at the micro–level but finds several limitations when 
discussing the nature of an elite group at the republican level that was dealing 
with a wider spectrum of consent. Nonetheless a simple patron–client 
interpretation does escape the influence of tradition on a system that is 
pervaded with cultural peculiarities. Therefore, a good compromise comes 
from a third political school that approaches the study of the Soviet Central 
Asian power system through the ‘patrimonial’ and ‘neopatrimonial’ concepts. 
                                                          
245 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalinism: New Directions (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 
10. 
246 However, Mote and Trout argue that the political territoriality was stronger at the 
party than the state-governmental level. Victor L. Mote and William Trout, “Political 
Territoriality and the End of the USSR,” Space and Polity 7, no. 1 (2003): 25. 
247 According to Roy, “it goes hand in hand with the establishment of territorialized 
solidarity groups. Regionalist factionalism is explained by this double transformation: 
the recomposition of solidarity groups, and the ruralisation of the party’s cadres. Even 
when, in the 1950s, the educational level of cadres rose significantly (at that time they 
were all engineers), the fact of their rural origins, of rootedness in their district, and 
their links with the structure of the kolkhoz remained very strong” Roy, The New Central 
Asia. The Creation of Nations, 103. 
60 
 
Patrimonialism is a Weberian concept of pre–bureaucratic patriarchal 
domination that is based on a “strict personal loyalty.”248 Analyzing 
contemporary societies, neopatrimonialism can be simplistically considered 
as a variant of patrimonialism [that] stresses the function played by vestiges of 
traditionalism and informal politics in newly emerging modem bureaucratic 
regimes. A starting point for neopatrimonial regimes is the crystallization of 
power in the center in relation to the periphery. Central elites establish control 
over political entities, which were created mainly by previous colonial powers, 
and as such attempt to structurally and ideologically transform the periphery.249 
Alisher Ilkhamov observes how the neopatrimonial concept perfectly suits 
the Uzbek experience250, where the state ideology and propaganda were 
functional to legitimize the patrimonial state. According to the author, the 
origins of such a system are pre–1917, with the institution of tanho (license) 
offered from the Emir of Bukhara to the local beks (governors) “to collect from 
local peasants taxes designed to fulfil both their private needs and the 
maintenance of local administration.”251 In exchange, the Emir received 
allegiance, military support, and part of the revenues collected.252 Such a 
system of tax collection imposed by a 'suzerain' upon his 'vassals' can be 
interpreted as the precursor of the Soviet neopatrimonial redistributive system 
that institutionalized in an official framework the patron–client ties within the 
party and bureaucracy, which expanded during the late Stalin era. Thus, these 
categories become relevant in order to analyze the Brezhnevian period. 
1.4.4 The cadres’ stability 
During the ‘reign’ of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982), there was a new 
compromise with those party elites that had been heavily disillusioned by 
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Khrushchev. “Brezhnev’s moderation, his desire to avoid problems and his 
allergy to adventure guaranteed him the largest popularity among bureaucrats 
who had badly endured the Khrushchevian inclination towards risk and 
change.”253 Indeed, the new Soviet leader was responding to the need for 
peace and stability that the Soviet elite was demanding after the turbulent 
period that preceded Brezhnev. And ‘stability of cadres’ itself became a pivotal 
issue that enforced the local patrimonial system and stabilized the power 
networks on the long-term. As Tompson reminds us: 
Brezhnev had become party leader largely because of the party elite’s hostility 
towards Khrushchev’s frequent reorganizations and even more frequent 
redeployment of subordinates.254  
The Brezhnevian peaceful reaction against the destalinization ‘soft terror’ 
was based on the slogans “Stability of cadres”, “Trust in cadres”, and “Respect 
for cadres”, as response to the Khrushchevian cadre reshuffling policy that had 
been exacerbated during the 1960–1961 ‘bloodless purges’ when about two-
thirds of the RSFSR obkom secretaries were replaced.255 Indeed, the stability of 
cadres – even enforced during the XXIII congress in 1966 that eliminated the 
requirement of rotation in some political offices256 – was automatically 
implying the continued reelection of the previous teams,257 the local 
promotion of officials – within the same organization or region – and so an 
excessive longevity of the cadres and the consequent aging of the ruling 
elite.258 At the local level, the ‘stability of cadres’ policy 
had a threefold meaning for national republics: stability of elite’s incumbency, 
stability of intra–elite relations and stability of center–republican relations. 
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Concurrently, liberation from ad hoc intervention from above in local personnel 
matters steadily pushed forward the centrifugal process of republican politics. 
Political autonomy in national republics was enhanced.259 
However, the major consequences of this stability path were indirect and 
negative, since this mechanism created greater opportunities for patronage 
and for “corruption than had previously existed, particularly in outlying 
republics with long–serving leaders”.260 In fact, during Brezhnevism, local 
officials at obkom, gorkom and raikom levels spent their careers in the same 
regions, facilitating the development of long–term relation, clientelism, 
patron–client networks, localism and personal allegiances, enforcing the basis 
of patronage politics261 in the USSR and contributing to “strengthening of 
regional allegiances and to the development of region–based networks among 
political elites.”262 As Markowitz comments: 
Patronage politics at the base of the Soviet state was by no means static. Local 
political offices were often where political careers were established in the 
context of shifting alliances, which had yet to congeal into long–term 
relationships.263 
This trend was even enforced by the fact that Brezhnevism endorsed a 
double complementary trend: meanwhile since the mid–’60s, the Soviet 
leadership sponsored a new (and formal) centralization of the party, it 
supported a regime that was de facto recognizing major autonomy to the 
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republics and the SSRs achieved a level of “quasi–independence.”264 This set 
was a response to the guidelines of the XXIII Congress of the CPSU in 1966, 
where Brezhnev affirmed the right of every nationality to be sovereign in their 
own homelands.265 Thus, in the whole of the USSR, republican leaders 
substantially received “a broad autonomy of action in exchange for loyalty and 
anti–nationalism”266 and their power was “equivalent to that of provincial 
governors in the Roman Empire.”267 About this policy, the Kazakh FS 
Dinmukhamed Kunaev remembered Brezhnev for having granted to the 
republics “the ability to act independently” by creating a pact of fidelity 
between local elites and Moscow where the FS served as a mediator.268 
Brezhnevism denounced terror as a matter of course269 in order to indorse 
what Gorbachev later defined as a tolerant and peaceful “gentlemen’s 
agreement” in which the center “endowed the first secretaries with almost 
unlimited power in their regions, and they in turn had to support the General 
Secretary, praising him as leader and chief.”270 This ‘quasi–feudal’271 system 
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allowed Moscow to rule according to the strategic priorities of the state and 
on ideological issues while the republics had freedom in the administration of 
extensive rural areas and in controlling the distribution of posts – particularly 
at local levels in oblasts and raions – and much of the economic resources 
coming from the center. This autonomist attitude was particularly evident in 
Central Asia272, where Moscow delegated its power to a group of loyal clients 
that ruled through a system based on what Tunçer–Kılavuz defines as 
‘territorial networks’. These groups were not just ‘clans’ based on kinship, nor 
purely ‘regional alliances’ but represented a very complex phenomenon that is 
not restricted to clan–based and regional affiliation but draws “on various 
loyalties including ties of family, friendship, work, education and patron–client 
relationships.”273 This kind of dynamic was evident at both party and 
bureaucratic levels. In these semi–autonomous and personalistic systems – 
which were ruled at lower levels by the territorial power networks based within 
the party and republican institutions – patronage intensified and there were 
negative consequences, such as corruption, rent seeking, blat, and 
zemlyachestvo.274 However, these conditions were not new elements within 
the USSR, but they were accelerated during Brezhnevism even assuming a 
systemic character. On this matter, Marco Buttino offers a clear corollary 
where he states: 
The patrimonial nature of the Soviet state was probably the ripe fruit of the 
revolution from above of the Stalinism years. At that time, the economy was 
developing through large mobilization campaigns, the apparatus followed the 
implacable will of the leadership, pandering to it and feeling threatened by it. 
The system was able to mobilize people, but few knew the reality of the country 
because all those responsible, at every level, gave the information that the 
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central authorities wanted to hear from them, rather than the truth. Purges and 
unlimited violence by the State served to spur mobilization, eliminate those 
undecided and force the culprits to justify their failures. The compromise of the 
Brezhnev years made the country more peaceful, but did not provide to the 
state a modern bureaucracy. It continued the cycle made of personalism, 
clientelism and corruption, followed by scandals and purges. The state, which 
was unable to know the country and to control the apparatuses, and which 
could no longer use unlimited violence, began the path to decline in those 
years.275 
In fact, due to the Brezhnevian peaceful and autonomist path, the stability 
of the system depended on the level of cooptation of local elites through the 
nomenklatura system that empowered them276 to recruit their protégés and 
which was determining the remuneration of labor and the allocation of 
privileges.277 A leader that was able to coopt elites by redistributing status and 
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socio–economic privileges would ultimately create a bond of loyalty and 
dependence that would guarantee the stability of his post278, and this dynamic 
was present from top to bottom – and vice–versa – in a self–conserving vicious 
circle.  This scheme was than defined in a quasi-pyramidal shape,279 the apex 
of which was the leadership of the CC CPSU. It had clients at the central and 
SSR levels, which proceeded downwards. Then the republican parties were 
mediating between the CPSU and the obkoms,280 which can be considered as 
the effective central institute of the Brezhnevian decentralized system, 
exercising “considerable influence over distributions of resources from the 
state to local economic units within their jurisdiction.”281 In fact, the obkom FSs 
“held power over appointments and resources in their oblasts [...and] were the 
distributors of political and economic benefits, with the power to appoint or 
dismiss local officials in their region”.282 Basically, these lower–level party 
leaders could be considered as the effective entry points for access to inputs – 
raw materials, technology, and specialized labor – for the productive and 
redistributive operations. Hence, Markowitz argues: 
[the obkom FSs] embodied political authority and served as points of access to 
state rents, they were highly sought after by local economic actors (such as 
collective farm chairs), who viewed them as means of converting their resources 
into rents as well as a way to influence government policies.283 
Substantially, they were warranting an ostentatious (and maybe not fully 
honest) political loyalty to the republican power in exchange for an unlimited 
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control over appointments and resources in their own oblasts, giving great 
power to a small number of ruling elites and helping to “consolidate regionally 
based networks of elites who were free to promote their ‘loyal kinsmen’”284 
even using the opportunity “to benefit themselves and their friends, families, 
and others in a position to provide reciprocal benefits.”285 Therefore, oblasts 
were the main bases of benefits exchange and the obkom FSs the principal 
clients of the central republican party and the main providers of resources – 
employment, promotions, assistance, welfare, permits, access to important 
goods and services, land286 – and career advancement, creating in turn patron–
client relations with the elites in their regions – as kolkhozes,287 managers of 
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factories and district leaders – in which protection and access to resources was 
exchanged even for illicit incomes. Finally, Critchlow comments Rashidov’s 
mestnichestvo and lack of inter-oblast mobility. In his words: 
Under Rashidov, cadre practices allowed officials at the gorkom/raikom level to 
spend much of their careers in the same oblast, facilitating development of a 
network of personal ties. The cohesion of personnel networks based on oblasts 
during the Rashidov period is made particularly striking by examination of the 
biographies of gorkom/raikom officiate in the group elected to the republican 
Supreme Soviet in 1975. Previous employment in the same oblast had played a 
significant role in furthering advancement to their present positions. Of 47 in 
the group, nearly all had either been recruited from the oblast in which they 
were serving or had served in it at an earlier point in their careers. This lack of 
inter-oblast mobility was probably attributable to the role of the oblast 
committees in controlling the city and district nomenklatura. Whatever the 
case, it helped to pave the way for "localism" and lasting personal allegiances 
within the oblast. [...] Of 31 oblast-level officials included in the 1975 Supreme 
Soviet deputies’ directory, 23 had held a previous post in the same oblast. While 
this may reflect a tendency to assign people to areas with which they were 
familiar, it also suggests that oblast interests were able to prevail even in 
Tashkent.288 
The author continues his evaluation, underlining how in the party selection 
preferred non-worker white collar citizens instead of blue collars workers, and 
there was a low participations of women, considering that "of the 245 persons 
in leadership or other elite positions elected to the republican Supreme Soviet 
in 1975, only 19 (7.8 percent) were women" as well there were not enough 
young representatives: on that sum, nobody was under 35 years old and the 
average was of 50 years old, reflecting a continuation in the aksakalism (with-
beard) tradition.289 
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1.4.5 The ‘social contract’ 
In this framework, the socialist orthodoxy was undermined and the 
informal Brezhnevian ‘social contract’290 – “under which the state provided 
material security in return for political quiescence and compliance”291 – 
became the main functional factor to ‘cadre stability’. Meanwhile, the situation 
was accentuated in which the Soviet leadership’s “disinterest in direct 
governance [which] allow[ed] clan networks to develop vast patronage 
networks that relied on the state and to become deeply entrenched”.292 This 
structure was reflected the indirect rule of Moscow and the party over the 
political and economic system in Central Asia through local trustees. Once mass 
terror was denounced, this tolerant and ‘pacific’ way, which dovetailed well 
with the social dimension of Central Asia, was the only possible solution to keep 
the regime stable: for this reason, the party had to be aware of how to respect 
and to exploit the dynamics in the intra–clan/regional balance of power and its 
representativeness.293 The resulting corrupt and lax atmosphere became the 
triggering factors of an economic and political system that had started to be 
founded on lies and delusional concordance. Il'ia Zemtsov describes a system 
in which regional politicians were in a position to extract unusually large sums 
of money from local economic actors within their jurisdiction. In his words: 
the secretary of the party committee of an industrial region accumulates sums 
that far exceed his formal salary. This illicit income is derived from obligatory 
tributes and dues from various enterprises and from sums given by 
administrative organs – the police, judges, prokurators. The secretary of the 
party committee of a rural region accumulates about as much, the loss of 
industrial income being compensated for by payments from collective and state 
farms.294 
                                                          
290 The Brezhnevian "social contract" involved the construction of a vast and expensive 
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According to Markowitz, in exchange for this income, 
party secretaries provided protection for those within their jurisdiction–
particularly from organs of local law enforcement that were formally 
responsible for exercising control and surveillance over these economic 
operations. The fact that police, judges, and prokurators also paid bribes to 
obkom first secretaries demonstrates how informal relationships encompassed 
and undermined formal mechanisms of social and political control–what were 
known as ‘family circles of local elites.’295 
The administrative organs themselves were involved in the mechanism, 
even receiving bribes or favors from local economic heads, which they passed 
on to the obkom FS. The party leaders – of republic, obkom, gorkom, and 
raikom – protected the system by colluding with police and Prokuratura, 
receiving bribes, and warning tolchaki (pushers/intermediators) in good time 
in order to impede inspections.296 Parallel, local party secretaries could get 
protection, even passing “on a portion of their income to higher ups in the state 
apparatus to ensure the distribution of production inputs and local budget 
funds from the republican center”.297 These parallel informal systems extended 
upward to the republican central committee FS who was in turn beholden to 
Moscow.298 This pyramidal patronage system was in this way colluding from 
the lowest levels of the local party to the highest cadres of the republican party 
and, then, to the heart of the CPSU. Through this kind of informal network, the 
Brezhnevian system reinforced (and further entrenched) in the UzSSR those 
above-mentioned power networks/clans that had persisted even after the 
Bolshevik reconquest.299 As Collins comments: 
Soviet policies ‘modernized’ clans, by driving them underground and linking 
them with corruption, mafioso activities, and the second economy, but did not 
seriously attempt to eradicate them.” 300  
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The political hierarchy of regions in the Soviet system – in which some 
regions were more important on political and economic levels – increased the 
dominance of certain regions and elite groups inside the republics. In 
Uzbekistan, this hierarchy depended on the influence of the clans – Tashkent, 
Fergana, and Samarkand based – and the importance of their elite that 
“enjoyed greater opportunities for promotion to significant posts than the elite 
from other regions of the republic.”301 These three groups had had in fact 
shared the positions of the party and the republic respecting a balance of 
power. At the same time, the elites from other regions also received a 
significant share of power within the framework of various alliance/cooptation 
relationships, but they were excluded from the top positions.302 In Uzbekistan, 
the nomenklatura system encouraged a diffusion of patronage in the republic. 
By 1967, 590 gorkom and raikom secretaries and raispolkom chairs passed 
through the Tashkent High Party School’s inter–republic programs of study, 
coming from all provinces. The same year, the school created six–month ‘inter–
oblast’ courses in Tashkent, Fergana, and Samarkand, and in its first year 
approximately nine hundred staff members of district party committees and 
soviets were trained at the three sites. For elites from across Uzbekistan, these 
inter–republic and interregional courses were sites at which contacts could be 
established and relationships formed.303 
As we have seen, during Rashidov’s reign the CPUz tried to satisfy all groups, 
without excluding some from the system’s benefits, by coopting potential rivals 
that could challenge the existing power in the top posts. This compromise 
worked until 1969–1971 – with the removal of Nasriddinova–Kurbanov – after 
which Samarkanders and their affiliates slowly rose to the top of the party and 
state posts.  
In a generally shared interpretation of Rashidovism, the Uzbek leader was 
a loyal Brezhnev client who “played the role of a ‘nineteenth–century khan’ 
delivering resources to the tsar while ruling independently within his 
territory.”304 During his ‘reign’, his clan predominated even in an 
institutionalized dimension by the creation of the Navoii (1982) and Jizzak 
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oblasts (1973) – which were dissolved after Rashidov’s death.305 By establishing 
new provinces Rashidov wanted to enforce his patronage base. However, 
Rashidovism can be read as a typical derivation of the Brezhnevian patronage 
system with the peculiarities of Uzbek ‘transformism’ that was based on clan 
dimensions, dividing oppositions and to co–opting members of other rival clans 
just to create a strong network of loyal figures all around UzSSR. In fact, 
Rashidov was able to divide the front of Tashkenters, coopting a part of them: 
i.e. were the Tashkenter buro members as Musakhanov and Salimov – who 
spent their previous careers in Tashkent and Moscow – or Khojaev, who 
became a new member in 1976, and rose his career in Samarkand and 
Namangan.306 As we have seen, this loyalty was more career/personal than 
territorial based, defining a typical case of institutionalized patrimonialism of 
the top republican leadership that was directly linked to the FS. As Norling 
clearly notes: 
the vast majority of Uzbek obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov were 
parachuted into these positions from elsewhere and did not rise through the 
oblasts in question. Of the 32 obkom First Secretaries for whom complete data 
are available under Rashidov, only 10% percent had served in the oblast of 
appointment immediately prior to being named First Secretary, only 4% 
remained in the province after terminating service, and around 45% came from 
a position in the republic–level government. Notably, more than 76% of these 
obkom First Secretaries had served in more than three oblasts during their 
careers and only 21% were natives of the oblast in which they served [...] Finally, 
72% of the obkom First Secretaries under Rashidov served in both parts of 
Uzbekistan’s historical divide, the former Khanate of Kokand and Emirate of 
Bukhara."307 
Such a ‘nation building experiment’ clearly demonstrates how influential 
the FS was and how the obkoms were not necessarily ruled by locals; this 
downplays the persuasiveness of different assumptions made about the clans’ 
                                                          
305 On 29 December 1973, Sharaf Rashidov made his hometown of Jizzak - formerly part 
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territoriality.308 Rashidov’s transformism, paternalism, and his attitude to 
satisfy the needs – with resources that patronage relations provided – of 
almost all of the elite groups led to a huge consensus toward his regime, 
avoiding his clients competing or looking for patronage elsewhere. 
Furthermore, another base to build Rashidov’s network was related to 
personal and family ties, infiltrating his relatives and friends into important 
government positions: two of his daughters married important men affiliated 
to the Muminov clan who had a decisive influence on the Samarkand and 
Bukhara regions. His son was also married to a daughter of Kallibek Kamalov -
the FS Karakalpak obkom (1963–1984) - also maintaining a firm influence over 
the Karakalpak clan. This ‘patrimonial contract’ offered protection and was set 
in general terms and not in details, allowing sort of ‘fluid’ relationships and 
discretional autonomy at lower levels. 
As we have seen, patronage was a typical informal power practice in the 
USSR and particularly tolerated in Uzbekistan, where it could combine with 
some traditional elements of the Uzbek society – such as the clans – defining 
that sort of neo–patrimonial situation we have described above. However, it 
had to be functional to the center’s interests. As Everett underlines: “if Moscow 
depended upon them to a degree […] they were dependent ultimately upon 
Moscow for their tenure of power.”309 This interdependence relation clarifies 
that, ultimately, Moscow tolerated these proto–states (or ‘reigns’) within 
Soviet borders, but it could define their limits and their own persistence if they 
became counterproductive to the central state. In the next chapter, we will 
analyze the main legitimation factor of Rashidov’s tenure – the improvement 
of cotton monoculture in the UzSSR – and then the origin of the ‘Uzbek cotton 
affair’, as a dramatic example of how all these dynamics combined, creating 
the preconditions for a critically irreversible situation where Moscow imposed 
once again its authority in Central Asia, retracting ‘from above’ that local-level 
autonomy. 
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2 THE ‘COTTON REPUBLIC’ 
 
Золотые руки делают белое золото!1 
Brezhnev: “Round it off to six million, Sharafchik!” 
Rashidov: “Yes sir, Leonid Illich!”2 
 
Cotton has been defined as an element of social “proletarization” across 
the world, characterizing the history of human development as well as 
international economic and power relations.3 In Soviet history, cotton also 
became a crucial element at the center of economic, social and even political 
dynamics. In fact, cotton emerged as an issue to be exploited by local politicians 
in order to legitimize their power towards the center of the empire. The 
Russian conquest and the later Soviet experience imposed a new political, 
economic, and social system in Central Asia where Uzbekistan became a region 
for intensive agricultural production. In Soviet times, the region became hyper-
specialized in cotton monoculture and related products,4 requiring the 
improvement of artificial irrigation networks as well as industrial machinery 
(sowers, harvesters, cultivators) and processing plants (to clean cotton and to 
produce cottonseed oil), chemicals (for fertilizers, pesticides, defoliants), 
                                                          
1 “Golden hands make white gold” was a famous expression - often attributed to 
Brezhnev – used to thank Soviet cotton-growers. 
2 This alleged conversation between Brezhnev and Rashidov in the late ‘70s, became a 
famous anecdote that was even reported in an interview in Pravda (17 July 1988) with 
former Uzbek Party officials in prison in Moscow on charges of corruption. James 
Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Independence 
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A. Knopf, 2014). 
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Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed 
Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 63. 
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textile mills, military industry etc. The origins of cotton monoculture lie in the 
colonial period. However, the CPUz received a strong push from the mid-1970s 
when Uzbek cotton became the main social, economic, and political strength 
of the republic within the Soviet system. Therefore, the following analysis of 
the history of the imposition of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan has 
numerous functions. Through cotton development in the UzSSR it is possible: 
to follow the steps of the ‘technological modernization and economic 
development of a backward region’ narrative; to understand how, from a 
political history perspective, cotton became the key component of maintaining 
legitimacy and stability for local cadres; to identify the environmental 
characteristics that led to a redefinition of the ecosystem, and one of the worst 
environmental disasters in human history; and finally, to understand the roots 
of the interdependence of the center and the periphery of the Soviet system 
and – as will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter – how this became 
highly salient in the course of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’. 
 
2.1 The origins of cotton monoculture 
The imposition of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan proceeded gradually 
over the last century. Its origins are identifiable in the colonial system of Tsarist 
Russia. However, this policy was exponentially pursued during the Soviet 
period through a series of phases. 
2.1.1 The Tsarist cotton in Turkestan 
The cotton plant is endemic in Central Asia, and has been used and 
cultivated for centuries. During the colonial period, Russians encouraged the 
cultivation of cotton in the region,5 promoting irrigation and land 
improvement6 and consolidating the trade between Turkestan and Saint 
                                                          
5 The main areas of cotton cultivation in Central Asia included the Syrdarya basin in the 
Ferghana Valley, the Turan Lowland in Khorezm, the Hungry Steppe between Tashkent 
and Samarkand, the Zeravshan Basin close to Samarkand, the Surkhandarya area 
between Bukhara and Afghanistan, Chirchik, and the northern suburbs of Tashkent, 
Murgab (in Tajikistan), Tedzhen (in Southern Turkmenia), and the lands of the middle 
Amu Darya and parts of its lower course. Ibid., 87. 
6 Akmal Bazarbaev, “XIX Asr Oxiri-XX Asr Boshlarida Turkistonda Er Egaligi An’analari va 
Transformatsiya Jarayonlari,” in O’zbekiston Qishloq Xo’jaligi Masalalari: Tarix va 
Taraqqiyot (Samarqand: O’zReFATi, 2016), 85–95. 
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Petersburg during the “cotton boom”.7 In 1885, this led to the first large 
importation of cotton from Turkestan – 67 tons in total.8 In very warm and dry 
climatic conditions with low rainfall, the implementation of cotton cultivation 
went in parallel with the irrigation process9 that diverted the two main Uzbek 
rivers – the Amudarya and the Syrdarya – to the fields.10 In fact, Russians 
encouraged the irrigation of Uzbekistan in particular, as it was considered 
functional for cotton cultivation. In 1886, Grand Duke Nikolai Konstantinovich 
organized the construction of the Khiva-Aryk and the Bukhar-Aryk canals – 
which in 1896 were extended to form the Nikolai I Canal11 – in the Hungry 
Steppe. One year later, the post of regional irrigator ‘‘for management of large 
irrigation canals in the region’’ was established by the Turkestan General-
Governor and in 1892 the post of Official for Special Missions in irrigation was 
established by the General-Governor. In 1896, the construction of a canal of 
300 versts (320 km) began, in order to connect Amu Darya waters to the lands 
of Bukhara Emirate. As well as this, in 1901 the construction of a colossal canal 
that was projected to irrigate 45,000 dessiatinas in the northeastern part of the 
Hungry Steppe began, and the work was completed in 1913. Later, the 
Romanov canal – “the first successful irrigational project in all Turkestan”12 – 
began, irrigating 32 thousand dessiatinas with waters from the Syr Darya.13 The 
opening of irrigation canals became strategically important and also served as 
a diplomatic lever: in 1912, Russia wrested further allowances from the 
Bukhara Emirate, thereby acquiring its first irrigation concession there, totaling 
72.5 thousand dessiatinas. At the same time, cotton production expanded 
throughout the empire, and 1913 was considered "the best year in the period 
before the revolution” with a production of 518,000 tons of cotton in what will 
                                                          
7 Beatrice Penati, “The Cotton Boom and the Land Tax in Russian Turkestan (1880s–
1915),” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14, no. 4 (2013). 
8 Igor S. Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 252. 
9 Irrigation became a fundamental modernizing technique to reduce the costs of cotton 
culture. In fact, due to Central Asia’s hot and dry climate, 570 m3 of water was needed 
to produce a quintal of cotton, and in some regions of Uzbekistan, such as Khorezm, 
even 700-800 m3 because of the high salinity of the soil. However, this could be reduced 
to 400 in some regions – as in the Hungry Steppe – where more advanced dripping 
irrigation technology was installed. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its 
Costs,” 79. 
10 Zhores Aleksandrovich Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: Norton, 1987), 231. 
11 The Nikolay I canal had a throughput of 11 m3/s, length 70 versts (75 km), and an area 
of irrigation for 7,000 dessiatinas. Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 253. 
12 Ibid., 254–55. 
13 Vasili Barthold, A History of Irrigation in Turkestan, 1963. 
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be Uzbekistan.14 As grand as this seems, production was to further increase 
tenfold in less than seventy years. 
2.1.2 The Bolshevik recipe for Uzbek cotton 
The development of cotton and irrigation in Central Asia continued under 
the Bolshevik regime. In 1918, a decree from Lenin assigned “50 million rubles 
for irrigational works”, creating the Turkestan Board of Water Management 
(Turkvodkhoz) and a Technical Irrigational Committee to manage water issues 
in the region. In that moment, all main canals and irrigation construction in the 
Turkestan Republic were placed under the jurisdiction of the People’s 
Commissariat of Agriculture of Russia.15 Then, in 1920, a decree of the Council 
of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR “about restoration16 of cotton culture in 
the Turkestan and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics”17 laid the foundations 
for the imposition of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan. The logic was for each 
region of the country to specialize in one output, which would maximize labor 
efficiency and promote the development of the socialist state in a context of 
permanent economic interdependence. The Bolshevik campaign for improving 
cotton cultivation and irrigation in Turkestan was even followed at the 
ideological level. Indeed, in 1921 Lenin remarked on the importance of 
irrigation as a base for building socialism, championing “irrigation, for more 
than anything else it will revive the area and regenerate it, bury the past and 
make the transition to socialism more certain.”18 Hence, cotton production 
became a state matter and had an impact on the formation of a special 
management system. 
                                                          
14 Arif Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward (London: Soviet Booklets, 1960), 
15. 
15 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 255. 
16 Restoration was a proper term, considering that the production of raw cotton 
dramatically decreased during the civil war, and only in 1928 the pre-war levels were 
reaffirmed again. In fact, the production of white gold felt from 517.2 thousand tons in 
1913 to 205.8 in 1924 and recovered during the first FYP reaching 533.3 in 1928, 744.3 
in 1930 and 785.8 in 1932. Azizur Rahman Khan and Dharam P. Ghai, Collective 
Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia (London: Macmillan Press & 
ILO, 1979), 21. 
17 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 256. 
18 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, “To the Comrades Communists of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, 
Daghestan, and the Mountaineer Republic,” in Collected Works, Vol 32 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1965), 318. 
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In Uzbekistan, Stalinism would further accentuate the features of what was 
to become the main base for Soviet cotton. In fact, collectivization was initiated 
first in the cotton sector, starting in 1925 in the fertile Ferghana Valley.19 
Parallel to this, in 1928 the first plan for the industrial reconstruction of the 
republic was announced in great fanfare as the main goal to purpose20 and 
collectivization started to take massive proportions, encompassing the whole 
of the Uzbek agricultural system. At that time, Soviet propaganda supported 
the campaign of modernization of Uzbek rural areas and even the Soviet 
playwrights Ilf and Petrov, in their “Twelve Chairs” (1928), had Ostap 
sarcastically declare that in the USSR everyone “drank to public education and 
to the irrigation of Uzbekistan.”21 
As the Soviet system was erected in Uzbekistan, the Zarafshan and 
Ferghana Valleys emerged as the main agricultural centers and, after 
collectivization, as the primary areas in which economic resources were 
developed.22 In that period, the economic planning regime was implemented 
and Uzbekistan became the first region in the Soviet economy for the 
production of cotton. As a result, all economic and social energies were focused 
on cotton. Traditional economic patterns were abandoned and most of 
pastures and agriculture fields were destroyed to open space for the ‘white 
gold’ monoculture that, after 1931, was directly controlled by Moscow 
planners.23 
The Stalinist recipe - based on collectivization and forced settlement, and 
aimed at boosting cotton production - contributed to the rural character of 
society in Uzbekistan.24 The sovietization of the agriculture sector – in which 
                                                          
19 Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 14. 
20 According to Alimov, the construction of “new industries had been started, including 
coal, chemicals, farm machines and electric power” and in the first FYP (1929-1933) 
alone more than 200 industrial complexes were built, and the Turkestan-Siberian 
railway and the chemical plant in Chirchik completed. Ibid., 7. 
21 Ilya Ilf and Evgeny Petrov, Dvenadtsat Stulyev (Moskva: ZiF, 1928). 
22 Lawrence P Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in 
Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 32. 
23 In 1931 control over cotton production was transferred from the Sredazkhlopok to 
the national cotton boards and the Narkomzem – the People's Commissariat for 
Agriculture – in Moscow was reorganized to have direct links with the cotton producing 
Central Asian republics. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 871, l. 17. 
24 In the late '50s, almost 40% of the labor force was absorbed by kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes and only 25% was employed in industry. RGANI, f.6, op. 6, d. 1106. 
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millions of rubles in field development programs were invested throughout the 
1930s – was implemented through two systems that integrated and 
collectivized rural society inside the system. The first were the kolkhozes - 
collective farms that were mainly composed of populations of the same region, 
strengthening regional identities. The second was the sovkhozes – or state 
farms. Both became key factors for including and collectivizing rural society 
inside the system. In fact, “these farms were critical instruments of social 
control through which state power was extended over the countryside”25 and 
were hierarchically organized and put under the dual control of state and party. 
According to Markowitz: 
the regime came to rely on farm chairs as agents of the state for mobilizing rural 
labor, distributing resources, utilizing technical equipment and fulfilling 
agriculture production plans. This provided farm chairs with informal authority 
as large-scale operations and economic resources were placed under their 
control.26 
During the second FYP (1933-1937), massive investment in irrigation 
infrastructure of some 27.1 million rubles occurred, mainly concentrated in 
those oblasts where cotton production was more intensive, such as Khorezm, 
Ferghana, Samarkand, Tashkent, and Bukhara. Also, a plan to develop the 
desert lands of Karakalpakya was promoted and in 1935 the Kyzketken – the 
main canal of the oblast, with a length of 25 km and a charge of 210 m3/s – 
which drew water from the Amu Darya was constructed. Parallel to this, the 
Soviet regime formalized incentives for cotton cultivation in Central Asia 
through the premii-nadbavok (premiums) and the kontraktsionnyi dogovor 
(contractual agreements).27 These projects set the stage for a systemic and 
intensive regimen of land use aimed at the cultivation of cotton in the region. 
However, besides these large innovations, the real turning point came in 
the period 1937-1939 with the completion of major infrastructure projects. In 
1938, “investments in these regions [...] alone amount[ed] to more than 7 
million rubles, which is a significant amount when viewed alongside the total 
investments in Uzbekistan for the five years prior”.28 In 1939, the CC ACP(B) 
                                                          
25 Ibid., 33. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Grey Hodnett, “Technology and Social Change in Soviet Central Asia: The Politics of 
Cotton Growing,” in Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970’s, ed. Henry W Morton, 
Rudolf L Tökés, and John N Hazard (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 68. 
28 In 1938, the total irrigation investment in Khorezm amounted to 2,055,000 rubles, in 
Ferghana 1,665,000, in Samarkand 1,000,000, in Tashkent 868,000, and in Bukhara 
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approved a decision “about measures on the further increase of the cotton 
industry in Uzbekistan”29 that allocated heavy investments for irrigation in the 
UzSSR: five million rubles for completing the Large Ferghana canal – a colossal 
infrastructure project that the regime celebrated as "the victory of man over 
the desert"30 – and another 10 million31 for the Southern and Northern 
Ferghana canals, the Tashkent canal, the Kattakurgan water transfer facility in 
Samarkand, the Tash-Sakin canal in Khorezm, and the unification of the Su-Eli 
and Lenin-Yab canals in Karakalpakstan into one large canal named after V.I. 
Lenin.32 These innovations contributed towards a Soviet production record of 
cotton that was about 2.24 million tons annually in the early ‘40s.33 Then, 
during wartime, the industrialization of the UzSSR and the relocation of 
industries in the region went alongside the development of the cotton sector 
as well. This increasing demand was also due to the fact that cotton was a 
strategic resource for the war effort. In fact, the military textile industry drew 
heavily on this cotton for producing cheaper and resistant uniforms, for camp 
logistics, and for the manufacture of explosives. In fact, cotton was used to 
produce gunpowder and blasting material for explosives such as nitrocellulose, 
pyroxylin, and the so-called ‘gun cotton.’34 
                                                          
720.000. Meanwhile, the other seven provinces received just 922,000 rubles. Cf. 
Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central Asia, 40–
41. 
29 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 257. 
30 Alimov recalls the event, stating: “None of us will ever forget the summer of 1939, 
when 160,000 peasants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan set to work to build the 170-
mile-long Ferghana Canal. They did it in forty-five days” Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big 
Leap Forward, 13. 
31 Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central Asia, 41. 
32 The “Lenin” canal - 110 km long and with a head charge of 240 m3/s – was constructed 
to irrigate the Hodzhely and Kungrad regions, on the left bank of the Amu Darya. 
33 Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Independence, 63. 
34 Pikhoya comments: "The cotton had a significant importance for the military industry 
complex, and in particular for the production of gunpowder. It was generally a scarce 
and highly demanded raw material for many productions, that was long-awaited by 
Moscow that prompted to produce more cotton and never met the effective demand, 
from gunpowder to be pillowcases. Therefore, cotton was included in the category of 
scarce (defitsyt) goods." Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 
10 December 2015. Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism, xii–
xiii; Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Prezident Rossiyskoy Federatsii Boris Nikolayevich 
Yel’tsin (Moskva: Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 2015). 
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2.1.3 The post-war cotton planning 
In order to further enforce the cotton sector in the UzSSR, action was taken 
even before the war had ended. In 1944 the CC ACP(B) approved a decision 
“about measures for reconstruction and development of the cotton industry in 
Uzbekistan” and in 1945 the Sovnarkom of the USSR accepted the "measures 
on restoration and the further development of the cotton industry in 
Uzbekistan" providing "plans and actions for restoration and further rise of the 
cotton industry in Uzbekistan for the period of 1946–1953.”35 “The importance 
of cotton in the Soviet economy was emphasized in Stalin's speech of 9 
February 1946, in which he mentioned cotton together with metals, fuels, and 
grains as products which were to constitute the bases for the postwar economy 
[…Then,] in February 1949 a decree was promulgated by the Soviet Council of 
Ministers to cope with the problem of increasing cotton production. The object 
of this decree was to create a cotton base which would attain and surpass the 
prewar level considerably.”36 
In fact, even after WW2, Moscow reaffirmed the importance of developing 
cotton as well as other agriculture and livestock in Central Asia as strategic 
issues of the Soviet economic system. The goal was to promote the 
construction of large hydric infrastructures in order to maximize irrigation and 
agricultural production and to develop hydropower in Central Asia. In 1948, the 
Farhad hydrosystem37 was constructed and in 1950, under Stalin’s initiative, 
the proposal of the SM USSR to construct the Turkmen canal was approved to 
divert Amu Darya waters to the Western part of the Karakum desert. A year 
later, the construction of the Amu-Bukhara canal began, meanwhile, in 1952 
the SM USSR approved a decision (N° 3975) about irrigation and land-
reclamation for the further development of cotton production in the Andijan, 
Namangan, Ferghana, and Surkhandarya regions of the UzSSR. In 1954, the CC 
CPSU promoted plans for further development of cotton production in 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan for the period 1954–1958.38 In fact, 
after the ‘50s the Uzbek irrigation system began to use pumps and automated 
                                                          
35 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 258. 
36 CIA, “CIA/SC/RR94 - Soviet Cotton Production in the Postwar Period,” 1955, 3, 7. 
37 “A hydroelectric power station and water reservoir of daily regulation with useful 
volume of 0.15 km3, [...] providing a main water draw-off from Syrdarya for irrigation of 
all the Hungry and Dalverzinsk steppes”. Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 258. 
38 Ibid., 259. 
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machines,39 proceeding parallel to a major campaign for the exploitation of 
Central Asian steppe and desert territories that was following the policy 
encouraged by the new Soviet leadership. Indeed, after 1953, Khrushchev 
heartened the “conquest” of the ‘Virgin lands’ of the Kazakh steppes. This plan 
redefined agriculture in Soviet Central Asia – later becoming a huge 
propaganda theme under Brezhnevism.40 While the Virgin Lands campaign 
emphasized mainly the production of grain, it would echo across the whole 
Central Asian agricultural system, heavily affecting the cotton production as 
well as upsetting the path of Syr Darya.  
At the same time as his agricultural programme, Khrushchev tried to bring 
the administrative apparatus closer to agriculture production, devolving 
authority to lower levels of the state and to collective farms.41 This plan of 
reforms sought to “reduce administrative agents' shirking of responsibilities by 
assigning them specific (as opposed to overlapping) duties, [and] these changes 
unintentionally provided collective farm chairs with increased maneuvering 
room within the soviet state apparatus.”42 Therefore, from the ‘50s, the 
managers of collective farms were enjoying such autonomy from the state 
farms that they could purchase and own “all the inputs used in agriculture 
                                                          
39 Asat Niyazovich Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari 
(1917-1991 Y.y.)” (Tarix fanlari doktori ilmiy darajasini olish uchun taqdim etilgan 
dissertasiya. Toshkent., 2010), 181. 
40 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Trilogy. Little Land, Rebirth, The Virgin Lands (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1980). 
41 During the Stalinist period, responsibility for exercising control over collective farms 
was divided between the rayon party committee (raikom) and the machine tractor 
station (MTS). Although these organizations commanded considerable formal authority, 
effective administrative controls over collective farms were not established. The 
Khrushchevian decentralization reforms would inevitably change this pattern. 
42 From 1953, “all those functions originally assigned to the inspection apparatus of the 
USSR Ministry of agriculture were transferred to a system of inspectors at the provincial 
level, placing them under the authority of specialized organs within obkom offices. This 
turned the Ministry into a coordinating apparatus with much less authority to intervene 
in agricultural production. Further, [after] March 1954, collective farm chairs were 
placed on the nomenklatura of the provincial party (obkomy) and republican central 
committees, which reflected the fact that a much larger proportion of farm chairs were 
members of the party. Then, in the late ‘50s farm chairs received more autonomy when 
Khrushchev abolished machine tractor stations and transferred their personal and 
equipment to collective farms”. Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and 
Unruly Elites in Central Asia, 33. 
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production, determine the wages of farm workers, sell production to the state, 
and retain surplus income.”43 
As mentioned, the production of cotton was a strategic issue for the USSR 
and it became a key material even in the Cold War, to the extent that Soviet 
adversaries even commented on the issue. A top secret CIA report dated 1955 
noted: 
Edible oils, livestock feed, clothing and cloth of all types, canvas, fertilizers, 
lacquers, paper, plastics, tires, and explosives are but a few of the many diverse 
products derived from the processed cotton fibers, seeds, and linters. Cotton 
plays an important part in consumer goods production. Cotton cloth is the basis 
of the Soviet textile industry, constituting over 85 percent of textile production 
in the postwar years. [...] Cotton seed is the basis of about 25 percent of the 
production of the Soviet vegetable fats and oils industry. Cottonseed meal 
supplements the shortage of fodder crops in the important meat and dairy 
industries.44 
Until the ‘70s, Soviet cotton could compete for quantity and quality45 with 
other international producers – such as the USA, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and 
China – and it was functional to the edification of the Soviet military machine. 
With the outbreak of the Cold War, cotton proved a necessary resource for the 
military sector – as mentioned, it was fundamental for producing explosives 
and gunpowder, and for the development of the ballistic industry because it 
was also used to produce double-base solid propellants for rockets and 
missiles. Data and statistics on these ‘special availments’ – supposedly 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 CIA, “CIA/SC/RR94 - Soviet Cotton Production in the Postwar Period,” 4. 
45 In a memorandum from the UzSSR Ministry of Light Industry on 7 September 1977, 
the agency Gosstandard defined the quality and the seasonal schedule for the cotton 
crop. In fact, the quality depended on the maturity of the cotton flower and first quality 
cotton was taken from a cotton flower matured to 50-60%; the second quality from a 
flower matured to 20-30%, and the third quality remained in the fields to be processed 
with the machines. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 4424, ll. 56-57. 
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collected in the Minsredmash46  and Minobmash47 files – are still classified and 
is difficult to estimate the share of cotton – as well as the activity of the “closed 
factories”48 – that was devoted to the development of the Soviet military 
programme. Therefore, ensuring continuous and expanding cotton production 
became a key issue for the Soviet cadres in order to compete in the arms race 
on a global scale.  
During the ‘‘60s – the so-called “golden age of socialism,”49 defined by 
Graziosi as the “last vital decade”50 of the USSR – the Soviet command 
economy consolidated cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan, in order to provide 
“cheap raw material for industry elsewhere” in a colonial-like system that paid 
scant heed to return on capital investment and environmental costs.51 At this 
time, Moscow’s strategy was aimed at modernizing cotton culture to avoid 
using manual labor or other phenomena as shefstvo52 which illicitly used a 
                                                          
46 The Ministry of Medium Machine Building (Minsredmash) was established in 1953 to 
supervise the Soviet nuclear industry, including production of nuclear warheads.  Its 
apparatus was directed from the center and operating within the republics. Ligachev 
describes Minsredmash as "a state within a state, an industrial empire with its own 
factories, institutes, even cities." Its archives are collected in RGAE, f. 8115 (but just for 
the period 1939-1946) and in RosAtom archives. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, Inside 
Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 
216. 
47 Ministry of General Machine Building (Minobmash), established in 1965 for space and 
ballistic issues. 
48 Buttino reconstructs the story of the Kinap, a ‘closed factory’ in Samarkand that was 
producing military equipment and that was apparently famous for its production of 
loudspeakers. Marco Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi (Rome: 
Viella, 2015), 323. 
49 Nikolaus Katzer, “Dans La Matrice Discursive Du Socialisme Tardif. Les «Mémoires» 
de Leonid Il´ič Brežnev,” Cahiers Du Monde Russe 54, no. 1–2 (2013). 
50 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 235. 
51 Jack F Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 21–22. 
52 The word shefstvo literally refers to “the creation of patronage relations between 
units of the armed forces and local governments”. These human resources were 
informally used in civil administration and productive systems (such as the cotton 
harvest) and the term takes on a broader meaning. Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski, “The 
Inextricable Ties Between Society and The Army in Post-Soviet Russia: The Resurgence 
of Shefstvo Under Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin,” The Journal of Power Institutions in 
Post-Soviet Societies, no. 8 (2008). 
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labor-force that was already occupied.53 The recipe was easy: the improvement 
of mechanization – especially from 195854 - and irrigation55. Therefore, the 
Soviet regime continued to pursue a number of projects for the development 
of cotton cultivation, completing at the end of the ‘50s several irrigation and 
hydric works for improving cotton culture, such as the Katta-Kurgan56 reservoir 
between Bukhara and Samarkand, the Kampyr-Ravat dam irrigation network 
(which brought water to about 500,000 acres), the Northern and Southern 
                                                          
53 A US intelligence report followed the shefstvo phenomenon in the UzSSR, reporting 
an interesting passage: “In December 1959 Khrushchev attended a party meeting in 
Uzbekistan. As the main speaker of the occasion, Sh. R. Rashidov, the first secretary of 
the Uzbekistan Communist Party, described the progress made in the agriculture of 
Uzbekistan and offered several optimistic forecasts on future farm production. At one 
point in his speech, while he was elaborating on the progress being made in the 
changeover to machine labor on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of Uzbekistan, 
Khrushchev interrupted him: “It would be a good thing if pupils, students and soldiers 
were not used at the harvest.” Rashidov replied: “In 1960 not a single student or pupil, 
not a single soldier will work at the harvest.” Whereupon Khrushchev said: “We would 
welcome that.’” This passage is interesting because it exposes an informal practice that 
remained in place throughout the Soviet period. In fact, even in the following years the 
calls to participate in the ‘cotton battle’ drew heavily on military and paramilitary staff. 
For example, in 1976 during the 5th Congress of the Uzbek DOSAAF – Volunteer Society 
for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet, a very famous paramilitary sport 
association in the USSR – attendees were directly reminded of the commitments of the 
paramilitary ‘volunteers’ for the production of Uzbek ‘white gold.’  R. Kolkowicz, 
“Memorandum RM-3360-PR - The Use of Soviet Military Labor in the Civilian Economy: 
A Study of military ‘Shefstvo,’” 1962, 1; FBIS, “Translations on USSR Military Affairs. No, 
1262,” 1977, 47. 
54 Richard Pomfret, “State-Directed Diffusion of Technology: The Mechanization of 
Cotton Harvesting in Soviet Central Asia,” The Journal of Economic History 62, no. 1 
(2002): 170. 
55 In these years, the CC CPSU and the SM USSR adopted a number of decisions to 
increase irrigation and cotton production, particularly n° 1059 (6 August 1956) “About 
irrigation of virgin lands of the Hungry Steppe in Uzbek and Kazakh SSR for increasing 
cotton production”, and n° 645 (14 June 1958) “about the further expansion and 
acceleration of works on irrigation and land-reclamation in Uzbek SSR, Kazakh SSR and 
Tadjik SSR.” Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 260. 
56 The CPUz reported that it “contains 760 million cubic yards of water. It improved the 
water supply of 1 million acres and irrigated for the first time more than 150,000 acres”. 
Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 13. 
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Ferghana canals,57 and the big irrigation scheme between Surkhandarya and 
the TaSSR embodied in the construction of the large Gissar Canal etc. 
The results were publicized prominently. Within the first 40 years of Soviet 
power, 2 million acres of new fields in Uzbekistan were irrigated,58 assuring a 
victory over the desert that Arif Alimov, chairman of the SM UzSSR (1959-
1961), presented in glowing terms: 
Each big canal and each hydro-technical development means another oasis, 
new thousands of acres of cotton, new villages, new orchards and vineyards.59 
All these efforts were channeled to cotton production and in turn ‘white 
gold’ became the main means of legitimizing the ruling elite. In fact, after the 
late '50s purges mentioned in the first chapter – which stripped Central Asian 
parties that were not able to satisfy Moscow’s demands (in particular the Tajik 
party) – it became clear that fulfilling the plan, at any cost, was a matter of 
survival for local ruling elites, who had to positively demonstrate their 
commitment to the Soviet cause, inexorably influencing the fate of the 
republic’s development. Therefore, the seventh FYP60 planned a final target of 
3.6-3.8 million tons of cotton in 1965 and a further growth of cotton fields.61 
Initial results were on target, with a record crop of 3,150,000 tons in 1959 that 
was publicized with great fanfare by the CPUz. This first triumph of ‘Rashidov’s 
reign’ confirmed the newly appointed FS as a credible partner for Moscow. 
When forecasts suggested the pan would be exceeded and would reach 4 
million tons by 1965,62 Khrushchev was encouraged in his belief in the ‘leap 
forward’ of the Soviet economy, reinforcing his optimism about prospects of 
the Soviet economic system against the capitalist world.63 At that time, Alimov 
stated: 
                                                          
57 Officially these two canals had “improved the irrigation of about 200,000 acres and 
given water to 35,000 acres of land never irrigated before.” Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 14. 
59 Ibid., 13. 
60 The seventh FYP plan lasted for seven years (1959-1965) and was called semiletka. 
61 In 1940, the land under cotton in Uzbekistan was 923,500 acres, in 1950 1,098,100, 
and in 1965 1,549,900. William Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” 
in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 20. 
62 Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 16. 
63 At the XXI Congress of the CPSU in January 1959, Khrushchev launched his challenging 
competition with capitalist economies declaring: “Let's lay out our ‘wares'. Let the 
socialist and capitalist worlds each lay out their own. And let each system show where 
and how long the working day is; how many material and spiritual benefits are received 
87 
 
Today we are making another big leap forward. We know there could have been 
no seven-year plan, nor any page in this plan devoted to Uzbekistan, if the 
October Socialist Revolution had not been victorious in Russia, if we had not 
covered a long and difficult, but joyous, path of struggle and victories.64 
The Uzbek victory was then presented in numbers. In 1960, almost 14,000 
km2 of Uzbek land was officially declared to be under cotton65 and there were 
more than 80,000 km of irrigation canals and 28,000 km of collector and 
draining networks.66 Meanwhile, central planners increased the cultivation of 
fruit, vegetables, rice, jute, kenaf, tobacco etc. Irrigation was the key priority67 
and the cotton sector attracted most of the UzSSR investments. Then, on the 
eve of the ‘60s, the conversion of kolkhozes into sovkhozes was progressing,68 
and crop mechanization was becoming a priority in the agro-industrial 
development of the UzSSR. Republican complexes such as the Tashselmash in 
Tashkent  were officially producing for the seventh FYP “28,000 cotton-picking 
machines, 52,000 tractor-drawn seeders, 75,000 cultivators, 70,000 tractor-
drawn implements, a large number of tractors, and many other machines.”69 
In addition, at that time cotton-related industrialization was also implemented, 
producing for the same period “6,000 roving machines, more than 2,000 
twiners, almost 3,000 spinning machines, and other machinery”70 for cotton 
transformation in order to increase the output of cotton products.71 
                                                          
by the working man; what housing he is provided with; what chances he has of getting 
an education, what part he plays in government, in the political life of his country, and 
who is master of all the material and cultural wealth—the man who works, or the man 
who doesn’t work but possesses capital.” Ibid., 23. 
64 Ibid., 28. 
65 Ibid., 12. 
66 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982). 
67 This position was kept through a series of steps. In 1961, the Karshinskiy canal and 
Self-flowing South Hungy Steppe canal (length 127 km, head charge 360 m3/sec) named 
after A.A. Sarkisov were completed. Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 260. 
68 By 1 January 1961, in UzSSR alone 54 kolkhozes were proposed to be converted in 
sovkhozes out of a total of 1146 kolkhozes. The number of sovkhozes created on the 
basis of the kolkhozes in 1954-1960 was 94. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fursenko, Arkhivi 
Kremlya, Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954-1964. Postanovleniya 1959-1964. Tom 3 (Moskva: 
Rosspen, 2015), 153–54. 
69 Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 10. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “During the seven-year period output of cotton fabrics will rise 40 per cent; 
manufacture of silk fabrics will go up from 21 million yards in 1958 to 94 million yards 
in 1965.” Ibid., 11. 
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2.1.4 Cotton for Communism construction 
However, the real “revolution” arrived during the XXII Congress of the CPSU 
(17-31 October 1961) with Khrushchev's program of “Communism in 20 
years”72 that directly challenged the capitalist development model and that 
claimed the Soviet Union would enter “the period of full-scale communist 
construction”73 by 1980. There, the necessity to improve irrigation and “to 
extend the area planted to cotton and increase its per-hectare yield”74 as well 
as an acceleration in consumer good productions, science, industry, culture 
and, clearly, agriculture were highlighted. Among the cultures that the USSR 
was going to develop – including corn for which Khrushchev assumed the 
nickname Kukuruznik – cotton had a great importance in Soviet development 
and in the construction of communism. Recalling Soviet cotton production of 
4.3 million tons in 1960, the FS CPSU presented an ambitious plan to reach an 
annual production of 8 million tons in 1970 and 10-11 million by 1980.75 
Substantially, Khrushchev was promoting monocultures at the republican level, 
assigning the corn and grain to Kazakhstan76 – the center of the Virgin Lands 
campaign – and to Uzbekistan the status of major supplier of cotton in the 
USSR. The Soviet leader also stressed the importance of mechanization in order 
to reduce cotton harvest costs and gave a pragmatic example: 
Cotton growing. An average of 52 hours at a cost of 25 rubles 30 kopeks is 
expended by the state farms of Uzbekistan to produce a centner of cotton. In 
the meantime, Comrade Kuchiev’s comprehensively mechanized team, of the 
Malek State Farm, Tashkent Region, takes 10 hours at a cost of 7 rubles 30 
kopeks.77 
                                                          
72 Khrushchev's original quote from his speech at the Congress was “Мы 
руководствуемся строго научными расчетами. А расчеты показывают, что за 20 
годы мы построим в основном коммунистическое общество.” From this time , 
‘Communism in 20 years’ became a very famous slogan. William J. Tompson, 
Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 238. 
73 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, “Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU 
Delivered by N. S. Khrushchev, October 17, 1961,” in Documents of the 22nd Congress 
of the CPSU. Vol I (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1961), 63. 
74 Ibid., 67. 
75 Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, “Report on the Program of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union,” in Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU. Vol II (New York: 
Crosscurrents Press, 1961), 57. 
76 Ibid., 63–67. 
77 Ibid., 75. 
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Since that moment, the development of cotton monoculture and opening 
of new cultivated lands, mechanization, irrigation,78 and the introduction of 
chemicals proceeded in parallel, becoming substantial pillars of the program 
that the CPSU was enforcing at the republican level.79 However, the 
Khrushchev plans did not achieve significant success, failing to reach short term 
goals. In 1963, the drought halved crop yields in the virgin lands because of the 
intensive exploitation of monoculture – affecting especially wheat and thus the 
supply of bread. Therefore, the Soviet Union was forced to use 372 tons of its 
gold reserves for food imports, an embarrassing failure for the political 
establishment, which had unquestionably invested in the economic leap 
forward.80 These bad results became one of the major reasons that the current 
soviet leader was ousted. In any case, his successor Brezhnev sought a change 
in ‘the settings’ of Soviet agriculture development but not its ambitions. He 
expressed his enthusiasm in 1964, when the UzSSR finally reached production 
of four million tons of raw cotton.81 Then, during the CPSU plenum (24 March 
1965) devoted to agriculture, a new ‘efficient’82 and ‘managerial’ approach83 
                                                          
78 In 1963, began the construction of the Takhiatash hydro-unit on Amudarya, which 
guarantees water-security for up to 900 thousand hectares of grounds in the lower 
reaches of Amudarya basin; and on 24 December the decree 2540 of SM USSR ‘‘About 
spade-work for irrigation and land-improvement of steppe Karshinsk in Uzbek SSR and 
steppes of Kyzyl-Kum in Kazakh SSR.’’ was approved Zonn et al., The Aral Sea 
Encyclopedia, 260. 
79 This line was later confirmed by Khrushchev who, after his Central Asian trip in 1962 
(29 September - 5 October) wrote a note to the CC CPSU on 12 October where he stated 
that the implementation of irrigation and canal building in Karshi and in the Hungry 
steppes had to proceed parallel to infrastructure building, particularly roads and 
railways. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Fursenko, Arkhivi Kremlya, Prezidium TsK KPSS 
1954-1964. Chernovye Protokol’nye Zapisi Zasedanii. Stenogrammy. Tom 1 (Moskva: 
Rosspen, 2015), 625; CPSU, Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New 
York: International Publishers, 1963), 82–91. 
80 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 261–
62. 
81 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 76. 
82 George Feiwel, The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency Issues, Controversies, and 
Reforms (New York: Praeger, 1967). 
83 This was one of the pillars of the Kosygin economic reforms (1965-1971) that 
recentralized the economy by re-establishing several central ministries, decentralizing 
the incentive systems for good performance, and redefining prices. Brezhnev promoted 
a line that sought improvements in the efficiency of the Soviet system by increasing 
investment in heavy industry, agriculture, and defense. Kosygin's reforms in agriculture 
gave considerable autonomy to the kolkhozers, recognizing their right to the contents 
90 
 
was finally defined that the Soviet agriculture policy had to follow during the 
next XXIII, XXIV and XXV congresses of the  CPSU, confirming the duties for 
cotton production, also through an increase in scientific production through 
fertilizers, pesticides, defoliants and herbicides.84 According to Rashidov, the 
important 1965 plenum was the “first occasion on which fundamental 
problems facing agriculture were being tackled in a business-like manner”85 
and a prompt for further mechanization,86 irrigation, land improvement and 
the opening of new lands, which had a strong impact on the Uzbek agricultural 
system.87 However, even if Brezhnev declared an output increase for many 
agricultural products (but not for cotton), the Soviet planners were not 
formulating a clear strategy for increasing the production and quality of white 
gold. In other words, Moscow demanded without giving a receipt and then the 
periphery had to find the solution.88 
                                                          
of private farming. As a result, during the seventh FYP (1966–1970), large-scale land 
reclamation programs, construction of irrigation channels, and other measures, were 
enacted. However, the reform substantially failed and no major reforms were initiated 
on the economic and social levels. Meanwhile, the Soviet state was trapped in Cold War 
competition, having to sustain high expenditures on defense, thus privileging military 
expenditure over civil investments and other consumer goods. Robert Service, History 
of Modern Russia: From Tsarism to the Twenty-First Century (London: Penguin Books, 
2003), 380; Abraham Katz, The Politics of Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (New 
York: Praeger, 1972); Jan Adam, Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe since the 1960s (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989). 
84 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 309. 
85 Ihor Gordijew, “Soviet Agriculture and the March, 1965, Plenum of the C.P.S.U.,” The 
Australian Quarterly 39, no. 1 (1967): 60. 
86 However, it seems that, until 1965, agricultural machines were not properly working 
for the supposed aims and cotton was preferred to be picked by human hands. From 
1965, these lacks started to be solved, improving the mechanization and new 
technology. Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-
1991 Y.y.),” 176. 
87 1965 was a key moment in Uzbek agriculture. In the UzSSR, 600,000 hectares of new 
fields were opened between 1946-1965, and this process was accelerated during 1966-
1985 with 1.6 million hectares of new lands opened and 160 new sovkhozes. According 
to Uzbek historiography, from 1965 to 1985, the agricultural production of Uzbekistan 
more or less doubled. Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston 
Respublikasi Fan va Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix Shohidligi va Saboqlari (Toshkent: 
Sharq, 2001), 292–93. 
88 Gregory Gleason, “Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton 
Production Complex” (University of California, 1984), 109–10. 
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Another important moment for cotton development in Uzbekistan came 
just after the XXIII congress of the CPSU – which promoted the idea of 
“developed socialism”89 – with the May 1966 CC CPSU plenum that was 
devoted to water engineering90 and land reclamation.91 On that occasion, 
Brezhnev exclaimed: 
We ourselves must be conscious and tell confidently the entire Party and the 
entire nation that this is not a transient campaign, this is a program in 
agriculture designed for a long period, a program requiring enormous efforts 
and no small amounts of capital investment and material and technological 
supplies. It is based on scientific and practical knowledge and on the 
potentialities that the Soviet economy now actually has.92 
Rashidov stressed the importance of economic development and in 1967 
also used the expression "leap forward" to refer to Uzbek industrial and 
agriculture advances.93 In such a way, he was able to ask for more funds and 
investments for the UzSSR - while the CPSU engagement in local issues 
                                                          
89 This expression was used to define a threshold of USSR development sufficiently 
advanced that the country would advance ‘naturally’ to communism in an unspecified 
period. 
90 “The resolution of the May Plenum of CPSU CC (1966) defined a new stage of land 
irrigation development that was principally different from all past ones. For the 
conditions of Central Asia and Southern Kazakhstan, it meant, first of all, that better, 
more efficient irrigation was the most important precondition for further increase of 
the yields of technical, fodder, and forage crops as well as the extension of areas under 
irrigation for greater yields of raw cotton. In 1966–1986, the construction of water 
management projects and commissioning of Central Asia’s largest irrigation canals (such 
as Karakum, Karshi, Amu-Bukhara, and others) was pursued aggressively. Their 
headwater intake varied from 200 to 500 cu. m/s and more. Such large reservoirs as 
Andijan, Charvak, Chardarya, Tuyamuyun, and Nurek were constructed and put into 
operation (all in all, there were 80 reservoirs with a total capacity over 100 mln cu. m). 
This enabled regulation of river flows in this region. In 1965–1988, as a result of wide-
scale irrigation works in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, over 3 mln ha of 
new lands were developed and water supply to a greater part of previously irrigated 
areas was improved.” Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 241. 
91 Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan, 55. 
92 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, Rechi I Stat’i, T. 1 (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo 
Politicheskoy Literatury, 1970), 397. 
93 Directorate of Intelligence - CIA, “Intelligence Report. Policy and Politics in the CPSU 
Politburo: October 1964 to September 1967 (Reference Title: CAESAR XXX). 31 August 
1967. RSS No. 0021/67,” 1967, 90. 
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increased.94 In the UzSSR alone, the budget for the improvement of irrigated 
lands passed from 861 million rubles in the seventh FYP (1959-1965) to 4.57 
billion in the ninth (1971-1975) and 6.061 in the tenth95 in a sector that was 
attracting more and more investment from the center in a long term strategy.96 
The Brezhnevian path of agriculture development proceeded through the 
‘70s. In his statement to the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev reported that 
over  in the previous decade, the average annual production of Soviet cotton 
grew from 5 million (1961-1965) to 6.1 million (1966-1970) and just in 1970 it 
reached a record yield of 6,900,000 tons,97 with an average productivity of 25 
centners per hectare.98 This output was presented as the result of the ongoing 
financial investments,99 and as a product of mechanization,100 water 
engineering101, irrigation and other gigantic projects that were even planning 
                                                          
94 As the 1967 decision of the CC CPSU noted: “About the urgent measures on increases 
in production of rice, increases of water-security, and ameliorative improvements of the 
grounds of collective farms and state farms in the Karakalpak SSR”, the 1970 decision 
n° 482 ‘‘About acceleration of works on irrigation and land development of the 
Karshinskaya steppe in Uzbek SSR,” or the 1972 decision of CC CPUz and SM UzSSR 
“About measures on the further rise of agriculture in the Karakalpak SSR.” Zonn et al., 
The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 261–62. 
95 Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan, 55–56. 
96 In the years 1966-1986, 17.1 billion rubles were provided for improving the water 
system of UzSSR. Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari 
(1917-1991 Y.y.),” 181. 
97 In a meeting with the republican party active on 8 September 1970 Brezhnev 
celebrated with Uzbeks who had exceed the plan by 300-400 thousand tons. RGANI, f. 
80, op. 1, d. 389, l. 31. 
98 Pravda, 31 March 1971, p. 2 
99 An evident consequence of the Brezhnevian recipe was that Soviet agriculture's share 
of total capital investment grew from 15.5% (1961-1965) to 17.2% (1966-1970). 
Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 309. 
100 In the period 1966-1970, the Uzbek agriculture system was officially provided with 
106,000 tractors, 31,700 cotton picker machines, 42,000 trucks, 33,500 sowing 
machines, and 22,000 cultivator machines. M. Iskanderov and R. Razzakov, “Povyshenie 
Effectivnosti Tekhnicheskogo Progressa v Promyshlennosti,” Kommunist Uzbekistana 11 
(1971): 22. 
101 In 1970, the construction of the Tuyamuyunskiy hydro-system - 452 km from the 
mouth of the Amudarya – began, enabling irrigation of 500 hectares of land. With the 
hydro-system, three coastal water reservoirs were constructed: Kaparas - with full 
capacity of 1 km3, Sultansanjar at 2.7 km,3 and Kosibulak at 1.5 km3. In 1971 the 
construction of the Large Karshinskiy canal began. It drew 5 km3 of water annually and 
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to divert the water course of Siberian rivers to Central Asia. From the summer 
of 1966, plans to finally realize the ‘perebroska’ were announced. The 
perebroska was a project to divert the course of Siberian rivers southwards, 
such as the Ob-Irtysh - or the Tobol, Ishim and others - in order to irrigate the 
Turgay lowlands, and then to reach the Amudarya, the Syrdarya and the Aral 
Sea through a gigantic infrastructure 2550 km long (130-300 meters wide and 
12-15 deep and a capacity of 1,150 m3/s) called the ‘Sib-Aral’ canal, with 
preliminary costs amounting to 32.8 billion rubles. The project was aimed at 
creating an intensive agriculture area that could supply food for a 200 million 
people.102 During the congress, the realization of this futuristic infrastructure – 
for which nuclear charges had been planned for civil purposes, presenting 
gigantic financial (and probably ecological) costs – was embraced by Central 
Asian leaders who hoped to increase the water base in their republics. 
                                                          
its six pump stations lifted water 150 m above the Amudarya with a charge of 240 m3/s 
for about 5 km3/yr. In 1973, Amudarya’s water finally reached the steppe of Karshi. 
Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 262. 
102 Douglas R. Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin 
to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 415. 
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However, the realization of the project was delayed indefinitely103 and 
hindered by a part of Russian intellectual society.104 
                                                          
103 The project to turn part of the Siberian rivers water goes back to the XIX century, 
when a debate within the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences started among 
geologists, agronomists and engineers. The project would be seriously considered in 
Soviet times and in November 1933 a special conference of the AN USSR approved a 
plan for a "reconstruction of the Volga and its basin", which included the diversion into 
the Volga of some of the waters of the Pechora and the Northern Dvina. In the early 
‘70s started the diversion of the Pechora through Kama River toward the Volga and the 
Caspian Sea in the south-west of Russia and was promoted the idea of expanding the 
navigation through the ‘Asia Channel’ that could connect the Kara Sea-Caspian Sea-
Persian Gulf. In 1971, during a IAEA conference in Vienna, was announced that for that 
task had been ‘pacifically’ used three 15-kiloton nuclear devices spaced 500 feet apart. 
In the wake of these successes - and hopes - also the Sib-Aral project was reconsidered 
in the early ‘70s. In 1971, was completed the irrigation and watering channel Irtysh – 
Karaganda, a first section of a possible project that was ensuring water to central 
Kazakhstan. In the same year, on the basis of a decision of the CC CPSU and the SM USSR 
(16 April 1971): “About measures on the further development of land reclamation and 
their agricultural development on 1971–1975”, Gosplan USSR instructed the Ministry of 
Water Management of the USSR to develop actions to organize research and design 
work to transfer part of the run-off of northern rivers into the riverine basin of the Volga 
River and of Siberian rivers into the basins of the Syrdarya and Amudarya Rivers. 
In 1976, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU the final design was selected from the four 
proposed the preliminary work on the project started. The decision of the CC CPSU and 
the SM USSR to “carry out research and design work on the problem of transferring 
northern and Siberian rivers to the southern areas of the country” was accepted in 1978. 
This project appealed to Central Asian leaders and to the Ministry of Land Reclamation 
and Water Resources of the USSR who saw an opportunity to manage huge 
investments. During the XXVI CPSU congress in 1981, the Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh 
delegates suggested that the project should be initiated during the XI FYP and the 
debate on the “Project of the Century” was followed even in the press. However, in the 
plan guidelines was stated that scientific preconditions had to be investigated before 
proceeding and even the chairman of SM USSR Tikhonov postponed the realization of 
the plan during a CC CPSU plenum in October 1984. Therefore, the huge costs of such a 
gigantic project and the opposition by Russian nationalist, ecologist, and reformist 
elements led to significant delays. Finally, on 14 August 1986 during a special meeting 
of the Politburo, it was decided to stop the work and the project was definitively 
dropped with a decision of the CC CPSU and the SM USSR ‘‘About stopping the work to 
transfer parts of the northern and Siberian rivers run-off.’’ Jan Ațke Dellenbrant, The 
Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1986), 93, 182; Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione 
Sovietica, 1945-1991; Michael H. Glantz, Creeping Environmental Problems and 
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During the Congress, Brezhnev directly addressed the priority of increasing 
the cotton yield in Uzbekistan. In his words: 
the expansion of reclaimed land and the introduction of crop rotations in 
Central Asia, primarily in Uzbekistan, will make it possible to increase the 
production of such a valuable crop, necessary to the country, as cotton.105 
Over the next decade, these aims would be implemented, defining the fate 
of Uzbek history in which cotton assumed once again an increasingly critical 
role. At the congress, Rashidov also “spoke about the upsurge in cotton 
production in Uzbekistan, about the construction of irrigation facilities on an 
unprecedented scale, about the extraction of gas,106 a new sector in the 
Republic's economy. Uzbek gas is now conveyed to the neighboring Republics, 
to the Urals and to the central regions of the Russian Federation.”107  
                                                          
Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 169; Edward A. Allworth, “The New Central Asians,” in Central 
Asia: One Hundred Thirty Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1995), 566; Milo D. Nordyke, “The Soviet Program for Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Explosions” (Livermore, CA, 1996); Martha Brill Olcott, Lubomyr. Hajda, 
and Anthony Olcott, The Soviet Multinational State: Readings and Documents (Armonk: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 143–46; Frederic Golden, “Making Rivers Run Backward,” Time, 
June 1982; M. I. Zelikin, Istoriya Vechnozelonoy Zhizni (Moskva: Faktorial press, 2001); 
NA, “Saving the Caspian,” Time, 1975. 
104 Dejevsky comments: "The press also started to attack cherished myths: in 1987, the 
project to divert the flow of the great Siberian rivers from north to south so as to provide 
irrigation to the desert lands of Central Asia was halted after a campaign waged by 
intellectuals on ecological grounds, partly in the columns of learned journals, but also 
in the press." Mary Dejevsky, “Glasnost’ and the Soviet Press,” in Culture and the Media 
in the USSR Today, ed. Julian Graffy and Geoffrey A Hosking (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1989), 31. 
105 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, “The Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press 23, no. 13 (1971): 9. 
106 Prior to launching full production of oil and gas fields in the Urals, the Caspian, and 
the Russian Far East, Uzbekistan was one of the main natural gas producers in the USSR, 
producing 250 bcm of gas in the decade 1960-1970 and exporting 70% of this to other 
republics of USSR. Saidakbar Rizaevich Rizaev, Sharaf Rashidov. Shtrikhi K Portretu 
(Toshkent: Yozuvchi, 1992), 68. 
107 CPSU, 24th Congress of The Communist Party Ff The Soviet Union. March 30-April 9, 
1971. What the Congress Discussed and Decided (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency 
Publishing House, 1971), 23. 
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Therefore, in the early 1970s the basis of the next leap forward was laid, in 
so doing integrating increasing cotton production, economic development, and 
the political legitimation of the UzSSR. Moscow played a key role here: in the 
age of ‘developed socialism’, the central planners were demanding more 
cotton and undermining other cultures in the republic, reinforcing the UzSSR’s 
de-facto economic dependence on a single sector: 65% of gross economic 
output of the republic, 60% of all Uzbek resource consumption, and 40% of the 
Uzbek labor force were dedicated to cotton.108 The regime was also offering an 
illusion of ‘honorable’ inclusiveness to Uzbek leaders and people. This binding 
dependence  was reinforced by a relationship of mutual ‘adulation’109 between 
the paternal Moscow leaders and their republican leader-children. Besides the 
aforementioned ‘patronage’ interpretation, this kind of relation between the 
center and the periphery was a typical key for reading the peaceful 
‘inclusiveness’ of the Brezhnevian regime. In the early ‘70s, the Gensek 
described the republic in terms of Leninist modernity, declaring: 
In the blossoming Uzbekistan of today we proudly see the results of the Party’s 
titanic work, the selfless endeavor of millions of workers and collective farmers, 
scientists and intellectuals. It is a joy to see your splendid cities, your modern 
factories and mills, your well-cultivated fields and your blossoming orchards.110 
Therefore, Uzbekistan was represented by the central authorities as a 
model republic and was awarded with the ‘banner of friendship of people’ in 
1973. Brezhnev personally arrived in Tashkent to give the award and to confirm 
the duties of ‘cotton republics’.111 After noting the successes of the previous 
years, Moscow planners declared the ambition to increase total Soviet cotton 
production to 8 million tons per year (an output that was already expected to 
                                                          
108  Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed 
Books, 1995), 59; Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs.” 
109 William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption 
in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). 
110 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Following Lenin’s Course: Speeches and Articles, 1972-1975 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 280. 
111 In a meeting on the activity of the party and agricultural issues of the ‘cotton 
republics’ held in Tashkent on 24 September 1973, Brezhnev asked for improving cotton 
production and irrigation and Rashidov confirmed the party commitments to produce 
at least 4,85 million tons for the third year of the current FYP. Turkmenistan had to 
provide 945 thousand tons, Tajikistan 775, Azerbaijan 450, Kazakhstan 300, and 
Kyrgyzstan 200. RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 392, p. 47, 107-108 and KPUz, Vernost Velikomu 
Soyuzu Bratskikh Respublik (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1973). 
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be achieved in 1970), forecasting for 1973 production of 7.5-7.7 million tons – 
with  Uzbekistan alone accounting for 4.9-5 million. 
Annual Soviet production of cotton (thousand tons)112 
 1961-1965 1966-1970 1970 1971 1972 
USSR 4,996 6,099 6,890 7,101 7,296 
UzSSR 3,337 3,982 4,495 4,511 4,709 
 During the award ceremony, on 27 September 1973 in Tashkent, the 
Gensek made a speech noting the great results of the UzSSR.113 He also 
announced a new ambition for UzSSR agriculture, setting a new production 
goal of five million tons. Therefore, the campaign for ‘inclusiveness’ and 
gratification proceeded parallel to a major request for Uzbek ‘white gold’ and 
to a broader call to modernize Soviet agriculture, even by using fertilizers and 
importing equipment from the West.114 
In 1974, the campaign to increase cotton production in the UzSSR had a 
new impetus. On 30 April, Gosplan USSR added new priority tasks for 
Uzbekistan in its report to the SM USSR. The construction of hydropower and 
electro-stations, a new chemical complex in Ferghana in 1975-1976 – able to 
produce 40 thousand tons of chlorate-magnesium defoliants – and investment 
of at least 10 million rubles for building plants for cleaning cotton were 
                                                          
112 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 390, ll. 155, 167, 170. 
113 Brezhnev came to Uzbekistan for the ceremony of friendship of people (24 
September 1973). The award was principally in recognition of Uzbek success in cotton 
production. It was noted that the UzSSR had surpassed the plan and supplied the state 
with 4.7 million tons, representing more than two thirds of Soviet cotton. Officially, this 
result made USSR the world’s top cotton producer in 1970. RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 391, 
ll. 1, 7, 101. 
114 In the early '70s, a new campaign to increase the use of fertilizers and agriculture 
equipment was promoted. This involved significant imports from the West. “In 1970, 
Soviet agriculture used only two-thirds as much fertilizer as American agriculture, 
although the sown area in the USSR was more than 70% larger. Soviet efforts to increase 
the supply and upgrade the quality of Chemical fertilizers in the Ninth Five-Year Plan 
(1971-75) clearly reflect[ed] Brezhnev’s resolve to raise crop yields—one of the key 
planks in his farm program.” Therefore, output of plant nutrients grew by 47% during 
1971-74 and was scheduled for a further increase of 15% in 1975 to 22.2 million tons. 
CIA, “Intelligence Report. ER IR 75-7. Soviet Fertilizer: Expansion of Output and Exports. 
March 1975,” 1975, 1, 4, 10. 
98 
 
listed.115 In this accentuated phase, the Uzbek party and government were very 
active in seeking investments from the center and increases in the budget of 
the UzSSR, promising in return a greater supply of cotton. In June 1974, 
Rashidov and Khudayberdyev requested an average increase of +15% in the 
sale price of raw cotton and a bonus of +50% outputs exceeding the plan. Such 
a request was not entirely improper; Uzbek cotton was sold at a low-middle 
level compared to other purchase prices for Soviet cotton. On July 2, the SM 
UzSSR and the CC CPSU agreed to increase prices to match Turkmen levels. 
Higher prices were argued to lead to higher profitability in Uzbek kolkhozes 
from 26 to 33% and in sovkhozes from 31 to 36%, but were also needed to 
ensure coverage for additional expenses, providing the state budget with 125 
million rubles more. The measure was formalized on 5 July 1974 with SM USSR 
decree n° 551. Kosygin noted that it was possible to increase the average price 
of raw cotton by increasing the purchase price by 5% and due to this policy it 
was necessary to demand from the state budget extra 125 million rubles.116 
The demands of the Uzbek leadership were therefore met, with a pledge in 
return to honor production plans. These dynamics triggered a process of 
reciprocally-increasing demands between Moscow and Tashkent that would 
explode in the following years.  
In his speech in Tashkent for the 50th anniversary of the UzSSR on 22 
October 1974, even Suslov congratulated the great success of the republic, 
noting particularly that despite a deep cultural history and literature, the 
"domination of feudalism" had made success even more unlikely. He noted 
how in 50 only, cotton production grew from 200,000 tons to five million tons. 
For this "great success" the republic was awarded with the Order of the 
October Revolution.117 On that occasion, the role of Uzbekistan and its leaders 
in the significant increase in raw cotton production in 1973 (4.9 million tons) 
and in 1974 (5.3 million tons) was clearly acknowledged. On 30 December 
1974, the Presidium of the SS USSR recognized the “outstanding achievements 
in the management of the party organizations of the republic and for the 
implementation of the recommendations of XXIV Congress of the CPSU on the 
development of agriculture” - awarded Rashidov with the title of Hero of 
Socialist Labor, investing him with the Order of Lenin and the Hammer and 
Sickle gold medallion. 
                                                          
115 GARF, f. 5456, op. 108, d. 892, ll. 1-2. 
116 GARF, f. 5456, op. 108, d. 892, ll. 8, 9, 12, 20. 
117 RGANI, f. 81, op. 1, d. 210, ll. 5-9. 
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2.2 The road towards ‘6,000,000’  
1975 was an emblematic year. It is generally recognized as the apogee of 
Rashidov’s efforts at regime consolidation, in which Uzbek ‘mature 
development’ was at the peak of its momentum and in which the UzSSR 
reached the height of its inclusiveness within the Soviet system. Ironically, it 
was also probably the beginning of the end, since a crisis in the Soviet system 
in Uzbekistan was just around the corner. 1975 was, in other words, the 
moment when the ‘chickens came home to roost’. In fact, in 1975 it became 
clear that the Soviet production system was drifting towards illusion and self-
complacency, coming dangerously close to being unable to guarantee food 
self-sufficiency for the country.118 This self-illusive trend manifested poetically 
in the declining health of the Soviet leader119 and in the obvious general 
degeneration of the entire system. 
2.2.1 The Soviet economic stagnation 
Since the mid- ‘70s, economic stagnation120 was masked by the triumphs of 
Soviet geopolitics in the ‘Global Cold War’121 competition and by the rhetoric 
of ‘mature’ or ‘developed socialism’. Agriculture, which had grown positively 
in the ‘60s and in the early ‘70s, saw the ratio of growth to investment decline 
precipitously. The increase in state debt produced by this state of affairs was 
exacerbated by further transfers to shore up the rural productive system.122 
                                                          
118 The disastrous Soviet grain harvest of 1975 (140.1 million tons) sent a clear signal of 
this. Fortunately, the positive yield of 1976 (223.8 million tons) helped to remedy the 
situation. USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “Agricultural Situation. Review of 1978 and 
Outlook for 1979: USSR” (Washington D.C., 1979), 3. 
119 In 1975, Brezhnev suffered his first stroke. 
120 Gorbachev introduced the concept of Period zastoya (“Era of Stagnation”) to 
describe the lack of growth in the economic, social, and political spheres during the 
Brezhnevian era. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle, Brezhnev Reconsidered (Houndmills & 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
121 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War : Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
122 In the decade 1965-1975, the number of kolkhozes in USSR decreased from 37,000 
to 29,000, while the number of sovkhozes rose from 11,700 to 18,100, increasing 
government spending considerably. In parallel, the countryside began to empty;  
already in 1966, up to 53% of Soviet citizens was living in urban areas. Graziosi, L’Urss 
Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 320–21. 
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Graziosi concludes that the growth of the Soviet economy had been 
deliberately overestimated and, taking into account dramatic Soviet 
population growth, was effectively negligible on a per capita basis. The table 
below presents Graziosi’s summary of the data collected by Mark Harrison – 
who compared official Soviet data (TsU) with CIA estimates, and those of 
Mortseen & Powell – and the evaluations of economist Grigory Khanin, who in 
1987 calculated the true extent of Soviet stagnation and decline. 
The Soviet economic stagnation (in % variation)123 
Period Soviet output Inflation 
Labor 
productivity 
 Tsu 
CIA, 
Mortseen 
& Powell 
Khanin TsU Khanin TsU Khanin 
1965-1970 7.7 4.9 4.1 1.9 4.6 6.8 3 
1970-1975 5.7 3.0 3.2 0 2.3 4.6 1.9 
1975-1980 4.2 1.9 1.0 -0.2 2.7 3.4 0.2 
1980-1985 3.5 1.8 0.6 na na 3 0 
The Russian sociologist Viktor Zaslavsky also argued that, despite the 
brilliant official announcements in the Soviet press and propaganda, evidence 
of the stagnation and decline of the Soviet economy could not be found with 
Western (market) econometric indices. Instead, he pointed to other social 
indicators such as life expectancy, the median age and other demographic 
trends, infant mortality, the number of abortions, statistics on alcohol 
consumption and drug abuse, increasing crime, and so on.124 Accurate data and 
a realistic debate on Soviet economic decline would have to wait, however, 
until the ‘80s. For the time being, the Brezhnevian recipe remained the only 
option in a state that was slowly collapsing under its own weight. The illusory 
self-satisfaction born of success in the 1960s remained the key mantra of a 
system incapable of seeing the truth and reforming itself. 
The official narrative that the CPUz was promoting gave no hint of a 
warning. At the beginning of 1975, Rashidov – through Pravda Vostoka125 – 
                                                          
123 Ibid., 440; Mark Harrison, “Soviet Economie Growth Since 1928: The Alternative 
Statistics of G. I. Khanin,” Europe-Asia Studies 45, no. 1 (1993): 146–47, 149–51. 
124 Viktor Zaslavsky, Storia Del Sistema Sovietico. L’ascesa, La Stabilità, Il Crollo (Roma: 
Carrocci, 2001). 
125 Pravda Vostoka (PV) was the main Russian language newspaper of the UzSSR and the 
official press organ of the CC CPUz, the SS and the SM UzSSR. 
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proclaimed with great fanfare the completion of the fourth year of the ninth 
FYP (1971-1975)126 ahead of time,127 and the “finish” was literally announced 
in all fields of production.128 At the XVIII plenum of the CC CPUz (1 July 1975), 
Rashidov announced that during the final four years of the ninth FYP, the USSR 
was supplied with 19.5 million tons of Uzbek raw cotton – “2.1 million more 
than required in the plan” – and that in 1974 alone, Uzbekistan had produced 
5.33 million tons (of which 2.715 had been harvested mechanically), recording 
productivity of 30.8 tons per hectare.129 
However, the media campaign did not report the deterioration in harvest 
quality, and the FS CPUz had to justify this qualitative shortage to the CC 
CPSU.130 Meanwhile, the CC CPUz, the SM UzSSR and the Presidium of the SS 
UzSSR promoted the idea of a “labor victory”, declaring that 105% of the plan 
had been realized and that production in 1974 was +8,7% more than 1973, that 
productivity growth of 4% had been achieved, and even that the quality of 
cotton production had apparently increased. The party reported yet another 
record in annual cotton production, claiming that in 1966-1970 it had averaged 
3.982 million tons per year and in 1974 alone delivered a record yield of 5.3301 
million tons.131 In any case, the CPUz warned agricultural workers about the 
risks of water scarcity (recent seasons had been very dry) in the next year, 
inviting them to make more efforts in irrigation132 in order to open new 
                                                          
126 The ninth FYP was considered, ex post, as a poor result for Soviet agriculture, which 
was hit by chronic drought and bad weather. This situation meant grain production was 
70 million tons short of the planned target. William Burroughs, Does the Weather Really 
Matter? The Social Implications of Climate Change (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 89. 
127 PV, 17672, 2, 5 January 1975, p. 1. 
128 PV, 17673, 3, 6 January 1975, p. 1. 
129 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 143, d. 2135 and PV, 17821, 153, 2 July 1975, pp. 1-2. 
130 In addition to these data, on 8 July 1975, the CC CPUz informed the CC CPSU that the 
quality was not satisfactory. In the last three years the share of top-grade cotton was 
2.174 million tons (or 46.2%) in 1972, 2.2855 (46.6%) in 1973, and 2.399 (45%) in 1974. 
Meanwhile, second-grade cotton rose from 17.5 to 19.6%. This negative trend was 
presented as temporary, and the qualitative commitments for the following years were 
reiterated. RGANI, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1011, ll. 19-20. 
131 PV, 17692, 24, 29 January 1975, pp. 1-2. 
132 PV, 17676, 6, 8 January 1975, p. 1. 
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irrigated fields and canals and to have a greater provision of water133 for 
improving the quality of cotton products.134 
In order to increase cotton production, Uzbek planners were still investing 
huge resources on improving fields and in the mechanization, which was seen 
as the best solution for improving quality and harvest speed.135 The 
mechanization goal for 1975 was three million tons of cotton cropped by 
machines136 and the Uzbek media started to promote this ‘revolution’, 
reporting successful stories of kolkhozes and villages that drastically improved 
their productivity in a very short time.137 However, the results of mechanization 
were the reverse because the machines often broke the cotton fibers and 
significantly worsened the quality of the crop. For this reason, many kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes in the republic preferred to disobey the planners’ guidelines, 
sabotaging the machines and recurring to the traditional manual crop.138 
Furthermore, the party registered problems with the production of fine fiber 
cotton, targets for which were not realized in any districts.139 
Percentage of Cotton Harvested by machines in UzSSR140 
Year 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
% 
23 33 46 63 68 54 34 31 40 42 45 47 
                                                          
133 PV, 17689, 21, 25 January 1975, p. 1. 
134 PV, 17677, 7, 9 January 1975, p. 3. 
135 PV, 17698, 30, 5 February 1975, p. 1. 
136 According to the plan for 1975, the UzSSR regions had to crop cotton as follows: 
Karakalpak ASSR, 350 thousand tons (of which 250 by machines), Andijan 600 (300), 
Bukhara 510 (235), Jizzak 280 (220), Kashkadarya 400 (200), Namangan 430 (200), 
Samarkand 530 (320), Surkhandarya 450 (220), Syrdarya 350 (265), Tashkent 430 (324), 
Ferghana 585 (235) Khorezm 415 (250). PV, 17705, 37, 13 February 1975, p. 1.  
137 I.e. PV was reporting that due to mechanization, the kolkhoz “Kommunism” in 
Gulistan recorded an increase of productivity by 7%, corresponding a quintal of raw 
cotton by 1,8 man/day, a field productivity of 40 quintals per hectare, and picking 90% 
of its total production (4500 ton) with machines. PV, 17864, 196, 21 August 1975, p. 2. 
138 During my field research periods in Uzbekistan (August 2013, May-June 2015), I have 
collected dozens of stories from former rural workers who testified these practices in 
UzSSR. 
139 PV, 17699, 31, 6 February 1975, p. 1. 
140 Peter R. Craumer, “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out- Migration in 
Soviet Central Asia,” in Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, ed. Robert 
A.Lewis (London: Routledge, 1992), 156. 
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2.2.2 More cotton to the fatherland 
From 1975, Moscow’s call to increase cotton production in the republic had 
a wider echo: the XVII plenum of the CC CPUz of 6 February 1975141 received 
the orders of the plenum of the CC CPSU of December 1974 to increase the 
production of cotton even more.142 On that occasion, Rashidov was personally 
committed to ensuring further success in Uzbek agriculture and, following the 
guidelines of the XXIV CPSU congress, the CC CPUz fixed the productive goals 
for 1975. At the end of the year, the UzSSR had to produce 5.2 million tons of 
raw cotton (not less than three million by machines) and 600,000 tons of grains. 
The expectation was that the plan would be realized before December 20, 1975 
and that it would exceed projections by 500 million rubles.143 Rashidov was 
categorical: the republic had to honor the commitments made to the central 
state at any cost. At the same time, he always recalled the sacrifices that had 
been made by the republic and the excellent results that had been achieved in 
previous years. He noted the request to the plenum of the CC CPSU of March 
1965 for technical innovation, chemical fertilizers,144 high yielding seeds, and 
irrigation networks in order to increase cotton production. The results were 
that, from 1965 to 1974, the cotton production of the UzSSR increased from 
3.746 million tons to 5.33, field productivity per hectare increased from 24.1 
quintals to 30.8, the gross income of collective farms from 1.626 billion to 2.571 
billion rubles, and the average individual income of farmers from 754 to 1156 
rubles.145 The party also announced and celebrated the construction of new 
canals in order to pursue its mission in cotton production.146 At this point, 
Rashidov was ready to renew the republic’s commitments for the next FYP, 
mobilizing the CPUz for its participation at the XXV congress of the CPSU (24 
                                                          
141 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 143, d. 2134. 
142 PV, 17700, 32, 7 February 1975, p. 2. 
143 The party also fixed the goal of qualifying 240 Uzbek products with marks and of 
realizing the housing plan for 3,480,000 units before 29 December 1975. PV, 17704, 36, 
12 February 1975, p. 1. 
144 At the beginning of the ‘60s, while Uzbek agriculture faced gigantic development 
requirements, the internal production of chemical fertilizers was still limited. I.e. in 
1960, the Chirchik plant was capable of producing ‘only’ 2.2 million tons of mineral 
fertilizer per year. Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 9. 
145 PV, 17737, 69, 23 march 1975, p. 3. Despite the undeniable success of Uzbek cotton 
production, this economic data should be read with caution. In the Soviet system these 
statistics were often ‘massaged’ – and sometimes ‘fake’ – and did not consider costs or 
inflation indices. 
146 PV, 17750, 82, 8 April 1975, p. 2. 
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February 1976) and declaring that the Uzbek party would reach that “worthy 
meeting” even exceeding the plan by at least 10,000 tons in 1975, 
implementing mechanization and completing the crop within 30-35 days.147 A 
hard commitment, the Uzbek leader nevertheless affirmed that the republic 
could meet it. Furthermore, Rashidov renewed the commitment with voters 
(for the election of 15 June 1975), promising improvements in new 
infrastructure, housing,148 services, factories,149 and more welfare to every 
Uzbek family.150 Rashidov’s commitments seemed to be satisfying Moscow as 
much as the Uzbek population and cotton looked as if it was as a glue that 
linked the central state, the Uzbek government, and its people, creating in the 
process a complex system of mutual legitimation. Rashidov’s logic was focused 
on concentrating the republic’s efforts to the cause of Soviet cotton and, in 
return, obtaining from Moscow investments that would be redistributed – at 
least in part - for UzSSR civil infrastructure, thus simultaneously earning the 
legitimacy of CPSU cadres and the local population. Such a system – with the 
republican FS in the role of mediator at the center – would in fact work for 
years. 
The CPUz leadership played on the triumphalism of the Uzbek people, 
reminding them of the gratitude that was expressed by the central leadership 
to the remote province of the Soviet system. Even Brezhnev, in a speech at the 
meeting of the Bauman electoral district, congratulated Uzbek cotton pickers 
for their hard work,151 and the CPUz declared that Uzbekistan was becoming a 
“model for cotton production organization” for both the other republics – such 
as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan - and foreign countries.152 
In exchange, the Uzbek party and government called for “More cotton to the 
                                                          
147 PV, 17772, 104, 5 May 1975, p. 1. 
148 During Rashidov's reign, dozens of newly refurbished cities, including Navoi and 
Zarafshan, Yangiyer and Gulistan appeared on the map of Uzbekistan. 
149 In the mid-‘70s an ambitious infrastructural and industrial plan was promoted, 
leading to the creation of hundreds of paved roads and bridges, the realization of 
hydropower stations on the Syrdarya, several cotton factories in Bukhara and Andijan, 
the development of industrial complexes for a silk-processing factory in Namangan, a 
carpet factory in Khiva, cement in Navoiy, leather in Kokand, porcelain in Kuvasai and 
Samarkand, lifts and fridges in Samarkand, several complexes for cotton-cleaning, 
textile- and rubber-processing, shoe manufacture, and a large electrochemical plant in 
Navoi. Rizaev, Sharaf Rashidov. Shtrikhi K Portretu, 69. 
150 PV, 17793, 125, 30 May 1975, p. 1. 
151 PV, 17809, 141, 18 June 1975, p. 1. 
152 PV, 17851, 183, 6 August 1975, p. 1. 
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fatherland!”, commanding “to all kolkhozers, sovkhozers, specialists, 
communists, komsomol’tsy and agriculture workers of the republic” to provide 
at least 5.2 million tons of raw cotton within the year153 and to deliver better 
quality at a lower cost, inviting all the state and political parts to play a role.154 
The Uzbek scientific community was accorded an important role in the 
development of sector, and the AN UzSSR started to experiment with new 
“good” defoliants and fertilizers produced in loco that, apparently, would have 
no impact on health or the ecosystem and were not limited in their use.155 
Thus, in 1975 propaganda was already being produced which attempted to 
change public opinion on the results achieved and continued to declare the 
success of those ‘virtuous’ regions – such as Tashkent156 – that had finished the 
FYP in advance and had moved on to the next plan. It is interesting to note that 
any activity of the republic seemed to need to be functional to cotton and even 
in the XIX plenum of the CC CPUz (30 September 1975), discussing the 
“measures to further strengthen party and state discipline and socialist law”; it 
was remarked that “the fatherland waits from us no less than 5,200,000 tons 
of ‘white gold’.”157 Additionally, even law enforcement statements and 
injunctions against corruption etc. were framed within the context of cotton, 
leading inexorably to a partisan interpretation of the law in a context in which 
defending cotton was the highest priority. 
At the start of the 1975 harvest in September, the party again went to great 
lengths to mobilize the population. The rhetoric was reminiscent of the fascist 
‘battle of grain’158 and workers were extolled to work for a ‘heroic exploit’ for 
the fatherland. Each million tons cropped was cast as a great victory by the 
Uzbek people for the Soviet cause, and workers were enjoined to “take all the 
yield”, even if the plans had already been completed.159 Finally, on 30 
November 1975, the fifth million ton of cropped cotton was announced160 and 
the day after, during the plenum of the CC CPSU (that approved the plan of 
                                                          
153 PV, 17813, 145, 22 July 1975, p. 1. 
154 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 143, d. 2135 and PV, 17821, 153, 2 July 1975, pp. 1-2. 
155 PV, 17871, 203, 29 August 1975, p. 1. 
156 PV, 17874, 206, 2 September 1975, p. 1. 
157 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 143, d. 2136 and PV, 17897, 229, 1 October 1975, p. 1. 
158 Benito Mussolini, La Battaglia Del Grano. (Roma: Libreria del Littorio, 1929); Luciano 
Segre, La “battaglia Del Grano” : Depressione Economica E Politica Cerealicola Fascista 
(Milano: CLESAV, 1984). 
159 PV, 17939, 270, 19 November 1975, p. 1. 
160 PV, 17948, 279, 30 November 1975, p. 1. 
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economic development in the state budget for 1976), Brezhnev thanked 
Uzbekistan for its results, exclaiming his famous motto “golden hands make 
‘white gold’” and declaring that “Uzbek cotton pickers enlarged the socialist 
competition to meet the request of XXV congress with honor, doing their 
internationalist duty in front of brother peoples of the country, providing to 
the fatherland five million tons of cotton and exceeding the plan for 280,000 
tons". Therefore, the party was honoring the ‘Uzbek victory’ of the previous 
ten years. In fact, comparing the ninth FYP with the eighth, it was reaffirmed 
that 
in these years the country received 24.5 million tons of Uzbek ‘white gold’ and 
this sum exceeded the plan[ned figure] for 2.3 million tons [...]. In the IX FYP the 
production of cotton increased by 4.6 million - or 23% - compared with the 
previous plan […]. In the struggle for the ‘grand cotton’, the workers of the 
republic had always felt the support and help of the CC CPSU and the Soviet 
government. [Since the implementation of the plenum’s resolutions (March 
1965 and May 1966) and the XXIV CPSU congress decisions (1971)] there were 
continuous improvements in agriculture in terms of investments and 
techniques, fertilizers and other material resources for agricultural 
development.161 
These triumphs were reported and publicized with great fanfare across the 
republican media. At the same time, the Soviet government approved new 
measures to develop agriculture in the USSR, where cotton was again a crucial 
yield to be increased by mechanization.162 The Soviet state budget provided 
Uzbekistan with 4,298,696,000 rubles for 1976. This figure was higher than for 
other peripheral republics of the USSR, but less than what was planned for 
Kazakhstan (about 6.7 billion rubles) and significantly smaller than the budget 
for the RSFSR (with over 54 billion).163 This was an indication that, despite the 
triumphalist narrative, Uzbekistan had a marginal role in the Soviet economy, 
relegated to raw material production. 
                                                          
161 PV, 17949, 280, 2 December 1975, p. 1. 
162 In a declaration about the plan of economic development of USSR for 1976, Nikolai 
Baibakov - Deputy chairman of the SM USSR and President of Gosplan USSR - declared 
that the state wanted to further invest in the mechanization of Soviet agriculture - 
supplying 380 thousand tractors, 270 thousand trucks and 97 thousand threshers - and 
in mineral fertilizers (78.6 million tons) in order to increase the production of potatoes, 
fruits and vegetables, and cotton. PV, 17950, 281, 3 December 1975, p. 2. 
163 PV, 17952, 283, 5 December 1975, p. 1. 
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The ninth FYP was scheduled for completion and the CPUz publicized the 
great results of Uzbek agriculture that were, officially, exceeding the plan in 
any sector.164 During the XX plenum of the CC CPUz (10 December 1975), 
Rashidov also congratulated planners and workers of the republic for the 
excellent results that had gone beyond expectations and “gave courage for the 
future.” During his speech, the Uzbek leader recalled that, in following the 
directives of XXIV CPSU congress, the Uzbeks had realized more than 500,000 
hectares of new fields, produced 24.5 million tons of cotton – exceeding the 
eighth FYP (1966-1970) production (19.9 million165) by 4.6 million, and the 
ninth FYP by 2.3 billion – and building over 24 million m2 of housing space.166 
Indeed, in the mid-1970s Uzbek agriculture production was officially 
increasing, and the party redoubled its efforts in cotton. Rashidov, once again, 
welcomed central planners’ requests for improved cotton output, laid out in 
the SM USSR ‘directives for the development of the Soviet economy for the 
years 1976-1980’ that set a target of at least 9 million tons of cotton per year 
in the USSR. For Uzbekistan, a 35-39% improvement in industry and a 21-24% 
improvement in agriculture were pushed, with the aim to reach 5.8 million tons 
(+22.9%) of cotton per year in 1980.167 The tenth FYP (1976-1980) also targeted 
fertilizer growth – from 90 million tons in 1975 to 143 million in 1980.168 
2.2.3 Enthusiasm and delusions: the tenth FYP 
In 1976, during the ‘start’ of the tenth FYP plan (1976-1980), the ecological 
limits of Uzbek cotton production were starting to become clear. The 
leadership had been warned about the drying of the Aral Sea basin and in 
                                                          
164 The ninth FYP (1971-1975) expected a lot from UzSSR agriculture, and in the end 
official targets were exceeded as follows (in million tons): The cotton target was 22.132 
(but the effective result was given as 24.460); wheat 2.274 (2.3595); fruit 0.582 (0.724); 
vegetables 3.547 (4.376); melons 1.528 (2.091); grapes 1.007 (1.059); meat 0.841 
(0.8638); milk 2.042 (2.142); raw silk 0.102039 (0.113457) and eggs 2.025 billion (2.208). 
PV, 17953, 284, 7 December 1975, p. 2. During the ninth FYP (1971-1975), agricultural 
production in the UzSSR officially increased for meat (+30%), milk (+60%), eggs (+120%), 
rice (+78%), wheat (+14%), fruit (+120%), vegetables (+55.5%), grapes (45.4%), melons 
(21.4%) and corn (more than 25 times). PV, 17992, 20, 25 January 1976, p. 3. 
165 PV, 17992, 20, 25 January 1976, p. 3. 
166 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 143, d. 2137; PV, 17957, 288, 12 December 1975, p. 1; and Pravda, 
11 December 1975, p. 2. 
167 PV, 17959, 290, 14 December 1975, pp. 4-6 and PV, 17963, 294, 19 December 1975, 
p. 2. 
168 PV, 17970, 301, 28 December 1975, p. 2. 
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January 1976 the last serious attempt at water deviation to address the drying 
of the Prearal basin was announced. A 75km branch was added to the main 
Lenin canal and was greeted with the slogan “Amu Darya returned to 
Muynak!”169 As we will see later, this attempt was unsuccessful and the 
ecological deterioration continued. This project was one small measure in a 
larger effort in the mid-70s to turn desert areas into prosperous irrigated lands. 
Indeed, the tenth FYP envisaged a series of irrigation projects to add four 
million hectares to Soviet irrigated lands, of which 462 thousand were planned 
in the UzSSR and 1.5 million hectares reached by water had to be devoted to 
pastures.170 
Despite the alarming ecological situation, Rashidov was still determined to 
pursue the Moscow line about agriculture in Uzbekistan, including for cotton. 
During the opening speech of the XIX congress of CPUz (3-5 February 1976),171 
he was effusive, recalling that cotton production had increased by 23% in the 
ninth FYP. He noted growth also in wheat (+15%), rice (+78%), and corn 
(2500%), and how the republic was able to exceed the plan by 300 thousand 
tons of ‘white gold’.172 
The Uzbek leader’s speech drew applause from the local party, but 
Moscow’s approval would have to wait until XXV congress of CPSU (24 February 
- 5 March 1976) where the dismal performance of Soviet agriculture weighed 
heavily on the minds of delegates. Here, the divisions between conservatives 
and critics within the communist party emerged. The latter – including Kosygin 
who was later marginalized – highlighted the obvious signs that the USSR was 
entering into a critical phase, while the former – including Rashidov – waxed 
lyrical about the Soviet system, emphasizing the unity of Soviet people, the 
stability of the political and economic situation, and the prospects of continued 
success. This was simple delusion. For his part, Brezhnev enforced a 
conservative approach and in his speech he cast a positive note: 
Objective historical reasons have prevented large investments in agriculture 
until recently. Of [the] 320 billion rubles invested in agriculture under Soviet 
power, 213 billion were invested during the past two five-year periods, 
concentrated in three main areas. Mechanization: In this decade collective and 
state farms received over three million tractors, 900,000 harvester combines, 
1,800,000 trucks and special purpose vehicles and billions of rubles’ worth of 
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170 PV, 17983, 11, 15 January 1976, p. 2. 
171 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 145, d. 2227. 
172 PV, 18000, 28, 4 February 1976, p. 3. 
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other farm machinery. Power per worker has doubled. Land Improvement: 
6,400,000 hectares of irrigated land and over 8,000,000 hectares of drained land 
were cultivated. Chemicalization: a more than 180 per cent increase in the use 
of fertilizers, over 100 per cent increase in [the] use of plant protection 
chemicals. All this has meant [a] 40 per cent increase in grain yield, a rise of 58 
per cent in labor productivity, and nearly 25 per cent growth in farm products 
per capita despite […] population growth of 23 million. Much remains to be 
done; 41 billion rubles more is to be invested in the new five-year plan […]. That 
will mean millions of tons more [of] fertilizers, comprehensive mechanization of 
grain farming and a higher level in livestock, a vast increase in reclamation 
including large-scale improvement in the Non-Black Soil Zone, large new 
irrigation systems in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as in the South and 
Southeast of the European part of the country.173 
At the XXV congress, even Rashidov had a short speech to thank the party 
– in which he defined Brezhnev as an “exceptional person”174 – and to 
broadcast the excellent results of Uzbek agriculture. Emphasizing the role of 
the republic for the Soviet cause, the FS CPUz declared: 
As before, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan concentrates its main attention 
on cotton growing. [...] Without any exaggeration, the work of our glorious 
cotton growers can be called a heroic exploit. And this heroic exploit was [made] 
possible […by] the fraternal help that is always forthcoming from all the many 
peoples living in our homeland. In our Party and in our land there is a wonderful 
atmosphere of mutual faith, mutual respect and friendship among all the 
peoples [and] all the nationalities. The stronger our friendship and mutual 
fraternal ties become, the greater will be our successes in economic, social, and 
cultural growth and in creating a new highly-developed human being.175 
However, in the XXV congress Rashidov - as Gapurov and Kunaev did - also 
denounced the water-sources problem and directly recalled the need to divert 
part of the flow of Siberian rivers into the Aral Sea Basin and into the Central 
Asian region, reaffirming their support for the already mentioned 'project of 
                                                          
173 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, “Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate 
Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, February 24, 1976,” in Building a New 
Society: The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Jessica 
Smith, David Laibman, and Marilyn Bechtel (New York: NWR Publications, 1977), 54. 
174 PV, 18019, 47, 27 February 1976, p. 2. 
175 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, “Speech of Congress Delegate,” in Building a New 
Society: The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Jessica 
Smith, David Laibman, and Bechtel Marilyn (New York: NWR Publications, 1977), 107–
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the century.'176 Furthermore, on that occasion Rashidov committed Uzbekistan 
to yet another new objective. Presenting it as a decision of the XIX congress of 
the CPUz, he promised “to reach, by the end of the tenth FYP, annual 
production of 6 million tons.”177 This was obviously an over-ambitious – if not 
unrealizable – figure that would haunt Uzbek planners for the next decade. In 
this way, Rashidov reaffirmed his loyalty to Brezhnev - who did nothing but ask 
davai, shest' millionov! - and to a party in which he was hoping would help 
advance his career. Then, during the II plenum of the CC CPUz (10 may 1976), 
the first after the XXV congress CPSU, Rashidov announced the challenge to 
further develop cotton production in Uzbekistan, recalling how the 
new targets are more difficult and ambitious than past ones. The most 
important and the most challenging goal is the improvement of cotton 
production. Cotton is a great source of the country and of the republic. Every 
year the demand for cotton increases. [...] CC CPSU and the Soviet government 
are always involved in the increase of cotton production in our republic, which 
always has been, and remains, the main base for cotton in the country. [...] 
During the XXV congress of party, L.I. Brezhnev [exclaimed] that “we have to 
offer good words to our cotton pickers […] as every year of the FYP good results 
in the cotton crop have been achieved.”178 
In this plenum speech, after reaffirming the commitments made by the CC 
CPUz, the Uzbek leader repeated the need to improve irrigation and field 
improvements. He noted how the state expected more Uzbek cotton still and 
was growing its investment in irrigation infrastructure: 2.2 billion rubles during 
the eighth FYP (1966-1970), 4.5 during the ninth (1971-1975) – when 511 
thousand hectares of new irrigated and new canals in Karshi, Namangan and 
Karakalpakstan were opened – and allocating 5.9 for the tenth FYP (1976-
1980). This plenum was where the ambitious “6 million” medium-term target 
was set. This agenda required: 
 
1 – The promotion of cotton production and the improvement of its quality for 
the tenth FYP as a core target for the party organization, the soviets, the 
agricultural organs, and the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. By 1980, the target of 6 
million tons of cotton was set; 
2 – Improvements inside the party in efficiency and effectiveness of cotton 
production, particularly in regard to cost-control; 
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3 – Proper use of [agricultural] resources in order to improve fertility, to 
intensify technology-use, and the use of mineral fertilizers; 
4 – Continuous improvement in the structure of the cotton growing areas; 
5 – Field improvements to enhance productivity; 
6 – Use of the latest techniques of agriculture. Kolkhozes must be managed with 
advanced techniques; 
7 – Planting of new, more resistant, varieties of cotton that harvest sooner; 
8 – Improving fiber quality and crop technology; 
9 – Improvements in the management of agriculture in obkoms, raikoms, 
kolkhozes, and sovkhozes.179 
Rashidov wanted to show he could effectively liaise between Moscow and 
the CPUz and reported with enthusiasm to the CC CPSU that the republican 
party fully agreed with the Moscow’s line in an event that was  
devoted to the important commitment and the primary value of continuously 
raising cotton production in the republic [...] The total unanimity of plenum 
participants has confirmed that every day the stimulating and inspiring strength 
of the decisions that represent the incarnation of political wisdom and foresight 
of the CPSU are spread, having the powerful and material force that accelerates 
progress. Expressing the view of the communists and all the workers of 
Uzbekistan, the participants of the plenum stressed the importance of the role 
of the general secretary of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev in solving all important issues 
for our people. For 1976, we will produce 5.3 million tons of raw cotton and, 
based on decisions at this plenum, will reach 6 million tons by 1980. Foreseeing 
by the end of this plan 1,880,000 hectares180 of fields planted with cotton, and 
providing then an average crop of 32-33 quintals per hectare, with 60% of 
cotton harvested through an increase of productive efficiency [due to 
mechanization]. During the tenth FYP, the republic will be provided with 92,000 
tractors, 30,000 harvesters, 35,000 trucks, 73,000 trailers for tractors, and many 
other machines and equipment. For 1976, we want to collect 270,000 tons of 
fine-fiber cotton181 and by the end of the plan 400,000 tons – 50,000 tons more 
than foreseen in the plan.182 
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180 To understand the effective size of this area, it is possible to translate this figure into 
18,800 km2 that is a little smaller than the territory of Israel (20,770 km2). 
181 For this task, the Ministry for agricultural mechanization of the USSR sent a 
memorandum to CC CPSU on 1 June 1976 confirming that 200 new machines for 
cropping fine-fiber cotton should be delivered by the end of the year. RGANI, f. 5, op. 
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In terms of substance, this agenda required the party to direct most of its 
energies to cotton production and the narrative of the “six million” started to 
absorb the press and the media, mobilizing the entire population to the great 
cause of “cotton for the fatherland.” Everything else the CPUz did was framed 
through the prism of the “battle for cotton” and the need to stimulate the 
enthusiasm of the population to the cause of the Uzbek “victory.” During the 
III plenum of CC CPUz (13 June 1976)183 the slogan “two FYPs in one” was 
advanced, tying the cause of cotton to the development of mechanization, 
industrialization and housing,184 and proposing mutual cooperation between 
the various kolkhozes and sovkhozes for the realization of their “socialist 
duties”185 for  a range of other products.186 The sacredness of that task was 
stressed by the constant slogans and appeals of the party that emphasized a 
“holy duty to provide to the fatherland no less than 5,300,000 ton of ‘white 
gold’”.187 As one had it: “Cultivators of Uzbekistan! Let’s perform the requests 
of the XXV CPSU congress: we will provide more field products to the 
fatherland”.188 Cotton itself took on a sacred significance, becoming “our glory, 
our pride, our priceless treasure!”189 Every additional ton was announced as a 
step forward, a won battle, a victory for the Uzbek people that was increasingly 
showing its ability to wrest fertile ground from the desert.190 It is interesting to 
note how the enthusiasm for the great cotton challenge was also confirmed at 
the popular level through dozens of – probably orchestrated by the CPUz - 
letters and telegrams that Brezhnev received from Uzbek kolkhozes and 
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sovkhozes where the workers and managers were confirming their pledges for 
1976 to produce more cotton.191 
This triumphalist narrative continued even in the following years: during 
the V plenum of the CC CPUz (28 January 1977), Rashidov was proud to 
announce the official results of the 1976 cotton crop as another success of 
UzSSR agriculture: the republic officially produced 5.3375 million tons, 6,5% 
more than 1975,192 and reaffirmed its commitment to reach 6 million tons of 
raw cotton by 1980 as well as to increase the production of ‘fine fiber’ 
cotton.193 Like a beating drum, the party was promoting the annual agricultural 
goals for cotton workers, recalling “the milestones of the jubilee year:194 cotton 
growers of the republic have pledged to produce 5,360,000 tons of raw cotton, 
of which 275 thousand tons are of fine fiber cotton, and to collect with 
machines no less than 3,200,000 tons.”195 Likewise, such appeals were also 
promoted for other “minor productions”196 and to prevent water wastage.197 
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where possible, sewer and waste water. Remember: respect for the security of the 
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Cotton had such a central role in the UzSSR system that it was even mentioned 
among the pillars of the new socialist society following the approval of the 1977 
Soviet Constitution, an document that was praised by Rashidov as being 
“golden pages in the glorious political history of the Soviet state, in the history 
of all world revolutionary process.”198 At the IX convocation of the VII Special 
Session of SS USSR, Rashidov even pronounced: 
this constitution is a symphony of intellect, happiness of free labor and 
authentic humanism. The new constitution is a veritable ode to the Soviet 
person, a hymn to the Soviet system, a hymn to the Soviet lifestyle, a hymn to 
our international brotherhood, a hymn to the indestructible and eternal 
friendship of the Soviet peoples.199 
At the same time, the Uzbek leader increased the expectations of the Soviet 
planners, setting the mechanization of the cotton crop as a fundamental 
objective to be implemented with a minimum threshold of at least 70% of total 
production,200 a result that came only rarely, as well as the improvement of 
chemical defoliation, crop techniques, and inter-ministerial integrated 
cooperation in the agriculture sector as it was reaffirmed in the VII plenum CC 
CPUz (15 September 1977)201 in order to concentrate “any technique to the 
cotton fields.”202  
The efforts that were made in Uzbekistan were again recognized and 
appreciated in Moscow. On 3 November 1977, Brezhnev wrote a 
congratulatory note to the three main leaders of the UzSSR - Rashidov, 
Khudayberdyev, and Matchanov - on the 60th anniversary of the revolution, 
noting the brilliant results of Uzbek agriculture: 
Dear comrades, I read your message on the execution of plans and duties on 
grain, cotton, kenaf, vegetables, fruits, grapes, potatoes, melons, silk with a 
feeling of deep satisfaction and pride. This is a good gift for the 60th jubilee year 
of the Great October Revolution.203 
                                                          
water-performing high-socialist commitments adopted for the jubilee year of 
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The day after (4 November 1977), the presidium of the SS USSR assigned to 
Rashidov an ‘Order of Lenin’ and the second gold medal ‘Hammer and 
Sickle.’204 These latest honors seemed to present the Uzbek leader as a father 
of the nation, a progressive modernizer, a devoted patriot, and a loyal Soviet 
leader who had managed to modernize the republic and to ensure that 
Moscow had all the raw materials it needed. The honors he received seemed 
then to act as an ornamental sweetener in a context where there was a 
tendency to reward and to create affiliation and affinity with the empire and 
its symbols.205 1977 would thus have been a wonderful year for the Uzbek 
cotton and for Rashidov, who sang its praises. In his article entitled “getting 
more and more”, the Uzbek leader declared the latest fantastic results of the 
republic: 
[This year], the cotton pickers [of UzSSR] have passed another frontier, and for 
the first time they provided to the state 5.43 million tons of cotton, exceeding 
the plan by 780,000 tons. Almost 95% of the crop is of first quality. In the entire 
history of cotton cultivation, our republic has never collected so much, and 
Uzbekistan has never fulfilled its socialist duties in such a short time as in this 
year. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic plan to provide a further 100,000 
tons of cotton before the year is out. [Moreover, just] today at the storage 
points more than 5.65 million tons have been delivered […] ten times the 
production of cotton in the pre-revolutionary period in the Turkestan krai. The 
area under cultivation has increased fourfold and is 1.8 million hectares.206 
In this phase of development, the party sought increased investment from 
Moscow. The USSR state budget for 1978 assigned 4,636,061,000 rubles (about 
7.84% more than in 1976) to the UzSSR at the VIII plenum CC CPUz (19 
December 1977).207 However, this increase was merely nominal and inferior 
compared to other republics like the RSFSR that received a bigger increase – 60 
billion rubles (about 11.11% more than 1976). In order to reaffirm his role, 
Rashidov continued to reassure Moscow about the successes of agriculture in 
Uzbekistan and he was again rewarded for his efforts. On 5 January 1978, the 
Uzbek leader - along with other prominent communists such as Mikhail Suslov, 
Pyotr Demichev, Nikolai Ogarkov, Nikolai Shchelokov, and Boris Bugaev – 
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received from the hands of Brezhnev the above mentioned awards.208 The 
Gensek exclaimed that: 
Under the leadership of the CC headed by you, Sharaf Rashidovich, the 
communists and all workers of Uzbekistan obtained very important results in 
the implementation of XXV party congress' resolutions in the struggle for “great 
cotton” for the country. Your role in this task has made you eligible for the 
‘Order of Lenin’ and the second gold medal ‘sickle and hammer’. 
Congratulations and best wishes for new successes in the struggle for the tasks 
of this five-year plan for the quality and effectiveness of labor.209 
Flattered in this way, Rashidov recalled the work of the UzSSR cotton 
pickers who “gave to the homeland more than 5.68 million tons”, thanked 
Brezhnev, and declared that “success has been possible thanks to the help, care 
and attention of the CC CPSU, of the politburo and of personally [you], L.I. 
Brezhnev, [...] who personify the best qualities of a Soviet Communist, the 
greatest authority of our Party and the State.”210 This type of narrative 
substantially repeated the same celebratory carousel of previous years. 
After this solemn (and pomp) ceremony acknowledging Rashidov’s merits, 
the Uzbek leader pledged even more to promote the realization of the plans in 
the republic, proposing faster implementation of the socialist tasks for the third 
year of the tenth FYP in relation to mineral fertilizers – requiring 150,000 tons 
more by 1978211 – and irrigation. In the spring of 1978, the Uzbek leader 
publicized the construction of new canals in the Hungry Steppe to complete an 
effective irrigation network of 158,000 km and an increase in agricultural 
production in the region, recalling the positive results of the republic: “just in 
the last seven years the USSR has obtained from Uzbekistan 35.5 million tons 
of ‘white gold’ […] exceeding the plan by more than 4 million tons.”212 
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Agricultural success was twinned with other gains. Indeed, considering the 
strategic importance of the republic as the main supplier of Soviet cotton – as 
well as other ‘strategic products’ like gold213 and uranium214 – the CPUz also 
promoted heightened decentralization and more autonomy for Uzbekistan. 
With constitutional reform in the USSR after 1977 the UzSSR also elaborated 
its own set of fundamental principles. From March 1978, a committee at the VI 
special session of the IX convocation of the SS UzSSR was established for the 
preparation of a constitution draft for the republic based on the Soviet 
Constitution. The project was approved during the IX plenum of the CC CPUz 
(17 April 1978).215 On that occasion, Rashidov made a long speech describing 
the event as a 
new stage in the development of socialist statehood and democracy [, 
representing the] indestructible unity the party and the people”. The Uzbek 
leader was directly referring to a text that was “uniting peoples […] under the 
banner of proletarian internationalism […] in the fraternal family united for the 
builders of communism.216  
The final draft was approved by the SS UzSSR on 19 April 1978 and was 
largely incorporating the principles expressed in the 1977 Soviet Constitution, 
such as art. 6 – which vested the central power of the political system in the 
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communist party – and the art. 16 recognizing the Uzbek economy as a 
component part of the united economic complex of the USSR. In essence, the 
new basic law changed nothing. In fact, the document merely formalized and 
reaffirmed those principles that had dominated the USSR over the previous 
sixty years and those bonds that had defined the relations between center and 
periphery in de facto terms. However, Rashidov presented the Uzbek 
constitution as a great opportunity that would have a big impact on the 
economic, political, and social development of the republic.217 
2.2.4 ‘White Gold’ at any cost 
Until summer 1978, Uzbek agriculture seemed to follow the general 
positive production trend across the USSR in that year. 1978 was supposed to 
be “a very good year for agriculture, and Brezhnev had every reason to think 
that his strategy of industrializing agriculture within a collectivist structure was 
correct.” 218 This attitude was reflected during the CPSU plenum (3 July 1978 
plenum), a “meeting […that] gave a new impetus to the intensification of 
agricultural production”219 where the Soviet leader reviewed the achievements 
that his policies had engendered, reminding attendees how the gross cotton 
crop in the USSR had grown from 4.84 million tons – with an average 
productivity of 20.6 quintals per hectare – from 1959-1965 to 7.91 million tons 
and 27.7 quintals per hectare in 1971-1977.220 The conquests of Soviet cotton 
– as well as for other agricultural products – were still lauded widely by the 
regime. However, a minority of the party – including the young Gorbachev who 
was appointed to the Central Committee's Secretariat for Agriculture in July 
1978 – pointed out the critical aspects of Soviet agriculture, noting the 
importance of carrying out effective and systemic reforms. This line was 
marginalized within the party. Rashidov also confirmed a conservative 
approach, pursuing the ‘Brezhnev route’ and continuing to acclaim the results 
of a system that was presented as ‘infallible’ and that would guarantee Uzbek 
cotton for the fatherland at any cost. 
However, even the ‘infallible’ system had to deal with the objective 
conditions of agriculture and the problems related to climatic circumstances. 
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Therefore, during the X plenum of the CC CPUz (25 July 1978),221 Rashidov took 
a more cautious line, assuming the bad weather conditions that had affected 
Uzbek agriculture during the summer might cause some delays in cotton 
production. However, he reaffirmed to the party the importance of honoring 
the commitments provided for in the plan, and he seemed to directly reassure 
Brezhnev on the positive results that Uzbek agriculture would reach, declaring 
that at any cost “all forces must be devoted to this purpose [in order to supply] 
not less than 5.7 million in 1978 and 5.85 in 1979.”222 The cadres of the CPUz, 
realizing the unfavorable conditions of Uzbek agriculture in 1978, seemed very 
concerned about this commitment from their FS. For this reason, in August a 
relentless media campaign to seriously engage as much as possible all the 
forces of the republic in the cotton crop and to achieve the promoted results 
at any cost began. Again, the preferred solution seemed to be in the 
mechanization of the harvest – not less than 70% of the total223 – while trying 
to not neglect quality.224 As we have mentioned before, a fast harvest, 
mechanization, and high quality would prove mutually exclusive objectives in 
the end. For the 1978 harvest, slogans such as “all the technique in the 
fields”,225 “not a single hour of inactivity, not a single gram loss”,226 “let’s work 
with no delays, effectively and with higher quality”227 were calling for 
maximum efficiency in the cotton crop, recalling militarist rallying of past 
battles. The CPUz was essentially encouraging everyone to do his duty on “the 
cotton field - our striking front”228 in order to “assault the last million!”.229 Even 
in mid-November, the promised result of 5.7 million seemed to be a distant 
prospect: on November 19, it was announced that only 5.2 million had been 
cropped230 and – with winter approaching – the CPUz mobilized a final effort 
among all UzSSR workers to “pick cotton in any weather”.231 
The triumphalism of previous years was notably absent. On December 12 – 
well after the ‘finish’ of the normal harvest season – the party announced a 
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total crop of 5.5 million tons,232 making no mention of plan targets. During the 
XI plenum of the CC CPUz (19 December 1978) Rashidov made no 
announcement on Uzbek cotton – as he had done conspicuously in previous 
final year plenums – focusing instead on other socio-economic issues.233 
Clearly, silence was the preferred strategy – the harvest was so clearly below 
expectations that not even ‘massaging’ could hide the fact that production had 
come in well below target. The positive trends of cotton production both in the 
USSR and Uzbekistan – which had reached a production peak in 1977 – had 
suddenly stalled. To some extent, refusing to raise the stakes on cotton 
production seemed a sign of mutiny. 
 
Official figures of raw cotton production in the USSR and in the UzSSR (in 
tons)234 
Period 1971-1975 1976-1978 1976 1977 1978 
USSR 7,670,000 8,510,000 8,280,000 8,760,000 8,500,000 
UzSSR 4,894,400 5,520,600 5,335,600 5,676,400 5,550,020 
However, if the production of cotton upstream suffered a setback, the 
manufacture of cotton products in the republic continued to produce brilliant 
results. For 1979, the MCC UzSSR forecast outcomes surpassing the plan by 
19.5 thousand tons of cotton fiber, 2.1 thousand tons of lind fiber, 12 thousand 
m2 of fabrics for packaging, 320 tons of kenaf fiber, 12 tons of spun fiber and 
30 tons of rope.235 Substantially, the party was still mobilizing enormous 
resources in cotton production but its importance – in terms of propaganda – 
was less, compared to the other achievements of the republic. 
The ‘annus horribilis’ of late Rashidovism passed soon enough, and the 
party refocused all of its energies on the sacred goal of ‘six million’ by 1980. 
The productive goals of the UzSSR for 1979 were then defined during the XII 
plenum of CC CPUz (26 February 1979). Here, organization of the party for the 
“socialist competition” for the timely commissioning of production facilities236 
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was discussed. Meanwhile, during the XIII plenum (8 June),237 the debate was 
mostly focused on the ideological, political, and educational duties of the party. 
However, also on that occasion, the CC CPUz discussed the possibility of crop 
rotation, challenging the official program of cotton monoculture - a point that 
would hardly be welcome in Moscow. Then, the development of 
mechanization for the cotton production was again reaffirmed –  in 1978 3.430 
million tons (i.e. 62.4% of the total production) were collected with machines, 
1.138 million tons more than in 1975.238 This intensive mechanization was 
probably the basis for the cotton production increase after 1975 but, as we will 
see, this process would present a high cost in terms of quality. The previous 
year's failure in the cotton crop led the Uzbek leadership to mobilize the 
republic in a greater effort in order to wash away the shame of 1978. The 
unceasing appeals of the CC CPUz, the Presidium of the SS UzSSR and the SM 
UzSSR to speed up the cotton crop and to complete the plan – in order to reach 
5.7 million tons and 70% of production with machines - continued throughout 
the summer even as the party sought to develop other sectors of agriculture 
and livestock breeding.239  
In late August the cotton harvest started. This time, there was less 
triumphalism and appeals to the ‘cotton war’, with a fatalistic rhetoric taking 
its place which called “everybody to the field, where we determine the fate of 
the crop!”240 and to the “heroic exploit”241 in order to stream “all forces to 
implement the plan and the Socialist duties.”242 Thereby, the CPUz referred to 
the moral duties of the Uzbek khlopkaroby, declaring that “picking all the 
cotton is our duty, our honor, our conscience”243 while in the republic’s field 
the wartime rhetoric of Ni shagu nazad! (Not one step back!) was enforced. At 
the same time, to the commitments made by the operators and the increasing 
harassment of workers was added weather conditions that were better than in 
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the previous year and the party was able to optimistically announce positive 
results to Moscow’s cadres.244 
Finally, it was possible to proclaim again positive results in the cotton crop 
and on 6 December 1979 the “excellent victory of the Uzbek cotton pickers” 
that cropped more than 5.72 million tons245 was announced. On the same day, 
party leaders met immediately during the XV plenum CC CPUz where Rashidov 
thanked Brezhnev for the “care” and “for the high consideration of our 
work”.246 Basically, the party was again able to assess the positive results of the 
republic and the Uzbek FS, during a “triumphal” meeting with the 
representatives of UzSSR workers, declared that Uzbekistan had again 
achieved a record production of ‘white gold.’247 After the 1978 flop and the 
temporary burying of cotton production data, the Uzbek government was 
again able to announce record results in 1979. 
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Cotton Production per region (in thousand tons) in 1979248 
Bukhara 609 
Ferghana 554 
Samarkand 547 
Kashkadarya 537 
Andijan 536 
Surkhandarya 505 
Tashkent 472 
Karakalpakya 449 
Khorezm 429 
Syrdarya 407 
Namangan 400 
Jizzak 319 
Total 5764 
 
Indeed, Rashidov seemed to have brilliantly reconfirmed Moscow’s trust 
and he continued to thank the Soviet leadership for the results that had been 
achieved in the republic. In his speech to the electorate entitled “party and 
peoples united”, the Uzbek FS said that “in all the successes and in all the 
results of the republic, the brotherly help of all Soviet peoples and, particularly, 
of the great Russian people is manifested.”249 Even during the XVI plenum of 
the CC CPUz (14 March 1980), Rashidov referred to the letter that had arrived 
from Moscow to acknowledge the positive results of the Tashkent oblast as “an 
act of care from the party and personally from Brezhnev”250 stressing that the 
positive scores were due to local efforts as well as to Moscow planners. 
For the results obtained in 1979 and for the realization of the plan, the 
UzSSR was awarded for the seventh time the “Red Banner”. On that occasion, 
Rashidov acclaimed “this triumphant act [as] the acknowledgement by the 
                                                          
248 The results of 1979 were presented by the chairman of SM UzSSR Khudayberdyev 
during the meeting of the “first” farmers of the republic. PV, 19240, 63, 16 March 1980, 
p. 2. 
249 PV, 19202, 25, 31 January 1980, p. 1. 
250 RGASPI, f.17, op. 149, d. 2419, and PV, 19239, 62, 15 March 1980, p. 1. 
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party and by the state of the contribution of the Republic’s workers in 
strengthening the country’s economic potential”.251 Once again, the Uzbek FS 
was carrying on increasingly advanced commitments, promising for 1980 a 
cotton production of 5,850,000 tons,252 a number that became a slogan and 
the main leitmotiv of the 1 May 1980 celebrations.253 A major commitment to 
increase the production of fine-fiber cotton significantly during the eleventh 
FYP followed. According to Gosplan UzSSR, the planned quantity of raw and 
fine fiber cottons was (in thousands of tons):254 
 
 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Raw Cotton 5,840 5,880 5,920 5,960 6,000 
Fine-Fiber Cotton 370 390 410 430 450 
  
The Uzbek party and government confirmed the healthy situation of cotton 
production in the republic and asked the central state and the CPSU to pay 
extra attention in terms of investments devoted to the improvement of cotton 
in the UzSSR.255 Furthermore, a decree of CC CPUz and SM UzSSR - entitled “on 
                                                          
251 PV, 19241, 64, 18 March 1980, p. 1. 
252 The UzSSR plan for 1980 also demanded three million tons of wheat, 1.22 million 
tons of vegetables, 860,000 tons of milk, 288,000 tons of meat, 26,500 tons of silk 
cocoons, 995 million eggs (PV, 19252, 75, 30 March, p. 1), 200 thousand tons of 
potatoes, 517,000 tons of rice, 702,000 tons of fruit and grapes, and 550 thousand tons 
of melons (PV, 19254, 77, 2 April 1980, p. 1). 
253 PV, 19279, 102, 2 May 1980, p. 3. 
254 The memorandum n° 14/11-145 of Gosplan UzSSR to the SM UzSSR of 11 April 1980 
is available at TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5275, l. 15. 
255 On 21 April 1980, Rashidov and Khudayberdyev wrote the memorandum M-21/4-37 
for the CC CPSU and the SM USSR, where they reported that following the directives of 
XXV congress CPSU and the CPSU plenum of July 1978, the cotton production of 
Uzbekistan was positive and that in the previous four years the republic had produced 
22.725 million tons. In 1979 alone, they reported, 5.763 million tons, with a productive 
average of 31.3 quintals per hectare, were delivered. The memo noted that fully 34.4% 
of cotton cropped could be transformed into fibers. According to the report, in 1979 
alone, Uzbekistan produced 323,500 tons of cotton fiber, and machines cropped 3.557 
million - while in 1975 the corresponding figure had been only 2.283 million tons. This 
represented an increase in machine crop share from 46% to 61.7%. For 1980 a crop of 
5.850 million tons of raw cotton – of which 3.8 million (or 65%) to be cropped by 
machines - and 355,000 tons of fibers was expected. These results were thus presented 
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the preparation of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, cotton factories and procurement 
centers of harvesting, and harvesting of raw cotton in 1980” –  set a target of 
355,000 tons of fine-fiber cotton for the current year256 and 3.85 million tons 
to be harvested by machines, placing incentives (awards, cars, and monetary 
prizes from 200 to 2,000 rubles) for the best mechanized pickers. They were 
reminded of the necessity of repairing the agricultural machinery before the 
                                                          
with pride by the Uzbek party and government, underlining how the new discoveries in 
terms of cotton varieties improved production. Then, they stated how, in the previous 
five years, 14 cleaning stations, 57 warehouses and 82 small cleaning centers, installing 
more than 3000 technologic instruments and 5000 spinneret tools had been built or 
repaired. In 1976-1977, about 70% of cotton was of first- or second-grade quality and 
only 10% was of fourth-grade. Uzbek cotton had been exported to 29 states, of which 
18 were capitalist economies. Due to bad weather in 1978-1979, the harvest had been 
largely postponed in November and this is why only 51-56% of the whole production 
was of the top two grades of quality, and the 1979 harvest had even continued into April 
1980. After presenting the results, the Uzbek party and government demanded that the 
ministry of agriculture USSR and the state technical committee for agricultural 
improvements progress both technique and scientific research in chemistry. They also 
asked for more tractors to kolkhozes and sovkhozes, agricultural technologies, transport 
means, spare parts, petroleum products, and an improved selection of seeds. A request 
to the ministry of light industry was made so that 62 new factories for cotton-cleaning, 
12 seeding centers, 80 warehouses, and 90 small cleaning centers and 60 mini-centers 
for seeding and 156 laboratories could be built. Furthermore, given most cotton was 
stocked outdoors, they asked for materials to build new 600 silos that could each 
contain up to 1,000 tons. In order to support the cadres, materials to build new 60,000 
m2 of housing, and 3000 places in kindergarten were requested. From the ministry for 
wheat, 161 million rubles to reconstruct the stations for cotton-cleaning and materials 
to complete 3000 m2 of factories were requested for 1981-1985. From USSR Minpribor 
(Ministry of Instrumentation, Automation and Control Systems) support to reorganize 
the new equipment and new technologies was also requested. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, 
d. 5275, ll. 66-72. 
256 This task resulted as one of the most difficult to realized, considering the difficulties 
and the necessary care for this crop. However, on 14 April 1980, the CC CPUz announced 
to Gorbachev positive results also on this sector stating that during the past 4 years of 
the current plan, the production of fine fiber cotton increased from 240 to 324 thousand 
tons, so increasing of 35%. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 410, l. 39. Then, on 21 April 1980, the 
CC CPUz and the SM UzSSR announced to the CC CPSU and the SM USSR that in the past 
4 years of the plan have been harvested 22.275 million tons exceeding the plan for half 
million ton. The actual record was in 1979 with 5.763 million tons and a productivity of 
31.3 quintals per hectare. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 410, l. 43. 
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harvest season.257 The order was: “strive for quality, defoliation, and improved 
rhythms of the ‘white harvest’. Quickly prepare the front of cotton picker 
machines”258 in order to observe a plan that, according to the CPUz, had been 
already respected for other agriculture issues, such as irrigation.259 
2.2.5 Announcing the ‘cotton miracle’ 
1980 marked the peak of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan. Excellent 
weather made the difference and the 1980 cotton harvest proceeded with 
faster rhythms than previous years and the call “through the victory of labor!” 
seemed to galvanize the entire Uzbek population.260 Despite the very public, 
triumphalist announcements, Rashidov had a cautious attitude and warned 
Moscow to be thankful for what had been achieved and not press further as 
the limits of what the republic could do were approaching.261 At the same time, 
he knew that in 1980 had been a stellar year. On 1 November 1980, the miracle 
was announced: the UzSSR had officially produced 6,000,000 tons of ‘white 
gold’ for the first time.262 
For this “outstanding victory of labor”, Brezhnev exclaimed: “cotton 
growers deserve the warmest words. Their selfless work of great skill, efficient 
organization of work at all stages of the harvest has been crowned with great 
                                                          
257 In 16 June, about 16,000 cotton harvest machines, 11,000 tractors, 6,000 cleaning 
separators, 5,000 stripper machines, 1,300 mechanical pickers, 600 cotton loaders had 
to be repaired or put back into operation. PV, 19331, 154, 4 July 1980, p. 1. 
258 PV, 19389, 212, 13 September 1980, p. 1. 
259 Already in summer 1980, the CPUz stated that the FYP was almost complete for 
irrigation, with more than 105 thousand hectares of new irrigated lands. PV, 19398, 221, 
25 September 1980, p. 1. 
260 PV, 19408, 231, 7 October 1980, p. 1. 
261 On 18 September 1980, a politburo meeting approved Uzbekistan’s target, a decision 
later confirmed by the CC CPSU and the SM USSR. The figures were confirmed in a 
memorandum of 14 October 1980, where Rashidov politburo members, secretaries of 
the CPSU and Chernenko, foreseeing a gradual increase in the cotton crop: 5.840 million 
tons in 1981, 5.880 in 1982, 5.920 in 1983, 5.960 in 1984 and finally 6 million in 1985. 
On this occasion Rashidov warned that the Gosplan request to increase these figures by 
another 150,000-200,000 thousand tons would be difficult, arguing “the 
implementation of this request would be harmful to the development of the entire 
agriculture [...] The plan is already extremely stressed out.” Thus, the Uzbek leader was 
declaring that Gosplan was exaggerating and – despite promises – it could not go 
overboard in requests. RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 410, ll. 52-53. 
262 PV, 19429, 252, 1 November 1980, p. 1. 
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success.”263 Rashidov took the victory personally, and was acclaimed as a 
“champion of socialism” who had been able to fulfill the commitments with 
Moscow. Even during his speech for the anniversary of the revolution – entitled 
“to you, homeland, the labor of golden hands of cotton workers” – the Uzbek 
FS declared “our victory is the inexhaustible combination of hard work and 
inspired craftsmanship, strong will, high creative activity of professionals in 
agriculture and water resources and all the working people of Uzbekistan.”264 
Rashidov’s commitment to the Soviet cause were also reconfirmed during the 
XVIII plenum of the CC CPUz (10 November 1980) dedicated to the UzSSR’s 
socio-economic development plan for 1981 and to the execution of the CC 
CPSU plenum guidelines that had been defined by Brezhnev.265 Then, on 
November 12 another record was announced by the CC CPUz, the Presidium of 
SS UzSSR and the SM UzSSR hailing the “heroism” of Uzbek workers who had 
cropped 6,150,000 tons of raw cotton (of which 3,900,000 with machines and 
a new record of 350,000 tons of fine-fiber cotton).266 
2.3 Resting on laurels 
On 14 November 1980 the Presidium of the SS USSR awarded the UzSSR 
with the ‘Order of Lenin’, commenting: 
the outstanding successes, achieved by the working people of the Uzbek SSR in 
implementing the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU in cotton 
production, the sale to the state of 6,150 thousand tons of raw cotton in 1980, 
and for fulfilling ahead of schedule the Tenth Five-Year Plan in sale of cotton, 
grain, vegetables, melon crops, potatoes, grapes and other fruit, and hemp267 
On that occasion, Brezhnev expressed his gratitude to Uzbek workers, 
suggesting that the mission was not fully accomplished and that the USSR was 
expecting further efforts from the UzSSR for the construction of 
communism.268 In fact, in the definition of the new horizons of building 
                                                          
263 PV, 19432, 255, 5 November 1980, p. 1. 
264 PV, 19433, 256, 6 November 1980, pp. 1-2. 
265 RGASPI, f.17, op. 149, d. 2421 and PV, 19436, 259, 11 November 1980, p. 1. 
266 PV, 19437, 260, 12 November 1980, p. 1. 
267 Ibid., 49. 
268 In Brezhnev's words: “The CPSU Central Committee expresses its firm belief that rural 
workers in Uzbekistan, based on the increased material and technical equipment of 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, will aggressively fight for a further increase in the yield of all 
crops and livestock productivity, increasing production, efficiency and quality of work, 
consolidating the results achieved, will welcome new successes in construction of 
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communism, the CC CPSU was forecasting an increase of annual cotton 
production in the USSR to 9.2-9.3 million tons by 1985, also improving the 
cultivation of better quality cotton varieties and fibers.269 This long-term 
development plan for the 1990 USSR economy had direct implications for the 
UzSSR, where the Soviet planners were hoping to increase industrial 
production by 28-31% and agriculture by 17-19%.270 In a meeting with the 
Uzbek top cadres on 7 December 1980, Brezhnev congratulated the republic 
for the brilliant results and demanded a further increase in the realization of 
the plan for 1981-1985. On that occasion, Rashidov received the Lenin Prize 
and thanked the Soviet leader, confirming the commitments of the party and 
the republic for more cotton during the following FYP.271 
By 1981, communism was supposed to have been operational and at a final 
stage, but this goal had been postponed indefinitely. The new year had to 
represent the beginning of a new era of welfare that would be implemented 
through the eleventh FYP (1981-1985) and under the guidelines of the XXVI 
congress CPSU and the XX congress CPUz for producing ever-more cotton.272 
                                                          
communism, to meet adequately the 26th Congress of the CPSU”. PV, 19441, 264, 16 
November 1980, p. 1. 
269 On 11 December 1980, the Ministry of agriculture of the UzSSR wrote to Gosplan 
UzSSR the memorandum 18-19-110 where it was reported that the fiber produced with 
the cotton cropped with machines was inferior in terms of quality and fiber resistance. 
The resistance of a fiber was classified on the basis of its strength and the weight that it 
could hold. A first-quality fiber could hold 3.9 grams and more, a second-quality fiber 
3.5-.8, a third-quality fiber 3.1-3.4 and a fourth-quality fiber 3 grams or less. TsGARUz, 
f. 837, op. 41, d. 5580, ll. 65-66. 
270 While the total annual output in 1960 was 4,800 million kw/h, this program proposed 
a target by 1985 of 44-45 billion kw/h, to produce 560-570 million m2 of cotton and silk 
fabric, 480-485 thousand tons of vegetable oil, 1-1.1 billion units of canned fruit and 
vegetables, no less than 5.9 million tons of cotton (of which 400-420 thousand tons of 
higher quality), 2.8-3 million tons of grain, 2.4-2.5 million tons of vegetables, 400-410 
thousand tons of meat, 2.5-2.7 million tons of milk, 20-21 thousand tons of wool, 2.25 
million lambskins, and to continue the development of the Karshi and Jizzak steppes 
also putting in operation 450-465 thousand hectares of irrigated land and irrigating 1.5 
million hectares of pastures. PV, 19452-19453, 275-276, 2 December 1980, pp. 4, 7. 
Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 10. 
271 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 1-3. 
272 In 1980, 9,100 picker machines and 9.96 million tons of raw cotton were officially 
produced in the whole USSR. This share was divided among: Uzbekistan (6.24), 
Turkmenistan (1.26), Tajikistan (1.01), meanwhile 1.45 was produced in minor 
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The commitments for Uzbek cotton had to be executed, as well as additional 
duties. In fact, even the Uzbek MCC – which was already promoting a plan to 
partially break the dependence relation with the center, processing more 
Uzbek cotton within the republic273 -  planned in 1981 to increase the 
production by 4.9% and to sell more than 80 million rubles of planned 
production.274 At the same time, mechanization remained a major ambition 
and the CPUz promoted the production of cotton pickers275 and other 
agricultural machines in the republic in those industrial complexes that were 
defined using the moniker “Uzbek excellence” (i.e. the Tashkent tractors 
factory Tashselmash).276 
2.3.1 The climax of Soviet Uzbekistan 
Therefore, on the eve of the 1980s, the UzSSR was publicized as a model of 
development from backwardness for socialist, post-colonial and even capitalist 
countries. The picture of the (apparently excellent) situation was directly 
offered by Rashidov in his self-referential book Sovetskiy Uzbekistan277 – 
translated also into English, Spanish and French – where the Uzbek FS 
promoted Uzbek achievements during his ‘reign’ and presented the fulfilment 
of the tenth FYP as the final triumph. In his words: 
                                                          
dimensions in other republics, such as Azerbaijan, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan. PV, 
19495, 20, 24 January 1981, p. 2. 
273 In fact, the chairman of the MCC UzSSR, Usmanov, in his memorandum 14-3-3402 to 
the SM UzSSR of 8 April 1980 wrote about the commitments of the ministry to improve 
cotton fiber quality, declaring that in 1976-1980, 14 new cotton-transformation 
factories, 57 warehouses and 82 cleaning stations had been built or repaired and more 
than 3000 technologic machines had been installed in the factories and plants as well 
as 5000 spinneret-instruments to improve cotton quality, planning to build by 1985 new 
factories that could process up to 7.2 million tons of raw cotton and up to 600,000 tons 
of cotton fiber The plan was mainly focused on the Karakalpak, Bukhara, Kashkadarya, 
Surkhandarya and Jizzak oblast. it was also planned to increase the investments for 
technologies in order to obtain 260,000 tons more. Usmanov was then asking for an 
extra investment of at least 8.6 million rubles each year levels in order to improve the 
technologies of cotton processing plants. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5275, ll. 21-24. 
274 PV, 19493, 18, 22 January 1981, p. 2. 
275 The cotton harvest machines in Uzbekistan increased from 8,300 in 1960 to 21,800 
in 1965, 26,100 (1970), 28,700 (1975), 36,600 (1980), 37,900 (1986). Craumer, 
“Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out- Migration in Soviet Central Asia,” 
157. 
276 PV, 19488, 23, 28 January 1981, p. 3; and Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan, 38. 
277 Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan. 
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A very great deal has been accomplished during the 10th Soviet five-year plan 
periods. An age-old backwardness, poverty and illiteracy have been overcome, 
and all forms of oppression and exploitation of working people have been 
liquidated, as well as all forms of social and national inequality. The Soviet Union 
has never been as powerful as it is today, and it is confident paving the way to 
further social progress. But this is only one aspect, even though an important 
one, of our achievements. Another, which is not less important, is that 
prosperity and happiness have entered firmly into each home and each 
family.278 
This narrative was directly related to the cotton campaign,279 marked as the 
triumph of “internationalism, the banner of our epoch”, a full conquest for the 
whole of Central Asia, which had left behind centuries of oppression, 
feudalism, war, division, backwardness and exploitation.280 The UzSSR was 
presented as an example of development also for technology, education, 
modernization and industrialization.281 However, cotton remained king. The FS 
CPUz reminded the whole world how in 1940 Uzbek annual cotton production 
amounted to 1.386 million tons, 2.824 in 1960, 3.746 in 1965, 4.495 in 1970, 
                                                          
278 Ibid., 7. 
279 “The working people of Uzbekistan are justly proud of the highest yields of cotton in 
the world and the enormous gross harvest of 6 million tons obtained in 1980.” Ibid., 9. 
280  The same narrative that condemned pre-revolutionary conditions – of feudalism, 
slavery, backwardness, exploitation, subsistence – and which presented the Soviet path 
as the progressive and civilizing strength of the Uzbek people, was typical of the 1960s 
as well. In fact, even Alimov reported: “The position of the Uzbeks was particularly hard 
in the years preceding the Great October Socialist Revolution. They were brutally 
oppressed by the emir, khans, beks and tsarist officials. Possessing neither land nor 
water, the working people had to toil all year round for the beys, receiving in return only 
scraps of food that barely kept them alive […] As a result of the October Revolution the 
power passed into the hands of the working people. All the wealth they had created—
the factories, mills, mines, railways and banks—became the property of the working 
people.” Alimov, Uzbekistan. Another Big Leap Forward, 6; Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan, 
10–28. 
281 Rashidov was publicizing that at the eve of the 80s, there were over 100 branches of 
production and 1500 large industries in the republic, 210 mechanized and automated 
enterprises and 5,200 mechanized assembly lines. According to the Uzbek leader, from 
1940 the fuel industry grew by 87 times, chemical and petrochemical by 265 times, 
engineering by 860 times, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy by 6,600 times 
meanwhile, from 1960, gas production increased by 81 times, reaching 36 bmc per year 
at the eve of the 80s. During the X FYP capital investments increased by 5 billion rubles 
(amounting to more than 24 billion) and were built the first 15 km and 12 stations of 
the first metro in Central Asia in Tashkent. Ibid., 38–39, 42. 
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and finally reaching 6 million in 1980. On the eve of the ‘80s, he noted, 
Uzbekistan had built 869 collective farms and five fishing farms - increasing 
their fixed assets by 2.6 times, and gross income and remuneration of farmers 
by 1.6 times over the 1965 level - and 900 irrigation systems with a total length 
of 158,000 km and drainage of 75,000.282 On the improvements of irrigation 
and the fields, Rashidov repeated that, after the-above mentioned May 1966 
CC CPSU plenum, 1.2 million hectares of newly-irrigated land had been 
inaugurated, increasing water supply on 2.3 million hectares of irrigated land 
and, only during the tenth FYP, more than 500,000 hectares were made 
arable.283 In his words: “Such well-developed irrigation and land reclamation 
systems as those of Uzbekistan do not exist in any capitalist country with 
irrigation-based agriculture.”284 This was a triumph for which the Uzbek leader 
was self-congratulating. 
Cotton sown in UzSSR (thousands of hectares)285 
1940 1950 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1988 
924 1,098 1,387 1,550 1,709 1,878 1,990 2,017 
Reading this narrative, it seems that, at the beginning of the ‘80s, the 
‘developed socialism’ conquests came to their climax in the UzSSR, and the 
whole Soviet system was able to boast or pretend about internal and external 
successes, and the prospect of problems seemed to be deferred over a longer 
period. This propensity inexorably emerged during the XX Congress of CPUz (3-
5 February 1981)286 when Rashidov’s speech was focused on the triumph of 
Uzbek economic development.287 In his call for the next FYP, the Uzbek FS 
stressed the importance of “fully using intensive factors to develop industry 
[considering that] in the last five years the industrial production increased by 
27.4% [and] the investment in new machineries grew 1.3 times more than the 
previous FYP”, implying a mechanical cotton crop of four million tons in 1980. 
The Uzbek leader was also reciting the necessity to improve the technical 
base in mineral fertilizers – a sector in which 25 billion rubles had been invested 
                                                          
282 Ibid., 48, 54, 56. 
283Ibid., 56–57. 
284 Ibid., 56. 
285 Craumer, “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out- Migration in Soviet 
Central Asia,” 144. 
286 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 150, dd. 2477 and 2478 (appendices). 
287 Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources, 
105. 
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(1,3 times more than the previous FYP) - and to capitalize on the capital 
investment (that were 22-25% more than the previous FYP) in order to 
“aggressively implement the Party's agrarian policy.” In fact, agriculture was 
again a crucial aspect for the CPUz, considering that in the UzSSR the 
production officially grew by 25.4% during the last FYP - surpassing the growth 
forecast of 22% - as well as cotton (16.5%) – with 28.5 million tons during the 
X FYP, 4 more than IX FYP -, grains (twice), vegetables and potatoes (1.6 times), 
grapes (1.7 times). During the X FYP, 27 million m2 for housing and 
implemented further progress of science and technique were realized in a 
republic that hosted a claimed figure of 35,000 people involved in scientific 
research, 900 doctors of sciences and 12,800 candidates of sciences. The 
statistics about the alphabetization of the Uzbek population – as well as the 
attention on women - were also sensational, publicizing issues that the CPUz 
leader exploited to legitimize his operation. 
During the CPUz congress, Rashidov remarked on the importance of 
improving governance and management methods within the party - that was 
branched in 290 filial involving almost 30,000 people – in order to “improve the 
effectiveness of ideological and educational work” of the party. Just at the 
beginning of the ‘80s, the Communist Party of Uzbekistan was even more 
enlarged and bureaucratized than it used to be before - since 1976, there were 
116,000 new CPUz affiliates, reaching a total of 570,000 members, about one 
tenth of workers - and all the efforts flowed into cotton production, as well as 
it was also confirmed by the speeches of all the other participants288 of a 
congress that confirmed the leadership of Rashidov and the previous 
establishment of power.289 
At this stage of peaceful development of the USSR, long debates on 
ideological issues and the prospects for the 'developed socialism' in the Soviet 
Union were raised, and Brezhnev was presented as an authentic and paternal 
guide for such a cotton miracle.290 Just three weeks after the Uzbek congress, 
                                                          
288 PV, 19504, 29, 4 February 1981, pp. 1-6. 
289 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 150, d. 2480. 
290 On 9 February 1981, the Bukhara obkom said that during the conference (held in 9-
10 January), was thanked Brezhnev “for the constant paternal care on the improvement 
of the Soviet people and for the titanic work for the strengthening of world peace.” 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 57, l. 177. Also a letter from the Karakalpak obkom of 7 February 
1981 was reporting the results of the 27th obkom conference where was announced a 
production of 1.253 million tons, exceeding the current plan for 113.5 thousand tons 
and the previous IX FYP for 266 thousand tons. RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 57, l. 185. 
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the CPSU was also going to host another event that would confirm the positive 
trends that had been followed in the past years: the 26th Congress CPSU (23 
February - 3 March 1981) where the UzSSR was represented by 166 delegates 
(3.3% of 5002 total).291 On that occasion, Brezhnev’s speech was mainly 
focused on the development of the “world socialist system”, the cooperation 
among socialist countries and with newly-free countries, and also on the 
relations with the capitalistic West.292 Meanwhile, on an economic level, the 
CPSU Gensek ensured the further improvement of the Soviet people's well-
being and claiming the best results ever stating: 
on the whole, the seventies may be summed up as a major step in developing 
the national economy of the country, of all the union and autonomous republics 
[...] Our great country has become stronger, richer, and more beautiful!293 
Also the chairman of the SM USSR, Nikolai Tikhonov, in promoting the 
Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 
and for the Period Ending in 1990294, declared a victory of Soviet agriculture 
and cotton, stating that “despite the unfavorable weather during three of the 
five years [...] in 1980 the cotton crop amounted to nearly ten million tons.”295 
The conditions of Soviet development were, however, less positive than 
expectations296 and less impressive than propaganda was publicizing, and the 
                                                          
291 Marilyn Bechtel, David Laibman, and Daniel Rosenberg, Peace, Plan and Progress : 
The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: NWR 
Publications, 1981), 217. 
292 Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, “Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the 
Party in Home and Foreign Policy. February 23, 1981,” in Peace, Plan and Progress : The 
26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Marilyn Bechtel, David 
Laibman, and Daniel Rosenberg (New York: NWR Publications, 1981), 51–67. 
293 Ibid., 67. 
294 This program had been already debated and accepted during the plenum CPSU of 20 
February 1980. PV, 19517, 42, 21 February 1981, p. 1. 
295 Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tikhonov, “Guidelines for the Economic and Social 
Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and for the Period Ending in 1990. February 
23, 1981,” in Peace, Plan and Progress : The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, ed. Marilyn Bechtel, David Laibman, and Daniel Rosenberg (New York: 
NWR Publications, 1981), 88–89. 
296 David Laibman, “Incentives, Planning and Socialist Construction. Some Thoughts on 
the 26th CPSU Congress and the Start of the 11th Five-Year Plan,” in Peace, Plan and 
Progress : The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, ed. Marilyn 
Bechtel, David Laibman, and Daniel Rosenberg (New York: NWR Publications, 1981), 23. 
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planned results were clearly below the targeted levels.297 Just in the 1975-
1979, the USSR had to import about 95 million tons of wheat, as well as meat 
and other food products, making clear that the country was not able to satisfy 
the basic needs of its citizens.298 This deficit in the trade balance contributed 
to drastically reduce Soviet gold reserves from 1221 tons (1975) to 502 
(1980).299 
The critical circumstances of Soviet agriculture were even denounced by 
the CC CPSU Secretary for Agriculture, Mikhail Gorbachev, who described a 
situation in which the kolkhozes in crisis were receiving funds as lost – 
meanwhile while those that were virtuosos were forced to fend for themselves 
– and that guaranteed salaries to the peasants had taken away the incentive to 
work.300 In order to respond to the situation, as soon as 1980 – much before 
his acknowledged success in the post of Gensek – Gorbachev realized a first 
plan of reforms that was aimed at stopping the expensive transformation of 
kolkhozes in sovkhozes and conceding, since 1981, almost a hectare for each 
kolkhoz family. Substantially, these reforms realized an inheritable private 
property right, promoting an atmosphere that reconsidered the collectivization 
of fifty years before.301 These results were also brought to attention during the 
congress, where – apparently – a substantial minority of the party was 
                                                          
297 Also Brezhnev in his statement, admitted that the “Central Committee of the CPSU 
at the same time clearly discerns the difficulties, the shortcomings, and the unsolved 
problems. Not all of the targets set were achieved. Not all of the ministries and 
enterprises fulfilled their plans. There are still bottlenecks and disproportions in the 
national economy.” Brezhnev, “Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 
XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of 
the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. February 23, 1981,” 67. 
298 Furthermore, in 1981 USSR produced only 158 million tons of cereals and had to 
import additional 46 million tons. In 1982-1983 the annual importations of cereals were 
below 40 million, meanwhile it raised again in 1984 with 46 million tons. Parallel, the 
“production costs” (or selling costs) were raising, while consumer prices were firm since 
1962. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 
472. 
299 Ibid., 442–45. 
300 Ibid., 445. 
301 In May 1982, the plenum of the CPSU launched a food program - which would last 
until 1990 - which nullified farm debt, preferred small projects targeted - rather than 
the previous pharaonic plans - and favored the spread of a kind of contract work. Ibid., 
473. 
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concerned about the economic situation in the country and started to 
champion the idea of reform. 
Despite this new, albeit modest, critical climate that was veiling a certain 
pessimism among Soviet planners, Rashidov defended the results of his work 
and disavowed those negative trends that did not seem to progress the UzSSR 
indexes. On that occasion, Rashidov could fully assess the results of the UzSSR 
cotton production. In his speech, he recalled the record of the previous year – 
6.237 million tons – and described the cotton pickers of Uzbekistan as high 
contributors that showed “the best features of soviet character and socialist 
lifestyle”. On this regard, he also quoted the Soviet anthem and the Brezhnev’s 
words “where there is success of the party there is the victory [about] the 
remarkable results achieved by the people under the leadership of the party in 
the last five years.”302 Due to his confirmation, the Uzbek leader even claimed 
a stronger position to demand for an increase of cotton and cotton products 
prices,303 justifying such request due to an increase of productive costs.304 
                                                          
302 PV, 19521, 46, 25 February 1981, p. 3. 
303 During Rashidov’s reign, cotton prices rose - as well as for other products such as 
cotton seeds. As emerges in the memorandum 05-13 of 10 April 1981 sent from the 
state committee for prices - Goskomtsen - of the UzSSR to the SM UzSSR, the new prices 
of seeds had been defined in base of their quality: first-quality seeds were purchased 
for 220 rubles per ton, second-quality for 200 rubles and third quality for 172. These 
prices were paid by the state and were redefined by Khudayberdyev who increase them 
respectively from 135, 120 and 95 rubles per ton.  TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5580, ll. 
96-99 
304 In an official memorandum of CC CPUz to CC CPSU of 13 April 1982, Rashidov asked 
to the secretary Gorbachev to increase the purchase price of cotton, because the 
material and technical costs for kolkhozes to produce one ton had raised from 384 to 
455 rubles in the 1970-1980 and in 1981 became 466, decreasing the profitability of 
kolkhozes to 27% and of sovkhozes to 15% determining the phenomenon of 
unproductive kolkhozes and sovkhozes that in 1980, the year of record production, 
were 122 on total of 1218 collective and state farms in UzSSR. In 1981 this phenomenon 
rose and were 253 the unproductive farms of the republic. Considering also the average 
levels of salary per capita in Uzbekistan - only 52.5 rubles against the Soviet 83.5 – he 
also demanded to rise the purchase price of cotton to 680 rubles per ton and to 
reconsider also the prices of silk cocoons. After an evaluation of the case, the CC CPSU 
answered to Rashidov on 5 October 1982 was declaring that could rise the purchasing 
price of cotton for 11%, for fine fiber cotton 16-20% but could not for silk cocoons. 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 88, d. 481, ll. 3-17. 
136 
 
After the great 1981 event, the FS CPUz then confirmed the agricultural 
commitments for 1981,305 and during the II plenum CC CPUz (28 May 1981)306 
Rashidov also exposed the need to further improve the selection and 
arrangement of training of cadres following the XXVI congress of CPSU, 
confirming such line also in his speech at the SS UzSSR.307 Probably, the Uzbek 
leader wanted to give the impression that he had an effective control over the 
party and the state in order to clench his leadership and to marginalize those 
potential factors of internal instability. However, the Uzbek leader was fearing 
the CPSU more than internal opponents and therefore he had to satisfy again 
the demands of the center in order to confirm his power. Not surprisingly, 
cotton was, again, the key of Rashidov’s political legitimation and the main 
argument to attract more funds and investments from the center as well as 
technical support for agriculture.308 
At the beginning of summer 1981, the party and the state were directly 
appealing the UzSSR machinists to be prepared for the cotton crop, confirming 
the target of at least 5.9 million tons of which was 3,9 harvested 
mechanically.309 These indications were also confirmed during the III plenum 
CC CPUz (11 September 1981)310 that was functional to implement the 
guidelines of the XXVI CPSU and XX CPUz congresses and to celebrate the 60th 
anniversary of the USSR. For such aims, the party was stressing the importance 
to improve quantity and quality of Uzbek cotton and related crop techniques, 
irrigation, mechanization and chemicals. The fast implementation of 
mechanization was directly recalled by Rashidov, who congratulated some 
                                                          
305 By 1981, the Soviet planners were expecting from the UzSSR a production of 5.9 
million tons of cotton, 2.5 of grains, 1.3 of vegetables, 0.95 of milk, 0.32 of meat and 
27.5 thousand ton of silk cocoons and 1.05 billion eggs. PV, 19528-19529, 53-54, 5 
March 1981, p. 1. 
306 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 150, d. 2481. 
307 PV, 19600, 125, 30 May 1981, p. 1. 
308 In a memorandum sent from Rashidov and Khudayberdyev to Gorbachev on 22 June 
1981, was stated that in April there was a bad weather to seed cotton and had been 
damaged 2.057 million hectares of agricultural soil from which 1.873 devoted to cotton. 
600,000 hectares had been seeded again and 300,000 in a later moment. For this task, 
the CC CPUz required 50,000 tons of nitrogen and 30,000 of phosphorus fertilizers. 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 364, ll. 24-25. 
309 PV, 19663, 188, 15 August 1981, p. 1. 
310 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 150, d. 2482. 
137 
 
districts where almost 90-95% of the harvest had been done by machines.311 
Even Brezhnev was congratulating the CPUz and some of its local leaders – such 
as Musakhanov, FS of Tashkent obkom312  – for “the victory in the cotton crop” 
that officially was exceeding 6 million tons also in 1981, exclaiming during the 
plenum CC CPSU (16 November 1981) “as usual, good job cotton growers of 
Uzbekistan!”313 On that occasion, Rashidov expressed his gratitude recognizing 
the “high socialist liabilities”314 of the Uzbek cotton workers. 
Despite the great announcements of the current and previous harvests,315 
the Soviet agriculture was not facing its best moment: the production of 1981 
was officially registering a -2% deficit over the previous year’s levels,316 but the 
negative figures of the Soviet agriculture crisis were up to twice as bad. 
However, this negative contingency did not extend to Uzbek cotton. In 1981 
the republic officially reached a new productive record of 6.23 million tons, of 
which 387 thousand tons was of the higher fine-fiber quality317 and an average 
productive quota of 32.2 quintal per hectare.318 In parallel, the other sectors 
related to cotton were also mobilized to increase even more the production: 
for 1982, the MCC UzSSR announced the target of +3,8% and a value of about 
80 million rubles more than planned.319 The Uzbek triumphalism for agriculture 
                                                          
311 During the plenum, Rashidov recalled that in the previous FYP (1976-1980), 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes of UzSSR had 87,000 tractors, 76,000 tractors trailers, more 
than 30,000 cotton crop machine, 28,000 seeding machines, 44,000 tillage machine. PV, 
19686, 211, 12 September 1981, pp. 1-2. However, these figures seemed to have been 
reconsidered downward by Uzbek historiography, estimating that between 1976-1982, 
were assigned to UzSSR just 3,973 tractors, 4,983 cultivators and 1387 fertilizer-
spreaders. Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fan va 
Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix Shohidligi va Saboqlari, 291. 
312 PV, 19722, 247, 25 October 1981, p. 1. 
313 PV, 19746, 271, 24 November 1981, p. 1. 
314 PV, 19747, 272, 25 November 1981, p. 1. 
315 The results of 1980 were even publicized with great fanfare by the CC CPUz and SM 
USSR that wrote to Gorbachev on 22 September 1981 an enthusiastic letter declaring 
that in 1980 were produced 6.245 million tons of “white gold” and 357,000 tons of fine 
fiber cotton. RGANI, f. 5, op. 84, d. 364, l. 39. 
316 PV, 19795, 20, 24 January 1982, p. 1. 
317 PV, 19796, 21, 26 January 1981, p. 1. 
318 PV, 19828, 53, 4 March 1982, p. 1. However, in 1981, the AN UzSSR estimated that 
due to the new technologies, the productivity per hectare had recorded peaks of 35.6 
quintals in 1981 that was about 150% of the 1965 levels and 140% of 1970. TsGARUz, f. 
837, op. 41, d. 5580, ll. 136-138. 
319 PV, 19798, 23, 28 January 1982, p. 2. 
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was complete. At the beginning of 1982, the CSD UzSSR was referring to SM 
USSR an extraordinary agricultural output for the first year of the XI FYP320, 
listing – as follows in the table below - a production that was exceeding in all 
cultivation sectors: 
 
Production Unit 
Expected for 
1981 
Realized 
in 1981 
Variation 
(%) 
Cotton (raw) Thousand tons 5840 6022,7 103,1 
Wheat Thousand tons 900 1290 142,3 
Vegetables Thousand tons 1480 1786,5 120,7 
Melons Thousand tons 560 626,8 111,9 
Fruit Thousand tons 265 347,1 131 
Grapes Thousand tons 370 429,9 116,2 
Livestock and Poultry Thousand tons 270 270,5 100,2 
Milk Thousand tons 760 788,8 103,8 
Eggs Million pieces 940 989,3 105,2 
Wool Tons 26500 30094 113,6 
Silk cocoons Tons 27200 31873 117,2 
 
In 1982, Rashidov finally approached the peak of his political success. The 
Uzbek leader had been able to confirm the party’s commitments to the Soviet 
cause, and to consolidate his power behaving and assuming a paternal role 
with state and party officials.321 This success had a wide echo even in Moscow 
where, by decree of the presidium of SS USSR, Rashidov was awarded on 5 
March 1982 with the ‘Order of the October Revolution’ – for his “organizational 
skills for communism” and his “success in completing plans and socialist duties” 
– and the ‘hero of socialist labor’ - for the “increase of production and selling 
                                                          
320 On 25 March 1982, the CSD UzSSR was referring to SM USSR such extraordinary 
production to SM USSR on the report n° 30-02. See TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5906, ll. 
49-53. 
321 This particularly emerged in his latest speeches at the VI congress of the union of the 
journalists of Uzbekistan, in the local party filials, in the Komsomol, unions and other 
“school of communism,” in the factories, in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic 
etc. See PV, 19801, 26, 31 January 1982, p. 4 and PV, 19805, 30, 5 February 1982, p. 1. 
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of cotton and other products of agriculture”322 - acknowledging from above the 
prestige of the Uzbek leader.323 
2.3.2 A bad omen 
On 22-25 March 1982, Brezhnev had a short trip in Uzbekistan.324 He arrived 
in Tashkent to personally deliver the awards to the UzSSR325 and to Rashidov 
for his “great managerial and political work and the socialist commitment for 
cotton production”326 in the difficult context of Uzbekistan where, according to 
the Gensek, it was necessary 
much experience and loyalty to the Party's work and organizational talent, to be 
critical and to [properly] appreciate the results, to have the will to achieve the 
goals, to know people well and to have passion for them. All these qualities 
helped Rashidov and the entire Soviet leadership, promoting the success of the 
republic.327 
                                                          
322 PV, 19830, 55, 6 March 1982, p. 1. 
323 During his career, Rashidov was awarded ten Orders of Lenin in 1950, 1957, 1965, 
1967, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, an Order of the October Revolution in 
1982, a Red Banner of Labor in 1951, two orders of the Red Star in 1942 and 1946, a 
Badge of Honor in 1944, a Lenin Prize in 1980 and two medals of Hero of the Socialist 
Labor in 1974 and 1977. As Clark comments, “for his part, Rashidov presented valuable 
tokens of homage to Brezhnev and massaged the latter’s insatiable ego in public. His 
reference to Brezhnev at the 1976 Twenty-fifth Party Congress as “the most outstanding 
and most influential political figure of contemporary times,” is but one of a large 
number of outlandish examples of Rashidov’s toadyism toward the general secretary.” 
Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political 
Elite, 1965-1990, 188; Jerry F. Hough, “The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System,” 
Problems of Communism 25, no. 2 (1976): 2–3. 
324 In that occasion, Brezhnev came to the prizegiving ceremony and visited the CC CPUz, 
the Tashkent tractors and aeronautic factories, the kolkhoz named after Lenin in the 
Ordzhonikidzsky raion and met workers, peasants and engineers “confirming the unity 
between people and party.” RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 63-67. 
325 At that moment, UzSSR had already been awarded for its efforts in the Soviet cause 
with a first ‘Order of Lenin’ in 1939 for the development of agriculture and cotton 
production, a second one in 1956 for the high harvest and high quality of agriculture 
production, an ‘Order of friendship of peoples’ in 1972 for the 50th anniversary of the 
USSR, an ‘Order of the October Revolution’ in 1974 for the increase of cotton 
production, and a third ‘Order of Lenin’ in 1980 for the incredible results of 6 million. 
PV, 19843, 68, 22 March 1982, p. 2. 
326 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, l. 29. 
327 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, l. 31. 
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Brezhnev was thus confirming the trust in Rashidov waiting for "more 
victories."328 The award ceremony was organized in March 24, a day that 
Rashidov defined as: 
a golden page in the chronicles of the UzSSR. it will go down as a celebration of 
universal jubilation and emotion, as a demonstration of the triumph of Leninist 
national policy of the communist party, a powerful life-giving power of 
friendship between the peoples of the USSR.329 
During the gala meeting in the same day, Brezhnev gave a speech where he 
thanked Rashidov – for the great result of the republic that had provided more 
than 6 million tons to the fatherland – and defining the UzSSR as one of the 
most impressive examples of development in Orient and a great example of 
internationalism. Referring to Tashkent, the Soviet leader exclaimed: 
Shines the star of the East in the constellation of the republics’ capitals as a 
symbol of brotherhood and friendship of the peoples of the USSR […] More 
successful years ahead Tashkent.330 
Then, suddenly the Soviet leader changed his pledging narrative and 
admonished the CPUz, stating: “it is necessary to pay special attention to 
improving the cotton quality […] the first qualities [first and second] of the 
cotton you do from year to year decreases […] passing from 70 to 46%.”331 The 
Brezhnev call was in line with the non-publicized statistics about the cotton 
quality crop that had drastically decreased in the last decade.332 It is possible 
to elaborate this trend in the table below: 
 
Period I quality (%) II quality (%) III quality (%) IV quality (%) 
1976-1980 48 13 25 14 
1980 47 12 28 13 
1981 32 14 36 18 
This reduction in terms of quality was an alarming issue that was, at that 
time, ignored, being glossed over by a ‘quantitative’ triumphalism rather than 
being realistic about ‘qualitative’ factors. Indeed, party and cotton workers 
                                                          
328 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, l. 32. 
329 PV, 19846, 71, 25 March 1982, p. 2. 
330 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 12-14. 
331 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5906, l. 150 and RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 7-8. 
332 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 5906, l. 52. 
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were obsessively committed to fulfilling the plan in terms of quantity, investing 
all the energies to reach the ‘magic numbers’. As a consequence, in the period 
of 'hard mechanization' (1971-1982), the quality of the cotton fiber drastically 
decreased333 and 865 million rubles were substantially lost.334 However, this 
trend was not just imputable to the intensive use of machines - that factually 
was in lower levels than publicized335 - but also depended on the human factor. 
In fact, cotton pickers, in order to achieve the ambitious harvest quotas, were 
harvesting also other parts of cotton plants, mingling stones, soil, or other dirt 
with cotton, or were wetting the cotton with water, oil or other liquids in order 
to make it heavier. The Brezhnev admonishment seriously embarrassed 
Rashidov at a moment when, in front of the whole CC CPUz, the Uzbek leader 
was receiving an award for his efforts. However, the small size and the non-
public dimension of Brezhnev's admonishment hinting that the Soviet leader 
would have turned a blind eye this time, and the quantitative approach seemed 
to be appreciated anyway. 
The ceremony proceeded and Brezhnev personally gave Rashidov the 
‘Order of the October Revolution’ for his commitments and success in 
completing the plans.336 On 25 March, the tones became critical once again 
when Brezhnev, during his speech at the CC CPUz, denounced that in the last 
                                                          
333 As suggested by the MCC UzSSR, due to mechanical crop, the cotton quality was 
drastically decreased year by year: the share of first-quality cotton was 70.3% in 1963, 
35.6% in 1970, 23.2% in 1971, 13.9% in 1972, 20.4% in 1973, 13.6% in 1974 and 17.8% 
in 1975.  This decrease was prospected even by Ministry of Finance UzSSR that reported 
the Soviet production of first-quality cotton of 53.1% of its total in 1976, meanwhile in 
1979 it declined to 44.2%. Furthermore, during this period sharply declined the share 
of first-quality cotton cropped by machines from 32% to 19.8%. In the same report, the 
Ministry also reported a first-quality cotton crop in the whole USSR of 5.263 million tons 
– by which 3533 from Uzbekistan – in 1979. However, it was forecasting for 1980 a 
Soviet production of 4.051 (about 1.212 less than previous years) by which 2.4 from 
UzSSR (about 1.133 less). This meant that the decrease of first-quality cotton was 
expected practically in the lonely Uzbekistan. The memorandum n° 05/26-7 of Ministry 
of Finance UzSSR to SM UzSSR of 29 October 1979 is available at TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 
41, d. 5275, ll. 38-40. 
334 Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-1991 
Y.y.),” 179. 
335 According to Dzhurabekov, at the eve of the ‘80s, the mechanized crop consisted of 
35% of the all production (the rest was harvested manually), meanwhile in 1985-1987 
was 40%. N. Dzhurabekov, “Eshe Raz O Sortirovke Khlopka-Syrza Promyshlennym 
Sortam,” Khlopkovodstvo 12 (1987). 
336 PV, 19847, 72, 26 March 1982, p. 1. 
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years a fourth of the state companies did not realized the plan - procuring a 
deficit of about 400 million rubles – and that the growth of industrial 
productivity had stalled.337 Rashidov, who had just been awarded, seemed to 
sadly regret the rebuke, and promised to follow slavishly Brezhnev’s tips in 
future.338 These remarks, with strongly pedagogical tones, seemed to further 
confirm the paternalistic relationship between the two leaders.339 To some 
extent, this relation was verifiable at any level of party and bureaucratic 
administrations. 
It is interesting to note the reasons for Brezhnev's change of rhetoric in 
those days: he arrived in Uzbekistan full of good words and left Tashkent - after 
just a few days - visibly annoyed and bothered by certain facts. Indeed, the last 
of Brezhnev’s visits to Uzbekistan was remembered for other events. Firstly, it 
promoted a new course in the Cold War dynamic, representing a first step in 
the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.340 However, despite the importance 
of the event, this is another story. The Tashkent tour is evoked here because it 
was one of the last public glimpses of the Soviet leader, and for a famous event 
that was not reported in the Soviet press. After visiting the Tashkent tractors 
factory and the kolkhoz named after Lenin,341 on March 23 Brezhnev was 
visiting an aircraft parts factory with Rashidov. Suddenly, the scaffolding 
bearing numerous onlookers collapsed, hurting the Soviet leader and his 
staff.342 Brezhnev broke his collarbone and was visibly shocked after the 
accident, meanwhile Rashidov had a slight bruise. The area was rapidly 
                                                          
337 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 35-36. 
338 RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, l. 51. 
339 Such kind of relation emerges even in the memorandum 405 directed to the CC CPSU, 
where Rashidov was reporting about the General Secretary’s trip to Tashkent (22-25 
March). The FS CPUz was commenting the Brezhnev’s speech at CC CPUz (24 March, 
during the award ceremony) as “indelible […] reinforcing our efforts for ten times” to 
overcome the plan for next years and to improve quality as well. The FS CPUz concluded 
declaring that “all the merits of Uzbekistan are linked to the attention of CPSU and 
personally of Brezhnev”. RGANI, f. 80, op. 1, d. 393, ll. 63-67. 
340 Sergey Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries : The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the 
Cold War (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
341 PV, 19845, 70, 24 March 1982, p. 1. 
342 Among the members of Brezhnev's security staff were also concussed Aleksandr 
Ryabenko and Vladimir Sobachenkov who was standing next to the Soviet leader and 
managed to protect him from a direct hit. He was injured at the head, hospitalized and 
readily dismissed in order to rejoin Brezhnev after one hour. Vladimir Medvedev, 
Chelovek Za Spinoy (Moskva: Russlit, 1994), 167–68. 
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evacuated and the leader’s injuries were disguised. The next day - March 24 
during the awards’ ceremony – both leaders seemed somewhat shaken and 
masked their discomfort due to the tragic event of the day before. Also in the 
following days, Rashidov was visibly mortified and embarrassed over the 
incident and wrote on 7 April a personal letter to Brezhnev where he stated his 
concern for the incident that is 
like an incurable wound, a large scar on the heart that does not give us peace. 
[…] if we can, we ask for your forgiveness [and we want to] sincerely and 
daughterly thank our dear and much loved father Leonid Ilich for his arrival in 
Uzbekistan and to send along with the trusted words.343 
Despite the not marked age difference and the friendly relations between 
Brezhnev and Rashidov, on this occasion the latter politician behaved like a 
mortified child who could not find the right words to direct towards his severe 
father. This demonstrated how the paternalistic relationship that Brezhnev had 
with Rashidov, particularly emerges around the terms “father” and 
“daughterly”. The Tashkent accident could be read as a bad omen for two 
leaders who were allegorically crushed by the weight of a heavy and fragile 
system that was collapsing on themselves and that in a few years would 
disappear completely. To some extent, this episode could also be considered a 
critical moment for the patrimonial system, and maybe the beginning of a 
rebellion against the Center by a periphery in search of a wider autonomy. 
On April 26, during the V plenum of the CC CPUz,344 Rashidov gave a 
somewhat vacuous and self-celebrating speech during which he repeated the 
same triumphalist data. The agenda was to focus the party organization and 
the beginning of the plan implementation that – according to Brezhnev - had a 
“positive start.”345 Also during the VI plenum CC CPUz (15 June 1982),346 the 
triumphalism that had been typical of the previous meetings was even more 
heavily stated and Rashidov argued that, “cotton will continue to lead areas of 
the economy […] We are obliged to comply strictly with plans and 
commitments for cotton production,”347 confirming those promises that had 
attracted so much trust and attention to the CPUz. Cotton thus became a sort 
                                                          
343 Rizaev, Sharaf Rashidov. Shtrikhi K Portretu, 136. 
344 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 151, d. 2320. 
345 PV was publicizing how “the highest score is the feeling of satisfaction and joy. At the 
same time, it increases our responsibility for further development of agriculture and 
increase the harvest of cotton.” PV, 19873, 98, 27 April 1982, p. 1. 
346 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 151, d. 2321. 
347 PV, 19915, 140, 16 June 1982, p. 1. 
144 
 
of laurel with which the Uzbek leader was crowned, continuing even in the VII 
plenum CPUz (17 September 1982),348 to commit even more energies to the 
noble cause of ‘white gold’. The meeting focused on the implementation of 
high effectivity of scientific research and strengthening the link between 
science - that was defined by Rashidov as a “direct productive force” - and 
production.349 Until his last days, Brezhnev frequently thanked UzSSR 
institutions and the CPUz for the cotton production successes,350 continuing 
until the end of that circus comprised of thanks, gifts, and promises. This 
tandem would, however, be interrupted with the disappearance from the 
political stage of one of the two protagonists. On 10 November 1982, the 75-
year-old Leonid Ilich Brezhnev died of a heart attack. His death was reported in 
the media much later, while television deluded citizens playing concerts and 
even PV only announced such a dramatic event for the Soviet regime as late as 
November 12. Despite the claims of personal friendship between Brezhnev and 
Rashidov and the propaganda in Uzbek newspapers, the Uzbek leader had a 
marginal role in the farewell funeral, having lost someone who was apparently 
a father figure, supporter, and most of all, a protector. To play again the 
political card of ‘cotton success’ and to redefine a tied relation with the next 
Gensek would be very difficult - if not impossible – for the Uzbek leader, who 
rose his career in that very establishment. Thus, Brezhnev’s death was clearly 
not the end of the world, but certainly the end of a world. 
2.4 The collateral costs of cotton 
As we have seen, cotton and its glorification narrative became the key 
issues promoted by the CPUz and its leaders to get a certain degree of political 
legitimation in the Soviet system. However, the party leadership and the whole 
republic became victims - and at the same time perpetrators - of a system that 
was mutually enforced in accordance with the directives of Moscow, 
implementing a vicious circle - or maybe a trap - that was becoming 
unsustainable on economic, social, administrative and ecological levels. 
2.4.1 Economic dependence 
The imposition of cotton monoculture and the implementation of such  a 
specialized economy constituted what Rumer considered to be an “agrarian 
                                                          
348 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 151, d. 2322. 
349 PV, 19989, 214, 18 September 1982, p. 1. 
350 PV, 20021, 246, 28 October 1982, p. 1. 
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colonial model”351, or a ‘colonial-like’ system352 of dependence between the 
periphery – that was providing raw material - to the center that, in exchange, 
was exporting the transformed production as well as all the other products that 
the republic was not able to autonomously provide for its citizens. These kinds 
of ties created a dependency between the periphery and the motherland – 
letting as highly undesirable any attempt for independence -  and dangerous 
                                                          
351 Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 79. 
352 I will not go into the debate on the colonial nature of the Soviet system, referring 
readers instead to the following studies: Deniz Kandiyoti, “Post-Colonialism Compared: 
Potentials and Limitations in the Middle East and Central Asia,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 34, no. 2 (2002): 279–97; Sergey Abashin, “Nations and Post-
Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” in Development in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. Migration, Democratisation and Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. Sophie 
Hohmann et al. (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Paolo Sartori, “Introduction: 
Dealing with States of Property in Modern and Colonial Central Asia,” Central Asian 
Survey 29, no. 1 (March 28, 2010): 1–8; Claire Mouradian, “The Origins of a Colonial 
Vision of Southern Russia From the Tsars to the Soviets: About Some Imperial Practices 
in the Caucasus,” in Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Migration, 
Democratisation and Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. S. Hohmann et al. (London & 
New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Laura Adams, “Can We Apply a Post-Colonial Theory to 
Central Asia?,” Central Eurasia Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2008): 2–8; Marco Buttino, 
Changing Urban Landscapes: Eastern European and Post-Soviet Cities, since 1989 
(Roma: Viella, 2012); Marco Buttino, La Rivoluzione Capovolta. L’Asia Centrale Tra Il 
Crollo Dell’impero Zarista E La Formazione dell’URSS (Napoli: L’Ancora del 
Mediterraneo, 2003); N. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier. The Making of a 
Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001); Jean 
Bernard, Soviet Colonialism (Calcutta: Institute of Political & Social Studies, 1961); Olaf 
Caroe, “Soviet Colonialism in Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs 32, no. 1 (1953): 135; Walter 
Kolarz, Communism and Colonialism Essays (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964); 
Michael Pap, Russian Empire: Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices 
(Cleveland Ohio: Institute for Soviet and East European Studies John Carroll University 
and Ukrainian Historical Association, 1985); Jeff Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in 
Tashkent: 1865-1923 (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 2007); Kathleen Stahl, 
British and Soviet Colonial Systems (London: Faber and Faber, 1951); Francine Hirsch, 
Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005); Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire and 
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); 
Adeeb Khalid, “Nationalizing the Revolution in Central Asia: The Transformation of 
Jadidism, 1917-1920,” in A State of Nations. Empire and Nation Making in the Age of 
Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Di Lenin E Stalin. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1914-
1945 (Bologna: Il mulino, 2007). 
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consequences when the motherland was not able to guarantee resources to 
the periphery. However, the risks linked to the concepts of “monoculture” and 
“super-specialization in cotton” were neglected as much as they were 
perceived as a bourgeois western propaganda made by sovietologists to 
criticize the Soviet planned system.  
The imposition of cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan reflected the planned 
Soviet system, where each republic was hyper-specialized in certain 
productions and primary goods, creating an interdependence tie between the 
center that provided manufactures and peripheries that supplied raw 
materials. In this scheme, every Five Year Plan (FYP) saw Moscow demand 
progressively more Uzbek cotton production, with Uzbekistan’s role limited to 
cotton growing. In fact, fiber processing was not in the UzSSR’s duties and it 
was done elsewhere: indeed, Uzbekistan created just 6.5% of Soviet textile 
manufacturing, and most of Central Asia's cotton was taken out of the region 
to be turned into textiles in mills located in European areas of the USSR.353 
Uzbekistan also extracted other raw materials – gold, uranium and natural gas 
– for export to the center, later reimporting much higher-value added 
manufactures, food products, machinery, and even textiles.354 Especially from 
the mid-70s, propaganda campaigns posited Uzbek cotton as the greatest 
victory for the republic, and the source of the entire Union’s wealth, and Uzbek 
leadership opportunistically exploited this to maintain their power. This 
                                                          
353 In fact, Uzbekistan had a negligible share of textile output – 2.7% in 1940, 3.7 in 1960, 
2.8 in 1980, and about 4% in 1984. Only 5-6% of Uzbek cotton remained in the republic 
while the rest was shipped to industrial complexes in the European part of the USSR - 
mostly in the Moscow, Ivanovo and Vladimir oblasts. This situation was due to the Soviet 
planner's idea that it was cheaper to ship raw cotton than textiles and more convenient 
to produce textile closer to the main consumption sites. However, there was no 
evidence to support this theory and the lack of data in terms of shipping costs make 
accurate calculation difficult. However, considering that cotton - in terms of produced 
textiles - had to be reshipped back to central Asia in order to clothe more than 50 million 
people, such a theory does not seem convincing, a point made often by Central Asian 
economists such as I. Iskanderov. Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central 
Asia,” 21; Leslie Dienes, Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 123; Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its 
Costs,” 83–84; Ibragimzhan Iskanderovich Iskanderov, “Eshche Raz O Vtoroi Tekstil’noi 
Baze Strany,” Ekonomika I Zhizn 3 (1966): 25; Ibragimzhan Iskanderovich Iskanderov, 
“Ekonomika Respubliki v Ramkakh Edinogo Narodno-Khoziaistvennogo Kompkleksa 
Strany,” Ekonomika I Zhizn 2 (1986): 9. 
354 Dienes, Soviet Asia: Economic Development and National Policy Choices, 123–25. 
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triumphalist narrative over ‘white gold’ was in real terms translated into 
continuous growth. Nevertheless, this system - determined by a symbiosis of 
the ambitions and the relations of the elite - was out of any economic criteria 
and it did not include costs and losses. 
Cotton Production (thousands of tons of raw cotton)355 
Year UzSSR USSR 
Uzbek 
share (%) 
1913 517 744 69.5 
1940 1,386 2,237 62 
1953 2,432 3,853 63.1 
1956 2,857 4,332 66 
1960 2,949 4,289 68.8 
1965 3,904 5,662 69 
1970 4,495 6,890 65.2 
1975 5,330 7,864 67.8 
1980 6,245 9,962 62.7 
1985 5,382 8,755 61.5 
1988 5,365 8,689 61.7 
In 1975, the whole Soviet cotton sector was worth around 26 billion rubles 
and cotton became the Soviet Union's single largest agricultural export 
(representing about 3% of total Soviet exports).356 This success would last until 
the late ‘70s, when increasing demand for synthetic fibers, deterioration in the 
quality of Soviet cotton, and China’s entry into the market drove the cotton 
price down and reduced the Soviet share of the world market from 30 to 
24%.357 However, it would continue to be the main determining factor in Soviet 
Uzbekistan: in fact, in the early ‘80s, production rose to 65% of the republic's 
gross output, and the whole sector was consuming 60% of resources and 
employing about 40% of the labor force. In 1983 alone, Uzbekistan officially 
produced as much cotton as the entire United States of America (US) - and the 
                                                          
355 Pomfret, “State-Directed Diffusion of Technology: The Mechanization of Cotton 
Harvesting in Soviet Central Asia,” 175. 
356 John Staples, “Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The 
Uzbekistan Case,” Past Imperfect 2 (1993): 31; Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy 
and Its Costs,” 62; USDA Foreign Agriculture Service, “U.S. Team Reports on Soviet 
Cotton Production and Trade,” 1977. 
357 Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 76. 
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USSR as a whole was the second largest producer in the world, after China but 
before the US – and Uzbek cotton was exported to more than 30 countries 
abroad. 
Parallel to this, in 1965-1983 the Soviet share of world cotton fiber 
production rose from 15 to 21 per cent,358 adding cotton to the list of notable 
world-class Soviet exports (others of which included caviar, vodka, and 
Kalashnikovs). However, cotton production was not economically efficient and 
was very labor intensive, requiring a quantity of labor per hectare on average 
six times higher than for grain in the kolkhozes of the UzSSR. For sovkhozes – 
which were supposed to have generally a higher degree of mechanization and 
a lower degree of labor intensity as compared with kolkhozes – the difference 
in labor requirement between cotton and grain was even greater.359 Khan and 
Ghai sum up these conclusions, showing how in 1976 the man-hours of labor 
required per hectare of cotton cultivated in Uzbekistan was 1089 in a kolkhoz 
and 666 in a sovkhoz, while for grain the averages were 181 and 58, 
respectively.360 Parallel to this, in Uzbekistan the man-hours of labor required 
to produce one ton of output were as demonstrated in this table:361 
  1965 1970 1975 1976 
Cotton 
Kolkhoz 380 370 350 330 
Sovkhoz  300 300 270 260 
Grain 
Kolkhoz  155 96 124 74 
Sovkhoz  84 46 78 43 
As already mentioned, the huge labor costs were exacerbated further by 
the expensive and the inefficient use of machines362 and prices that, in a 
planned economy system, were kept artificially low while the ‘productive costs’ 
remained high. Despite the fact that these costs are not easy to compute in a 
non-market system, we can analyze increasing state spending though the 
procurement prices for raw cotton in Uzbekistan that nominally increased from 
                                                          
358 Ibid., 62–74. 
359 Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 
27. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 The manual cotton harvest had a cost of approximately 1,000 man-hours on each 
hectare although mechanization could reduce this rate to 600. However, mechanization 
increased humidity and impurity in the cotton and dramatically decreased the quality 
of the yield. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 78. 
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435.6 rubles per ton in 1965 to 539.8 in 1970, 544.0 in 1975, and 561.6 in 
1976.363 
Therefore, investments in cotton absorbed a huge share of a scarce level of 
capital without producing the expected output, in a state that was already 
struggling to satisfy the basic needs of citizens and to produce an adequate 
volume of consumer goods. Eventually, the effects of cotton monoculture 
became clear during the economic crisis of late ‘80s and even in the Soviet 
press the imposition of monoculture started to be perceived as a “tragic 
experiment”. The cause of such a tragedy was identified as being an excess of 
specialization: 
Specialization should be reasonable. In Uzbekistan, it has degenerated into the 
dictatorship of a single crop, indeed one so highly specific as cotton. It first 
became a monoculture in a psychological sense, when it drove all the other 
needs of the region from the minds of certain leaders. Then it crowded the 
normal crop rotation from the fields and pushed everything else out of the plan. 
By being transformed into virtually one great cotton plantation, Uzbekistan 
embarked on a long, tragic experiment—to determine the capacity of a 
monoculture to corrode not only agriculture, but also industry, education. 
health, and finally public morality [...] Cotton, to which everything was sacrificed 
(including the normal life of townspeople, who were incessantly dispatched to 
work on cotton), had the same harvest in 1984 as in 1969. Only the production 
costs had increased. And how they had increased, warping the economy of the 
entire republic! To this very day the return on capital continues to decline; the 
construction of new housing is being cut back. After beginning with cotton, the 
leprosy of inflated reports permeated the entire republic, spread to the social 
sphere, and did not pass by culture and law enforcement organs. It is said: Make 
no idols. But they made one here: cotton, and cotton alone. It degenerated into 
a deception of society and themselves, into false honors, into bribery.364 
By diverting all the republic’s energies to cotton production, the communist 
regime of the UzSSR strongly condemned the Uzbek economy for its lack of 
self-sufficiency and for causing a decrease in the living standards of Uzbeks 
during the ‘70s.365 
                                                          
363 Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 
23. 
364 Literaturnaya Gazeta, 11 February 1987, p. 12, translated in Rumer, “Central Asia’s 
Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 80–81. 
365 Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-1991 
Y.y.),” 173. 
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2.4.2 The ruralized society 
The imposition of cotton monoculture had evident effects on an Uzbek 
society that had essentially preserved its rural profile. It is useful to compare 
the demographic trends of the USSR, Soviet Central Asia,366 and Uzbekistan in 
terms of population, the share of rural population, and the natural rate of 
growth (NRG)367 in order to get a picture of Uzbekistan and its degree of 
rurality. 
Population (in million), Rural population (%), NRG368 
 USSR Central Asia Uzbekistan 
Year Pop 
Rural 
%  
NRG Pop 
Rural 
%  
NRG Pop 
Rural 
%  
NRG 
1913 159.2 82 1.64 7.274 81 - 4.334 76 - 
1940 194.1 67 1.32 10.906 75 1.91 6.551 75 2.06 
1959 208.8 52 1.78 13.682 65 - 8.119 66 - 
1966 232.2 47 1.09 17.487 63 2.86 10.399 64 2.88 
1970 241.7 44 0.92 19.792 62 2.75 11.800 63 2.81 
1977 257.8 38 0.89 24.161 60 2.76 14.474 61 2.82 
As is evident, while in the rest of USSR the share of rural population was 
decreasing from the pre-revolutionary period – from 82% in 1913 to 38% of 
1977 – such diminution was not substantial in Uzbekistan (from 76% to 61%) 
where a positive NGR saw the population more than triple. Additionally, the 
population was mainly settled in the rural regions of intensive agriculture, such 
as the Ferghana Valley.369 Therefore, besides the high rates of urbanization, the 
vast majority of Uzbek society remained rural.370  
                                                          
366 The weighted averages for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kirghizstan 
indicators. 
367 The NRG (Natural Rate of Growth) is the differences between birth and death rates. 
368 Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 
8. 
369 Ibid., 9. 
370 In some intensive agricultural regions, a demographic boom was evident: in just 30 
years (1959-1989), the population of Ferghana oblast almost doubled (from 1.139 
million to 2.153) as well as the Karakalpak (from 510 to 1,214 thousand) while the 
Khorezmian population tripled (from 381,000 to 1.016 million). Similarly, in the same 
period the oblasts containing the biggest cities also enlarged: Tashkent oblast passed 
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Year 
Births  
(per 1000 
inhabitants) 
Deaths (per 
1000 
inhabitants) 
NGR 
1940 33.8  13.2  2.06 
1965 34.7  5.9  2.88 
1970 33.6  5.5  2.81 
1975 34.5  7.2  2.73 
The rural population of the UzSSR became an integrated part of the Soviet 
productive system and was gradually absorbed into its large collective 
agriculture facilities.371 At the same time, the regime imposed and maintained 
an economic system that employed a great deal of labor intensively. 
Proportionally, in 1970 kolkhozniki, laborers and white collar workers made up 
31.1% of UzSSR population and this figure even rose to 32.1% in 1976.372 
Furthermore, during the first period of ‘hard’ monoculture (1966-1976), the 
population of sovkhozniki almost doubled. 
Workers in collective agriculture in the UzSSR (thousands)373 
 Kolkhozniki Sovkhozniki 
1965 971.7 343.3 
1970 1029.4  392.2 
1975 1046.6  572.9 
1976 1045.8  607.9 
The soviet regime thus enforced an agricultural productive plan – 
substantially based on cotton – absorbing the lion’s share of the population. 
However, besides the “coverage for the collective farmers initiated in 1965 
when social security benefits for all collective farms were unified and through 
a series of subsequent measures (e.g., lowering of retirement age to 60 years 
for men and to 55 years for women and the raising of overall and minimum 
                                                          
from 1,349 to 4,236 million; Samarkand from 1,148 to 2,135 and Bukhara from 585 
thousand to 1.141 million. Jan Lahmeyer, “Uzbekistan. Historical Demographical Data 
of the Administrative Division,” Populstat, 2001. 
371 In Uzbekistan the average number of households per kolkhoz was 866 and the 
average of workers 1110. Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development 
in Soviet Central Asia, 96. 
372 Ibid., 12. 
373 Ibid., 44. 
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pensions),”374 the overdependence on “white gold” had dramatic effects on the 
rural society. Considering the “seasonal” nature of the cotton harvest, most of 
the workforce that was absorbed by it risked unemployment in the remaining 
months of the year375 in a society where the annual salary of an Uzbek 
peasant376 was lower than the Soviet average in the mid-‘80s.377 In parallel, the 
redistribution was inferior than the average Soviet rates. In fact, as evidenced 
in the following table, the payment from the public consumption fund (PPCF) 
in Uzbekistan was also lower than the Soviet average. 
PPCF (rubles per head per year) 378 
  1965 1970 1975 1976 
USSR 182 263 354 370 
UzSSR 126 192 260 269 
Furthermore, as we will see in the next chapter, often these nominal 
salaries were not even properly granted by the kolkhozniki whose labor 
conditions were not far from ‘serfdom’ – or from ‘slavery’ in some terrible 
cases that will be described in the next chapter – in many instances. In parallel, 
the plague of the auxiliary labor – often falling heavily on university students 
and school children who spent more than 60 days out of the school year in the 
cotton fields379 – resulted in very serious consequences for rural communities. 
This overdependence on cotton defined a myopic approach – a direct legacy of 
the communist culture – that would be difficult to eradicate from the Soviet 
mentality and could only be reversed in the medium-to-long term. 
                                                          
374 Ibid., 19–20. 
375 The estimates that are provided by the FATi are alarming: in 1979-1986, the 
unemployment had a range between 16-29%, with peaks of 35.5% in 1970, 46.7% in 
1979 and 50% in 1986. Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston 
Respublikasi Fan va Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix Shohidligi va Saboqlari, 98. 
376 In Uzbekistan payment per man-day in an average Kolkhoz in 1976 was 4.96 rubles. 
The lowest such payment in any Kolkhoz was reported to be 3.50 rubles while the 
highest known rate was 11.00 rubles, the ratio of the highest to the lowest being 3.14. 
Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 82. 
377 In 1986, the average annual salary of an UzSSR peasant was 1297 rubles, which was 
lower to the Soviet (1630) and the RSFSR (1796) levels. Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta 
Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-1991 Y.y.),” 205.  
378 Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 
18. 
379 Yash Leninchi, 11 November 1988 cited in Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy 
and Its Costs,” 83. 
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The role cotton played in the proletarization of the (rural) Uzbek society is 
clear. At the same time, we can indirectly interpret ‘white gold’ as a key factor 
in forging the contemporary idea of the Uzbek nation, a concept that has to be 
read through the diffusion of the national language.380 This hypothesis is 
grounded in the following corollary. The Soviet regime promoted cotton 
monoculture in Uzbekistan and the realization of collective agriculture facilities 
where the Uzbek rural communities – that were generally more conservative 
and traditionalist – were greatly absorbed and where the Russification was 
slower than the cities. This was evident even because the non-native 
communities of the UzSSR were mainly settled in the cities and constituted 
minor communities in the Uzbek rural framework. In the following table we can 
observe the concentration of the national communities within the urban 
framework, in order to understand how much an ethnic group was urbanized 
in the UzSSR. Conversely, from these data we can also deduce the share of 
‘ruralized’ communities. 
Urbanization by republic and nation (%)381 
 Total Indigenes Russians 
 1959 1970 1959 1970 1959 1970 
Uzbekistan 34.1 36.7 20.1 22.8 83.7 89.1 
Kazakhstan 43.7 50.3 24.3 26.3 59.0 69.1 
As evident, the majority (89.1%) of Russians in the UzSSR were settled in 
the cities in 1970 while the 77.2% of ethnic Uzbeks were in the countryside 
(where only 10.9% of Russians were based) –  ethnic Uzbek society was thus 
predominantly rural. These figures indicate the ethnic concentration of the 
Uzbek and Russian communities in the USSR but are not indicative of the 
effective compositions of UzSSR cities where Uzbeks were anyway the majority 
group. This aspect is, in fact, evidenced in the following table where a positive 
trend for the titular community emerges and a negative one for non-native 
Russians. 
                                                          
380 As usual, also the Uzbek ‘Nation' is a concept referred to self-conscious human 
collectivities that individuate themselves through the shared language. 
381 Robert J. Kaiser, “Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia,” in Geographic 
Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, ed. Robert Lewis (London & New York: Routledge, 
1992), 285. 
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National composition of the urban population382 
 Indigenes Variation Russians  Variation 
 1959 1970 1959-70 1959 1970 1959-70 
Uzbekistan 37.2  41.1 3.9 33.4  30.4 -3.0 
Kazakhstan 16.7  17.1 0.4 57.6  58.4 0.8 
Uzbek rural communities, isolated from the Russianized cities and pushed 
into the countryside for the cause of the ‘white gold’, enforced much more a 
national identity – through the use of the national language, tradition, and 
religion and consequently even nationalism – than the urbanized Uzbeks. Not 
surprisingly, the most traditional and nationalist communities were set in those 
areas – such as the Ferghana valley – where intensive agriculture had been 
enforced and where the sovietized/collectivized communities were less 
Russianized than their urban counterparts.  
Once again, in order to reconstruct this process, it is useful to analyze some 
figures. The great results of the Rashidovian russification campaign383 had 
different impacts on the urban and rural societies of UzSSR. In fact, in the 
countryside it was less necessary to speak Russian, and the Uzbek kolkhozniki 
used the Uzbek language as the essential and informal mode of communication 
while the ‘colonial’ language was endorsed just in formal relations with the 
‘colonial’ institutions. At the local level, even party and state institutions were 
even formally using local languages in the ordinary course of business, while 
the ‘colonial’ language was used in communicating with Moscow. The data on 
bilingualism in urban and rural communities are truly indicative: the cities were 
substantially more integrated within the Soviet system in terms of language 
while the rural peripheries were traditionalist and less Russianized. At the same 
time, the non-native community of urban Russians was not even integrated 
into the national society.384 
                                                          
382 Ibid., 286. 
383 In 1970, 19.6% of ethnic-Uzbek men and 9.3% of women were bilingual, rising to 
53.9% and 44.6%, respectively, in 1979. Robert J. Kaiser, “Social Mobilization in Soviet 
Central Asia,” in Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, ed. Robert Lewis 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1992), 258. 
384 The number of non-natives, including Russians, claiming fluency in the Uzbek 
language was 12.4% in 1970 and 13.5% in 1979. Without Russians, the figures were 17.8 
and 20.2%, respectively. Kaiser, “Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia,” 292. 
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Bilingualism in the UzSSR in 1970 (%)385 
 Urban Rural 
Monolingual 12.9 32.9 
Prebilingual 12.4 16.8 
Incompletely 
bilingual 
21.0 20.1 
Completely bilingual 34.0 14.3 
Postbilingual 9.0 5.5 
Developing bilingual 33.4 36.9 
Developed bilingual 43.0 19.8 
1970 census results 33.4 7.3 
Another interesting set of data concerns the preservation of the traditional 
ethnic integrity within Uzbek families. In fact, in 1978 the rate of exogamy 
among Uzbeks was pretty low in cities (8.2%) and minimal in the countryside 
(2.3%),386 further defining a situation of de facto segregation that recalls other 
colonial societies where cities developed in a schizophrenic pattern of social 
division and would have dramatic consequences due to the ‘Uzbekization’ 
enforced in post-1991 Uzbekistan.387 Cotton, then, was the mainstay of 
ruralization in a society that nationalized - or better, resisted Russification - in 
the countryside and then became a catalyst for the spread of the Uzbek 
language and nationalism enforcing the natives' identity and the sense of 
Uzbekity, especially in the rural areas. At the same time, the cities remained 
more ‘cosmopolitan’ and integrated into the Soviet system, even culturally 
                                                          
385 These categories have been reinterpreted by Kaiser: Monolinguals in general do not 
speak in a second language; prebilinguals speak a second language with great difficulty; 
incompletely bilingual speakers have with some difficulty; completely bilingual speakers 
generally speak fairly freely; postbilinguals speak completely freely, and think in the 
second language.  Mikhail Nikolaevich Guboglo, Sovremennyye Etnoyazykovyye 
Protsessy v SSSR (Moskva: Nauka, 1984); Kaiser, “Social Mobilization in Soviet Central 
Asia,” 257; Tsentral’noye Statisticheskiye Upravleniye SSSR, Itogi Vsesoyuznoy Perepisi 
Naseleniya 1970 Goda, Tom 4 (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo “Statistika,” 1973), 205–208, 277–
278, 318–319. 
386 Kaiser, “Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia,” 294. 
387 An example of a reshaped city is Samarkand where great masses of urban Slav 
settlers abandoned the city, leaving places for Uzbek peasants from the countryside. 
Buttino, Changing Urban Landscapes: Eastern European and Post-Soviet Cities, since 
1989; Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi. 
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speaking. Not surprisingly, the areas where national identity roots were 
rediscovered were predominantly those of high agricultural concentration.  
Above, I reported in the tables some data referring to Kazakhstan. This 
consideration was not by accident but rather underpins a final comparative 
consideration. As is evident, the Soviet regime enforced cotton in Uzbekistan 
and kept the Uzbek population rural and tied to native language, developing 
consequently a strong nation and nationalism. In contrast, Kazakh society was 
much more urbanized and integrated within the urban-industrial complexes 
that absorbed the labor force and russified the Kazakh population more than 
their southern neighbors. Then, in the Kazakh SSR – where a huge Russian 
minority had settled - language, nation, and nationalism had a weaker role in 
the post-Soviet scenario. Anyway, that is another story. 
2.4.3 The ecological costs 
Much more serious were those collateral damages at the ecological level that 
would present fatal and irreversible consequences for the Uzbek ecosystem. 
Despite the huge investments that the Soviet state provided for land 
improvements,388 the results of cotton monoculture imposition were dramatic: 
monoculture destroyed the classic cycle of crop rotation and land management 
– cotton-alfalfa-manure-cotton – and the fertility of land drastically decreased 
in the UzSSR. Consequently, in the years of ‘hard monoculture’ (1975-1983), 
land productivity decreased by about 20%.389 Furthermore, the massive abuse 
of fertilizers, pesticides and water deviations had their worst and evident 
effects in salinization,390 inflow waters,391 pollution and drainage of Aral Sea, 
                                                          
388 Between 1971-1985, 2,063 million rubles were invested in UzSSR for land 
improvements. Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston Respublikasi 
Fan va Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix Shohidligi va Saboqlari, 291. 
389 Data elaborated from Kh. Madzhitov, “Effektivno Ispol’zovat’ Oroshaemye Zemly,” 
Sel’skoye Khozyaystvo Uzbekistana 12 (1984): 2–5. 
390 "Salt problems occur because of both the high salt content of many irrigated soils, 
especially newly reclaimed ones, and the high level of salinity in irrigation waters" as 
well as inadequate drainage measures. Craumer, “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, 
and Rural Out- Migration in Soviet Central Asia,” 135. 
391 Amu Darya in Karakalpakya had 1.5 grams mineral contents per liter. "In 1985–7 [...] 
the net accumulation of salts in the basins of these two rivers was about 20 to 25 million 
tons per year" Murray Feshback and Alfred Friendly, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and 
Nature under Siege (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 77; Craumer, “Agricultural Change, 
Labor Supply, and Rural Out- Migration in Soviet Central Asia,” 136. 
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creating a plethora of environmental problems that degenerated in one of the 
worst ecological disasters of human history entailing the creation of the 
‘Aralkum’ man-made desert.392 
In 1960, the Aral Sea had an absolute level of +53.40 m with an inflow of 
water – only from Syrdarya and Amudarya - of 56.0 km3,393 and a mineralization 
rate of at 7.2 g/l.394 Since 1961, due to “cottonization,”395 the water inflows 
started to be ever more polluted and Aral Sea began to dry up while its absolute 
level inexorably kept dropping for the next years.396 In 1970, navigation across 
the Aral Sea substantially decreased and the Soviet government started to be 
worried about the situation,397 organizing in Tashkent in 1975 a First 
                                                          
392 Glantz, Creeping Environmental Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral 
Sea Basin; Siegmar-W. Breckle, Aralkum- A Man-Made Desert. The Desiccated Floor of 
the Aral Sea (Central Asia) (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 2012); Michael R. Edelstein, 
Astrid Cerny, and Abror Gadaev, Disaster by Design the Aral Sea and Its Lessons for 
Sustainability (Bingley: Emerald, 2012); Marinus G. Bos, The Inter-Relationship Between 
Irrigation, Drainage and the Environment in the Aral Sea Basin (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1996). 
393 In 1960, the total inflow of water reaching Aral Sea amounted at 62 km3 of water, 40 
in 1970 and only 0.9 in 1985. E. Yusupov, S. Ziyadullaev, Aralu zhit'! Priaeal'yu - 
razvivat'sya, PV, 21308, 130, 7 June 1987. 
394 Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 260. 
395 Igor S. Zonn, “Reasons for the Environmental and Socio-Economic Crisis,” in The Aral 
Sea Environment, ed. Andrey G. Kostianoy and Aleksey N. Kosarev (Berlin: Springer, 
2010), 79. 
396 The gradual decrease of Aral Sea in terms of absolute level can be summarized with 
the following data: 53.3 m. (1961), 53 (1962), 52.6 (1963), 52.5 (1964), 51.9 (1966), 51.6 
(1967), 51.3 (1969). In 1970 it reached 51.4 m - with a surface of 60,300 km2 and a water 
volume of 964 km3 – and kept decreasing: 51.1 (1971), 50.5 (1972), 50.2 (1973), 49.9 
(1974), 49.0 (1975), 47.6 (1977), 47.1 (1978), 46.5 (1979). In 1980 Aral Sea level was 
45.8 m – with a surface of 51,700 km2 and a volume of 644 km3. 45.2 (1981), 44.4 (1982), 
43.6 (1983), 42.8 (1984), 41.9 (1985), 41.1 (1986). In 1987 its level was 40.3 m – with a 
surface of 41,100 km2, a volume of 401 km3 and a mineralization rate of 20 g/l. The level 
kept decreasing with 39.7 (1988), 39.1 (1989), 38.2 (1990, with a surface of 32,000 km2, 
a volume of 350 km3 and a mineralization rate of 28–30 g/l.), 37.7 (1991), 37.3 (1992), 
36.9 (1993), 36.6 (1994), 36.1 (1995), 35.5 (1996), 35.1 (1997), 34.8 (1998), 34.0 (1999), 
33.3 (2000), 32.1 (2001), 30.5 (2002), 30.5 (2003), 30.1 (2004), 30.4 (2005), 29.6 (2006), 
29.1 (2007). Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 260–82. 
397 “For the first time, the future of Aral Sea is considered in the report “Perspectives of 
development of land reclamation for 1971–1985, regulation and redistribution of the 
rivers run-off,” prepared by the State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
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Coordination Meeting on studying the influence on the environment and on 
estimating the socio-economic consequences of the Aral Sea level decrease. 
Then, a second conference was organized in Almaty in 1977 and an All-Union 
summit entitled “Scientific bases of actions for prevention of negative 
consequences of the Aral Sea level decrease” in Moscow. In 1980, Nukus 
hosted a session of the Presidium of the AN USSR convened in the form of 
scientific-practical conference that was devoted to the “Problems of the Aral 
Sea and Amudarya delta.”398 However, the Uzbek government could not 
interrupt the cotton monoculture, and the scientific recommendations had 
been often ignored, while the course of river waters kept being deviated to 
cotton fields. Since the mid-‘70s, water substantially ceased to reach the Aral 
                                                          
Minvodkhoz of the USSR, and VASKhNIL and approved by the Central Committee of 
CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on 24.07.1970 (No. 612). Ibid., 261. 
398  Ibid., 263–64. 
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Sea.399 In 1988-1990 the Aral became two isolated seas (large and small Arals) 
with a dry cutoff wall appeared between them, and in 2001 the famous 
Vozrozhdeniya Island400 joined the mainland to the south.401 Since the 2000s, 
Uzbek and Kazak governments promoted several attempts to rehabilitate, at 
least in part, the Aral Sea but sadly the situation seems to be irreversible.402 
The disappearance of the Aral Sea was an almost apocalyptic ecological 
disaster that, however, has directly involved a remote – and not very densely 
populated – area of the republic. More serious were the consequences in the 
regions of high agricultural production. 
In fact, cotton monoculture not only implied a set of irrigation networks – 
that were diverting waters from their natural flows, changing the ecosystem – 
but also an intensive over-use of biochemical agents such as fertilizers, 
defoliants, and pesticides. Fertilizers were improving the salinity of the land 
and were often polluting and changing the chemical composition of the soil. 
More dangerous were antibiotic agents as defoliants that were used to 
                                                          
399 “Due to nearly complete utilization of the Syrdarya water for economic needs and 
construction of several dead earth-fill dams on the main river channel within its delta, 
the inflow into the sea practically stopped. [From] 1982 the diversion of the Amudarya 
waters to [the Aral Sea] along the main channel was stopped; near Kyzyldjar settlement, 
a dead earth-fill dam was constructed. The residual flow was directed to irrigation of 
lands on the left bank of the river and to water supply to the dried water bodies in the 
delta. A small portion of water ran to the sea along small arms and via a system of lakes. 
[…] In 1987, flow of the Syrdarya into [Aral Sea] ceased completely. Small quantities of 
water got into the sea only in relatively water abundant years, for example 1988–1994.” 
Ibid., 39. 
400 Vozrozhdeniya Island was a famous place because in 1948 a top-secret bioweapons 
laboratory that was testing biologic agents as anthrax, smallpox, plague, brucellosis, 
tularemia and the terrible nerve gas ‘Novichok’was established there. In 1954, the site 
was expanded and named Aralsk-7, becoming a key structure in the Soviet biological 
warfare program. In 1971, an accidental release of weaponized smallpox from the island 
infected ten people, of whom 3 died. In the 1990s, the defector Ken Alibek - the former 
head of the Soviet Union's bioweapons program -  promoted an awareness campaign 
to clear the island, along with its dangerous content, which was in a state of neglect. 
Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological 
Warfare (New York: Macmillan and Co., 2001); David Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The 
Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy (New York: 
Doubleday, 2009). 
401  Zonn et al., The Aral Sea Encyclopedia, 39. 
402 Philip P. Micklin, N. V. Aladin, and Igor Plotnikov, The Aral Sea : The Devastation and 
Partial Rehabilitation of a Great Lake (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014). 
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facilitate the mechanized cotton harvest and were massively spread in those 
fields were millions of Uzbeks worked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The demand for defoliants started in the mid-‘60s and increased mainly in 
the late ‘70s.403 The most famous defoliant was Butifos, an organo-phosphate 
chemical agent that left behind a nauseating and unmistakable stench in the 
                                                          
403 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 4143, l. 27. 
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fields and villages and that was unofficially abused in most Uzbek fields.404 In 
Uzbekistan the 2,4,5-T a component of the more infamous ‘agent orange’ used 
by US troops in Vietnam was also largely experimented with. Similarly, in the 
UzSSR there was a massive abuse of pesticides which was intended to increase 
the agricultural production. Nancy Lubin estimated an average share of 20-25 
kg of poisonous chemicals for every hectare in Soviet Central Asia - while the 
Soviet average figure was 3 kg – corresponding to 7-8 kilograms of poisons per 
capita.405 However, this statistic was destined to dramatically increase in those 
rural areas with high population density – as the Ferghana Valley406 – that was 
mostly occupied in agriculture where these figures could reach “upwards of 
230 kilograms of fertilizer per acre […] Pesticide usage per hectare of arable 
land in places exceeds the safe level of 1.3 kilograms per hectare by 40-50 fold, 
and the USSR average by 26 times.”407 Concretely, the abuse of these chemicals 
would cause devastating effects for the ecosystem and the health of millions 
of Uzbek workers who had been exposed in the fields to these poisonous 
agents for years. Indeed, the toxic legacy of chemical fertilizers, defoliants and 
pesticides would determine terrible environmental and health consequences 
                                                          
404 Butifos was blamed locally for the "exceptionally high rate of infant mortality (46.2 
per thousand in Uzbekistan in 1986) and birth defects among children born to the 
women who work in the cotton fields." It was officially banned in 1989, when it was 
replaced with other equally dangerous substitutes. Yash Leninchi, 10 January 1989 and 
NS, “Soviet Cotton Threatens a Region’s Sea-and Its Children,” New Scientist, 1691, 
November 1989, 22. 
405 Nancy Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 56. 
406 In 1979 UzSSR, the density of population varies from the arid deserts of Karakalpakya 
- with average density of 5 people per km2 (now 7.5) - to the very highly populated areas 
of the Ferghana Valley where, for example, it reached 308 people per km2 in 1979 and 
nowadays it exceeds the 660 units per km2. Khan and Ghai, Collective Agriculture and 
Rural Development in Soviet Central Asia, 1. 
407 Nancy Lubin, “Environmental Resources and Constraints in the Former Soviet 
Republics: Uzbekistan,” 1994, 8; Aleksei Yablokov, “Notes on the Environmental 
Situation in Russia,” Environmental Policy Review 6, no. 2 (1992): 1–20. 
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on the population,408 as the dramatically high rates of tumors, malformations 
and the mother and infant mortality in the UzSSR.409 
The narrated facts were just a part of the unintended consequences of 
cotton monoculture in the UzSSR and were already known in Soviet times. In 
fact, since the mid-70s, several appeals to the Uzbek party and government 
came from the national academy (AN UzSSR)410 even mobilizing parts of 
intellectuals and civil society411 to the ecological issues related to the dramatic 
situation in the Aral, warning on the serious risks of monoculture in the 
Ferghana valley,412 or even requiring to implement organic solutions instead of 
chemical poisons in the fields.413 Other calls of the republican party were 
addressed to the CC CPSU and asked for institutional measures.414 However, 
these calls received little media attention and were not followed up , relegated 
                                                          
408 Rumer reports: "A study of Akkurgansk raion (Tashkent oblast) in the 1970s found 
that inhabitants who lived in areas of the raion where cotton was planted were 60 
percent more likely to suffer from disorders of the nervous System than those who lived 
in other parts of the raion." Furthermore, the high incidence of acute intestinal 
disorders and jaundice in children has also been linked to cotton. Rumer, “Central Asia’s 
Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 82. 
409 During the years of high cotton monoculture, the infant mortality - children dying 
before the age of one, per thousand children born - in Uzbekistan was dramatically 
increased, reaching rates of 31 in 1970, 47 (1980), 45.3 (1985), 46.2 (1986), 45.9 (1987), 
43.3 (1988), 46 (1989), meanwhile the RSFSR figures were about half: 23 in 1970, 22.1 
(1980), 20.7 (1985), 19.3 (1986), 19.4 (1987), 18.9 (1988), 19 (1989). Lubin, 
“Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” 57. 
410 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 4695, ll. 102-123. 
411 TsGARUz, f. 2742, op. 1, d. 258. 
412 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 6978. 
413 In an American intelligence report on the Central Asian situation in 1983, appeared 
that “because defoliants and other chemical preparations are spread from early spring 
to late fall a number of farmers have begun to fear going near fields […] Also, in recent 
years, the application of excessive amounts of mineral fertilizers has led to cases of 
poisoning from eating contaminated vegetables and melons.” FBIS, “JPRS 84130 - USSR 
Report. Political and Sociological Affairs No. 1445 - Central Asian Press Surveys - 16 
August 1983,” 1983. 
414 On 20 November 1984, the CC CPUz wrote a memorandum to the CC CPSU declaring 
that "air, water and soil of the republic are contaminated" and considering the 
weakness and the scarce sensibility on these issues in the ministries, it was created in 
the republic the "soviet for defense of nature." Even at political level, the CC CPUz 
requested at CC CPSU on 8 April 1985 to create a party committee for defense of nature 
in Uzbekistan." RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, ll. 92-94. 
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among to the minor issues and remaining behind the legitimizing cause of 
cotton for the fatherland. However, these problems started to be seriously 
considered by the Uzbek leadership in the late ‘80s, once their grave 
environmental consequences – and their media following - became more 
substantial and tangible. At that time, Moscow’s grip was weaker and the new 
Uzbek leadership was in search of legitimation at a popular level, condemning 
the monoculture regime and approaching the ecological demands of the 
people. In this great game of political opportunism, the legitimation pattern 
shifted from ‘self-glorification’ to ‘self-victimization’ and cotton was once again 
key. Therefore, we have seen how cotton determined the fate of the republic 
at economic, political and social levels. The pertinence of these three 
dimensions would continue into the next decades, when the condemnation of 
economic dependence and the food shortage crisis and other supply problems, 
the ecological disasters, the repressions during the cotton affair – that we will 
see in the next chapters – and then the transformation of Uzbek society and 
nation, characterize cotton as the pivotal key to read the history of the 
contemporary Uzbekistan. 
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3 THE ANDROPOVIAN ORIGINS OF THE 
‘UZBEK COTTON AFFAIR’ 
 
The victory of the Revolution marked a turning point in 
the history of the peoples of our country. The cleansing 
wind passed over Turkestan as well, sweeping away with 
it the dirt and the scum of the old world, a world of cruel 
social and national oppression, feudal and capitalistic 
exploitation, the tyranny of the khans, rich landowners 
and tsarist officials, and lack of rights for the working 
people.1 – Sharaf Rashidov 
 
One of the peculiarities of the black market [in the 
USSR] is that, because there is no private property, the 
merchant sells goods that don’t belong to him and the 
buyer doesn’t become the owner of what he buys.2 – Lev 
Timofeev 
 
To contextualize the ‘cotton scandal’, we need one more premise, 
introducing some elements of the informal Soviet economic system and the 
crucial passage of Soviet history, with the end of Brezhnevism and the rise of 
Yuri Andropov. The name 'Uzbek cotton affair' is useful for defining a season of 
purges, judiciary scandals, and power reshuffles that related to the UzSSR in 
the period 1983-1989. However, such terminology is not always proper 
because the 'affair' was not a singular case but a plethora of these phenomena 
within the republic. Moreover, only sometimes were these directly related to 
cotton and a part of the revealed corruption and system of privileges and 
protections related to the revealed patrimonial system. However, as we have 
seen, cotton was the key element of power legitimation and for this reason it 
                                                                
1 Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Soviet Uzbekistan (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), 
15–16. 
2 Lev Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 58. 
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was the main source of money that consistently became the origin of bribes. 
Anyway, in the many 'Uzbek cotton affairs' we are going to analyze, only a part 
of the bribes was directly connected to cotton. 
Often the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ is presented as an "Andropovian" move 
against Rashidov – a loyal client of Brezhnev – and Uzbekistan as an exemplary 
test site (a ‘polygon’) in which to experiment the ‘moralizing’ measures of the 
Andropovian bloodless terror. This is partly true. However, it responded to a 
long tradition of Soviet politics where anticorruption campaigns – as were the 
appeals for increasing economic growth3 – were typical factors of legitimation 
that the new leaders wanted to promote in order to demonstrate their realism 
and pragmatism and to proceed with political struggle against rivals.  We saw 
this pattern in Stalinist times, then during destalinization, Brezhnevism and, for 
sure, it became a key issue in the post-Brezhnev framework when 
‘moralization’ assumed even a key ideological dimension. In the post-1982 
period, Uzbekistan was not an isolated case of a corrupted system and the 
Andropovian anticorruption campaign to clean up the USSR would assume 
massive tones on the entire Soviet system4 and the consequences would be 
unexpected. Therefore, we want to understand if the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ 
presented some specific peculiarities or was effectively the manifestation of 
Andropov’s campaigns in the republic. My contention is that the ‘Uzbek cotton 
affair’ had its origins in Andropov’s policies but, however, assumed its 
peculiarities only later, when this journalistic definition – that intended a whole 
season of scandals that overwhelmed Uzbekistan from 1983 until 1989 - was 
spread during perestroika and assumed a different importance within Soviet 
public opinion in terms of media coverage, political manipulation and 
consequences, inexorably effecting the political life of the republic. 
 
                                                                
3 Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 191. 
4 Anti-corruption cases including those against embezzlement and theft of socialist 
property rose from 4,039 arrests in 1975 to 6,024 in 1980 and 10,561 in 1985 registering 
an increase of 50% just for embezzlement. Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al 
Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 426.  
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3.1 The ‘informal’ Soviet system 
In the USSR there was a wide spectrum of shades of ‘grey’ – or 
‘underworld’5 - economies that contributed to distort the Leninist orthodoxy 
with which the communist planned system was conceived. Grossman 
estimated that in the second half of the ‘‘70s, private profits constituted almost 
30% of family incomes and 10-12% of the Soviet labor force was employed in 
the second economy.6 In what Graziosi has defined as a situation of “proto-
capitalism,” Soviet citizens were engaged in systems out of law to provide 
those goods and services that the state was not able to provide and, therefore, 
the second economy even worked as a lubricant of an inefficient system and 
that would soon become a determinant cause of the Soviet crisis.7 
The main tool of this informal system was ‘corruption’ – a social 
phenomenon that can be generally intended as the use of public office for 
private advantages8 – in its various forms. In the USSR, corruption was 
                                                                
5 Gavriil Popov writes: “In our country, the principal manifestation of the underworld 
economy is what the West calls normal, everyday business: buying and reselling to make 
a profit. Such activities become part of the ‘underworld’ because they operate outside 
official, nonmarket channels for distributing goods, and outside the system of state 
prices. The success of such activities is no accident: they flourish because of shortages 
that force the buyer to overpay the underworld economy for goods that are hard to get 
the official way. Indeed, it was such shortages that created the stimulus for the 
underworld economy to spring up in the first place. [...] Another major activity of the 
underworld economy is the illicit production, from state raw materials and using state 
equipment, of goods that are in great demand [...] Yet another is administrators’ selling 
‘permissions’ to the general public. Our country’s endless maze of bureaucratic 
regulations offers the opportunity to trade power for bribes, to profit from one’s right 
to allow something or not. [...] Of course, we also have the ‘classical’ forms of 
‘underworld’ activity, from drugs to racketeering. But, on the whole, our underworld 
economy is the inevitable result of the nonmarket nature of our economy, and of 
universal state-ification and bureaucratization.” Christopher Cerf et al., Small Fires: 
Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987-1990 (New York: Summit 
Books, 1990), 284–85. 
6 Gregory Grossman, “The Second Economy in the USSR,” Problems of Communism 26, 
no. 5 (1977). According to Vaksberg, in the 80s the Soviet black economy was worth 
between 200-400 billion rubles, or representing a quarter of Soviet GDP at the time. 
Arkadii Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 133. 
7 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 440. 
8 According to Friedrich “Corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder who 
is charged with doing certain things [...] is by monetary or other rewards not legally 
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common, well known, and generally tolerated within limits. The term 
korruptsiya,9 however, was reserved for egregious examples and officially 
indicated decay, venality, and bribery 
practiced in the bourgeois world among officials, politicians, high-ranking 
officials. Although k[orruptsiya] is regarded by the legislation of many capitalist 
countries as a criminal offense, in practice it is not always and not fully punished. 
K[orruptsiya] has been particularly widespread in recent years in the US, Japan 
and others capitalist countries.10 
Indeed, instead of using korruptsiya, the formulation “negative 
phenomena” (negativnyye yavleniya) or “violations of Party and state 
discipline” (narusheniya partiynoy i gosudarstvennoy distsipliny) was preferred 
to suggest a wide spectrum of economic crimes related to bribery 
(vzyatochnichestvo), speculation (spekulyatsiya), squandering and 
theft/embezzlement of socialist property (razbazarivaniye i khishcheniya 
sotsialisticheskoy sobstvennosti), false additions, falsifications and report-
padding (pripiski), and abuse of power (dolzhnostnoye zloupotrebleniye). In all 
these forms, corruption became a pillar of the informal system. Besides the 
                                                                
provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the award and 
thereby does damage to the public and its interests.” Carl J. Friedrich, “Political 
Pathology,” Political Quarterly 37, no. 1 (1966): 74; Leslie Holmes, Corruption: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Paul Heywood, 
Routledge Handbook of Political Corruption (New York: Routledge, 2015); Arnold J. 
Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Victor T. Le Vine, Political Corruption: A 
Handbook (New Brunswick u.a.: Transaction Publishers, 1989); Susan. Rose-Ackerman, 
International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption (Cheltenham 
UK ;;Northampton MA: Edward Elgar, 2006); Seppo Tiihonen, The History of Corruption 
in Central Government (Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2003); Charles A. Schwartz, 
“Corruption and Political Development in the USSR,” Comparative Politics 11, no. 4 (July 
1979): 425; Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis; Michael Clarke, Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); Kelly M. McMann, Corruption as a Last Resort : Adapting 
to the Market in Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Holmes, 
Corruption: A Very Short Introduction. 
9 The Soviet government did not recognize the word ‘corruption’, allowing it to enter 
into use only in the late ‘80s. Instead, the terms ‘bribery’, ‘abuse of power’, 
‘embezzlement’ etc. were preferred. According to Satarov, by rejecting the term, the 
notion and so the nature of the phenomenon itself was effectively denied. Georgiy 
Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye Posobiye (Moskva: RA “SPAS,” 2004), 
40. 
10 N.A. Polyakov, Kratkii Politicheskii Slovar’ (Moskva: Politizdat, 1983), 156. 
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difficulties in measuring the extent of the phenomena11 and the risks to 
misinterpret the statistics about the Soviet context,12 corruption and generally 
the ‘second market’ were key factors in the Soviet system. Then, corruption 
could be considered as a "lubricant"13 of the Soviet machine with which 
Brezhnevism transformed the Stalinist terror machine in a tolerance system 
that also had positive implications because, above all, it limited the use of 
systemic violence,14 turning a blind eye to a structure that, although – 
ideologically, morally, and materially – corrupt, ensured a peaceful stability and 
                                                                
11 The problem of objectively measuring corruption is very difficult. On the one hand, it 
is very tricky to measure something that – apart from the odd rare case – does not 
manifest any clear evidence. Therefore, corruption is generally measured through 
corruption perception indices. However, these indices are not related to the socio-
cultural context and are inherently subject to social biases. Transparency International, 
“Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 Long Methodological Brief,” 2010. 
12 A more objective measure is related to the statistics of the revealed criminal cases. 
However, these measures are also relative to the context and are not comparable given 
the differences in legal systems. Even in the USSR, where the law was supposed to be 
homogenous across the federative republics, the anticorruption campaigns had been 
exploited due to political opportunity, and these comparisons can therefore be 
inconsistent. Indeed, comparative studies analyzing corruption revealed how, in 
Brezhnevian times, 25% of the corruption cases appeared in Russia. This is a relatively 
low share, considering the population dimension and that the key central administrative 
bodies were in Moscow. In second place there was Azerbaijan with 15.5%, followed by 
Uzbekistan 12%, Georgia 8.2%, Ukraine (5.8%) followed by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
at 5.5%, while for Belarus and the Baltics was only 0.7% each and Tajikistan 0.3%. In the 
post-Brezhnev period (1983-1987), the RSFSR was at 29% followed by Uzbekistan with 
21.3% – huge considering the share of the republic's population compared with Russia 
– Kirghizstan 9.7%, Kazakhstan 6.5% and Georgia 5.8%. Holmes, The End of Communist 
Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 146; F. J. M. Feldbrugge, 
“Government and Shadow Economy in the Soviet Union,” Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 
(1984): 541. 
13 Heller defined corruption as “a lubricant that makes possible the operation of a 
machine that combines total and permanent control and permanent falsification.” 
Mikhail Heller, Cogs in the Wheel: The Formation of Soviet Man (New York: Knopf, 1988), 
139. 
14 William Clark finds corruption in the Soviet system as the main factor of distortion of 
capital and investment, decreasing the legitimacy and the administrative capacity of the 
system. However, the author revealed some positive aspects related to the bureaucratic 
flexibility, the increase of capital formation and managerial/entrepreneurial behaviors, 
and a general decrease of violence William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet 
Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1993), 208–14. 
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both provided economic advantages and disadvantages that – to some extent 
– was blind eyed because it was useful to supplement the inefficiencies of the 
planned redistributive system.15 This tolerance seems to represent 
Mandeville’s idea of societies that need both vices and corruption in their 
moral – but not criminal – manifestations. 
Konstantin Simis – a Soviet dissident who defected from the USSR and in 
1982 wrote the first illuminating book on the phenomenon16 –describes 
corruption as a functional element of the Soviet ‘second economy’,17 the 
impact of which had been revealed since Stalinist times.18 Therefore, Simis 
defined corruption as an endemic phenomenon within the Soviet system, 
inside economics and politics within the ruling elite at central and local levels, 
in the Soviet justice and law enforcement system, and, finally, in common life.  
To understand the logic of the second economy and corruption we should 
remember that in the USSR goods and services were scarce and distributed 
                                                                
15 According to Critchlow, corruption "helped to make the system work, by stimulating 
initiative, cementing working relationships, and easing popular dissatisfaction with the 
state-controlled sector of the economy." James Critchlow, “Corruption, Nationalism and 
the Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia,” The Journal of Communist Studies 4 (1988): 144. 
16 Konstantin Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
17 Bribery and blat found their dimension within the bureaucracy that, through the 
nomenklatura system depended on the party. Grossman, “The Second Economy in the 
USSR”; Gregory Grossman, The Second Economy in the USSR and Eastern Europe: A 
Bibliography (Bala Cynwyd: WEFA Group Special Projects, 1990); Aron 
Katsenelinboigen, “Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union,” Soviet Studies 29, no. 1 
(1977); Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and Informal 
Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Morris Bornstein, The Soviet 
Economy, Continuity and Change (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981); Maria Łos,́ The 
Second Economy in Marxist States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990); Vladimir Treml 
and Michael V. Alexeev, “The Second Economy and the Destabilizing Effect of Its Growth 
on the State Economy in the Soviet Union : 1965-1989” (Bala Cynwyd: The WEFA Group, 
1993). 
18 To some extent, the practice of pripiski developed during the ‘revolution from above’ 
period, when industrial productivity was claimed to raise annually by impossible 
rhythms of 10-20% and falsification was seen as a natural source of survival. In this 
framework, de facto corruption was institutionalized. Elena Aleksandrovna Osokina, Za 
Fasadom “stalinskogo Izobiliya” : Raspredeleniye I Rynok v Snabzhenii Naseleniya v 
Gody Industralizatsii 1927-1941 (Moskva: Rosspen, 1997); Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in 
Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), 
95. 
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through a planned system that was not able to efficiently provide them to its 
citizens. Thus, in a non-free market society, a person who needed a determined 
good or service preferred to pay an extra ‘informal cost’ to officials who could 
help, support, or provide the requested things. In this context, blat19 and 
tukhta20 became the main currency of such an informal system and tolkachis 
its main intermediators.21 All these elements formed a ‘black’, ‘grey’, ‘shadow’, 
‘underground’, ‘secondary’, or just ‘informal’ system that illicitly provided 
assistance to citizens to access all those goods and services that the Soviet state 
was not able to efficiently supply.22 In a system where nothing beholds to 
anyone and everything is the property of the state, corruption and 
embezzlement were developed in this way so as to bypass the system’s 
shortcomings. The confession that Brezhnev made to his counselor Aleksander 
Bovin is exemplary: 
You do not know life. [Here], nobody lives on his salary. I remember when I was 
young [...] we worked to unload wagons. And how did we do? Three bags – or 
three boxes – to the state and one for us. In this way, everybody lives in this 
country.23 
The fact that Soviet power was de facto tolerating these practices – as well 
as other illegalities like blat, tukhta or tolkachis – reflected the “elite 
perceptions that these forms of corruption often perform vital systemic 
functions.”24 This attitude could be considered as a form of "passive reform" or 
                                                                
19 The concept of blat refers to the procurement of mutual favors, nepotism, protection 
etc. determining the capability to acquire (even illegally) favors, goods, and services that 
were in short supply. Cf. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking, and 
Informal Exchange. 
20 In the Soviet Union, the “greatest single source of inefficiency in the economic sphere 
was the inflated work norms, which forced people to falsify their work reports in order 
to survive. The term used to describe this practice was tukhta”. Cf. Stephen Carter, The 
Politics of Solzhenitsyn (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), 43. 
21 Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped 
Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
22 According to Ed A. Hewett, in the mid-80s around 20 million Soviet citizens were 
engaged fully or part time in ‘underground’ activities. Edward A. Hewett, Reforming the 
Soviet Economy. Equality versus Efficiency (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1988), 190. 
23 Andrea Graziosi, L’Unione Sovietica in 209 Citazioni (Bologna: Il mulino, 2006), 156. 
24 John M. Kramer, “Political Corruption in the USSR,” Western Political Quarterly 30, 
no. 2 (1977): 221. 
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a "substitute for reform"25 in a system that did not seem to be reformable. In 
fact, just referring to the ‘70s, James Millar conceptualized ‘Brezhnev’s Little 
Deal,’ which tolerated  
the expansion of a wide range of petty private economic activities, some legal, 
some in the penumbra of the legal, and some clearly illegal, the primary aim of 
which was the reallocation by private means of a significant fraction of Soviet 
national income according to private preferences.26  
On this purpose, Clark added: 
that general argument is extended to the class of officialdom, which operated 
under an increasingly informal and explicit “little deal” of its own. A large 
number of informal and technically illegal measures appropriate for the 
maintenance of economic growth and, by extension, the stability of the regime, 
would be permitted and in some cases encouraged by the Soviet leadership.27 
Brezhnev promoted this new peaceful28 and tolerant control pattern, which 
was, in fact, based on loyal patrimonial networks, fostering nepotism, 
corruption, and corporatism.29 However, “the regime’s willingness to tolerate 
a great deal of deviant behavior that would previously have been punished. Lax 
policing of the second economy and the turning of blind eyes to report padding 
and corruption on the part of managers constituted a part of the regime’s 
‘Little Deal’, a tacit accommodation between the regime and its increasingly 
acquisitive subjects”.30 The pursuit of that compromise between all the social 
forces was functional to “ensure peace, order and tranquility within both the 
leadership and society at large”.31 
                                                                
25 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 64, 92. 
26 James R. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” 
Slavic Review 44, no. 4 (1985): 697. 
27 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 96. 
28 Brezhnev that since 1964 was promising a "peaceful" development exclaiming that 
"The Soviet people should live in peace in order to work quietly" Graziosi, L’Unione 
Sovietica in 209 Citazioni, 150. 
29 Cf. Valerie Bunce, “The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of 
Corporatism,” British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 2 (1983): 129–58. 
30 William J. Tompson, The Soviet Union under Brezhnev (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 90. 
31 Ibid., 117. 
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The Brezhnev era was then characterized by a high level of systemic 
“metacorruption”32 that did not create either culprits or innocents, and denied 
that part of the resources were being channeled for purely private purposes. 
Nonetheless, it was an integral part of the Soviet productive system, even 
though it was illegal. Corruption then increased even more during stagnation 
and it was functional to keep in the illusions of efficiency of a huge drifting state 
and was unofficially tolerated at lower-individual scale.33 
However, in the early ‘80s, the CC CPSU started to seriously analyze the 
phenomenon as a systemic risk for the country,34 testifying that tolerance 
ended when the level of machinations, bribery, and embezzlement emerged at 
                                                                
32 Anton Koslov defined “metacorruption” this way: “When terror is stopped and the 
process of corruption begins, what can be seen on its periphery is metacorruption: 
corruption becomes the norm, and the non-corrupted is viewed as an aberration from 
the norm. Metacorruption is a stage beyond; it is the corruption of the corrupters, when 
corrupt power no longer conceals its corruptness. […] We could say that this is a new 
form of anomie, anomie squared.” Anton Koslov, “Afterword,” in Russia’s Secret Rulers, 
ed. Lev Timofeev (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 163–64. 
33 In this regard, the criminal dispatches of the KGB that were full of banalities, and often 
self-comforting that did not trace the level of real concern that the Brezhnevian group 
had, are interesting. The 'boss' still ensured stability and peace and pursued the way of 
self-delusion in the considerations of a country that was drifting. Graziosi defined this 
as the "triumph of hypocrisy." Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione 
Sovietica, 1945-1991, 427–28. 
34 The memorandum of the party-organizational department of the CC CPSU and the 
CPC (Committee of Party Control) date 21 May 1981 “on strengthening the fight against 
bribery in 1975-1980” revealed that in 1980 alone more than 6000 cases of bribery were 
registered - which is 50% more than in 1975 - and the emergence of organized groups. 
It also listed the basic registered offenses: vacation of scarce goods; the selection of 
equipment and materials; adjustment and reduction of planned targets; appointment 
to positions of responsibility; concealment of fraud. The reasons shall include: serious 
shortcomings in personnel work; bureaucratism in front of legitimate requests of 
citizens; poor performance in front of complaints and citizens' letters; gross violations 
of the state, planning and financial discipline; tolerance towards bribe-takers; the poor 
performance of public opinion. It reported punishment towards leading party workers 
at gorkom and raikom levels for condoning bribery. It was proposed to adopt a 
resolution of the Central Committee. According to Satarov “then, there is a strict 
correspondence between the lack of understanding of corruption phenomena, 
primitive explanation of their causes and inadequate means of combating them.” 
Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye Posobiye, 40–49. 
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high-scale and appeared as a threat to the system’s stability and security.35 In 
this context, corruption was contrasted by specific ad-hoc campaigns that had 
that ‘demonstrative’ attitude that we will examine in the next pages. To 
determine the level of tolerance towards corruption, Clark described a 
chromatic spectrum. According to the author, 
a final informal rule that helps comprise the ideology of administration and 
govern the behavior of Soviet officials states that “black” forms of corruption 
will not be tolerated. In this case, “black” corruption was seen by the authorities 
as the most dangerous and threatening to the System. It involved large and 
boldly conspicuous material gains, high living, and a blatant disrespect for Soviet 
law. Again, the scale of the corrupt activities is important here. Small-scale 
corruption within limits set by the authorities would be tolerated. Large-scale 
corruption and sizable accumulation of wealth would bring severe criminal 
penalties. Bribery for personal gain was a serious criminal offense in the Soviet 
Union, and officials who abused their position to accumulate vast stores of 
wealth were subject to the death penalty.36 
Clarks underlines how the massive anti-crime campaigns were generally 
neutral, meanwhile the arbitrariness in the regime's response to corruption 
were centrally directed struggle against determined officials as well as the 
subsequent discrediting campaigns in the press and media.37 Therefore, 
although corruption was a systemic phenomenon, it could be 
                                                                
35 "The Committee [KGB], in all the state security agencies is critical, in the spirit of the 
high requirements of the party analyzed the state of the operational activity, planned 
structural measures on unconditional fulfillment of Party and state tasks. The main 
efforts of the KGB, the Committee focuses on issues that are critical in ensuring the 
security of the Soviet Union and the socialist community, to further strengthen political, 
economic and ideological foundations of socialism, strengthening the defensive might 
of the USSR. […] All the work but the selection, placement and training of personnel was 
based on Leninist principles, and XXV Party Congress decisions. Much attention was paid 
to improving the level of management and control, serial approval at all levels, in all 
areas of activity of the KGB of the Leninist style of work, a party, a competent, creative 
approach to business. Purposefully and complex work was carried out on the 
ideological, moral, and ethical injection frames, to improve their professional skills, 
education of high responsibility and rigorous demands for timely and full 
implementation of the Party and government directives, public safety facilities and 
measures." KGB annual report to the CC CPSU, 28 February 1977, NSA, Box 22, R9935, 
ll. 2, 10. 
36 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 42. 
37 Ibid., 146–47. 
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convicted/punished according to political opportunity.38 In fact, anti-
corruption campaigns were functional to blame the culprits – rather than 
eradicating the vicious circles and the causes of corruption – and to maintain 
the regime’s stability or to promote policy changes.39 As we have seen with the 
Ryazan or the Tajik affairs in the early ‘60s, corruption was often a political tool 
that had even stronger moral implications rather than judicial.40 Corruption 
allegations had been, in fact, a traditional means to discredit leaders, 
politicians, managers etc. and to carry out a reshuffle of cadres or, more 
brutally, internal purges within the apparatus. Following the corruption 
corollary proposed by Satarov, even anti-corruption campaigns become an 
instrument of political struggle and power affirmation. In fact, the author 
comments that even 
an anti-corruption campaign in totalitarian regimes, substitutes ostentatious 
struggle against corruption, instantly it degenerates into a struggle for 
corruption markets, for the opportunity to extract the selfish advantage of 
official position.41 
In order to fight corruption in all its manifestations, there were specific 
organs that had to supervise the party (CPC), the state bureaucracy (PCC) and 
the society (OBKhSS). Then the prokuratura had the power to instruct the cases 
and could work in parallel with the KGB investigations. The KGB – the 
committee for state security famous for its espionage and counterespionage 
activities during Cold War – had a minor role against economic crimes until the 
end of the ‘70s when the “state within the state”42 was provided with extra 
powers to fight against corruption, embezzlement, and any violations of the 
                                                                
38 In his article, Schwarz evidences the link between politics and corruption in USSR. He 
also affirms: "The Soviet meaning of corruption is best described as an alliance of law 
and informal political rules. Law is by all accounts the weaker ally" Schwartz, 
“Corruption and Political Development in the USSR,” 429. 
39 Satarov cites the big corruption case of Lenminvodtorg in 1961 – that led to a political 
purge in the Leningrad apparatus – as one of the first massive anticorruption cases due 
to a political struggle. Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye Posobiye, 43. 
40 "The cry ‘You are corrupt!' is moral and political more than a legal accusation, and the 
connotations of decay, depravity, secretiveness and self-interest are well understood as 
being incompatible with official position in public office: public trust is betrayed.” Clark, 
Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 
1965-1990, 4; Clarke, Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Control, xiv. 
41 Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye Posobiye, 45. 
42 Evgeniya Al഻bats, KGB: State Within a State (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, 1995). 
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socialist law.43 In fact, from the first great scandals of late ‘70s, the KGB 
considered corruption – especially at high levels – as a dangerous threat to the 
security of the state that could discredit the Soviet government so much 
externally as internally as the dissidents’ issue. 
3.1.1 A system for ‘statusnye’ 
As we have said, the main reason for corruption in the USSR was in the 
inefficiencies of the non-market economic system inefficiencies. At the top of 
the Soviet redistribution machine were the statusnye – members of the party, 
high bureaucrats, artists, people awarded with socialist prizes and generally 
the intelligentsia – which thanks to their status received goods and services in 
a more, better, and faster extent. Officially, they were not much richer in terms 
of money, but they had a valuable status precondition that guaranteed them 
material privileges. Aleksander Minkin – theater critic and investigative 
journalist who became famous for writing the first articles about Uzbekistan in 
late ‘80s – comments: 
If you were a simple person and you had a low salary, you had little choice. […] 
But if you were a statusniy, you could choose furniture, books, cars, TV and get 
everything you wanted in priority […Thus] distribution depended on the status 
among the leaders. However, if you were neither the top nor a simple person – 
so if you were ‘in the middle’ – and you had a little bit of money, you could buy 
what you wanted, resorting to corruption with bribes, and finally even the 
status.44 
Then, Minkin seems to give the interpretation of corruption as the key to 
accede the distribution of goods and services by the Soviet ‘middle class’, so 
defining a ‘mediocre’ system that is enforced by people ‘in the middle’ and that 
was ‘liberalizing’ those goods that people did not want to sell at lower fixed 
prices. Therefore, corruption became the effective tool to seek opportunities 
and to access those limited public resources and it could be considered as a 
‘last resort’ of individual survival, especially for lower classes.45 Nevertheless, 
despite various and legitimate doubts about the usefulness of money in a non-
market system, with money it was possible to buy everything in the USSR. This 
is true even of status – the origin of the material benefits – which was often on 
sale. Corruption thus became an important factor of social mobility in a system 
                                                                
43 Luc Duhamel, The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
44 Personal interview with Aleksander Viktorovich Minkin, Moscow, 7 December 2015. 
45 McMann, Corruption as a Last Resort : Adapting to the Market in Central Asia. 
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that had officially claimed to have destroyed social classes, because it 
permitted one to climb the social hierarchy by buying status46 and getting 
automatically better living standards and a priority in accessing scarce goods 
and services. In other words, “a political career in the party apparatus was seen 
as the quickest way to make a fortune.”47 Especially in the ‘Southern regions’, 
the ‘costs’ of these positions are as follows: 
toward the end of the 1970s, a first secretaryship in a district Party committee 
(raikom) cost[ed] 200,000 rubles (at a time when the average monthly salary 
was about 150 rubles), while a second secretaryship cost[ed] 100,000 rubles and 
an office in the raikom secretariat around 10,000. Within the state apparatus, a 
Trade or Light Industry ministership ranged somewhere between 250,000 and 
300,000 rubles. Those who were wealthy enough to afford this could eventually 
charge 100,000 or 150,000 rubles for the position of department chief in their 
ministries.48 
The minimal precondition to access political life – i.e. CPSU membership – 
could be sold for 1,000 rubles.49 Nevertheless, not only political posts were ‘on 
sale’: even the directorship of a theater could cost from 10,000 to 30,000 
rubles, a rayon prokuror around 30,000, chairman of kolkhoz 50,000 and 
chairman of sovkhoz 80,000 rubles, rector of a university about 200,000 
rubles.50 Furthermore, Minkin comments how even awards were on sale and 
were functional to the ‘glory’ and to better living standards. One way was 
bartering production quotas with other kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In this way, 
the managers of the production centers made sure, through production units 
in other centers, the fulfillment of the plan and in return received medals. In 
his reconstruction of the situation in Uzbekistan, he interprets the pattern with 
which these awards were conferred: 
Everyone wanted medals, Lenin's orders, the heroes of labor etc. and every year 
the directors of the kolkhoz met to decide to whom had to be assigned the 
awards. And so there was a particular trade [or barter in time] of cotton that 
                                                                
46 It could be considered as a good investment: “the position of authority is the ultimate 
good on the Soviet black market. The “commodity of power” is the most expensive 
commodity but the most profitable.” Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers, 58. 
47 Virginie Coulloudon, “Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” in 
Corrupt Histories, ed. Emmanuel Kreike and William Chester Jordan (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 2004), 253. 
48 Ibid., 281; Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers, 59. 
49 Sergey Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” Klub 
«Olimpas», 1991, 15. 
50 Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye Posobiye, 44. 
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was exchanged with colleagues and ‘lent’ to those kolkhozes that had been 
intended to receive the award. This system so, worked in turns every year. The 
cotton was harvested, put in the trucks and arrived in the cotton cleaning 
factories where all the trucks declared that they were coming from the kolkhoz 
that was intended to win the award. Then, the cotton was downloaded and 
weighed. […] in this way, the predestined kolkhoz could declare that it had 
fulfilled the plan – and even over-exceeded it for 500% – getting glories and 
awards.51 
Therefore, it seems that a part of the nomenklatura encouraged abuses, 
black business, and corruption to preserve its privileges, disavowing the 
Leninist idea of a new man – who was honest and devoted to the common 
cause52 - and was the main pivot of corruption in the USSR and regarded the 
power relations among elites. In conclusion, corruption was not only a factor 
of social mobility but also a conservative measure for the preservation of 
privileges in a society that was supposed to be conceived on the basis of 
fairness and equality. As mentioned, at the end of the ‘70s, the situation 
became outsized and out of control and corruption assumed the forms of 
“patronage, cronyism, or nepotism in the political milieu; gift giving, bribery, 
and embezzlement in both the political world and the bureaucracy; and 
systematic rule evasion and falsification of data (pripiski) in industry.”53 In fact, 
these phenomena were directly connected to other illegal activities that were 
typical in the planned economy, such as report padding, over-reporting, or 
falsification of statistics. 
3.1.2 Report-padding, data falsification, additions 
Report-padding, data falsification, false reporting, distortions, additions 
etc. are all aspects – and synonyms – of pripiski, an untranslatable Russian 
word54 referring to the practice of misreporting production data in order to 
inflate the official results, such as typical infringements within individual 
production units. As it had been admitted by Nikolai Nikiforovich Tarasov, the 
former minister of light industry in the USSR (1965-1985), and the former 
chairman of the SM UzSSR Khudayberdyev, the practice of pripiski was an 
                                                                
51 Personal interview with Aleksander Viktorovich Minkin, Moscow, 7 December 2015. 
52 Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, La Gloire Des Nations Ou La Fin de l’Empire Soviet́ique 
(Paris: Fayard, 1990), 39. 
53 Coulloudon, “Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” 249. 
54 During our narrative, we will mostly translate pripiski as ‘falsifications’. 
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"open secret" that was well known in the party leadership.55 Vaksberg adds 
that even Brezhnev well knew about falsification but good results were 
functional to his – and his protégée’s – legitimation.56 Anyway, tolerated or not, 
these practices were spread in the Soviet productive system and even in 
industry. However, Ryzhkov declared that probably the publicity that was given 
to the fight against pripiski in Andropovian times was perhaps even more 
enflamed that their real effectiveness on the Soviet economy.57 However, as 
we shall see, this practice would have a devastating importance on the Uzbek 
cotton sector. The phenomenology of falsification58 finds its explanation if the 
peculiarity of a system where fulfilling the plan was the final and necessary goal 
that had to be reached at any cost59 – even resorting to any kind of dishonest 
                                                                
55 Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation 
Crisis, 101–2. 
56 Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 114–15. 
57 Ryzhkov declares that "pripiski were also in the industrial plants. For example, when 
due to some reasons were still needed two or three more days to conclude a process, 
sometimes it was reported in documents that the work was already completed and 
ready, even if it was not. Very strict measures were taken against these tricks, and [the 
culprits] were severely punished and some were excluded from the party." In his 
comments to my questions, Ryzhkov reduces the impact of report-padding on the 
collapse of Soviet economy: "pripiski existed, but I cannot say that these were 
enormous. However, there was a great campaign against them [as a part of the 
Andropovian policies. However,]. I think that is absolutely not correct to say that these 
led to the collapse of Soviet system. [Undoubtedly,] they affected our lives, our 
economy, but to say that they hit the Soviet Union so much that made it to collapse it 
is not absolutely correct. The destruction of the Soviet Union had other reasons, both 
internal and external, but not those of whom we are talking about now." Personal 
interview with Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 December 2014. 
58 Joseph S. Berliner, “The Informal Organization of the Soviet Firm,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 66, no. 3 (1952): 342–65. 
59 "A key element in this system of organized corruption was the Five Year Plans drawn 
up by the state and Party organs. Anyone, from the minister to the chief executive 
officer at an enterprise, was professionally and politically evaluated according to his 
ability to achieve the goals of production imposed by the plan. This was also the 
fundamental criterion of promotion to the upper rungs of the bureaucratic ladder. 
These plans did not only establish targeted output volumes for each single enterprise, 
but also determined the type and the quantity of raw materials it was allocated. They 
also established what equipment the plant should receive from which suppliers, as well 
as to whom, and in what quantities, it would sell its output […] Soviet industrial 
managers were not allowed to spend their budgets as they saw fit for their factories. 
On the contrary, their duty was to fulfill the Plan at any cost—not only because this 
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means60 – in order to maintain the regime’s stability and was a direct 
responsibility of the FS, and the price for that failure would be “disgrace, 
demotion, or even worse.”61 And even lies and self-illusion become central 
elements for that purpose. In the early ‘90s, Nikolai Ryzhkov, one of the 
protagonists of perestroika dramatically commented on Brezhnevism: 
The stuffiness of the country had reached a maximum; after that only death [...] 
Nothing was done with care [...]. We were stealing from one another, we took 
and gave bribes, we lied in our reports, in the newspapers, from the high 
podiums, wallowed in our lies, conferring medals one another. And all of this 
from top to bottom, and from bottom to top.62 
According to Oleg Khlevniuk, 
Various book-keeping falsifications and the concealment of the true state of 
affairs can be encountered in any social-economic system. However, in the 
Soviet Union there were additional incentives for falsification: the unlimited 
power of the state in the economic sphere, economic adventurism and the cruel 
(at some periods extremely criminalized) methods of managing the economy. 
Putting forward unattainable economic goals, the state gave the producer a 
choice: either suffer a harsh punishment for failure to fulfil the plan, or look for 
fraudulent ways out. The best-known and most extreme form of this model of 
adaptation to the system (or rather, survival inside it) is the so-called tufta (trash 
– production of false results) in the Gulag economy. The intensity of cheating 
                                                                
would advance them in their own careers but also because, if the plan was fulfilled, 
workers would receive bonuses that augmented their annual wages by about 20-25 
percent." Coulloudon, “Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” 246; 
Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism, 133–34. 
60 "If the manager "gives the plan” as they say, he will be forgiven a multitude of sins—
even outright violations of the law, including the criminal code. But if he "wrecks the 
plan," then nothing can help him, not even the fact that the plan was wrecked [from the 
very beginning]. This happened so often that it can be said that, as a rule, the Soviet 
planning and supply organs not provide construction projects with enough equipment 
and materials. Managers faced with the need to procure, by any means, everything not 
supplied by the state, everything without which their plans [could not] be fulfilled." 
Ibid., 135; Coulloudon, “Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns.” 
61 Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1958), 76. 
62 Then, Ryzhkov continues declaring: “We cannot live like this any longer. Everything 
must be done in a new way.” Graziosi, L’Unione Sovietica in 209 Citazioni, 161; Martin 
McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 2013), 397; 
Nikolaı ̆Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Perestroika : Istoriya Predatelඁstv (Moskva: Novosti, 1992). 
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was directly connected with the phases of continually repeating cycles in the 
Soviet economy, where the leap forward (skachok) is standard.63 
This practice was typical in agriculture in general (and cotton in particular), 
and cheating on productive figures was relatively easy. A first way was to 
negotiate a different quota with party and state officers through gifts and 
bribes. An effect of this was that the shortcomings of some production units 
were foisted to other unfortunate people who were not in the good graces of 
planners. Then, it was possible to distort quantitative cotton output data 
directly by reporting false data about nonexistent cotton into the 
accountability’s registers and bribing – paying 260-700 rubles per non-existent 
ton of cotton64 - those officers who were in charge of controlling in order to 
covering the shortcomings.65 At the local level, it was also possible to make the 
raw cotton heavier, adding dirt, stones and other parts of plants in the harvest. 
However, this ploy was clearly visible and evident. Therefore, watering was 
preferred. Indeed, for its absorptive capacity, cotton can absorb more than 
25% its weight in water, and such a variation could remain unnoticed at first 
glance. In the same way, it was possible to falsify data on the quality of cotton 
that could be diluted with other fibers or cutting agents. On some occasions 
the output of production was not distorted, but rather the means by which the 
result was obtained, and this was typical of the falsification of yield-per-
                                                                
63 Oleg Khlevniuk, “The Economy of Illusions: The Phenomenon of Data Inflation in the 
Khrushchev Era,” in Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in the Soviet 
Union, 1956-1964, ed. Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic (London: Routledge, 2011), 172. 
64 Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 22. 
65 “Falsification was rampant from the national level down to individual farms. The 
heads of kolkhozes and sovkhozes simply bribed the procurement inspectors to inflate 
the amount delivered, both on the delivery receipts and in reports to their superiors. 
Another type of deception was to expand the area under cultivation and then to conceal 
this from both the planning and statistical office.” These practices were also confirmed 
by Nishanov. Boris Z. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” in Soviet 
Central Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 81; Rafik 
Nishanovich Nishanov, Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Rafik Nishanov Rasskazyvaet 
Marine Zavade I Yurii Kulikovu (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2012), 237. 
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hectare66 figures that were publicized – and probably pushed67 – in order to 
offer an image of efficiency in each kolkhoz. 
As we have analyzed in the previous chapter, from the tenth FYP (1976-
1980), the Soviet demand for cotton increased to the highest levels and 
claimed just for the UzSSR an annual production of six million tons of raw 
cotton. The planned figures became more and more difficult to reach in every 
productive unit and, especially from 1978 – when Soviet agriculture had to face 
a difficult moment also related to the bad weather conditions – pripiski became 
a solution to fulfill – at least officially – the plans. Investigations showed that 
during the intensive falsification period (1978-1983), every year it was reported 
a crop between 500,000 and 900,000 tons greater – for a total of 4.5 million 
tons of Uzbek raw cotton had been produced just in paper and 2 billion rubles68 
– about 30% of the republic annual budget69 – embezzled.70 Again, data 
falsifications could be read as a way to compute and determine the effective 
price of goods in a non-market system.71 
                                                                
66 On this regard, Khlevniuk defines: "the most widespread method of improving yield-
per-hectare figures (for grain and especially cotton) was to remove from the accounts a 
certain part of the sown area". Then, the author gives an example, stating that just in 
Uzbekistan, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes concealed 30,000 hectares of cotton 
cultivation in 1961, 38,000 in 1962 and 42,000 in 1963. Khlevniuk, “The Economy of 
Illusions: The Phenomenon of Data Inflation in the Khrushchev Era,” 181, 188. 
67 Lipovsky comments: “crude pressure applied to kolkhozes in an attempt to force them 
to go all lengths in order to raise their yields to 30 centners per hectare (when a realistic 
yield would have been no more than 25) led to the local leadership reporting false and 
distortedly high results” Igor P. Lipovsky, Central Asia: In Search of a New Identity (North 
Charleston: CreateSpace, 2012), 121. 
68 These figures appeared for the first time in 1983. However, as we will see in the next 
chapter, they were destined to grow. 
69 In order to evaluate the entity of the scam we should remind that the budget for 
UzSSR in 1984 was 7.244 billion rubles Jan Ațke Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional 
Dilemma: Planning, People, and Natural Resources (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 150. 
70 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Independence 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 41; Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-
Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 101; Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers, 61; 
Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU (Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1997), 150. 
71 Timofeev argues that the case of inflating data is an interesting example to determine 
the effective marked price - determined by demand and supply – in a non-marked 
system. In his oversimplified example, it was possible to assume that whether the state 
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The origin of the cotton scams was in the cotton cleaning factories that 
were receiving and processing the ‘ghost cotton’ from the kolkhozes and that 
was inserting the falsified figures directly into the state economic system. The 
data may be falsified - with the complicity of management - directly at the 
cotton cleaning factories’ accountant by paying a bribe,72 or otherwise a 
staging system could be organized. Minkin gives a description of what he 
defined as the “cotton carousel” and explains how it worked: 
A kolkhoz truck arrived, claiming to deliver a quantitaty of cotton form a certain 
kolkhoz, downloaded it, and registered the figure in the delivery registry. Then, 
the same truck went around the factory at its warehouse, reloaded another load 
of cotton - that had been already deposited at the factory - by paying a bribe. It 
did a round of the building, and delivered the ‘new cotton’ at the same factory. 
Doing it this way, the kolkhoz had documents that claimed to have supplied 
much to the state […] and won orders and monetary awards that were used to 
cover the costs of corruption.73 
Later, factories and warehouses had to justify the lack of cotton reported 
and very often denounced that their storage rooms were lost, robbed or 
‘mysteriously’ caught fire, losing the precious – and nonexistent – stock of 
‘white gold’. The practice of mysterious fires of warehouses was very diffused 
in the ‘white gold’ sector:74 in fact, as cotton fiber – being highly flammable – 
hardly leaves a trace of the crop destroyed, it was not easy to estimate the 
amount of the damage that, therefore, was defined in official figures.75 This 
kind of scam to the Soviet economic system was so typical – even becoming 
                                                                
was annually acquiring for five million tons of raw cotton but was paying for six million 
tons, it meant that “the results is that the actual cotton turns out to be one sixth more 
expensive than supposed.” According to Timofeev, even bribes were also “a special 
instrument for balancing price in accordance with supply and demand.” Timofeev, 
Russia’s Secret Rulers, 62, 64. 
72 Bribery was the engine of this system which “progressively forced Party officials and 
industrial managers to participate in a system of organized corruption.” Coulloudon, 
“Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” 246. 
73 Personal interview with Aleksander Viktorovich Minkin, Moscow, 7 December 2015. 
74 Nishanov, Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Raﬁk Nishanov Rasskazyvaet Marine 
Zavade I Yurii Kulikovu, 237. 
75 These stories were confirmed by the personal witness of Shavkhat (he did not want 
to give me his surname), a former khlopkarob who worked in the ‘70s in a small cotton 
farm based in the Namangan oblast. On 28 May 2015, the 68 year-old Shavkhat was 
working as a taxi driver in Tashkent and, a little intimidated by my curiosity, he has 
misunderstood my questions and asked me if Albano and Romina were still together. 
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the topic of comedies76 – and diffused from local kolkhozes, to district 
warehouses, and then to the processing factories in Uzbekistan and in Russia. 
3.1.3 The Pyramid 
So we analyzed the elements of this vicious cycle where, following the 
payment of bribes, it was possible to fake production data, fulfill the plan and 
get financial rewards from the state that allowed bribes to be paid and to 
endlessly repeat the cycle of scam. However, it is evident that this system 
required the complicity of supervisors to operate, and also the bribed 
supervisors had to justify all of this from the bottom to the top of the Soviet 
system, building a network of malfeasance that implied the neopatrimonial 
assets (described in the first chapter) and the above-mentioned economic 
offenses, defining so the elements of the story we are about to narrate. As 
Timofeev comments: 
For many years, the Uzbek Party and economic leaders reported inflated 
indicators to the central authorities. They would add millions of tons to the 
actual amount of raw cotton turned over to the government. The money 
received for the nonexistent cotton was embezzled. These stolen billions finally 
ended up being injected into shadowy black-market dealings, including the 
purchase and sale of official positions, which fostered universal corruption in 
the republic.77 
At the bottom of the pyramid there were the directors of collective farms 
who, from the ‘60s onwards, emerged as powerful local actors, able to 
establish circles of mutual protection at the local level, even during Stalinism.78 
In a general description of this system in the USSR, Merle Fainsod argues: 
                                                                
76 In the 1965 film entitled "Operation ‘Y’ and Shurik's Other Adventures" by Leonid 
Gaidai, there was a warehouse manager who, trying to cover up his theft, hired three 
petty criminals to stage a break-in. 
77 Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers, 61. 
78 Belov witnesses that already at the end of ‘40s kolkhozes were forces to bribe the 
raion officials in order to get services and fundamental goods: “To be able to function 
effectively and obtain the minimum necessary supplies, legally or illegally, the kolkhozes 
had to remain on good terms with the raion officials […] During 1948 our kolkhoz, which 
was regarded as not at all liberal in its bribes, was obliged to supply the following 
quantities of farm products to raion officials: To the chairman of the raion executive 
committee for furnishing an order for an automobile: Flour (2 centners), Oats for his 
horse (5 centners), Fish (20 kilograms), Honey (5 kilograms); To the secretary of the 
raion Party committee: Flour (1 centner), Fruit (2 centners), Fish (30 kilograms), Pig, 
slaughtered (1), To the chief of the raion MGB section: Potatoes (6 centners), Fruit (2 
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management had its prerequisites, illegal and quasi-legal, and many kolkhoz 
chairmen sought to protect them from exposure by installing their own clique 
in strategic positions in the kolkhoz, by absorbing the chairman of the village 
soviet, the store manager, and other leading village personalities into a common 
network of shared privileges, and by bribing the relevant raion officials where 
possible to keep quite.79 
It seems that collective farms were acquiring greater influence over 
agricultural policy and several agro-industrial complexes and associations were 
developed in the 1960s to enhance coordination of agricultural activities. 
These new structures established an “institutional base from which farm chairs 
could extend their authority over an entire district's rural economy [...]. Farm 
chairs and other enterprise managers had emerged as Soviet style local 
strongmen, with few checks on their authority”.80 These unrivaled figures were 
able thus to convert resources into rents, requiring “protection and access to 
the patronage networks spanning the state's institutional framework.”81 
This dynamic even increased in early ‘80s, when the collective farms of the 
republic started to receive even more funds for their cotton. In fact, since the 
late-’70s, there was an increase of financial availability of UzSSR kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes based on the law amendments of 1980 that defined new price 
standards. In fact, with the introduction of the Decree CC CPUz and SM UzSSR 
decree of 14 November 1980 on the “improvement of economic planning and 
stimulation of the production and preparation of agricultural products” were 
established new sales prices. [... Since then] prices have on average increased 
by 15% as well as those of the extraordinary supplies above average quality [that 
                                                                
centners); To the chief of the raion MVD section: Hay (5 centners), Watermelons (5 
centners); To the raion prosecutor: Shoats (2), Fish (15 kilograms), Honey (5 kilograms), 
Flour (50 kilograms); To the inspector of flour-mills: Flour (2 centners), Vegetable oil (10 
kilograms), Fish (10 kilograms); To the chief of the raion agricultural department: 
Turkeys (4), Flour (1 centner), Hay (3 centners), Vegetables (2 centners); To the director 
of the MTS: Shoats (4), Fish (10 kilograms); To the director of the fuel depot: Fish 
(kilograms), Sugar (10 kilograms), Potatoes (5 centners); To the head of the construction 
department: Flour (1 centner), Fat (5 kilograms), Sugar (10 kilograms); To the raion 
automobile inspector: Honey (15 kilograms), Fish (10 kilograms).” Fedor Belov, The 
History of a Soviet Collective Farm (New York-London: Routledge, 1998), 66–67, 216–
17. 
79 Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule. 
80 Lawrence P Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in 
Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 34. 
81 Ibid. 
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was expected] in the X 5YP, for 50% of its price. [... due to this introduction], in 
1982, the kolkhoz and sovkhoz of Surkhandarya received 106.4 million rubles 
more, Bukhara 59.8 and Namangan 26.1. [... In fact], in 1982 the cotton [ton] 
cost an average of 180-350 rubles more than the previous year, for a final 
product that was worth from 890 to 1930 rubles per ton depending on the 
quality.82 
This further increase in prices provided greater financial base for agriculture 
of the UzSSR. In this way, Moscow would pay more and more for Uzbek cotton 
expecting, however, amazing results. This larger availability of finances 
inevitably provided a larger base for illicit purposes and to produce bribes. In 
fact, already in 1982, Simis publicized the common practice in Uzbekistan of 
directors of kolkhozes and sovkhozes who were illicitly paying regular tributes 
to the republican leaders – in the form of money, gemstones, handmade rugs, 
and other valuables – in return for protection. Also Nancy Lubin, after a 
fieldwork in the late ‘70s in Uzbekistan affirmed how: 
Activity in agriculture, for example, not only provides access to private earnings 
from one’s private plot, or opportunities for the theft of tools, fodder or working 
time; it also provides easy access to larger-scale illegal activities. Since farms are 
often subject to less stringent controls than are other state-owned enterprises 
and organizations, they can frequently provide illegal undertakings with their 
premises, transport, labor or with regard to, say, currency conversions. As 
several émigrés have pointed out, an entire system of under-reporting harvests 
and over-reporting losses has also evolved, with the remainder of agricultural 
produce sold through private channels. Close connections with local industries 
also provide the collective farm leadership with goods and services in exchange 
for part of that agricultural produce.83 
The source of this money was the funds of the collective farms and often 
the salaries of their workers. In this regard, Minkin offers us an exemplary 
story: in 1978, when he was working as a columnist for the newspaper 
Moskovsky Komsomolets. An Uzbek arrived in the newspaper redaction and 
told terrible stories about corruption and its relation with the machinations of 
wages in the structures such as kolkhozes and sovkhozes that were, 
substantially, out of legal state control. In these structures, the accountants 
were working as secretaries of the directors and were managing the controls 
                                                                
82 Prot. 58/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2324, l. 14. 
83 Nancy Lubin, Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 191. 
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on the base of the directors’ will. During a business trip in Central Asia,84 Minkin 
collected many stories and describes a typical situation during the payment of 
salaries: 
Too often, workers were forced to sign in the payment registry that they had 
received, for example, four rubles from the kolkhoz’s management. They 
deceived the simple peasants! Then, the accountant was writing figures on the 
left - for example ‘20’ in order to have a final result of ‘204’ – or easier adding a 
couple of zeros on the right, making it appear that the employee had taken 400 
rubles. The difference was always to the advantage of the system because the 
remaining 396 were put in the kolkhoz treasury and served to fill someone’s 
pockets or was sent to those figures who were at the top. This means that many 
kolkhozniki were simply working as slaves, forced to sell their labor for some 
miserable kopeks and were often blackmailed by the kolkhozes’ management 
that – in addition to the salary – could remove other primary services to the 
                                                                
84 Minkin could craftily publish some parts of these stories already in 1979. However, 
he had to face censorship and even the anger of some people who did not want him to 
publish anything about. He tells of an incredible adventure: “In 1979, I was a young and 
hopeful idiot who did not understand the size of the scandal I was facing. In November 
I was on a business trip in Central Asia to make theater reviews and take inspiration for 
some corruption stories. One evening I was in a hostel in Urgench and suddenly I started 
to feel very bad. The innkeeper brought the thermometer. I put under my arm and it 
indicated 39.5°! Then, the lady exited the room and went to call a doctor. Suddenly, the 
telephone in the room rang. I toke the phone and I heard an unknown voice with an 
Uzbek accent saying "now a doctor will come, he will take you to the hospital, and no 
one will see you alive anymore!" It seemed that someone had poisoned me and 
someone else knew about this attempt and was warning that if I went to the hospital I 
would never exit that place alive. In silence I kept listening to the stranger’s voice that 
indicate me: "go out of the hotel, a black car is coming… don’t say anything and jump 
inside." I did not have time to think and no other option than trusting him. I had nothing 
particular with me, I just took my bag, and I went out of the hostel where I saw a Volga 
[the typical KGB car]. I jumped into the car and sped like a rocket from Uzbekistan to 
Tashaus in Turkmenia [Tashaus is named Dashoguz now] and immediately to the airport 
where I realized that there was a plane full of people who were waiting just for me. 
When passengers suddenly saw the Volga rushing on the airstrip and me with straight 
hair like crazy, they were all surprised. There, an airport employee brought me a bag 
full of melons and another full of watermelons. And so it flew to Moscow.” Therefore, 
Minkin is convinced that somebody wanted to poison and kill him, but a call saved his 
life, deporting him from Uzbekistan (where airports had already been warned to stop 
him leaving the republic), managing to delay a large passenger aircraft (that was two 
hours waiting for him) and such an incredible one-night adventure. Personal interview 
with Aleksander Viktorovich Minkin, Moscow, 7 December 2015. 
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workers and their family. […] The story of [Akhmagian] Adylov was just a case in 
a myriad of injustices that afflicted Uzbek kolkhozniki.85 
Thus, often the chairmen of collective farms were extracting money from 
their employees86 and they kept huge amounts of these sums to give the 
money to the highest leaders of the republic. As mentioned in the 
consideration about statusnye, those people in power had a conservative 
approach that was functional to preserve – or to increase – their benefits and 
privileges and a good result in the economy was functional to the survival of 
politicians from the top87 to the bottom in a quasi-feudal regime where local 
leaders were holding the effective economic power. As mentioned, during 
Brezhnevism, the local parties were even more autonomous and – as Moscow’s 
proxies – were effectively ruling the periphery of the Soviet state. 
According to Simis, in the republic every activity had been politically 
patronized and parceled88 and in Uzbekistan – a society that had been 
characterized even by Muslim traditional elements89 – he gives an example of 
the corruption level within the local party where: 
bribes were also paid for the provision of specific services: appointments to 
lucrative and prestigious jobs, not-guilty verdicts in trials, and academic 
degrees. Chairwoman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan 
Nasreddinova, for example, traded in pardons, and her rates were well known: 
                                                                
85 Personal interview with Aleksander Viktorovich Minkin, Moscow, 7 December 2015. 
86 Also Ryzhkov comments: "Some of kolkhoz and sovkhoz leaders virtually have become 
people who have turned their people into slaves and been enriched enormously [from 
this system]". Personal interview with Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 
December 2014. 
87 Simis is lapidary: "Corruption, even in the highest stratum of the Soviet ruling elite, 
has become a fact, and not even a rare fact." Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The 
Secret World of Soviet Capitalism, 47. 
88 I.e. according to Simis, in the 60s, all the small shops and stalls in the Alai bazar in 
Tashkent were paying tributes to Kurbanov, chairman of SM UzSSR. However, there 
were underground secrets as the illegal drugs that were making payments to everyone 
within the party and the state. Ibid., 61. 
89 As we have seen in the first chapter, the traditional paternalism and kinshipism of 
Islamic society led to rampant nepotism in an institutionalized framework, forging a 
typical neo-patrimonial system in Uzbekistan. Cf. John Staples, “Soviet Use of 
Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case,” Past Imperfect 2 
(1993): 30; Michael Rywkin, Moscow’s Muslim Challenge : Soviet Central Asia, Rev. ed. 
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 150; Boris Z. Rumer, Soviet Central Asia: “A Tragic 
Experiment” (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 147. 
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for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to issue an official pardon after 
someone had been convicted of a serious felony the cost would be 100,000 
rubles. Pulat Khodzhaev, President of the Supreme Court, charged from 25,000 
to 100,000 rubles for a verdict of not guilty.90 
Therefore, in what has been defined in the following years as a ‘pyramid’ 
system,91 illicit means – and, as ever, bribery – were the oil to lubricate the 
mechanism of the system, from a kolkhoznik to the Gensek CPSU. In this power 
structure, the FS of the national party was thus the connector between 
Moscow92 and the republic. In fact, he was protected in Moscow and, at the 
same time, was shielding his power network at the republican level in a process 
that Graziosi defines as a “feudalization process” where the protégées were 
promoted in the ranks of nomenklatura.93 Pikhoya adds that it is necessary not 
to underestimate the high level of autonomy94 of local authorities, that were 
more afraid of Tashkent than of Moscow because in the local capital there were 
management cadres who were redistributing sources within the republic and 
local elites. "These funds served as a loyalty price of local elites to the Moscow 
authorities and were at the base of the relationships between the local and 
Tashkent authorities in a system of very complex and not always formalized 
relations. Anyway, everybody knew the rules of the game"95 in a system where 
autonomy was the “price for loyalty,”96 a concept that has been reinterpreted 
                                                                
90 Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism, 62. 
91 Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, “Piramida,” Strana I Mir 3 (1989); Telman Khorenovich 
Gdlyan and Yevgeniy Yuriyevich Dodolyev, Piramida-1 (Moskva: MTA, 1990). 
92 The FS was showing a formal face to Moscow, speaking its language and showing 
sincere trust, and another with the local cadres whereby it was ruling in almost 
complete arbitrariness. Then, it seems that the control of the center was even weaker 
in the rural areas where the KGB was not consistently present and was in part colluding 
with the local systems. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione 
Sovietica, 1945-1991, 257. 
93 Ibid., 429–30. 
94 "A colonial system upside-down" that was favoring an unequal redistributive system 
of resources. As we have mentioned in the first chapter, while Russian and Ukrainian 
taxes were redistributed in all republics, most of the Uzbek taxation remained within 
the republic. Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 
December 2015. 
95 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
96 Pikhoya adds: "Even the opportunity to study in the central universities was greater 
because the USSR republics had the set quotas for entering into most prestigious 
universities in Moscow and Leningrad. Obviously, it was a non-competitive system. In 
the North Caucasus, there were proportionately twice as many graduates than in the 
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also in contemporary Central Asian politics where the fair redistribution of 
resources among the elites and corruption are functional to stability and to 
avoid struggles.97 
Too often, there had been an abuse of the word ‘mafia’ (in Russian, mafiya) 
within the literature on the Soviet second economy. This term has generally 
become a widespread neologism to refer to the criminal implication of 
consistent party groups of any illicit activity managed by an organized criminal 
group.98 In the USSR, this semantic was fully politicized and was used for the 
first time in the Soviet press to define the level of malfeasance in Moscow 
commercial scandals.99  
Needless to say, the issue is real and serious, and a comparison with the 
Italian mafia is not pertinent. The mafia, in its original Italian connotation, it is 
not just a group of organized crime networks but a determined system that is 
rooted in a society and that has specific rules, dynamics, and even its own 
rituals.100 However, in many books and sometimes even in the scientific – or 
                                                                
rest of Russia. In return, Moscow had the total and absolute loyalty of the republics and 
so the dangers of nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism etc. were avoided and no space 
for dissent and dissidents was provided. This was the price of loyalty." Personal 
interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
97 Analyzing the contemporary Kyrgyz scenario, Radnitz affirms that, in an informal 
context, if all elites are satisfied they do not struggle. When there are struggles they 
proceed with orchestrated protests that led to the ‘colored revolutions.’ Scott Radnitz, 
Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010). 
98 Besides some criminology and sociological studies dedicated to the Italian mafia, the 
transliteration of the Italian word mafia was not used in common language and 
practically did not exist in the literature before the mid-‘70s when a number of literature 
titles reporting the word mafiya emerged. The use of the term "mafiya" in Russian 
literature increased by sixteen times in 1975-1991. Analysis of the word "mafiya" in 
Google Ngram Viewer. 
99 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 486. 
100 Gaetano Mosca, Che Cosa È La Mafia (Bari: Laterza, 2002); Leonardo Sciascia, La 
Storia Della Mafia (Milano: Barion, 2013); Michele Pantaleone, Mafia E Politica: 1943-
1962 (Torino: Einaudi, 1962); Gaetano Falzone, Storia Della Mafia (Milano: Pan, 1975); 
Mario Centorrino, L’economia Mafiosa (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1986); Giovanni 
Falcone and Marcelle Padovani, Cose Di Cosa Nostra (Milano: Rizzoli, 1992); Salvatore 
Coluccello, Challenging the Mafia Mystique: Cosa Nostra from Legitimisation to 
Denunciation (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A 
History of the Sicilian Mafia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Henner Hess, Mafia 
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self-styled scientific – literature, that provides good argumentations and 
corollaries there is an improper use of the term mafiya that does not match the 
characteristic of the famous Italian criminal organization.101 In this literature 
‘mafia’ misinterpretations about the cotton scam in Uzbekistan were common. 
For example, McCauley even identifies Rashidov as the inventor of the scam 
and the godfather – "Il Padrone", but he probably meant "Il Padrino" – of the 
‘Uzbek mafia.’102 However, these exaggerated words were more common for 
their narrative appeal than for an effective analogy with the mafia. Besides, the 
party was definitely the place of Soviet malfeasance, scandals, and corruption, 
and so to speak about the party in the USSR meant to speak about the Soviet 
system itself and it was not an organ explicitly delegated to a criminal function. 
Crime was crime and as such was considered, treated, and repressed. 
Telman Gdlyan – one of the main characters of this story who massively 
abused the semantic space of mafiya103 for his political attacks in the late ‘80s 
(see chapter 6) – also seems nowadays to partially repudiate this term, 
commenting that, besides the magnitude of the corruption scandal in 
Uzbekistan, these were similar cases, sometimes connected, but that 
nevertheless did not constitute a single system. He justifies the use of the term 
by declaring that in the ‘80s the Italian series called “La Piovra” – “The 
Octopus”, in Russian Sprut – was very popular. This series broadcast mafia 
stories - and even used the related semantic – and made it famous among the 
Russian public. In his words, “when these films appeared, the phenomenon 
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192 
 
assumed the name of mafiya.”104 To conclude, in the USSR the involvement of 
party figures, who were in charge of managing the economic system, is not in 
doubt. However, this is far from what might be described as a ‘mafia’ ruled by 
the party and infecting the state. The party was the pivotal element of the 
Soviet state, and maybe it would be more pertinent to consider it as a 
clandestine –until the 1977 Constitution that formalized its primacy within the 
state – masonic outfit whose active participation was a necessary condition for 
access to the political and social life of the country. Some respectable scholars 
have also invested in the idea that the Bolsheviks were a sort of illegal 
conspiratorial organization that took the power and ruled the Russian/Soviet 
state for more than 70 years.105 However, none of these considerations help us 
to describe the phenomenon that took hold in Uzbekistan and that we want to 
describe without value biases and as objectively as possible. 
3.1.4 The Rashidovian ‘anticorruption’ campaigns 
As we have seen, both corruption and anticorruption were typical elements 
of Soviet politics and were functional both to stability and to legitimation. Both 
developed in parallel and political leaders opportunistically followed their 
course. Also in Uzbekistan, the FS CPUz Rashidov was undoubtedly aware of 
the pripiski in the republic and tolerated a situation that guaranteed stability 
for his power that – as we saw in the previous chapter – depended on how the 
republican leadership was able to manage the Uzbek economy and to provide 
cotton ‘at any cost’ to the Soviet state. At the same time, Rashidov 
opportunistically followed the Khrushchevian campaigns against kinship, 
localism, and zemlyachestvo,106 and played the card of anti-corruption 
campaigns to fire political rivals. However, in Uzbekistan, the campaign against 
mestnichestvo was less harsh because the FS obkoms were slightly more 
rooted to their own territory, not serving in their native regions for prolonged 
periods of time or even had a complete lack of native ties to the territory; and 
                                                                
104 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
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dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 245. 
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rapid inter-oblast mobility from the oblast after the end of their mandate107 so 
as to weaken the zemlyachestvo tendencies. Then, these careers did not allow 
roots in the districts. However, the risks related to "groupism"108 were 
identified in Uzbekistan as well as in the rest of the USSR. 
Already in the summer of 1959, the new FS CPUz expressed strong criticism 
of localism, nepotism, deception, and fraud and was able to sack the first and 
second secretaries of the Tashkent obkom and proceed with a purge in the 
upper party throughout 1960 and 1961, especially in the Tashkent, Ferghana, 
Bukhara, and Surkhandarya obkoms where power reshuffles followed.109 In 
spring 1961, the FS proceeded to reshuffle the Karakalpak obkom – where a 
scam in the cotton harvest was revealed110 – the Chirchik gorkom, and the 
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109 In February 1961 the FS Tashkent obkom Rasul Gulamov was replaced by Malik 
Abdurazakov; in February 1962, the FS Ferghana obkom Tursun Kambarov was replaced 
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110 In Karakalpakstan there was a first example of fraud over the cotton harvest: in 1960, 
S. Turemuratov, first secretary of the Amu-Darya raikom, was denounced in a letter for 
having illegal luxury things, to have padded the volume of cotton in the sovkhoz 
"Mangit" that was buying it in other districts to camouflage the production. The 
accusations proceeded by stating that Turemuratov was operating under the auspices 
of Nasyr Makhmudov, FS of the Karakalpak obkom. (RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 146, ll. 39-
43). Then, the OrgOtdel of the CC CPSU sent an instructor to Karakalpakstan and the 
buro of the CC CPUz adopted a resolution in May 1960 to severely reprimand 
Turemuratov but that didn't remove him from his post. In January 1961, D. Seitniyazov, 
secretary of Karakalpak obkom, alerted Moscow to Makhmudov's defects in his service, 
suspecting that Sharaf Rashidov afforded protection to him. Makhmudov was the 
immediate superior of Rashidov – when he served as the first secretary of Samarkand 
obkom from 1943-1948 and Rashidov was the obkom secretary on ideology from 1944-
1947 – and probably he was well aware of the facts in Amu Darya and took no measures 
(RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 170, ll. 186-190). Then, the CC CPSU sent two officials to conduct 
and inspection jointly with CC CPUz that at the end led the CC CPUz buro to adopt a 
resolution that dismissed Turemuratov and other raikom first secretaries, expelling 
them from the party. (RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 170, ll. 177-178). This resolution accused 
the Karakalpak obkom of "intolerable liberalism" (RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 170, l. 176) 
while Makhmudov and other leading officials received just a "severe reprimand" and 
kept their posts. Makhmudov served as first secretary of Karakalpak obkom until 1963, 
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Tashkent oblasts that were criticized for “appointment of toadies, the covering 
up of poor performance, the selection of cadres on the basis of familyism, 
kinship, personal devotion or common region of origin, servility, mutual cover-
ups, and the plundering of public property.”111 This was the first reshuffle of 
power for which the FS, through the usual allegations, was able to clean the 
party and to affirm more loyal figures. This process continued during the XVI 
CPUz congress in September 1961 when Rashidov criticized “the reliance on a 
narrow circle of people, the movement of cadres from place to place, reliance 
on people who lacked political or professional qualities, deception and false 
reporting, abuses and infringements of leadership collectivity."112 This attitude 
lasted through the long wave of Khrushchev’s purges in early ‘60s and were 
then resumed during Brezhnev’s era in a weaker way. In fact, 
In Uzbekistan the prevailing tenor of discussion of party life during the Brezhnev 
period was not characterized by a vigorous criticism of abuses. Rather it focused 
upon the sort of standard criticisms of party functioning: the weakness of 
higher-level leadership, poor economic leadership, bureaucratic slipups and 
malfunctioning, and the weakness of criticism. The problem was generally seen 
as not being abuse of position but bureaucratic deficiencies.113 
Anyway, Rashidov used these arguments as a key to combat his political 
rivals. In late 1964, Rashidov kept criticizing the Tashkent obkom – apparently 
the main base of his opposition – and continued in a minor scope. During the 
"the XVII CPUz Congress in March 1966 Rashidov claimed that cadre questions 
had always been resolved collegially and that the republican CC regularly 
reviewed the activities of obkoms."114 However, the criticism became harsher 
and inflamed again in early 1968 against the Andijan obkom, which was 
accused of poor economic and political performance, careerism, and 
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toadyism.115 On that occasion Bektash Rakhimov became FS Andijan obkom. 
Gill comments that 
this criticism coincided with Brezhnev's qualification of the 'trust in cadres' 
principle [...], but it was not sustained. Criticism reverted to the standard line of 
inadequate leadership, collecting too many reports and providing too little 
assistance to lower party organs. In Samarkand obkom during 1970 there was a 
lot of criticism and self-criticism but then no action; whilst questions of intra-
party life were rarely discussed at party meetings, this failing was not regarded 
as serious enough to require changing the obkom leadership.116 
In the early 1970s, other critics alerted the party with particular regard to 
economic performances, which the party had started to supervise more. This 
was confirmed at the XVIII CPUz Congress in March 1971, where there were 
complaints about "passivity and complacency, a liberal attitude toward those 
who infringed party rules and failed to carry out their responsibilities, [and] 
abuse of the faith placed in responsible people and deception."117 As 
mentioned above, criticism and commitments for economic improvements had 
both the demonstrative aim of improving the image of pragmatism for the 
Uzbek leader and to confirm his leadership’s legitimacy even against his rivals. 
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As we saw in the first chapter, at the beginning of the ‘70s, the struggle 
between two main factions – headed by Rashidov from one side and Kurbanov-
Nasriddinova in the other – reached its zenith when both sides started to send 
reciprocal revelatory denunciations118 to Moscow.119 However, Brezhnev 
probably wanted to avoid another Georgian case and, as we have seen in the 
first chapter, “tried [his] best to avoid an open, scandalous wholesale exposure 
of the ruling elite of Uzbekistan”,120 removing Nasriddinova and appointing her 
as chairwoman of the Council of Nationalities of the SS USSR (1970-1974).  
After ousting his main rivals on the eve of the ‘70s, Rashidov kept up small 
criticisms in order to reshuffle the party cadres. This situation led to the open 
accusation against the Tashkent gorkom in early 1973 and to a general 
campaign in which “inertia, passivity and complacency seem to have been the 
most serious faults mentioned.”121 Then, in 1975 Rashidov collected with the 
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assistance of the Uzbek KGB a body of evidence of the corruption of his 
opponents and there were purges and open trials in 1976-1977 against 
Kurbanov and Pulat Khodzhaev – the chairman of the SC UzSSR – against whom 
ad hoc trials were orchestrated.122 The first was sentenced to ten years and the 
second to eight. Investigations against Nasriddinova – a public and relevant 
figure at the central level – would be counterproductive and she was saved 
from these inquiries and arrests by the plea of Brezhnev.123 However, she was 
de facto ‘exiled’ to minor post of Deputy Minister of Construction Materials 
Industry of the USSR and chairwoman for the Asia and Africa Committee (1974-
1978). At the same time, the party was enforcing a healthy image of an 
organization that was sensitive to criticism.124 
As seen in the previous chapter, the tenth FYP committed the republic to 
the most onerous of duties in cotton production – the famous 6,000,000 tons 
by 1980 – and despite the greatly publicized results of agriculture, production 
was deeply decreasing in terms of quality (because of the abuse of 
mechanization), and quantity due to the bad weather conditions of 1978, a 
year that had affected the cotton harvest negatively. In this season alone, the 
falsifications and report-padding – a practice that we have seen existed across 
the Soviet system – became systemic in order to fulfill the plan at any cost. In 
that year the first warning from the Prokuratura USSR to the SM UzSSR even 
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appeared, referring about Kolkhozes and sovkhozes that were trading cotton 
in order to fulfill the plan and cases of cotton disappearances from warehouses. 
After these preliminary checks, the judicial organs were planning to proceed 
with further controls.125 
Even in 1979, problems in agriculture officially appeared. On 16 April 1980, 
before the miraculous crop that led to the official sixth million record, 
Khudayberdyev reported to Ziya N. Nuriev – the Bashkir deputy chairman of 
the SM USSR who also headed the SS USSR presidium’s commission on 
agriculture – that the MVD and the Minister of Finance USSR had recorded 
many irregularities in the quality and in the quality of cotton, violations in the 
state, and problems in delivering cotton. Then, the head of Uzbek government 
said that workers were not responding to the qualitative criteria – because they 
were quantitatively committed to the cause of white gold – and asked for more 
funds to improve mechanization, defoliants, plants and harvest quality and to 
reduce the shortcomings. In parallel, even Rashidov wrote directly to 
Gorbachev to justify the shortcomings and to ask for more funds.126 The 
paradox is that in order to justify the shortcomings, the Uzbek leadership was 
asking for more money from the center. 
In late 1970s, rumors about corruption in Uzbekistan started to circulate 
and Andropov127 was accumulating material against the party and the possible 
involvement of the Uzbek FS.128 Stories of scholars and apparatchiki who 
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became dissidents129 were already reported in the international literature130 
and also in the official press where “eulogistic self-reporting and deception, 
and embezzlement were reported, but there was no republic-wide campaign 
as these problems were said to be under control."131 In that moment, while the 
KGB was already collecting materials on the case,132 an early warning of the 
situation also appeared in 1980 in a dispatch written by A. Buturlin – the head 
of the Investigation Department of the USSR Prokuratura – who was sent to 
Uzbekistan in July 1980 to inspect on the alleged corruption. However, it seems 
that Rashidov was warned about the situation and applied pressure to cover 
the case up.133 As we have seen, in 1980 the weather contingencies were 
positive and the party and republican organs asked the cotton pickers to make 
all the efforts to get the hoped results of six million tons of white gold. 
However, prokuratura was still seeing violations in cotton production, even 
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related to the presence of livestock in the fields, improper use of the machines, 
and several losses of cotton during the various phases of transport.134 
Publicly, Rashidov still pushed public opinion with a healthy image of the 
party and also during the XX Congress CPUz in 1981 – the last attended by 
Rashidov but not the last in which he would be an important protagonist – 
when he claimed that the situation of the republic was improving and 
"described complacency, weak supervision of party organs and irresponsible 
leaders as being isolated problems."135 Even after Brezhnev’s visit to Tashkent 
in March 1982 – that we recalled for its drama in the previous chapter – the FS 
CPUz promoted a new emphasis on 
the need to struggle against all negative phenomena – abuse of official position, 
embezzlement of socialist property, eyewash, bribery, drunkenness, and a 
liberal attitude toward those who infringe the norms of communist morals. This 
was clearly only ritual advice, since the actual conduct of the republican party 
leadership set a very different example. Serious criticism of the failures of party 
organs to both improve economic leadership and ensure discipline only 
occurred in Uzbekistan after Rashidov died.136 
Between 1977-1982 there was a rash of demotions and firing in the Uzbek 
upper echelons that led to a reshuffle of power figures who lost their posts, 
such as the FS of Bukhara (Murtazaev in February 1977), Samarkand (Rakhimov 
in February 1982), and Ferghana (Shamsudinov in December 1978) obkoms, 
the chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR (Matchanov in December 1978), 
the MVD UzSSR (Yakh'yaev in July 1979), the Minister of Forestry (Tairov in 
December 1979), and the First Secretary of the Board of the Writer's Union 
(Yashen in November 1980).137 These efforts were even proudly communicated 
to the CC CPSU that received from Rashidov a memorandum on 3 March 1980 
where the FS CPUz stated that 
in the organization of the CPUz there is the practice to widely study the 
personnel before their appointment in managerial posts. Firstly, the political, 
moral and managerial skills are evaluated and also their character, 
organizational skills and their ability to build relations with the employees, 
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combine the rigor with a careful attitude to people and be self-critical about the 
results of the work, taking into account the opinion of the Party organizations 
[...] All this provides an objective representation about the person and allows 
solving the issue of virtually error-free appointments [...] In the posts of FS of 
gorkoms and raikoms are appointed people younger than 45 and for the second 
secretaries younger than 40. Obkoms, gorkoms and raikoms collegially control 
these appointments. Removing these leaders takes place only when it is clear 
that they cannot perform their job well [...] all the FSs obkoms and chairmen of 
oblispolkoms are graduates, and 45.7% are engineers, 24.3% are specialists in 
agriculture and of the 12 FS obkoms, 11 are economists [...] In the past 4 years 
due to several violations in party and state discipline and for abuses 142 people 
of the party, soviets and agriculture managers from the nomenklatura of CC 
CPUz have been removed, among which there were the former FS Jizzak obkom, 
the Minister for forestry policies UzSSR S.M. Tairov, the former secretary of the 
Fergana obkom M. Umarov, the former deputy minister for geology of the 
UzSSR B.I. Bykov, and others. For abuses of power related to the distribution of 
cars and public funds the former chairman of the Sovietabadskii raispolkom in 
the Samarkand oblast K. Mamedov has been removed.138 
On that occasion, the Uzbek leader also reported the growth of the party 
nomenklatura that was supposed to be a positive figure139 that had to impress 
the Gensek. However, the tolerance towards Rashidov would last as long as his 
protector in Moscow was alive. As Gorbachev recalls: “Brezhnev preferred to 
spare his comrades-in-arms in the ‘upper echelons’, on whom he was 
dependent in one way or another. Was criticism of [...] Rashidov [...] ever to be 
permitted? It was simply unthinkable.”140 With the new Gensek, who had a less 
apologetic approach,141 the story changed even for the “Uzbek khan”. 
                                                                
138 RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, d. 90, ll. 2-4, 13, 
139 "In the past 10 years, the CC CPUz nomenklatura increased for 847 people and 3680 
within the obkoms [...] The secretaries of the main party organization in 1970 were 
13,523 (by which 56.1% Uzbeks) and in 1980 17.936 (60% Uzbeks)." RGANI, f. 5, op. 77, 
d. 90, ll. 14, 17. 
140 Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), 203. 
141 Martin Ebon, The Andropov File: The Life and Ideas of Yuri V. Andropov, General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). 
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3.2 The new course of Andropov 
As a staunch communist who had chaired the KGB since 1967,142 Yuri 
Andropov143 became a key figure of the Soviet regime, especially after 1975 
when Brezhnev suffered his first heart attack and a debate about the possible 
succession of the leader started within the CC CPSU. Andropov was a minor 
candidate compared to others – such as Kirilenko and Chernenko – but due to 
                                                                
142 Andropov chaired the KGB from 18 May 1967 until 26 May 1982, when he was 
promoted as secretary responsible for ideological affairs, succeeding the defunct 
Mikhail Suslov. 
143 Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was born on June 15, 1914 in a small town of the 
Stavropol' krai. At 16 years old, he joined the Komsomol in Mozdok, in the North 
Ossetian ASSR, and he became full-time Secretary of the Water Transport Technical 
School Komsomol in Rybinsk, in the Yaroslavl oblast. In 1938 he became the FS of the 
Yaroslavl oblast Komsomol and in 1940-1944 the FS of Komsomol in the Soviet Karelo-
Finnish Republic. During WW2, he took part in partisan guerrilla activities in Finland and 
in 1944 he joined the CPSU. In 1947 he became Second Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and in 1951 he joined the staff of the CC CPSU in 
Moscow. In 1954 he was appointed Soviet Ambassador in Budapest and he played a key 
role in crushing the Hungarian uprising in 1956. In 1961, he became a full member of CC 
CPSU and in 1962 was promoted to the secretariat. On 18 May 1967, he became 
chairman of the KGB and a candidate member of the Politburo, becoming a full member 
in 1973. Under Andropov, the KGB increased its organization and activities, expanding 
its operative horizons – with “prophylaxic” measures to limit the negative phenomena 
– inside and outside the Soviet boundaries. He was convinced that only suppression of 
dissidents and the use of armed force could ensure the survival of Communist regimes. 
After Budapest (1956), he played a key role also in the implementation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, subduing the uprising in Prague (1968), Kabul (1979) and partially in Warsaw 
(1981). Jaures Medvedev, Andropov Au Pouvoir (Paris: Flammarion, 1983); Zhores 
Aleksandrovich Medvedev, Andropov. An Insider’s Account of Power and Politics within 
the Kremlin (New York: Penguin Books, 1984); Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Ot 
Andropova K Gorbachevu: Dela I Dni Kremlia (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1986); BRE, 
“Andropov, Yuri Vladimirovich,” Bol’shaya Rossiyskaya Entsiklopediya. Tom 1, 2005; 
Vladimir Solov഻ev and Elena Klepikova, Yuri Andropov, a Secret Passage into the Kremlin 
(New York ;London: Macmillan, 1983); Ebon, The Andropov File: The Life and Ideas of 
Yuri V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Arnold 
Beichman and Mikhail S Bernstam, Andropov, New Challenge to the West (New York: 
Stein and Day, 1983); Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, Andropov (Moskva: Molodaya︡  
Gvardiiya, 2006); Yuri Andropov, Sulla Strada Del Socialismo (Milano: Mondadori, 1984); 
Leonid Mikhaıl̆ovich Mlechin, Andropov (Moskva: Prospekt, 2006); Al഻bats, KGB: State 
Within a State; Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le 
Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale (Longueuil: EǶditions Kéruss, 2007), 7. 
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his primary position in the KGB and his honest perception of the country’s 
situation144 he could act as a sort of “grey cardinal” of the Soviet regime with 
the complicity of those figures like Ustinov, Gromyko, and Suslov who feared 
that Brezhnev's removal would spark a succession crisis and who were thus 
keen to help maintain the status quo. 
The country, which had officially reached a stage of ‘developed socialism,’ 
stood for years in a state of systemic ‘stagnation’, undermined by economic 
development and socio-demographic indices that were in rapid decline. 
Andropov was well aware of the level of corruption and the endemic problems 
of the Soviet system145 and he thought that this was the worst evil that afflicted 
the system. In order to redeem the USSR and to save the country from a tragic 
epilogue, Andropov expanded the praxis of ‘prophyilaxing measures’146 and 
started to promote a new policy to clean the system from its internal 
‘speculators’. His security agent background was a necessary precondition to 
the Andropov figure: during his long career in the KGB, he was able to collect 
all those pieces of evidence and compromising materials against enemies, 
opponents, or simply competitors that could be drawn out when needed. 
Just after the ‘Gierek affair’147 in Poland, the CC CPSU approved a resolution 
against official corruption in September 1980. Considered a risk of 
delegitimization to the entire Soviet system – which had touted its infallibility 
over the previous sixty years – this act was not openly announced in great 
                                                                
144 In his memoirs, Gorbachev recalled that when Andropov was in power, he and 
Nikolai Ryzhkov (the chairman of Gosplan), asked the Soviet Leader for access to real 
budget figures. He replied that those data were "off limits", even for them. Gorbachev, 
Memoirs, 147. 
145 According to Graziosi, Andropov was able to read the problems of the USSR but he 
did not have a recipe to resolve them and he did not have any basic knowledge of 
economics. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991, 484–85. 
146 In the KGB annual report of 1978 (4 February 1979) it was reported than within the 
year, 15,590 Soviet citizens had been "profilaxed". This document is among the 
Volkogonov papers in NSA, Box 23, file R9041, p. 7. However, until the late 1970s, the 
KGB did not expose a particular interest in economic crimes. In fact, these kinds of 
crimes were not mentioned in the Report on KGB work in the 1959-1974 period. This 
document is among the Volkogonov papers in NSA, Box 21, file R9034; Box 22, file 
R9935; Box 23, files R9037, R9936, R2986. 
147 In September 1980, Edward Gierek, FS of the Polish United Workers Party, was 
ousted and indicted for corruption. Medvedev, Andropov. An Insider’s Account of Power 
and Politics within the Kremlin, 92–93. 
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fanfare. However, it was spread and repeated at every federal level within the 
USSR148 and in addition to confirming the mandate of the OBKhSS, it also 
increased the powers of the KGB, which hitherto had not generally been 
involved in the struggle against economic crimes.149 Therefore, the 
involvement of the KGB in such a war indicated the dramatic and systemic 
extent of corruption inside the Soviet system, at the federal as well as at local 
levels.150 
During the XXVI Congress of CPSU in February 1981, the need to enforce 
discipline, criticism and self-criticism, and to struggle against parasitism, 
bribery, and speculation were reaffirmed by the Party151 and it was further 
enforced on 16 October 1981 when the CC CPSU adopted a resolution for 
"strengthening the struggle against bribery, theft of socialist property, and 
speculation."152  
This line, which had already been implemented during the regional scandals 
in the early and late ‘70s, was now having a systemic echo. In fact, it proceeded 
those massive investigations and arrests that, after September 1978, flustered 
the trade organizations and the Soviet fishing ministry during the so-called 
‘caviar affair’. This scandal directly implicated even the FS of the Krasnodar 
Kraikom, Sergey Fedorovich Medunov, who was protected from Brezhnev 
without allowing any operation of the KGB against his group.153 However, when 
his collaborator was arrested in the summer of 1982, things changed also for 
Medunov.154 This was the heyday of the "Sochi-Krasnodar affair" that 
                                                                
148 Medvedev, Andropov Au Pouvoir, 110, 157. 
149 In December 1980, Andropov asked for extra powers and got on 30 December a 
resolution from the secretariat of CC CPSU granting the KGB greater autonomy to 
combat crimes. VBA, f. 2, op. 2, d. CT243/8. 
150 Ibid., 157–59. 
151 Marilyn Bechtel, David Laibman, and Daniel Rosenberg, Peace, Plan and Progress : 
The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: NWR 
Publications, 1981); Avtorkhanov, Ot Andropova K Gorbachevu: Dela I Dni Kremlia, 17–
39. 
152 GARF, f. 8131, op. 28, d. 6044, l. 27. 
153 Duhamel, The KGB Campaign against Corruption in Moscow, 74. 
154 The 'Medunov affair' was prepared directly by the former KGB chief, who was de 
facto ruling the party in the last months of Brezhnev's life. On 20 July 1982, Andropov 
chaired a meeting of the secretariat where the affair was defined and participants 
included V.I. Vorotnikov, the Soviet ambassador in Cuba who would take Medunov's 
place at FS Krasnodar kraikom, three days later. Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. 
Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 14–15. 
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discovered a high level of corruption, embezzlement, and violations of socialist 
law in these touristic regions of the USSR and led to the dismissal of more than 
5000 officials and the punishment of about 1500 figures. 
Therefore, Andropov emerged as the real figure of the regime's power, that 
could even challenge the leader – now in terminal state – and his powerful 
family. In January 1982, Andropov revealed to Suslov that Semyon Tsvigun, the 
First Deputy Chairman of the KGB and Brezhnev's brother-in-law, was shielding 
Brezhnev's children – Galina and Yuri – from corruption investigations. Suslov 
immediately asked Tsvigun to report the situation and even threatened to 
remove him from his post and expel him from the CPSU. Nevertheless, Tsvigun 
– who was seriously ill with lung cancer – committed suicide155 on 19 January 
1982 before he could challenge Suslov's statement. Incredibly, also Suslov had 
a coronary two days later, and died on 25 January of arteriosclerosis and 
diabetes.156 Sulslov’s death started a minor purge against his former clients157 
and a new battle for Brezhnev’s succession in which Andropov – who assumed 
Suslov’s post of Second Secretary CPSU and secretary responsible for 
ideological affairs – emerged as the effective leader of the Soviet regime, 
sidelining Kirilenko and Chernenko during the last days of Brezhnev's rule.158 
As result, after these deaths Andropov had a broader range of operation in 
order to affirm his power and to affect those figures that had been protected. 
In January 1982 there were the first attacks against Brezhnev’s family, with 
the "diamonds affair", when several prominent jewelry smugglers – who all had 
links with Galina Brezhneva – were arrested. In this scandal the actor – and 
Galina's friend – Boris Buryata (nicknamed "Boris the Gypsy") and the circus 
                                                                
155 Tsvigun’s suicide is in the same line of other relevant officer-suicides in the security 
apparatus, such as Vikto Paputin, first deputy MVD USSR who committed suicide on 29 
December 1979 after the coup against Amin in Afghanistan, and Sergey Krylov, head of 
MVD USSR academy and opponent to Churbanov, who shot himself on 19 April 1979 to 
protest against that “world of slaves, toadies and careerists.” Leonid Mikhaıl̆ovich 
Mlechin, “Zavety Shchelokova,” Novaya Gazeta, August 16, 2010; Vaksberg, The Soviet 
Mafia, 107. 
156 Christian Schmidt-Häuer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986), 
73. 
157 Aleksei Ivanovich Shibaev was at the head of the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions after 1976 and was considered a protégé of Suslov. In the immediate week after 
the latter's death, he was arrested with corruption allegations and defamed by sex 
scandals. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in 
the Political Elite, 1965-1990, 166. 
158 Schmidt-Häuer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power, 78. 
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lion tamer Irina Bugrimova were also implicated, in connection with their 
possession of stolen tsarist diamonds. Additionally, the director-general of 
Gostsirk (the Soviet state circus) Anatoly Kolevatov – in whose apartment 
millions in cash and diamonds were found – and his deputy Viktor Gorskiy were 
hit. They were arrested just after Suslov's funeral. The allegations of 
embezzlement, corruption and diamond smuggling forced Brezhnev's daughter 
to a sort of "exile". Meanwhile, her brother, Yuri Brezhnev – who was forced 
to resign from the post of First Deputy of the Ministry of Foreign Trade – and 
her husband Yuri Churbanov159 – who was Deputy chairman of the MVD USSR 
(1980-1983) – were then both arrested on charges of corruption.160 In May 
1982, quitting his post at the top of the KGB, Andropov effectively became the 
second secretary and the effective regent of the regime.161 
In summer 1982, when Brezhnev was on holiday at his dacha – and 
Andropov was in charge – there was a massive operation during the "Sochi-
Krasnodar affair" that led to the removal of Medunov,162 a symbolic figure who 
                                                                
159 Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov was a career chekist who entered the MVD in 1967. In 
1971 he married Galina Brezhneva and was rapidly promoted, becoming Deputy (1971-
1975) and Head of the Political Directorate of the MVD (1975-1977) and then Deputy 
(1977) and First Deputy Minister of the MVD USSR (1980). He rapidly rose through the 
military ranks becoming Colonel in 1971, Major-General in 1974, Lieutenant-General in 
1977 and finally Colonel-General in 1981. He also was a member of the Central Auditing 
Commission CPSU (1976-1981), a candidate member of the CC CPSU (1981-1986) and a 
deputy of the SS USSR. On 14 January 1987 Churbanov was arrested during the "Uzbek 
affair" for bribery and embezzlement and for covering up investigations of CPUz in 
spring 1983. He was even accused of threatening the Gdlyan’s life. After the trail (5 
September - 30 December 1988) he was sentenced by the Military Collegium of the 
Supreme Court to 12 years' imprisonment with confiscation of property and deprivation 
of military rank, awards, and orders. In 1990 Galina filed for divorce and division of 
property and in 1993 Churbanov was released 'on parole', with the cancellation of the 
probation period of three years. Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, Ya Rasskazhu Vse, Kak 
Bylo (Moskva: Izdatel഻skiı ̆ t︠s︡ entr “Liana” sovmestno s izd-vom “Nezavisimaia︠︡  gazeta,” 
1993); Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, Moı ̆ Testඁ Leonid Brezhnev (Moskva: Algoritm, 
2013); Larisa Nikolaevna Vasil഻eva, Kremlin Wives (New York: Arcade, 1994). 
160 Yevgeniy Yuriyevich Dodolyev, Galina Brezhneva. Zhizn’ Sovetskoy Printsessy 
(Moskva: Zebra-E, 2013); Yevgeniy Yuriyevich Dodolyev, Delo Galiny Brezhnevoy. 
Brillianty Dlya Printsessy (Moskva: Eksmo, 2013). 
161 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 5. 
162 Sergey Fodorovich Medunov had been the FS Krasnodar kraikom since 1973 and was 
famous for his arrogance and love for luxury. During the "Sochi-Krasnodar affair", 
Medunov was removed from his post in the party on 23 July 1982 and was transferred 
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was well known among the Muscovite power figures that spent their holidays 
in the most fashionable resorts on the Black Sea.163 Then, on 9 November 1982 
Yuri Sokolov164, the director of Gastronom n°1 Eliseevskiy - the famous historic 
store on Tverskaya street in Moscow, his wife, his deputy Nemtsev, as well as 
the heads of departments Svezhinsky, Yakovlev, Kon'kov and Grigorev were 
arrested on charges of bribery and embezzlement of food on a large scale. Also 
on that occasion, the participation in criminal activities by Galina Brezhneva 
and her group was suggested.165  
3.2.1 Andropov’s team 
After effectively leading the country from ‘behind the scenes’ and 
becoming the designated successor, Andropov became the Gensek on 12 
November 1982, two days after Brezhnev’s death.166 Finally, the new Soviet 
leader had full autonomy to act promptly to restore the Soviet system in a new 
moral framework and to intervene in the upper management of the party in 
order to promote his trusted allies. He had emerged from the post-
revolutionary generation of Soviet politicians that would define the next epoch 
of Soviet political history. In fact, due to Andropov, the figures of Mikhail 
                                                                
to minor post as Deputy Minister of Fruit and Vegetable production. In the scandal was 
also implicated the Vyacheslav Voronkov, the mayor and chairman of the Sochi 
gorispolkom. Peter Frank, “Political Succession in the Soviet Union: Building a Power 
Base,” in Process of Political Succession, ed. Peter Calvert (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1987), 109; Ilya Zemtsov, The Private Life of the Soviet Elite (New York: 
Crane, Russak & Company, 1985). 
163 Medvedev, Andropov Au Pouvoir, 114–15. 
164 Sokolov was arrested "for food theft in large quantities" and after assessment of “the 
nature of the crimes committed and the level of their danger to society", he was 
sentenced to death on 24 November 1983 and executed in July 1984. Rodolfo Brancoli, 
“A Morte Il Re Gastronomo Che Fece Ombra Ad Andropov,” La Repubblica, July 18, 
1984. 
165 Anatoliy Rubinov, “Magazin Yeliseyeva,” Nauka I Zhizn’ 8 (2001); P. V. Pyatnov, “Etot 
Znamenityy Yeliseyevskiy Na Tverskoy,” Sovremennyye Problemy Servisa I Turizma 2 
(2012). 
166 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 6. 
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Gorbachev167 and Nikolai Ryzhkov168 were reinforced – and Andropov 
entrusted to them the task of studying the country's economic reform. As well, 
also Yegor Ligachev,169 Vitaly Vorotnikov,170 Mikhail Solomentsev,171 Viktor 
                                                                
167 Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had been the FS Stavropol kraikom from 1970 until 
1978 when he was appointed to the Central Committee's Secretariat for Agriculture in 
1978, replacing the defunct Fyodor Kulakov. The future Soviet leader emerged as a 
technocrat and had Andropov's appreciation for his critical and reform-minded vision. 
168 Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov was born on 28 September 1929 in Dzerzhynsk, Ukraine. 
A member of the CPSU since 1956, he was a technocrat who rose through the ranks at 
the Uralmash. In 1975 he was appointed First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport 
Machine Building and in 1979 First Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, becoming a member 
of the CC CPSU in 1981 and the next year he became the Head of the Economic 
Department of the CC. On 27 September 1985, he succeeded Tikhonov and became 
chairman of the SM USSR, becoming one of the main perestroika promoters. Borys Illich 
Oliın̆yk, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, and Nikolaı ̆ Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Gorbachev: 
Anatomiya︡  Predatelඁstva (Moskva: Algoritm, 2013); Nikolaı ̆ Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Na 
Rubezhe Eepokh : Razmyshleniya (Moskva: Izdatel഻skiı ̆dom “Ekonomicheskaia︠︡  gazeta,” 
2013); Nikolaı ̆ Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Glavnyı ̆ Svidetelඁ (Moskva: Algoritm, 2009); Nikolaı ̆
Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Tragediia︠︡  Velikoı ̆Strany (Moskva: Veche, 2007). 
169 Yegor Kuzmich Ligachyov was the FS Tomsk obkom (1965-1983). On 29 April 1983, 
Andropov appointed him as the head of the Organizational-Party Work Department of 
the Central Committee – replacing Kapitonov – “to take charge of personnel 
assignments as part of the effort to combat corruption.” In December 1983, Ligachev 
became a Secretary of CC CPSU and on 23 April 1985 he rose to the post of full member 
of the Politburo. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of 
Yegor Ligachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The 
American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 56. 
170 Thanks to Andropov, Vitaly Ivanovich Vorotnikov could come back from his ‘Cuban 
exile’ as Soviet Ambassador to Havana (1979-1982). He replaced Medunov in the post 
of FS Krasnodar obkom on 23 July 1982 until his appointment as chairman of SM RSFSR 
on 24 June 1983. He also became a full member of the Politburo on 26 December 1983. 
Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 9. 
171 Mikhail Solomentsev, a secretary of the CC CPSU since 1966 and chairman of the SM 
RSFSR, was elevated by Andropov and became the director of the CPC at the CC CPSU 
on 15 June and a full member of the Politburo on 27 December 1983. Under Gorbachev 
initiative, he was forced to retire by both posts on 30 September 1988. Mikhail 
Sergeevich Solomentsev, Veryu v Rossiyu (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2003). 
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Chebrikov,172 Grigory Romanov,173 Eduard Shevardnadze,174 and Geidar Aliyev 
were promoted to the higher ranks.175 The latter two were considered a part 
                                                                
172 Viktor Mikhailovich Chebrikov was Deputy chairman of the KGB under Yuri Andropov 
from 1968-1982. On 17 December 1982, he replaced Fedorchuk – who became 
chairman of MVD USSR – and became the 6th chairman of KGB USSR, holding that post 
until 1 October 1988. 
173 On 16 September 1970, Grigory Vasilyevich Romanov became the FS of Leningrad 
oblast. In 1976, he became full member of the politburo and the secretariat of the CC 
CPSU, and in 1977 he promoted the removal of Podgorny – the second most powerful 
man in the Soviet Union – from his post in the politburo and, then, as Chairman of the 
Presidium of SS USSR. This move would have eliminated a political competitor fostering, 
inexorably, the rise of Andropov in succession to Brezhnev. Robert Vincent Daniels, 
Russia’s Transformation: Snapshots of a Crumbling System (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 
174 Thanks to the Andropov’s support, Shevardnadze – who was at the head of Georgian 
MVD since 1965 – was able to mount a corruption scandal against the Georgian 
leadership and to replace its ‘stalinist’ FS, Vasil Mzhavanadze, on 18 December 1972. 
Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism, 57; Gerald Mars 
and Yochanan Altman, “The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia’s Second Economy,” Soviet 
Studies 35, no. 4 (1983): 546–60; Solov഻ev and Klepikova, Yuri Andropov, a Secret 
Passage into the Kremlin, 105; Louise I. Shelley, Erik Scott, and Anthony Latta, Organized 
Crime and Corruption in Georgia (London-New York: Routledge, 2007). 
175 Many aspects of Aliyev's early life are obscure. Heydar Alirza oghlu Aliyev (in Russian: 
Geidar Aliyevich Aliyev) was born in Nakhchivan on 10 May 1923 and joined the local 
NKGB in 1944. He rapidly rose through the ranks of the security committee and he 
became a deputy chairman of Azerbaijani KGB in 1964, and its chairman in 1967. In 14 
July 1969, he became FS of Communist Party of Azerbaijan in 1969 – after the dismissal 
of Veli Akhundov for corruption allegations – and on 5 March 1976 he became a 
candidate member of the Politburo (and full member from 22 November 1982 until 21 
October 1987). Aliev promoted a purge in Azerbaijan during an anticorruption campaign 
between 1977 and 1982 that resulted in ninety-three convictions and garnered him the 
nickname “hammer of the mafia”. His rise to power had been defined by Andropov’s 
sponsorship to the post of First Deputy chairman of SM USSR on 10 October 1982 and 
full member of the Politburo on 22 November 1982. However, during perestroika, his 
role was marginalized by Gorbachev and, after his forced retirement in 1987, Aliyev 
reinvented himself as a moderate nationalist and was subsequently elected as a deputy 
to the SS of Azerbaijan SSR. However, his name is mostly remembered because, after 
the dramatic season of instability of the early ‘90s, Aliyev succeeded Abulfaz Elchibey, 
becoming the 3rd President of Azerbaijan from 24 June 1993 until 31 October 2003 and 
affirming himself as a symbol of ‘Azerbaijani independence’ and a ‘father of the Azeri 
nation’. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 157–58; Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia. 
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of the Andropovian “Caucasian strategy.”176 In parallel, in order to promote a 
systemic debrezhnevization course,177 Andropov started to reshuffle part of 
the previous establishment: i.e. the replacement of the Minister of railroads 
Ivan Pavlovski with Nikolai Konarev, the promotion of Boris Pastukhov as 
Chairman of the USSR State Publishing Committee replacing Boris Stukalin, the 
dismissal of Stepan Khitrov – who chaired from 1967 the Ministry of Rural 
Construction of the USSR – and Alexander Struev, Minister of trade of the USSR 
from 1965. At the same time, some key figures such as Andrei Alexandrov-
Agentov, Viktor Sharapov, Viktor Grishin and even Tikhonov who succeeded 
Kosygin as the chairman of the SM USSR since 1980 were confirmed.178 
To reconstruct the attempts made by Andropov to reform the Soviet 
system, it is useful to read this still mysterious period through the lens of the 
Russian historian Rudolf Pikhoya.179 He comments that corruption in the USSR 
was not a mystery in the KGB, and the operation to ‘clean’ the country – and 
Uzbekistan as well – was just a part of a major campaign to reform the system. 
Andropov’s reform was based on two pillars: on the one hand, the new Gensek 
wanted to ‘restore order’ and to strengthen the administration, its discipline, 
and responsibility even recurring to a ‘demonstrative actions’ (far from the 
Stalinist systemic terror); on the other hand, he probably wanted to advance a 
first wave of reforms that effectively were not enforced during his short reign 
and that started only in 1987 during perestroika. In the first reading key – the 
‘demonstrative actions’ – we can observe the struggle against the Brezhnevian 
group within the Kremlin. Otherwise, in Uzbekistan the campaign was to some 
extent just ‘demonstrative’ and had real and systemic implications.  
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figures in the Transcaucasian republics, such as Geidar Aliev, FS of Azerbaijan (1969-
1982), Eduard Shevardnadze, FS of Georgia (1972-1985), Karen Demirchyan, FS of 
Armenia (1974-1988). Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating 
Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990, 151–59; Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al 
Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
177 As Colloudon comments, "De-Brezhnevisation was becoming systematic: Gennadi 
Brovin, one of Brezhnev’s three personal secretaries, was accused of misuse of power 
and corruption and sentenced to nine years in a labor camp. High-ranking officials of 
the ministries of Railroads and Aviation, as well as some others previously in charge of 
organizing international exhibitions, found themselves under arrest" Coulloudon, La 
Mafia En Union Soviet́ique, 187–88. 
178 Medvedev, Andropov Au Pouvoir, 139–46, 164. 
179 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
211 
 
At the same time, the second ‘reformist’ aspect finds its evidence in analysis 
of the Uzbek affair. According to Pikhoya, “under Andropov the Pandora vase 
of information was opened " and in it could be found the roots of Glasnost, 
deliberatively publishing – in the press – the summaries of the politburo 
sessions and the negative results about economic crimes.180 Along this trend 
we can interpret the huge media campaigns that were enforced to describe the 
arrests of the above mentioned Sokolov, the director of the GUM mall, B.S. 
Tveritinov, the directors of the Okean, the suicide of Sergey G. Noniev, director 
of Gastronomy 2 in Smolenskaya etc. All these cases were the first to be 
published in the Soviet press with such a deep scandalous narrative – on this 
occasion the idea of mafiya in the USSR181 appeared for the first time – and 
were responding to a specific tactic Andropov had to discredit malfeasance and 
corruption in the country, believing that socialism would develop more swiftly 
if corruption and fraud were exposed. In this ‘soft terror’ strategy, Andropov 
acted swiftly and predictably to attack inefficiency, absenteeism, and 
corruption, even tasking the militsiya to check shops and cinemas to see if 
people were avoiding work. In fact, from 1983 a huge inspection campaign in 
the enterprises and in those places was organized to find the people that were 
supposed to work and were not. Then, the fight especially in the trade system 
in Moscow began, which led in June 1983 to the arrest of N.P. Tregubov – head 
of the central administration of commerce of the Moscow gorispolkom and 
close friend of Grishin182 – who was sentenced to death.183 In the Moscow trade 
administration alone, 15,066 people were prosecuted, of whom 1221 were 
leaders of various ranks.184 
However, his ‘demonstrative terror’ needed big fish to be exposed. The 
main occasion was on 17 December 1982 with the dismissal of Nikolai 
Shchelokov, an old friend of Brezhnev and a member of the Dniepropetrovsk 
clique, who had been chairman of MVD USSR since 1968. Shchelokov had been 
Andropov’s longtime rival since the late ‘60s – when stepped up his criticism 
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against KGB authoritarianism and disagreed on the role of judiciary organs185 – 
representing one of the main obstacles to the rise of Andropov's KGB. Now, the 
new Gensek had the occasion to permanently get rid of his old adversary, 
discrediting him with allegations of mismanagement of public safety and moral 
criticism on his private habits. In fact, Shchelokov - who was famous for his love 
for luxury – was accused for being the main culprit of the high levels of 
corruption within the police, the OVIR, and the other organizations under the 
MVD.186 He was replaced by Vitaly Fedorchuk – head of the Ukrainian KGB in 
1970-1982 and famous for his hardline approach towards dissidents187 – and 
fell into disgrace.188 Similarly, even Konstantin Zotov, the chairman of the OVIR 
of Moscow, was arrested with other officials189 in what seemed to become a 
war between the KGB and the MVD. Just to give an example of the supremacy 
of the first organ over the second, after Shchelokov’s dismissal, his post had 
been occupied by Vitaly Fedorchuk, the chairman of the KGB who had 
succeeded Andropov in May 1982. Further, it is indicative to note that the day 
after Shchelokov's dismissal, the politburo devoted the attention of the 
prokuratura USSR for fighting corruption within the ruling class and reinforced 
the sanctions against corruption, embezzlement, and profit, thus disproving 
the contribution of the regular police forces and even calling for a better work 
of the prokuratura to defend socialist legality.190 
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The war against corruption in the upper echelons of the Soviet system 
became one of the key elements of the Andropovian agenda that was 
functional to his consolidation of power and perhaps also a consequence of his 
health.191 In fact, as we have seen, this ‘moral mission’ had two implications: 
first, the anticorruption campaign was an instrument to ‘reform’ a rotten 
system that had been based on patronage, clientelism, and corruption in order 
to keep its structural integrity in a phase when the USSR was likely to drift. 
Second, this restyled ‘soft’ – or ‘bloodless’ – terror was a weapon against his 
political adversaries. 
The new ‘moral path’ to legalize the USSR was definitively on the way and 
was constantly being reaffirmed at a political level. Indeed, at a meeting of the 
Presidium of the SS USSR in January 1983, Andropov kept calling for a “more 
vigorous struggle against embezzlement, abuse of office, bribe-taking and 
other forms of corruption”192 and on 7 January a CC CPSU meeting demanded 
a strengthening of the discipline of labor. Additionally, on 9 January, the 
Genprokuror through Pravda announced the end of tolerance for the ‘negative 
phenomena’ and on 12 January the SS USSR demanded to the Prokuratura 
USSR a more rigorous control of the security organs in a persecution against 
dishonesty that had the tone of a witch hunt, fueling complaints from citizens 
- even in the private form of donos - and facing the alarming increase in crime 
in the early 80s.193 Considering the warning data on increasing crimes 
registered in the USSR in 1980-1984,194 the Andropovian attempts to increase 
Soviet rigor and to keep the ideological integrity were clear. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of 1983, the CPC was even reinforced to 
proceed in investigations with unlimited measures195 as a part of the 
Andropovian line that even became a key ideological issue within the party. 
Therefore, during the 14 June 1983 plenum of CC CPSU, the Gensek further 
argued that there was a need “to completely eliminate such phenomena as 
instances of the use of state and public property and official positions for 
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purposes of personal enrichment.”196 On that occasion, Chernenko harshly 
condemned the already marginalized figures of Medunov and Shchelokov who 
had severely violated party discipline and who were on the "way of corruption 
for personal aims."197 Parallel to the party dimension, also at the state level the 
Andropovian line was strongly endorsed: in March 1983 the chairman of the 
MVD USSR Fedorchuk followed the Andropovian path, announcing new 
measure to improve discipline and responsiveness to citizens’ complaints and 
to strengthen the OBKhSS. Furthermore, the ministry was reorganized and 
became subject to much more scrutiny by the party that was creating CPSU 
‘political agencies’ within its departments. Then, in late 1983 was the criminal 
legislation even reformed, increasing the punishment for corruption.198 
The next key passage in the moralization campaign passed even through 
the end of the ‘stability of cadres’ policy, formalized by Andropov in August 
1983.199 In fact, a system characterized by the stability and longevity of cadres 
ensured by the nomenklatura system200 indirectly promoted an extensive 
growth of corruption at every level.201 The concept of making again the cadres 
‘fallible’ would have been a dramatic and effective choice to eradicate, as far 
as possible, those figures that were set up as local potentates. At the same 
time, it would definitely interrupt the “little deal” that guaranteed stability and 
the loyalty of the provinces to Moscow.202 In fact, during the Andropovian 
anticorruption campaigns, 18 ministers, and 37 FSs of obkoms, kraikoms and 
leaders of republican parties were dismissed and replaced with loyal figures.203 
As a consequence of the interruption of the Brezhnevian peaceful-tolerant 
path, the Andropovian policy was in fact stopping the practice that a part of 
the budget was de facto redistributed among national elites. When this 
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agreement was denounced by the center, patrimonialism lost a base to be set 
and there was a new rise of nationalism.204 As Satarov comments, “the 
persecution of corrupt government officials in the republics was perceived by 
them as a signal of a unilateral termination of the implicit contract between 
the fatherland and the colonies. The stability of the Soviet empire was 
maintained on the basis of an agreement, according to which regional elites 
retained the loyalty of the center, and the central elites turned a blind eye to 
regional affairs, while fear and force  were no longer applied– as had been the 
case in Stalin's time. The persecution of corruption was simply contrary to this 
agreement.”205 
Indeed, the Andropovian policy had implications not just centrally but also 
locally. The Gensek was effectively calling for a fight against corruption even in 
the republics and in that endeavor had the participation of ‘honest’ local 
figures – such as Shcherbytsky in Ukraine, Shevardnadze in Georgia,206 and 
Aliyev in Azerbaijan – each of whom had the occasion to purge part of the 
apparatus.207 At the same time, this campaign had the effect of eliminating the 
figures that were not welcome in Moscow anymore. And this was apparently 
the case in Rashidov’s Uzbekistan where the campaign lasted for five years 
after his demise and assumed a systemic – and not just demonstrative – 
dimension. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient elements to understand 
whether Uzbekistan deliberately became an experimental polygon208 or a 
scapegoat to be sacrificed by the Andropovian politics of ‘soft terror,’ also 
because Andropov - who was acknowledged to be the main promoter of the 
'Uzbek purge' - was already dead in wake of the most acute season of purges 
in the republic. We can therefore consider Andropov as the initiator of a 
campaign that, as we will see in later chapters, was enforced by his successors, 
when the results of the ‘moralization campaign’ in Uzbekistan assumed even a 
public/media dimension and the republic became an emblematic - and 
probably the most famous - case of corruption in the USSR. In fact, due to the 
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publicity and the size of the scandal that we are going to describe in the 
following pages, Uzbekistan in the ‘80s became a synonym of corruption, 
nepotism, kinship, patronage and even ‘mafiya.’ However, one of the main 
protagonists of this story, Telman Gdlyan, referred to Uzbekistan not as ‘black 
hole’ but as an objective example of the high corruption that was systemic in 
many other parts of the USSR: 
the situation in the UzSSR was not far from the other Central Asian and Caucasus 
republics as well as in the oblasts of Stavropol, Krasnodar, and the Northern 
Caucasus, Adygea, and the Black Sea coastal districts, Southern Ukraine, and 
finally Moscow, where corruption flourished. However, we cannot say that the 
entire Soviet Union was similarly covered by corruption.209 
Indeed, it is possible to read the Uzbek cotton affair – and the publicity that 
it got in the following years – as one of those attempts to regain control over 
the republics that had been greatly weakened during Brezhnevism. Pikhoya 
comments that one of the first victims of the Andropovian ‘demonstrative 
terror’ was Estonia where the Genprokuror and KGB sent an investigative 
group headed by Gdlyan. Then the case was shifted to Uzbekistan where – 
because of the enormous deficits in the cotton system – it was easier to 
promote a ‘demonstrative’ campaign.210 During these controls – functional to 
Andropov’s objective to restore Moscow’s control over the republics – the KGB 
and prokuratura investigators “found the ax under the bench”,211 as the saying 
goes, thereby pursuing a moralization campaign that would assume a systemic 
dimension. 
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3.3 The ‘silent phase’ of the ‘Uzbek affair’ 
As we have mentioned in the second chapter, Brezhnev’s demise 
represented the end of a world. The experienced Rashidov - who rose through 
the party ranks during late stages of the Stalin period, affirmed his leadership 
under Khrushchev and inexorably followed the steps of Brezhnevism, ruling the 
republic for almost a quarter of century – was convinced that he could also 
easily and opportunistically ride the new Andropovian course. Just in the first 
weeks, the FS CPUz presented himself as a loyal communist and devotee of the 
new course of Soviet policy. During the VIII plenum CC CPUz (29 November 
1982),212 the FS CPUz directly referred to Andropov and his directive declaring 
that “in his speech there was a brilliant analysis of the Soviet economy [...] a 
principled assessment of our successes and failures and deficiencies identifying 
urgent tasks.”213 
Probably, Rashidov wanted to satisfy the Gensek, offering some scapegoats 
to the moralization cause and to show his devotion to the new Andropovian 
course. However, he ignored the fact that those measures would be intensified 
against the UzSSR and he kept announcing the brilliant results of the Uzbek 
cotton harvest – another 6 million tons also for 1982214 – and celebrating the 
“joyful and solemn” 60th anniversary of the USSR, keeping the same narrative 
of cotton to the fatherland in the name of brotherhood among nations.215 Such 
rhetoric did not work anymore and from 1983 the republic entered a new 
season of criminal cases, purges, and power reshuffles among the CPUz, which 
were orchestrated by Moscow and which inexorably prejudiced the 
equilibrium between Moscow and Tashkent.  
Besides discussing the political implications of the Uzbek cotton scandal (in 
chapter five), this case was inexorably political because it was mainly assailing 
the UzSSR ruling elite. In fact, the risk was that – if following literally and strictly 
the law – it was possible "to put in the dock practically the whole population of 
the republic."216 As Nikolai Ivanov – one of the main investigator in the case – 
commented, in Uzbekistan “millions of people gave and took bribes, and for 
honest people this is amoral. As well [it is even amoral] to take the 
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responsibility of so many of them.”217 This is why, according to the former 
investigator in the case, only the top ‘organizers’ of the cotton scam were 
involved. Thus, besides reconstructing the dramatic – and sometimes comical 
– personal stories of the culprits, we will mainly focus on the political aspect, 
the debate within the party, and the responses to the investigations in Moscow 
and in Tashkent, in order to understand if this story contributed to a political 
disaffection between the motherland and the periphery of the empire.  
During the first ‘silent phase’ (1983-1984), the ‘cotton affairs’ were still not 
publicized as a systemic case and were so intended – and even publicized – as 
a series of separate cases in the framework of the Andropovian moralization 
campaign. In this first stage, these cases were not perceived as a systemic 
attack against the local ruling elite and the factions within the CPUz used the 
campaign to prove their loyalty to Moscow against their discredited rivals. 
3.3.1 Staging Andropovism and triumphs 
1983 is the year that is generally marked as the beginning of the “Uzbek 
cotton affairs” when the case was initiated – almost at the same time – at 
different levels before combining in a unique stream. In fact, in 1983, at the 
beginning of the investigations, three main channels were pursued: at the 
political level, the party initiated its own investigation activity (CPC) that 
entrusted loyal figures and sought to take back the control over the rebellious 
periphery; at the security level, the KGB – which was under the direct influence 
of Andropov – played a crucial role,  especially in the first phase, in ousting the 
MVD, in collecting materials, and in instructing the cases that were perceived 
as threats to state security; finally, at the civil prosecution level, the USSR 
prokuratura (also thanks to the PCC) proceeded in the judicial investigation 
before passing the cases to the judiciary. 
Just on the eve of 1983, the Uzbek party wanted to give the image of a 
healthy organization that was following Andropov’s directives in order to 
implement the decisions of the XXVI congress of the CPSU and to reinforce the 
"struggle against any violation of party, state and labor discipline". It noted that 
there were “many shortcomings due to weak discipline and failures in meeting 
targets of technological development that are in the ministries of light industry, 
ministry of cotton industry and food industry and in the metallurgic 
enterprises, non-ferrous metallurgy, gas and mechanic industry."218 Therefore, 
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the CC CPUz demanded that the vicious practice of adjusting the plans towards 
decreases should be halted, and that the violation of the Kolkhozes' charter 
should also be ended.219 However, in this statement, cotton – the main product 
of the republic – was not even mentioned. 
In Moscow, Andropov was aware of pripiski in the Uzbek cotton sector and 
it seems that – when he was head of the KGB – he even ordered the Uzbek 
cotton field harvests to be photographed with reconnaissance satellites.220 He 
probably wanted to establish order within the republic and advocated a 
Mzhavanadze-like solution,221 thus prompting Rashidov for his resignation by 
the end of the year. A widely diffused version of the facts claims that in January 
1983, between the politburo sessions Andropov had a very tough discussion 
with Rashidov in his office which can be seen as a suggestion that he should 
resign if he was not able to produce a record crop the next autumn.222 Whether 
this episode was real or just fictional, surely Andropov wanted to understand 
the situation in Uzbekistan and Rashidov tried to follow the Gensek’s vision or 
– at the very least – align with his narrative. In the last months of his “reign”, 
the Uzbek leader showed apparently sound results and a willingness to go 
along with the CC CPSU. “In January 1983 the CC CPUz called on party 
organizations to [fight] against uneconomic practices, slackness, squandering 
and waste of socialist property, eyewash [insincere discourse], drunkenness 
and hooliganism, while the following month the plunder of socialist property, 
bribery and speculation came under criticism.”223 On 28 January 1983, the 
CPUz Secretariat admitted that in 1982, 137 members had been expelled from 
the party, of which a quarter had been ejected for criminal offenses. This was 
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of course a relatively small number, considering it was a national party that had 
more than six hundred thousand members and candidates.224 
Furthermore, from spring of 1983, Rashidov – who was already discredited 
by rumors about his personal life225– tried to identify a number of scapegoats, 
denouncing weaker episodes of malfeasance in order to demonstrate that 
Tashkent was committed to cooperation with the CPSU. Generally, these 
accusations were full of moralism and no major charges were associated with 
them. However, this effort was presented as proof to the Gensek of the “hard 
line” of the Uzbek establishment, and also allowed internal purges within the 
CPUz to proceed. During the CC CPUz buro meeting of 22 April 1983, it was 
reported that some party members had received illicit incomes from the illegal 
trade of cars, which was common and widespread practice in the USSR. On that 
occasion, it was alleged that 
over the past three years, 34 executives of the Tashkent rayon bought cars for 
personal use and one third were resold or donated. Even the FS of Tashkent 
raikom in 1979 sold two cars and purchased the third on behalf of his wife, and 
the chairman of an asphalt factory sold three cars and bought a forth one [...]. 
Also Valeri Rubenovich Gabrilyan, Deputy Chairman of the Committee of 
Physical Culture and Sports at the SM UzSSR, [...] traded cars, had illegally got a 
new apartment with five rooms, every year was going to visit capitalist countries 
and had not been truthful during party controls. [...For these reasons] he is 
sanctioned by the party and the SM must pay attention to his case and send him 
away from his post.226 
However, parallel to his commitments to the hard line, Rashidov tried to 
pursue the usual triumphalism, emphasizing the republican duty to help 
maximize Soviet cotton production. During the IX plenum of the CC CPUz of 7 
February 1983, Rashidov kept boasting of the victories of the republic in 
agricultural production, declaring: 
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It is the third year that the republic has given the country more than 6 million 
tons of “white gold”, exceeding the plans also for corn, kenaf, vegetables, 
potatoes and cucurbits, fruit, grapes, meat, milk, eggs, wool, astrakhan sheep, 
silk, and other production […] exceeding the plans and providing 270 thousand 
tons of raw cotton or more. […] compared to the annual average of the X 5YP, 
the production of wheat in the kolkhoz and goskhoz increased by 27%, and 
vegetables by 20%.227 
On 16 February in Tashkent a conference called “the indestructible 
brotherhood of the Soviet peoples” was held and Rashidov gave a speech 
marking the 60th anniversary of the USSR. He stated: 
in the multi-centennial history of humanity, there are events that have left an 
indelible sign for their global meaning, for the strength and depth of their 
beneficial effect on the world, and on the destinies of the people of our planet. 
Of all these events, the epochal one was the creation of the USSR.228 
At the CPUz buro meeting of 25 February 1983, the positive economic 
trends in the UzSSR were further hailed, particularly the record production for 
the third consecutive year of more than six million tons of raw cotton, as well 
as its improved quality and a substantial increase in the production of meat, 
milk, and eggs.229 This triumphalism was even repeated on 28 February during 
the congress on the agricultural vanguards of the republic, held in Tashkent, 
where – under a huge Lenin portrait and banner reporting the figure 
‘6,000,000’ – there was a very self-congratulatory event and a long speech by 
Khudayberdyev.230 Also at the CPUz buro meeting of 11 March 1983 it was 
reiterated that, although there had not been optimal weather conditions, in 
1981-1982 more than 12 million tons of cotton had been sold to the state, 
exceeding the plan by 294 thousand tons.231 The agriculture results presented 
seemed to meet the party's requests. However, the CPUz – during the buro 
meeting of 23 March 1983 – even studied the possibility of further extending 
the arable areas of the republic, which already officially amounted to 4.1147 
million hectares.232 
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This contradictory line also emerged in the press: on 20 March 1983, Sovet 
Ozbekistoni, the main newspaper in the Uzbek language, published a call for 
people to strengthen discipline and to act as ‘party soldiers,’233 while at the 
same time trumpeting the achievements of the Rashidovian regime. On 18 
April 1983, Khudayberdyev reported to the SM USSR an article that had 
appeared in Izvestiya entitled “ne syrez, a volokno”234 where the great results 
of an average annual production of 6.012 million tons in 1981-1982 (exceeding 
the plan by 5.3%) were reported. The Uzbek government was still publicizing 
the great results of the past,235 in an attempt to live off the glory of the 
Brezhenev past that had already long passed in Moscow, if not in Tashkent. The 
triumphalism of Rashidov – who seemed to sincerely believe in cotton’s place 
in the civilizing mission of the UzSSR – was confirmed even with foreign 
officials, as occurred during his speech in Kabul on 26 April for the 5th 
anniversary of the (Saur) ‘April revolution’,236 and also during the Honecker and 
DDR delegation official visit in Tashkent on 6 May 1983.237 At the VII conference 
of the association of writers of Asian and African countries, Rashidov continued 
this line to foreigners, giving a long speech about the vigor of the ‘Tashkent 
spirit’ that had been awakened for over a quarter century.238  
CPUz triumphalism was not only about agriculture but also other sectors of 
the economy. In fact, Khudayberdyev, in the plenum of the CC CPUz of 30 May 
1983 repeated that, for the previous two years of the current 5YP, the light 
industry production volume had risen by 15.2% and textile production of 
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cotton by 34%.239 As well, in August the CC CPUz and the SM UzSSR announced 
that the MCC was also improving and in the previous two years of the eleventh 
FYP five new factories had been built, as had 30 outlets for cotton preparation 
and several stations for drying and stock. New technologies to increase the 
quality level had also been introduced.240 
Internally, the CPUz was already anticipating some purges in the regional 
establishments. In the CPUz buro of 10 June 1983 A.P. Shendrik, the Second 
Secretary of the Andijan obkom was accused of having built an illegal home 
and of giving to his two sons apartments that had another allotment. He was 
punished with party sanctions.241 At that point, the extent of the corruption 
phenomenon was not clear, as these serious episodes were still lumped in with 
the small-scale speculation and fraud carried out in the collective farms. In fact, 
in the meeting of the party-economic aktiv of CPUz held on 28 July 1983, 
several cases of malfeasance and black market speculation were denounced: 
the director (Malikov) and the General Accountant (Ravshan) of the kolkhoz 
"Gulistan" in Akdar'inski raion falsified financial documents in the amount of 
more than 100 thousand rubles, declaring that such money was granted as 
prizes to workers [...]. In the first six months of this year, the organs of the MVD 
in Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Chelyabinsk, Tyumen, and Omsk oblasts 
arrested 141 people of Uzbekistan on charges of speculation in agricultural 
production. Of these, 21 were from Tashkent oblast, 16 from Fergana oblast, 16 
from Namangan oblast, 11 from Tashkent city, and 78 from Andijan oblast242. 
At the same time, it became clear that these phenomena of corruption and 
malfeasance were assuming a systemic nature. In fact, similar trends were also 
detected in the health system, in universities, in municipal services, and in 
other departments of the economy.243 Corruption, then, was revealed as an 
intrinsic phenomenon in the UzSSR where “it was possible to buy everything 
and to pay for everything”.244 Of course, the party preferred to publicize only 
the merits of the republic, but this narrative could never hide from Moscow 
that something untoward was going on behind the scenes. 
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3.3.2 “Who do you think you are talking to?” 
Parallel to Rashidov’s triumphalism and the commitments of the FS CPUz, 
Andropov wanted to have the clearest view possible of what was going on in 
Uzbekistan. Then, the Gensek instructed the ‘mediation’ of one of the most 
talented rising communists of the moment. On 29 April 1983, Andropov 
replaced Kapitonov at the head of the Party Organization Department of the 
CC CPSU with the former FS Tomsk obkom, Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev. From his 
first days in office, Ligachev was warned by Viktor Smirnov – the head of Central 
Asian Department in the CC245 – about the alarming situation in Uzbekistan: 
especially in the period 1980-1983 the CC was receiving tens of thousands246 of 
letters from Uzbekistan denouncing corruption, injustice, dishonesty, 
arbitrariness, and abuse of power of every kind, and that the party simply 
responded with "official replies" declaring that the accusations were not 
founded or that measures had already been taken. In some severe cases, the 
authors of these letters wrote back that they had even been punished for 
expressing their criticism.247 
It is interesting to note how the chronology of the FYP, agricultural outputs, 
falsifications, and complaint letters perfectly match. The UzSSR that had to 
fulfill the plan at any cost and had to reach the famous 6,000,000 record. After 
the failures and problems in agriculture that mysteriously grew even in 1978-
1979, falsification in reports, corruption, and abuses of power exponentially 
developed in order to fulfill the plan at any cost and therefore from 1980 letters 
began to arrive when the party demanded the best effort from the people in 
order to realize the plan. As we will see, just in 1978-1983, the level of abuses 
became so evident and systemic that this was reflected in the letters of an 
exasperated population. The character of these ‘private reports’ was mostly 
microscopic and individual, concerning small cases of injustice perpetrated by 
                                                                
245 Smirnov was also the second secretary of the communist Party of Moldavia. 
According to Gdlyan, he was one of the main protectors of the Uzbek ‘mafioso’ system. 
Later, he was arrested and charged for bribe-taking during the ‘Uzbek affair’. However, 
Ligachev believed in his honesty. Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Nikolai 
Veniaminovich Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo (Moskva: Gramota, 1996); Ligachev, Inside 
Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 210. 
246 These huge figures were in part overhauled by Gorbachev in 1989 who announced 
to the politburo members that from 1978 to 1983 the Central Committee had received 
on average 736 letters per year from Uzbekistan in a total of 3680 letters over five years. 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 21, l. 1. 
247 Ibid., 210–12. 
225 
 
local powerful figures – such as directors of kolkhozes, raikom secretaries, 
managers of shops and in general anyone who was in charge of managing the 
slightest access to a scarce resource – who acted shamelessly. The content of 
these letters became starting points for further investigation and sometimes, 
as we shall see in the following paragraphs, led to the most dramatic 
consequences. 
Ligachev – often described as the honest face of the regime and probably 
one of the most orthodox Leninists –was a convinced Andropovian and it seems 
that he really believed in the Gensek’s attempts to moralize the Soviet state. 
From this perspective, it seems that he could not accept the situation and he 
had no pity for figures like Rashidov, who was described as a sort of ‘godfather’ 
protected by Brezhnev,248 and other local leaders who behaved like bais in a 
republic where "nothing could get done without a bribe."249 After reading some 
of these letters, Ligachev returned home in a bad mood and thought about a 
possible solution to improve the situation in Uzbekistan. The future number 
two of the Soviet regime was not powerful enough to directly confront 
Rashidov: he was not yet a politburo member nor a secretary.250 However, his 
role as department director was important and he had a direct line to 
Andropov. Finally, they met and the Gensek listened calmly. Thanks to his 
interactions with the KGB, the Gensek was fully aware of the situation in 
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Uzbekistan251 and insisted Ligachev to invite and to "put Rashidov in his 
place."252 Then, Rashidov came to Moscow for a business trip and met Ligachev 
who put a big pile of letters on the table. The Uzbek leader started to glance at 
them and Ligachev interrupted, stating 
Sharaf Rashidovich, the Central Committee is receiving many letters about the 
outrages in your republic. People are complaining — on major issues — more 
and more. We send the letters to you to be checked, but you and your comrades 
reply that the allegations are unfounded. That’s hard to believe. Look at how 
many letters there are. And this is only a small selection of them. The Central 
Committee has been deluged with letters from Uzbekistan.253 
Ligachev continues, describing how the Uzbek leader, faced with such bold 
and direct accusations, fidgeted in his chair and tried to find words to account 
for the situation. At this point, he countered and sought to put Ligachev in his 
place. Frowning unceremoniously, he demanded "Who do you think you are 
talking to?"254 Ligachev answered that Andropov had been informed about the 
letters and he was speaking at the request of the Gensek. Rashidov changed 
the tone of the conversation and, trying to keep calm, glanced at the letters 
and said “those letters are full of slander. We have to protect our leaders and 
give them a chance to work in peace. Uzbekistan must give the country cotton, 
and not... you know, letters.”255 Then, Ligachev proposed a commission 
authorized by the Central Committee be sent to Uzbekistan in order to evaluate 
the facts. He sought to mollify Rashidov, assuring him that there was nothing 
to fear from the commission and that slander would be called out publicly for 
what it was and the situation would improve anyway.256 After meeting in late 
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August 1983, Ligachev advised Andropov of the meeting.257 The Gensek 
requested to go deeper and "not to compromise the highest principles while 
examining all the questions [...] to mean that he wanted to get to the bottom 
of the matter."258 However Ligachev seemed to agree with the FS CPUz about 
the opportunity to establish the commission after the cotton harvest season, 
in order to do not prejudice the republic during its most stressful period or 
compromise the cotton supply for the state.259 In autumn, the CC Commission, 
headed by Konstantin Nikolaevich Mogilnichenko – the department's deputy 
director and "a principled, extremely honest man" – was created and sent to 
Uzbekistan where it uncovered incredible levels of corruption amongst the 
party cadres. Parallel to the party investigation, the KGB was already mobilized 
and discovered incredible facts in the remote UzSSR. 
3.3.3 The ‘Bukhara affair’ 
Parallel to the Ligachev’s ‘mediation’, Andropov established other 
mechanisms via the organ that was closest to his control, the KGB. Indeed, the 
Gensek authorized Levon Melkumov260 – the head of the Uzbek KGB - to 
conduct an investigative campaign on the diffused corruption within the UzSSR 
nomenklatura.261 The investigation campaign in Bukhara did not emerge out of 
nowhere and - despite evidence of malfeasance in the republic – the result was 
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not obvious. Melkumov was between the hammer and the anvil: he had to 
direct a centrally-oriented agency while he was officially under the direct 
dependence of the SM UzSSR. Indeed, in a republic were the party and the 
informal patrimonial politics were deeply consolidated in the power structure, 
it was not easy to operate against the local party. Already in 1981, Melkumov 
together with the Second Secretary CPUz Grekov, prudently initiated the 
investigation on the diffused corruption in the highest echelons of the 
Bukharan party nomenklatura, including the FS Bukhara obkom Abduvakhid 
Karimov who was famous for his patrimonial attitude and for including his 
friends within the oblast administration, in the UVD, and in the local 
prokuratura. Karimov – popularly known as the “Emir of Bukhara” for his 
lifestyle262 - was considered to be a protégée of Rashidov and of the former 
chairman of the MVD UzSSR Khaidar Khalikovich Yakh’yaev. Thus, a sort of 
immunity from the security organs – with the exception of the KGB – was in 
place. However, the KGB - although being a centrally-oriented and highly-
favored institution within the USSR – was not powerful enough to legitimize an 
action against such a high party official. 
After Brezhnev’s demise and the new course of Soviet politics – which was 
in a great part dominated by the KGB and its former chairman Andropov – the 
security committee had a broader remit to act, and the consent of Moscow to 
proceed. Then, under Andropov, also Melkumov – who did not have direct 
interests in the Uzbek power networks – followed the "Kremlin globalist" line 
and was able to start a case in the republic.263 According to Gdlyan and Ivanov, 
the idea to start the case exactly in Bukhara was strongly political. Considering 
the non-idyllic relations between Karimov and Rashidov, it was seen as 
potentially the safest option to pursue and the easiest place to hit in order to 
have the weakest resistance by the FS CPUz.264 The first signs of malfeasance 
were in the dozens of denunciations of some of the Bukhara residents who 
approached the regional KGB and protested against racketeering by the 
Bukhara police. Therefore, for almost three months the operation to catch – 
red-handed, if possible – one of the main figures responsible for the situation, 
the head of the Bukhara oblispolkom’s OBKhSS, Akhat Muzaffarov, was in 
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operation. For this purpose, the KGB had engaged a woman who had to give 
him a bribe of 1,000 rubles to release a convict from prison.  
The operation started in the afternoon of 27 April 1983, when Muzaffarov 
was caught red-handed and arrested. A treasure worth 1,131,183 rubles265 in 
cash, gold, diamonds, watches, and jeans – an excess of wealth in a country 
where the average salary was between 165-190 rubles per month – was found 
in his home.266 After denying his illegal activities, the investigators showed him 
the collected evidence – such as the recorded serial numbers of banknotes that 
he had received as a bribe – and he realized he was caught. Then, the former 
OBKhSS understood that KGB had collected much evidence against him and he 
decided to collaborate with the investigations and give other names. Among 
these were the FS Karimov, Kudratov - the director of the Bukhara 
gorpromtorg, and Davydov - the deputy chairman of the MVD UzSSR.267 
According to Vaksberg, Rashidov understood the danger of the case and 
wanted to cut all ties to the case, thereby closing Muzaffarov’s mouth 
forever268 and relegating the case to the MVD269 which was supposed to be 
under his control. However, this plan did not work. Within a few weeks eight 
high officials of Bukhara were also arrested, among whom was the head of the 
UVD. In fact, just after Muzaffarov’s first criminal case (the famous 
N°18/58115-83),270 the arrests of the arrogant S. Kudratov271 (3 May) and D. 
Sharipov proceeded,272 as did also the head of the UVD of the Bukhara 
                                                                
265 Ibid., 15. 
266 Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers. 
267 Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo, 16–20. 
268 Vaksberg argues that in Uzbekistan the price for a political (“Mafioso”) murder was 
between 10,000 and 200,000 rubles, meanwhile the indirect price of a son’s life – to do 
not send him to Afghanistan – was about 4,000-8,000 rubles. Vaksberg, The Soviet 
Mafia, 120–21. 
269 Ibid., 118. 
270 The verdict of the SC UzSSR of 13 May 1986 sentenced to death, and confiscation of 
property, S. Kudratov and A. Muzaffarov while other persons had been sentenced to 
long terms of imprisonment. PV, 21426, 158, 20 June 1987, p. 3. 
271 Shody Kudratov was the director of the Bukhara city organization for trade in 
manufactured goods (gorpromtorg), in whose house had been found more than 
4.000.000 rubles in cash and gold. Gdlyan defines him a briber who proudly declared: 
“the law, it’s me, Shody Khudratov” Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo, 15–20; Nashe 
Kino, Kremlevskie Pokhorony. Sharaf Rashidov. 
272 Sharipov was the, director of the provincial administration of the state committee 
for material and technical supply. 
230 
 
oblispolkom A. Dustov, the OBKHSS officials B. Gafarov and H. Dzhumaev, and 
the chairman of the district consumer cooperative, M. Bazarov.273 In parallel, 
the KGB was already running pre-operative investigations, sending more than 
150 officials in the city274 and defining the scope of a gigantic case that, were 
the law to be followed literally, could result in the arrest of many thousands 
officials from the party authorities, the Ministry of Interior, etc.275 
Still, in early June the KGB gave reason to delay the consolidation of the first 
phase of work in order to expand the scope of the investigation with another 
40 missions in Bukhara. Substantially, the KGB wanted to collect all the 
evidence of the case and so did not pass the investigation to the prokuratura. 
According to Gdlyan, the KGB – despite being a formidable organization against 
spies, dissidents, and religious figures – did not have a consolidated practice 
for this kind of investigation. Therefore, precious time was lost, giving the 
‘mafiosi’ the chance to organize themselves and to hide the valuables and to 
secure any evidence that might implicate them. These valuables were hidden 
in remote rural villages or, in case of cash and obligations, were just destroyed. 
Gdlyan recalls the Bukhara’s Kostry iz storublovok (fires of one-hundred-ruble-
bills),276 or even figures such as Dustov who had left only the nails on the walls 
and cheap carpets on the floor.277 Connected to Bukhara, in June 1983 the 
'Tashkent Affair' – related to the theft of oil on a large scale – emerged when it 
appeared that some officials enforced criminal activities maintaining ties with 
some leaders of law enforcement agencies and the State Committee for oil 
products. Then, the director of a petrol station S. Zakiryaev, the head of the 
Traffic Police Department of Tashkent UVD A. Madaminov and 13 tank farms 
and the gas station employees were arrested, accused of trying to bribe the 
chairman of the MVD UzSSR Kudrat Ergashev, who was removed from his post 
on 30 June 1983 – officially for retirement – and was replaced by Nimatzhan 
Ibragimov.278 As we have seen above, this was not the first time that the KGB 
investigations were targeting the MVD and its heads. In fact, the Uzbek cotton 
affair was, as well, part of a struggle between the two agencies and the heads 
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of the MVD were seen as the main figures that were receiving bribes to ignore 
corruption, in Uzbekistan as in the rest of the USSR. In fact, during the 
investigations it emerged that a large proportion of the bribes was addressed 
to the Uzbek MVD and, from there, directly to Shchelokov and Churbanov. The 
political nature of this strategy is therefore undeniable and helps us to perfectly 
interpret the Uzbek cotton affair – or at least its first ‘silent phase’ - in the 
framework of the Andropovian moralization campaign, in which the MVD 
became one of the main ‘victims’. 
Rashidov’s reaction to these facts was again that of a leader who wanted to 
downplay the negative phenomena in the republic, showing his commitments 
to the Andropovian cause. In fact, Rashidov did not want to extend the scope 
of the case and defined it merely as an isolated case on which the party and 
state organs would have to clarify. During the CPUz buro meeting of 27 May 
1983, Rashidov proceeded to pass the buck, commenting as follows: 
the organs that should enforce the law often lack a sense of responsibility and 
there are people who go on the road of corruption, such as the executives of 
the Bukhara OBKhSS UVD, of the Khorezm oblispolkom, and the Tashkent 
gorispolkom. These people should be involved in the struggle against theft of 
socialist property. [...Then,] the MVD, the Prokuratura, the MJ and the SC UzSSR 
do not work in a sufficiently active way to strengthen the fight against 
corruption, speculation, and theft and must improve collaboration with the 
state and people's control organs, improving the effectiveness of the CPSU work 
that is committed to the fight against theft of socialist property.279 
However, Rashidov was probably furious and tried to play the card of the 
moralization campaign in his favor, blaming those figures who were at the base 
of the investigations for the negative results in the republic. The Uzbek leader 
was still powerful enough to push through the removal of the second secretary 
CPUz Leonid Grekov280 on 8 July 1983. At that post arrived Timofey Nikolaevich 
Osetrov, an expert politician who had served from 1970 as First Deputy 
Chairman of the SM UzSSR. This initial pyrrhic victory for Rashidov was followed 
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280 Leonid Ivanovich Grekov was the Second Secretary CPUz (1976-1983). When the 
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by another incredible dismissal: on 24 August 1983, the head of the Uzbek KGB 
Melkumov was also dismissed from his post and transferred as Minister-
counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Prague. As well, his deputy, General 
Valentin N. Lagunov was also transferred to Tambov on 30 November and the 
rest of the Uzbek KGB top investigative department was substantially 
pensioned off.281 Probably, Rashidov believed that the dismissal of Melkumov 
could ease the tensions in the republic. Improbably, the harder General-Mayor 
Golovin took up the post of chairman of the KGB UzSSR282 and appealed to the 
General Prokuror to take the investigation and not to let the local authorities 
influence it in any way.283 In fact, from April 1983, the prokuratura USSR was 
warned of the KGB cases in Uzbekistan but was still not instructed to follow 
them. This precautionary line – to send the KGB on to make preliminary 
inquiries then allow the central prokuratura to immediately carry out the 
criminal cases – seemed to be necessary in a republic where – as we have said 
– the party controlled the security apparatus and justice could be readily 
bought and sold. Indeed, the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’ had been investigated by 
exogenous agents such as the centrally controlled KGB, the central Prokuratura 
of the USSR. Additionally, the most important trials – also considering the rank 
of the accused – took place not in normal courts but in the SC USSR. Thus, to 
send exogenous investigative groups from Moscow seemed to be the 
preferable solution, even considering that the Genprokuror USSR seemed not 
to trust the professionalism of the UzSSR investigators.284 
Therefore, on 18 August 1983 the investigations over the criminal case n. 
18/58115-83 (the "Bukhara affair") passed from the KGB to the USSR 
prokuratura, which created a special investigation team that became operative 
on September 1.285 The original investigative group on special cases was 
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composed of three people: Telman Gdlyan286 at the head, Nikolai Ivanov as the 
effective deputy of Gdlyan, and Ravil Tuktarov, whose responsibility it was to 
examine the first 14 volumes of materials. This was the original formation of 
one of the most famous investigative groups of Soviet history – something 
comparable to the Italian ‘Pool di Milano’ during the Tangentopoli affair – that 
just six years later was composed of more than 200 investigators and collected 
about one thousand volumes of materials.287 According to Razzakov, the 
investigations were transferred at the very moment that the Bukhara case was 
considered almost over and Gdlyan was asked to enlarge the case. Conversely, 
Gdlyan revealed to us that within the space of just three months after arriving 
in Uzbekistan he was asked by the Genprokuror to end the case as soon as 
possible,288 while in the meantime his investigative group was collecting other 
materials in order to enlarge the case and to hit the main culprits.  
Despite the narrative and the myths that were later created about Gdlyan’s 
legendary groups, we should remember that it was the most famous but not 
the only team of the USSR prokuratura that was working on the case. As well, 
there were hundreds of inspections that exposed the ‘cotton’ situation in the 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the republic to monitor the harvest season. In 
autumn 1983, the Prokuratura USSR informed the SM UzSSR about the 
disappearance of large amounts of cotton, as well as the failure in the use of 
machinery and defoliants detecting waste and inefficiency – such as the 
presence of cattle in the cotton fields – and the fact that several people in 
September and October did not show up at their official offices because they 
were working in the cotton fields. Seeing the tip of the iceberg, on 7 October, 
the prokuratura committed to broaden the investigation and by 14 October 
1983, more than 500 controls had been organized, of which 110 were in 
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kolkhozes and sovkhozes.289 Just a couple of weeks later, the first results of the 
investigations were produced.290 
Although Gdlyan and Ivanov were not the only investigators in the Uzbek 
cotton affairs, their role in the initial stage of the Bukhara affairs was the most 
prominent. In fact, they were finally able to involve even the FS of Bukhara 
oblast (and Rashidov’s friend) Abduvakhid Karimovich Karimov291 who was 
dismissed from his post on 4 January 1984, replaced by Ismail Dzhabbarov, and 
transferred to Tashkent where he covered a minor post as deputy minister of 
land reclamation and water resources. The Gdlyan’s group had collected 
evidences against his criminal activity292 and organized an operation to give him 
to justice. On 11 August 1984, when the ‘Emir emeritus’ was holding a party in 
his mountain dacha in Karshi, in the middle of the night, a squad headed by 
Ivanov arrested him. In that incredible night,293 Karimov was deported by 
helicopter to Tashkent – and later to Moscow’s Lefortovo prison – and his 
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treasure confiscated in the following days.294 On 13 Odylov, a mysterious figure 
we will analyze in the next paragraphs, was arrested and on 15 August, just 
four days after Karimov’s arrest, General-Lieutenant Kudrat Ergashev – the 
former chairman of the MVD UzSSR – committed suicide.295 This serious 
episode was just the first of a trail of blood and suspicious suicides among many 
eminent figures who wanted to save their honor and the heritage of their 
families.296 The most famous case is the suspicious death (officially 
acknowledged as a suicide) of the first deputy chairman of the MVD UzSSR, 
Gennady Davydov, who was found on the night of 17-18 May 1985 with three 
bullets in his head. Usually it only takes one, but perhaps his will to die had 
allowed him to shoot a further two bullets after the first had killed him. In any 
case, the Bukharan ‘soap opera’ did not end there. In fact, even Shamsi 
Abdullaevich Rakhimov, chairman of the Bukhara UVD was arrested for bribery 
and in May 1986 sentenced to 14 years in prison.297 
As we have seen, besides the seriousness of the facts, the Bukharan affair 
kept a very internal dimension and was not publicized in great detail in the 
Soviet press. In fact, the information of these facts emerged only in the late 
‘80s during the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ that we will analyze in the sixth chapter. 
This first story was probably the main case that remained almost confined in 
the judicial dimension and its politicization would emerge later, during the next 
stages of the cotton affair. As we had the occasion to examine, at the beginning 
of the Bukhara affair only low-middle level personnel were taken, while the 
main ‘bosses’ of the corruption machine emerged only after autumn 1983. 
What was the connection between these trends and these dates? What 
happened later? As we have seen, even the powerful KGB found many 
problems in conducting investigations in Uzbekistan where high-level officials 
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enjoyed the political protection of Rashidov. Things changed when the ‘Uzbek 
khan’ left the stage. 
3.3.4 An unhappy ending 
September 1983 was a dramatic moment for the FS CPUz. After a hard 
battle against the KGB and an initial pyrrhic victory in the republic – the 
removal of Grekov and Melkumov – the investigative teams of the USSR 
prokuratura were spread, and Gdlyan took a case that was directly threatening 
the stability of Rashidov’s regime. The Uzbek leader was prompted by Moscow 
to resign from his office, and a possible succession proved highly problematic 
when his predestined successor Khodzhaev suddenly died.298 Another bad 
omen arrived on 21 September 1983 when the famous Machine operator 
Tursunoi Akhunova from the Kirov kolkhoz died at only 47 years old. Akhunova 
had become a symbol of the Rashidovian cotton triumph and her death was 
something of a portent of the end of the Rashidov era.299 
While the first effects began to bite in the Tashkent regime, the CC CPUz 
kept his agenda full of commitments, and on September 11 he left the republic 
for an official visit in Ethiopia and prepared to welcome delegations from 
Mongolia (23 September) and from Germany (28 September) that were coming 
to Tashkent. At the same time, as usual, the Uzbek leader started on October 
1 his usual period of business trips around the republic to supervise and to 
encourage the local cotton pickers: on October 1 he gave a speech at the 
Plenum of the Syrdarya obkom, on October 6 did the same at the Plenum of 
the Jizzakh and on October 13 he participated in the Plenum of the Navoi 
obkom. In the meantime, on 10 October 1983, the Secretariat CPUz made a 
budget of losses due to violations that had been discovered in the kolkhoz and 
in the sovkhoz of the republic - especially in Samarkand - revealing that: 
In the Samarkand oblast, many kolkhozes and sovkhozes purchased cattle from 
the people at market prices and causing losses of more than 2 million rubles in 
1981 and about 4 million rubles in 1982. In many kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
appear violations of financial activity, [...] statements and reports by workers in 
the party organs and in the soviets. Just in the years 1981-1983, the CC CPSU, 
the CC CPUz and the Samarkand obkom received 670 reports and statements 
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[to denounce these events. Therefore], the debt of the kolkhozes is 38 million 
rubles and the debt of sovkhoz is 54 million. In 1981, 1982 and in the first nine 
months of 1983, in the oblast have been replaced 95 directors of the kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes, that is 49% of the total300. 
Substantially, the CPUz revealed evidence of malfeasance in the republic 
and a first purge was conducted against the Samarkand agrarian leadership. 
This was an event that was as curious as it was important because it was carried 
out by the Rashidov leadership, a politician who was supposed to help and 
represent the Samarkand/Jizzak group. Then, on 17 October Rashidov received 
the CPSU secretary Kapitonov who came to Tashkent probably trying to 
convince him to not delay his retirement. Together they traveled the republic, 
visited the Andijan and Tashkent regions and on 19 October they came to visit 
that aircraft plant that just a year before had offered Brezhnev the worst of 
Uzbek hospitality.  
In those days, Rashidov was visibly very tired and seemingly depressed. Also 
at the buro meeting of 21 October 1983, one of the last party meetings 
attended by the increasingly nervous Rashidov, the pitch of the allegations 
became even more heated. On this occasion, the party acknowledged that 
mistakes had been made and that the republic was affected by the spread 
practice of making falsifications and additions. The shown data presaged a 
warning framework: 
in the fight against counterfeiting in the first semester of 1983, had been verified 
data of 1567 companies, institutions and organizations of the republic. […] 
Controls showed that were frequent episodes of falsification detecting in 34% 
of checked cases and only 7% of which would be unintentional. […] in 
Surkhandarya falsifications amounted for 12.7%, 11.9% in Namangan, 10.9% in 
Fergana and 9.5% in Samarkand.301 
The emerging circumstances and the doubting messages from Moscow 
worried the Uzbek leader who felt the psychological pressure of the party and 
of the KGB, most clearly represented by Andropov and his ally and former KGB 
official, Gaydar Aliyev, whose name became much more famous in the ‘90s 
when he became the President of Azerbaijan. At that time, Aliyev was a full 
member of the Politburo and had a strong influence on the KGB. A not totally 
fictional version of these facts – also confirmed by the impressions of Ryzhkov 
- claims that Aliyev had a role in warning Rashidov about the fact that Andropov 
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was preparing a judicial campaign against him and maybe also in initiating – or 
at least threatening – investigations in the UzSSR.302 Apparently, the influential 
Aliyev wanted to focus on Uzbekistan in order to divert the attention of the 
moralization campaign from his republic. In fact, it was estimated that 
Azerbaijan had – proportionally - the highest corruption and patrimonialism 
rates of the whole USSR,303 and this was not something new.304 However, Aliyev 
was able to successfully cover up an eventual ‘Azeri cotton scandal’305 and was 
                                                                
302 Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran (London & New 
York: Overlook TP, 2011), 131. 
303 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 86; Satarov, Antikorruptsionnaya Politika: Uchebnoye 
Posobiye, 44–45; Zemtsov, Partiya Ili Mafiya. Razvorovannaya Respublika. 
304 In 1969, the FS Azerbaijan party "Veli Akhundov, was eventually blamed for the 
economic crisis, accused of corruption, and removed in 1969. Akhundov’s replacement 
was Heydar Aliyev [...] who had climbed through the ranks of the KGB in Nakhichevan. 
Aliyev promoted growth of nonpetroleum-related industry but also consolidated 
Azerbaijani control of dominant positions in the political and economic administration. 
Though appointed to root out corruption, he replaced Akhundov’s corruption with his 
own patronage system. In 1982 Aliyev became the first Azerbaijani appointed to the 
Politburo, but he was ousted from that post in 1987 because of his toleration of 
corruption and opposition to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms." Bernard A Cook, 
“Azerbaijan,” in Europe since 1945 : An Encyclopedia, ed. Bernard A Cook (New York-
London: Garland, 2001), 70; Viktor Andrianov and Guseynbala Miralamov, Geydar Aliyev 
(Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2005). 
305 In 1978, during a session of the SS Azerbaijan, Gambay Aleskerovich Mamedov – the 
former head of the investigation department of the republican KGB, prosecutor of 
Azerbaijan, and a veteran of the Battle of Stalingrad – came unexpectedly to the podium 
session and denounced the criminal responsibility of Aliyev for the deficiency in 
agriculture and industry in the republic. In particular, he referred to 'additions' in the 
Azeri cotton production system – which had been unable to produce the claimed annual 
production of one million tons of raw cotton – and corruption in the upper echelons of 
the republican authorities. Aliyev was able to cover the case up and Mamedov was 
discredited by a campaign of anonymous letters that denounced his honesty and finally 
he was removed from his post, exiled to Moscow, and three years later expelled from 
the party. All the evidence of his investigations was destroyed and the episode 
forgotten. Only recently have opposition circles in Azerbaijan resurrected the case in 
order to discredit the Aliyev ‘dynasty’. Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 176–87; Azadliq 
Radiosu, “Gambay Mamedov Protiv Geydara Aliyeva,” Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty, October 14, 2009; Gordon, “Byvshiy Sledovatel’ Po Osobo Vazhnym Delam Pri 
General’nom Prokurore SSSR Vladimir Kalinichenko: ‘Vsesil’nyy Ministr MVD SSSR 
Shchelokov Prinyal Resheniye O Moyem Fizicheskom Ustranenii. V Otvet Na Eto 
239 
 
at that point riding the moralization campaign against another veteran of the 
Brezhnevian regime. 
Also the writer Georgy Markov, who met Rashidov in those late October 
days, confirmed that the Uzbek leader was very depressed and visibly 
worried.306 The same impression is given by Ryzhkov who at the end of October 
joined a Soviet delegation to Vietnam headed by Aliyev307 – one of the main 
trustees of Andropov, show hospitalization was imminent. The delegation 
halted for a technical stop in Tashkent and: 
We arrived, we were welcomed by Rashidov, without much celebration. Then 
they took us to the residence where there was a banquet. There were few 
people, about 10-15 on one side and we were 5-6 on the other. The lunch went 
well. I was sitting next to him [Rashidov], and in front of us there was Aliyev. In 
that moment, I noticed he changed his mood. He was a completely different 
person. Not that cheering, charming and elegant man I had seen in Moscow 
[with a] funny and interesting [attitude]. He was visibly depressed and silent. I 
had the feeling as if there was something depressing him, as he was seriously ill, 
or something else. However, it was pretty obvious that he was depressed. The 
dinner was over, we spent the night, the morning after we left [for Vietnam]. He 
accompanied us to the airport and the atmosphere was the same [heavy]. He 
was not himself. He said that he also had to make a trip in the republic’s oblasts 
because the cotton harvest had already begun. That's how we left. Two days 
later in Vietnam, we were informed that he was dead. Then, there were rumors 
that he committed suicide: For me it is still not clear, and, to be honest, I have 
never been interested in this issue. Apparently, someone knows, but as they 
say, ‘it is not known if it's worth digging up the past.’308 
During his visits to the cotton fields in Karakalpakya, Rashidov suddenly felt 
bad: he had a heart attack about seven o'clock in the evening on 30 October. 
His physician Boris Naumov noted a sharp re-extensive myocardial infarction, 
in which there was an acute sharp heart disorder. “Rashidov could no longer 
be saved, and the next day at five o'clock in the morning he died. [...] Death 
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occurred in a train. During his trips, he usually slept not at the hotel and stayed 
in a cabin-wagon, where he had his wife, a doctor, and a personal chef.”309 In 
the official medical report it is stated that he suffered from 
coronary artery disease and ischemia, atherosclerosis of the coronary vessels, 
cardiosclerosis post-heart attack. On October 30, 1983 at 19 had an acute 
infarction, repeated and extensive infarction and as a result has happened an 
acute cardiac event and 31 October at 5 in the morning his heart stopped.310 
Then, on 31 October 1983 – 22 years to the day after Stalin's body was 
removed from Lenin's Tomb, symbolizing the end on an era – the UzSSR was 
shocked by a tragic political event. The passing of a leader who had ruled the 
republic for almost a quarter of century was also the end of an era. As was 
already mentioned by Ryzhkov, Rashidov’s death recalls the similar and 
mysterious deceases of Fedor Kulakov in 1978, and Pyotr Masherov in 1980 
who seemed to be worried just days before their deaths.311 Since the very first 
moments, stories about his suicide – or even his murder – started to circulate 
in most parts of Soviet regime, in the tabloid press, and even in contemporary 
reconstructions.312 Even Ligachev gives the impression that something was 
strange because during their meeting at the CC Rashidov had appeared "in 
robust good health.”313 In order to formulate a credible hypothesis it is better 
for us to proceed by way of Occam’s razor, to say that these rumors came 
directly from those opponents who wanted to discredit him as guilty and were 
then echoed in a society that is generally prone to conspiracy theories. In fact, 
there is no evidence to suggest his committed suicide, and also his colleagues 
in Uzbekistan and in the CC CPSU – such as his alleged rivals Nishanov314 and 
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Gdlyan315 – exclude this hypothesis. However, is probable that Rashidov felt 
the psychological pressure of the situation in the republic, and he understood 
that the game was going to be over for him.316 As Nishanov comments, 
Rashidov was like a “hovering cloud”317 who had just suffered a stressful 
political condition and psychological conflict with Andropov. Added to this, his 
poor health – on account of his injuries on the front and his cardiac illness, 
which required a strict diet – and his practice of making numerous trips to visit 
cotton fields, his very early morning starts, and even the head injures he got 
during the Brezhnev visit in Tashkent, it is clear he had sufficient pre-conditions 
for death. As the Russian historian Yaroslav Listov commented, to work as a 
mad man – as Rashidov did – could be seen as an indirect way of committing 
suicide. Then, Nikita Petrov, historian of the society "memorial", said that it 
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of murder saying that "It is not true, because he died in the presence of his relatives, in 
their own hands. This is just to say that [he died] close to those people who were not 
interested in his death and who knew that the end of Rashidov could weaken their 
position. [In front of such allegations] the FS of Karakalpakya, Kalibek Komalovich 
Komalov, a very intelligent man, laughed, saying that these rumors are taken from the 
clouds and have nothing to do with reality. His daughter, after all, was married to the 
son of Rashidov. It's evident that they had a good relationship. All these rumors about 
the death of Rashidov, have nothing to do with the truth." Personal interview with 
Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. Conversely, Ivanov – who was 
the conspiracy theorist of the group – did not exclude the possibility of suicide or 
murder. Nashe Kino, Kremlevskie Pokhorony. Sharaf Rashidov. 
316 In a historic documentary for Russian TV the last days of the ‘Uzbek Khan’ are 
reconstructed, probably with some element of fiction,. On 29 October, the FS Khorezm 
Khudaibergenov reported to Rashidov that his oblast had harvested 300,000 tons. The 
day after, from the train he used to travel around Uzbekistan during the cotton harvest 
season, Rashidov called Andropov to announce this victory and he was expecting to hear 
from the Gensek some praising words, but Andropov answered very drily "we will check 
your information." From that moment Rashidov started to feel bad. The documentary 
also reports versions of his suicide – without providing any significant elements – and 
the journalist Akram Murtazaev – one of the last people to had a contact with him by 
phone for an interview on Komsomolskaya Pravda – declared that Rashidov was calm 
at the phone and he is skeptical about suicide. Ibid. 
317 Nishanov, Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Raﬁk Nishanov Rasskazyvaet Marine 
Zavade I Yurii Kulikovu, 216. 
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was a natural death and after Rashidov’s death the politburo warned its 
member to take better care of their health.318 
Rashidov’s official post-mortem released on PV on 1 November 1983 – 
signed by both Soviet and Uzbek party and state authorities319 – praised him as 
a devoted Soviet figure, “an eminent personality who spent all his life in the 
great activity of building communism,"320 stating:  
In all parts of the party, state and society, Sh. R. Rashidov showed 
wholeheartedly his dedication to communism, [his] will and perseverance in the 
realization of Party policy. He has been characterized by a sense of innovation, 
by the ability to solve the problems of life of the party and the state in a creative 
way, to gather and organize people, leading the organization of the republic 
party for nearly a quarter of a century. He has dedicated his rich life experience, 
organizational development skills of economy and culture in the republic. 
During these years, strong industrial and technical-scientific potential have been 
created in Uzbekistan, leading the development of new branches of industry, 
and agriculture has become greater and mechanized. Uzbekistan has become 
the main base for the country's cotton. Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov is a famous 
writer and journalist. A series of novels, stories, theoretical works on current 
problems of literature, international education and friendship of the peoples 
were born of his pen. He is the member of the writers’ union of the USSR. For 
the great merits in front of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, Sh. R. 
Rashidov was twice awarded with the Hero of Socialist Labor. He also got several 
state honors: Order of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, the red banner 
of labor, red star, a mark of honor and other medals. The venerated memory of 
Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet 
                                                                
318 Nashe Kino, Kremlevskie Pokhorony. Sharaf Rashidov. 
319 The document was signed by Yu.V. Andropov, G.A. Aliyev, M.S. Gorbachev, V.V. 
Grishin, A.A. Gromyko, D.A. Kunayev, G.V. Romanov, N.A. Tikhonov, D.F. Ustinov, K.U. 
Chernenko, V.V. Shcherbitskii, V.I. Vorotnikov, P.N. Demichev, V.I. Dolgikh, V.V. 
Kuznetsov, B.N. Ponomarev, M.S. Solomentsev, E.A. Shevardnadze, M.V. Zimyanin, I.V. 
Kapitonov, K.V. Rusakov, N.I. Ryzhkov, T.N. Menteshashvili, E. Ajetmuratov, I.G. 
Anisimkin, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.K. Mikhailov, M.M. Musakhanov, T.N. Osetrov, A.U. 
Salimov, I.B. Usmankhodzhayev, N.D. Khudayberdyev, K. Kamalov, N. M. Makhmudova, 
U. Umarov, R. Ashuraliyev, R.G. Gaipov, V.P. Yesin, M. Kamalov, A. Karimov, A.K. 
Karimov, S. Mamarasulov, Kh. Umarov, V.A. Khajdurov, M. Khudaibergenov, Kh. A. 
Shagazatov, G.M. Markov, A.S. Sadykov, Kh. Rustamov, N.P. Zheleznov, D. Yusupov, S.A. 
Azimov. PV, 20324, 250, 1 November 1983, p. 1. 
320 PV, 20324, 250, 1 November 1983, p. 1. 
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people, flaming patriot and internationalist, will always remain in the hearts of 
the Soviet people.321 
On 1 November in Tashkent, the farewell to Rashidov322 - held in the Palace 
of Friendship - was attended by thousands of people who formed long queues 
to pay homage Rashidov’s body and occupied for hours the center of the Uzbek 
capital.323 Then, a special commission was created to organize a state 
funeral,324 which was held on November 2 in the central Lenin square of 
Tashkent just in front of the Lenin Museum in a very solemn ceremony. On that 
occasion the candidate member of the politburo Vladimir Dolgikh participated, 
and also from Moscow Khudayberdyev read a eulogy almost in tears where he 
kept promising that the country would provide the requested 6 million. On that 
occasion, also Usmankhodzhaev exclaimed: 
The wise, greatly experienced comrade, friend, brother that we have loved so 
much for his great dedication to the activity of the revolution – with which he 
had the same age - the rare goals, the heightened sense of responsibility, the 
undoubted modesty is no longer with us. it is impossible to list everything that 
Sharaf Rashidovich has done for the organization of the Republic Party, which 
he had ruled for nearly a quarter century of our native Uzbekistan.325 [Then it 
seems that he informally exclaimed] “his glorious deeds, his bright examples will 
remain with us forever.”326 
 Rashidov’s body was buried on the central square in Tashkent, close to the 
Lenin memorial where the huge Lenin statue stood. Then, a project to build a 
memorial complex was developed, which could become a place of pilgrimage 
                                                                
321 PV, 20324, 250, 1 November 1983, p. 1. 
322 At Rashidov’s farewell, the head of the cotton brigade of the sovkhoz ‘Ulyanov’ Kh. 
Rustamov, the head of the Komsomol youth brigade Tashkent aviation production 
association E. Mirkamilov, the President of the AN UzSSR A. Sadykov, the FS of 
Turkmenistan M.G. Gapurov, the Commander of the Turkestan military district, the 
General Yuri Maksimov, and the secretary of the Union of Soviet writers A. Ananiev also 
participated. Tsifrovaya Biblioteka Ukrainy, “Pokhorony Sharaf Rashidovicha 
Rashidova” (Kiev, 2013). 
323 PV, 20325, 251, 2 November 1983, p. 1. 
324 The decision to organize a state funeral for Rashidov was announced with the 
resolution n° 628 (31 October 1983) of the CC CPUz, Presidium of the SS UzSSR and the 
SM UzSSR. It was implemented by the CPUz buro of 3 November 1983. Prot. 76/1983, 
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2342, l. 38. 
325 PV, 20326, 252, 3 November 1983, p. 1. 
326 Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR. 
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for the workers.327 Just after the demise of the Uzbek leader it seemed that the 
whole republic had lost its most spiritual guide, a sort of semi-god to whom 
everybody was devoted. Just in the aftermath of Rashidov’s funeral, measures 
to protect his memory were implemented, such as renaming streets in 
Tashkent and Jizzak, entitling to him a raion of the Kashkadarya oblast – 
Sharafrashidovsky – and three higher education institutions (in Tashkent and 
Jizzak), as well as the renaming of a textile plant in Tashkent, a kolkhoz in the 
Karakalpak ASSR, the regional library of Jizzak, a memorial room in the State 
Museum of the peoples of the Uzbek SSR. Moreover, several plaques on 
buildings in Tashkent, Jizzak, and Samarkand were set.328 Rashidov died in a 
very delicate moment for the Soviet political life when also Andropov – who 
has been permanently hospitalized from August 1983 – was entering his 
terminal phase. Despite his short reign, Andropov’s legacy survived.  
                                                                
327 Nashe Kino, Kremlevskie Pokhorony. Sharaf Rashidov. 
328 Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR. 
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4 THE SYSTEMIC PHASE (1984-1985) 
 
You see, this is the first general law of real socialism: 
leaders lie, always, even when it is not necessary. The 
second is that agriculture does not work. Never, in any of 
these countries. Third, pay attention – he said this to me 
very seriously – communist candies always stick to the 
paper.1 – Berlinguer 
The bribe is a dangerous enemy of the revolution and 
of the new system2 – Osetrov 
“Ты не посадишь – тебя посадят. Ты не уберешь 
– тебя уберут”;3 “Не подмажешь – не поедешь”4 – 
Russian proverbs 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Rashidov tried to ride the 
Andropovian moralization campaign in order to oust his rivals or to blame his 
opponents, and to keep scandals as limited and isolated episodes that would 
not taint the healthy image of the republic. However, he proved to be unable 
to control the indirect effects that the various campaigns of the KGB, the 
prokuratura and the PCC had on the CPUz and, indeed, the republican 
administrative apparatus as a whole. In fact, the emergence of these scandals 
sensitized the Uzbek party to the need to clean – or maybe to purge – the 
                                                                
1 The FS of the Italian communist party, Enrico Berlinguer, to the young secretary 
Massimo D'Alema in Moscow on 13 February 1984, before entering the mortuary of 
Yuri Andropov. Massimo D’Alema, A Mosca L’ultima Volta : Enrico Berlinguer E Il 1984 
(Roma: Donzelli, 2004), 61. 
2 The second secretary of the CPUz, T.N. Osetrov, in the aftermath of the XVI plenum. 
Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 18. 
3 “If you don’t pitch [them], you will be pitched [put in jail], if you don’t pick them, you 
will be picked [taken out].” This is a reinterpretation of a famous Russian joke told in 
Khrushevian times about corn: Почему опасно иметь дело с кукурузой? Ее не 
посадишь - тебя посадят! Ее не уберешь - тебя уберут! 
4 “If you don't grease [the wheels, the cart] won't go.” 
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malfeasance that had been diffused inside the party and the state. In this 
moment of agony for patrimonialism, Moscow claimed to identify the 
responsible of the situation and, on the aftermath of Rashidov’s death, a self-
destructive witch hunt began within the CPUz to identify scapegoats in a 
moment when local scandals turned into a systemic case at party and state 
level. However, Rashidov died before the systems he had built over the 
course of 24 years collapsed under a series of exogenous and endogenous 
factors. With the death of the ‘khan’, the ‘silent phase’ was almost over and 
the CPUz entered a stage with a new FS, who tried to keep the stability of the 
party and to proceed with systemic internal purges. The new head of the 
Republic did not understand that in trying to confront the patrimonial system 
he would further destroy the existing system of management. Patrimonialism 
was under attack. The former was done because the falsification/corruption 
cases were no longer considered to be local and isolated but rather as a 
republican problem. Was this the effect of an internal struggle for Rashidov 
succession or maybe was it the result of the new aggressive policy that 
Moscow was enforcing to retake control over the republic? Both 
interpretations are pertinent to the Uzbek cotton affair and, as we will see, 
the first depended on the effectivity of the second. Substantially, after 
Rashidov demise, the role of Moscow in setting the Uzbek agenda increased 
drastically and the CPUz ended to execute the central orders, while, at the 
same time, the new establishment was blaming the former regime and 
searching for sacrificial victims to be exhibited. The local apparatus was 
trembling. 
4.1 The Post-Rashidov UzSSR 
As we have noted, after Rashidov’s death, the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ 
essentially took on a systemic character. The criminal cases themselves were 
separate and often unrelated to cotton. Nevertheless, the new FS CPUz – who 
in this first stage did not deny the prestigious role of Sharaf Rashidovich – 
chose not to further minimize their relevance and progressively started to 
present these cases as a systemic problem to be dealt with inside the party. 
His strategy was again functional to his legitimation and assured him – in this 
phase – a semblance of stability. However, the consequences would become 
dramatic and uncontrollable as the case would spread among the public. 
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4.1.1 The rise of Sekretar nol’ 
In the final years of Soviet Uzbekistan there were many jokes about the 
fact that there was only ever an eternal and charismatic first secretary 
(Rashidov) and his successors could only aspire, at best, to be a sekretar nol’ 
(‘zeroth secretary’). Indeed, this nickname was given to the next FS CPUz and 
reflected his low charisma,5 his servility towards Moscow, and maybe his 
weakness within the various factions of the republican party. Indeed, the 
search for Rashidov’s successor was a complex event: in that moment, the CC 
cadres had the delicate task of designating a candidate who could strengthen 
Soviet sovereignty in Uzbekistan and continue the investigations in order to 
remove all of those who had been guilty of crimes against socialist property. 
Most importantly, the CPSU wanted to invest in a controllable figure that 
could brace Moscow grip’s over the Central Asian republic.  
In the immediate aftermath of Rashidov’s death, the plenum of the CC 
CPUz of 3 November 1983 paid a long tribute to the defunct leader. On that 
occasion, the second secretary, Osetrov, recognized the importance of 
Rashidov within the party and the state, devoting “all his life and his talent to 
the construction of communism”. He also declared that: 
all of us members of the CC are grateful to the fate that gave us the happiness 
to work together with Rashidov, under his leadership, and to realize the 
predestination of the Lenin party, […] In these almost 25 years, Rashidov 
sincerely and selflessly served the party, the motherland and the Soviet 
people. [He was a] person of exceptional operability and a tireless worker, a 
good organizer, and talented manager. A fighter for the general line of the 
party, strong and virile. During every move, he recalled the ideals of 
communism […]. He was an example of modern Leninist leadership […as it 
was] reiterated by the Secretary of the CC CPSU Vladimir Ivanovich Dolgikh. All 
the victories of the workers of the republic for the last two decades, and even 
today's affairs, shine with the name of Sharaf Rashidovich, his patriotic affairs, 
and his energy. During these years in Uzbekistan, a strong industrial and 
technical-scientific potential has been created, leading to a new phase of 
industrial development. [... furthermore] the republic became the main cotton 
source for the Soviet state.6 
                                                                
5 Gdlyan commented: “Usmankhodzhaev with his quality could not be compared with 
Rashidov. Rashidov was smarter and cunning, while Inamdzhan Buzrukovich was 
quieter, not harmful and to some extent naive.” Personal interview with Telman 
Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
6 Prot. 12/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2320, ll. 4-5. 
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During this occasion, the aforementioned Inamzhon Buzrukovich 
Usmankhodzhaev7 – a respected Uzbek, devoted communist, and centrally 
oriented Soviet figure8 who was the chairman of the Presidium of the SS 
UzSSR – was appointed FS of the CPUz9 and made a speech that was as 
ambiguous as it was worrying. In fact, in thanking the participants, the new 
leader recalled how – to honor the memory of Rashidov – it was necessary to 
improve the situation of the party, taking a collaborative position with the 
requests of the Central Party. Specifically, Usmankhodzhaev declared: 
                                                                
7 The official biography reported: "Inamzhon Buzrukovich Usmankhodzhaev was born 
on 21 May 1930 in the village of Baghdad, in the Baghdad raion of the Ferghana 
oblast, Uzbek. Higher education: in 1955 graduated from the Tashkent Polytechnic 
Institute. Member of the CPSU since 1958. At the XXVI Congress of the Party recruited 
member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Member of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 
deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, honored builder of the Uzbek SSR. 
Since 1955, he worked as an engineer trust "Fergenavodstroy", head of a construction 
site trust, the chief architect of the city of Margilan. In 1960-1965, he was the 
instructor of regional party committee, the head of the regional administration for the 
construction of the collective farms, the deputy chairman of the regional association 
"Selhoztehnikav", the chairman of the executive committee of Fergana. From 1965 he 
was the secretary of the Syrdarya obkom, and from 1969, the instructor of party 
organizational work of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In 1972-1974 he was the 
chairman of the Namangan oblispolkom, and in 1974-1978 years, the FS of the Andijan 
obkom. From December 1978 he became Chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR. 
Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the SS USSR. He was awarded the Order of 
Lenin, the October Revolution, two Orders of Red Banner of Labor, the Order "Badge 
of Honor" medal." PV, 20327, 253, 4 November 1983, p. 1. 
8  According to Ligachev, the appointment of Usmankhodzhaev was also welcomed by 
Chernenko, Gorbachev and the politburo. Ligachev confirmed his appreciation but 
rejects any accusation of patronage. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s 
Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 242.  
9 Officially, Osetrov proposed to Andropov the candidacy of Usmankhodzhaev. 
However, Ligachev discusses the somewhat cryptic circumstances of Usmankhodzhaev 
appointment and gives the responsibility to Chernenko "who was handling personnel 
matters for the hospitalize Andropov." Probably with Ligachev’s advice and the 
support of Gorbachev – who "took active part in the review of candidates" – put forth 
Usmankhodzhaev’s candidacy to the Politburo. As was regular practice, at this point 
the Politburo merely approved the appointment. Cf. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and 
Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 220, 242. 
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Now that with us there is no more our dear Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, 
when his warm heart has stopped beating, we with you, under the leadership 
of the CC CPSU, will make the general line of the party, concentrating all forces 
for the resolution of the key problems that the organization of the republic 
party and also all workers of Uzbekistan have to face. Sincerely trusting in their 
help to solve these problems and to support the activity of the republic party. 
In this hard moment, their duty is their vocation, even more to close our ranks 
around the CPSU. [...] Doing so, it will be the best tribute to the memory of 
Rashidov who has passed away. [...] Success, of course, is determined by 
cadres. Improving the selection of cadres, their deployment, their education at 
Obkom, Gorkom and raikom levels [...] and improving their work in an 
atmosphere of criticism and self-criticism.10 
This call sounded like a warning to the whole party and seemed to 
announce that something immense was going to happen soon. However, in 
the aftermath of Rashidov’s demise, the lack of a determined strategy was 
clear, and the CPUz was in any case committed to pursuing the predecessor’s 
way. Furthermore, the name of the deceased leader also seemed be destined 
to point the way to communism and to resound for the following months.  
Already during the meeting of CPUz buro on 18 November 1983, the draft of 
a Rashidov commemoration proposed by CC CPSU was approved.11 Therefore, 
in this very delicate phase, besides the serious and evident legacies of the 
former Uzbek regime, Rashidov’s name remained a respected symbol in the 
political life of the UzSSR. In fact, based on the resolution n. 1227 of the CC 
CPSU and SM USSR of 23 December 1983, during the CPUz buro meeting of 5 
January 1984, the resolution n. 9 of the CC CPUz and SM UzSSR that 
confirmed the memory for the defunct leader and gave his name to many 
places in the republic was approved.12 Then, on the same occasion – on the 
                                                                
10 Prot. 12/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2320, ll. 9-10. 
11 Prot. 78/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2344, l. 22. 
12 1 - entitling Rashidov to the Tashkent textile complex, the regional library of the 
Jizzakh oblast, the sovkhoz ‘Madanyat’ in the Karauzyakskii raion (Karakalpak ASSR); 2 
- placing memorial plaques on the building of the number 68 in the Garman Lopatin 
street in Tashkent and in the state university building in Samarkand; 3 - building a 
memorial on the Rashidov’s grave – on the duty of Tashkent gorispolkom, ministry of 
culture and of the union of artists and architects of the UzSSR; 4 - the Tashkent 
gorispolkom has to rename Ulitsa Uzbeskaya in ‘Prospekt imeni Rashidova’; 5 - 
assigning his name to a ship of the Ministry of the Navy fleet. Prot. 82/1984, RGASPI, f. 
17, op. 153, d. 2454, l. 47. Then, in March the Ministry of sea fleet of the USSR entitled 
a liner ship - 62,000 ton and 262 meters long - to Sharaf Rashidov. PV, 20440, 67, 18 
March 1984, p. 2. 
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basis of the resolution of SM USSR of 25 November 1983 – the SM UzSSR also 
defined a special regime of benefits also for Rashidov’s family.13 At the end of 
1983, Rashidov was dead but his name and his political methods seemed to 
be very much alive. However, in November 1983, while the party was 
renewing to great fanfare the commitments to cotton production – which 
were very similar to those that were publicized in the previous years14 and 
probably again tolerating the illicit practice of additions15 – the prokuratura 
referred to the Uzbek government about other irregularities found in the 
cotton fields where criminal cases had been opened also for embezzlement of 
small quantities of cotton, the presence of animals in the fields, misuse of 
                                                                
13 According to the SM USSR resolution of 25 November 1983 and the following 
resolution of SM UzSSR on Rashidov's family material protection was defined a special 
regime of benefits that included a personal pension to Rashidov's widow, Khursan 
Gafurovna Rashidova, of 250 rubles per month, giving to her and to her daughter 
Svetlana with her husband and niece (who lives in Moscow), and also the other 
daughter Gulnara with family (in Moscow with her husband and two grandchildren) 
the right to benefit the First Polyclinics and General Hospital of the Ministry of health 
of the USSR [a privilege that was reserved to the top cadres of the CPSU], leaving to 
the widow the apartment n. 17 in German Lopatin street 68 in Tashkent and 
condoning the excess square meters. To assign to the widow the dacha and the car 
driver for 30 hours per month and for all the members of Rashidov's family the right to 
benefit from the Tashkent Central Polyclinics sited in Zhukovskii street 7. Prot. 
82/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2454, ll. 122-124. 
14 Are indicative the PV titles that present a less triumphalist rhetoric but anyway 
renovating the republic's duties: "the homeland expects 6 million tons of cotton. Our 
duty is to perform the socialist requirements" (PV, 20331, 257, 10 November 1983, p. 
10); "The word was given - let's keep it! The workers of the republic are determined to 
implement their internationalist duties" (PV, 20334, 260, 13 November 1983, p. 1); 
"On the field, until the complete victory! Our word is invariable: despite the bad 
weather, give homeland 6,000,000 tons of cotton!" (PV, 20244, 270, 27 November 
1983, p. 1); "Our goal - 6,000,000! The workers of the republic are determined to 
implement their socialist duties on the preparation of cotton for the state" (PV, 20248, 
274, 2 December 1983, p. 1). 
15 On this purpose, Nishanov is categorical: “Uzbekistan never gave six million tons of 
cotton. Maximum of five by superhuman efforts could be harvested using a flap torn 
ground. Everything else was added. One year 400 thousand tons and in another 700, 
and after the death of Rashidov, perhaps also a million was added” Rafik Nishanovich 
Nishanov, Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Raﬁk Nishanov Rasskazyvaet Marine 
Zavade I Yurii Kulikovu (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2012), 240. 
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machines etc.16 At the end of the month the controls even increased,17 
referring to the “distracted workers” that were cheating on the weight of the 
crop adding water, dirt and stones. In December, controls revealed that most 
of these situations were imputable to kolkhozes’ and sovkhozes’ brigadiers 
and that investigations had to be extended. At the end of the year, 
Prokuratura advised the Uzbek government that in 1983, 1020 controls had 
been organized, 297 people had been publicly reprimanded, 914 punished 
with administrative and fiscal measures, 38 criminal cases had been opened 
against 44 people and 243 people had been found culprit of violating law.18  It 
seems that despite the conspiracies theorized to oust Rashidov, nothing had 
substantively changed. 
However, Usmankhodzhaev started to promote a new generation of post-
Stalinist technocrats that had become the face of post-Rashidovian CPUz: on 
20 December 1983 Akil Umurzakovich Salimov19 was appointed as Chairman 
of the Presidium of SS UzSSR.20 Not coincidentally, Usmankhodzhaev, Salimov, 
                                                                
16 The report was referring that since the beginning of the harvest season had been 
completed 605 controls, 172 people had been publicly reprimanded and 178 found 
guilty for violations of law, 660 punished with administrative sanctions and 20 criminal 
cases against 24 people had been opened. Memorandum n° 7/38-83 (9 November 
1983) of the Prokuratura USSR (UzSSR department) to the SM UzSSR. TsGARUz, f. 837, 
op. 41, d. 6190, ll. 79-84. 
17 928 controls, referring about 267 people publicly reprimanded, 857 punished with 
fiscal and administrative sanctions, 209 people violating law and 29 criminal cases 
opened against 35 people. Memorandum n° 7/39-83 (22 November 1983) of the 
Prokuratura USSR (UzSSR department) to the SM UzSSR. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 
6190, l. 85. 
18 Memorandum n° 7/41-83 (1 December 1983) of the Prokuratura USSR (UzSSR 
department) to DM UzSSR. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 6190, ll. 90-93. 
19 Akil Umurzakovich Salimov, born in Tashkent on 24 December 1928, was a famous 
academic and vice-rector of the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute. Member of CPSU since 
1957, he enforced his career in the CPUz, becoming Head of the Department of 
Science of the CC CPUz and Secretary of the CPUz (1970-1983). On 20 December 1983, 
he became the Chairman of the Presidium of SS UzSSR, keeping that post until 6 
December 1986. Parallel, we became deputy chairman of the presidium of SS USSR (11 
April 1984 - 29 June 1987), and candidate member of the CC CPSU (1986-1988). On 
October 1988 he was arrested for the "cotton affairs" and lost his posts. On June 1989 
he was liberated due to unfoundedness of the allegations. 
20 PV, 20364, 290, 21 December 1983, p. 1. 
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and Khadyrov21 were formed at the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute. 
Meanwhile Anisimkin, a senior Russian member of the Secretariat, was the 
director of the Chirchik Hydroelectric complex. According to Carlisle, this 
marked a return of the Fergana/Tashkent group to power that “also 
strengthened Moscow's hold locally for it brought to power young, well-
educated, and technically trained natives who were beholden to the center, 
linked career-wise to all-Union development priorities, and oriented 
principally toward Moscow.”22 
In these first months in power, this new establishment had to consolidate 
a power that in the previous 24 years had been based on a charismatic figure 
who had been able to find a compromise between the various factions. This 
had, of course, suddenly vanished with his demise. Despite having the 
support of Moscow, the new FS had to find a way to get rid of the internal 
opposition, and the solution could be in opportunistically leveraging the 
moralizing campaign enforced by Andropov and to conduct a purge against 
the inner opponents. It was a case of two birds with one stone. 
However, Usmankhodzhaev had to be aware of how to manipulate the 
situation to his advantage in order to remain on the right side of the fence. 
Just after Rashidov’s death, there was a new wave of donosy (complaints) in 
the form of hundreds of letters23 to the CCs in Moscow and in Tashkent 
denouncing corruption and malfeasance in various sectors of the republic.24 
                                                                
21 According to Carlisle, Khadyrov "was the clearest illustration of the emergence of 
the post-stalinist generation". This technocrat was born in 1939 and since 1970 he 
held secondary posts, becoming FS Chirchik gorkom in 1975 and, in 1979, head of the 
department of Heavy Industry and machine building of the party secretariat. Donald S. 
Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” in Soviet 
Central Asia. The Failed Transformation, ed. William Fierman (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), 114. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Boldin reveals how it was common in the USSR to write letters of complaints to the 
party leadership. He reveals that annually about a million of letters were sent to the 
CC CPSU and passed through the CC general department. Only in 1987 the letters 
became 1.2 million and about 300,000-400,000 were sent from abroad. Valery Boldin, 
Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His Chief of Staff 
(New York: Basic Books, 1994), 192. 
24 In mid-December 1983, a letter denouncing to the CC CPSU and Pravda that 
scandals were not just in corruption, falsification and shortcomings, but even in the 
abuse in the cotton fields - where kolkhozes and sovkhozes are no more engaged in 
cotton, and there is the intensive labor of citizens, children, students, employees, 
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While Rashidov tried to use as his advantage the Andropovian moralizing 
course – minimizing the importance of the complaints and continuing to 
promise cotton at any cost – Usmankhodzhaev proposed himself as an 
Andropovian proxy in the region: at a moment when the CPUz lost part of its 
authority in the republic, the newly appointed FS CPUz seemed to satisfy the 
Moscow conditions was becoming – again – increasingly necessary in order to 
stay in power. When the CPSU was still strong, this precondition seemed to 
be more important than balancing the internal equilibrium. In this new 
framework, Usmankhodzhaev played the very dangerous role of the 
‘collaborator’, giving Moscow what she wanted, and telling her what she 
wanted to hear. In this phase of witch-hunts and complaints, the solution was 
in critically presenting to Moscow the results on the ‘negative phenomena’ 
and then pretending to offer a credible solution to these. 
4.1.2 The size of a Soviet problem 
At the end of 1983, the severity of the situation was finally exposed when 
controls revealed that between 1978 and1983, 4.5 million tons of cotton 
were produced just on paper, causing a cost of hundreds million rubles every 
year.25 In this regard, Clark calculates an overall amount of 3 billion rubles 
wasted in the 1976-1983.26 However, these figures were destined to rise 
when it became clear that the cotton scandal was not limited to the Uzbek 
affairs. In fact, at the beginning of 1984, a ‘Russian cotton affair’ – a separate 
criminal case that was nevertheless linked to the Uzbek one – was also 
opened in the cotton processing plants of RSFSR. This outcome echoed in 
Uzbekistan. 
On 26 January 1984, four almost empty rail wagons supposedly to 
transport cotton arrived in the textile factory of Serpukhov in the Moscow 
oblast. However, these were filled up, instead, with leftovers and other 
                                                                                                                                            
kindergarten teachers, doctors, nurses etc.". V.S. Solotunov so denounced how in 
hospitals there were no more doctors, because all the energies were devoted to 
cotton. Then, the party replied that children and students were regularly engaged due 
to the resolution of SM UzSSR PP-22337 of 25 November 1983 and the turns in 
hospitals were regular. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 2-6, 24. 
25 Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 101. 
26 William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption 
in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 187. 
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rubbish.27  The documents attached to the wagons declared that they were 
full of processed raw cotton from Jizzak cleaning plants. The head engineer of 
the Serpukhov textile factory went to the KGB and declared that three people 
from the cleaning factory of Jizzakh offered him a bribe of 40,000 rubles – 
good money with which it was possible to buy four apartments in Moscow – 
to forge documents in order to make it appear that the Uzbek enterprise had 
delivered 150 tons of cotton.28 The three corrupters were arrested and 
300,000 rubles in cash were seized, which they were keeping for bribes. The 
central KGB instructed its Uzbek department to investigate and Grigorii 
Bindasov – former head of investigative department of the KGB UzSSR – 
remembers that four investigations in the Jizzakh oblast were enforced, 
where 1.5 million rubles in money and obligations and a lot of gold had been 
found. Then, the Serpukhov case was sent to the Prokuratura USSR and led to 
800 criminal cases29 in which there were several directors of cotton cleaning 
and textile factories in the oblast of Moscow, Vladimir, and Ivanovo. At that 
time, Vladimir Kalinichenko – an investigator for particularly important cases 
of the General Prokuror USSR from 1979 – was at the head of the 
investigations.30 He found that the Soviet state was paying for non-existent 
cotton from Uzbekistan with the complicity of directors of Russian factories, 
who received big sums of money in exchange for letting the process take 
place. He discovered that for registering the delivery of "an empty wagon the 
price was around 10,000 rubles and, for a half-empty one between 5,000 and 
6,000."31 Kalinichenko had estimated the cost of this combined Uzbek-Russian 
system that confirms Clark’s estimation. According to him, the Soviet budget 
had payed about 3 billion rubles for Uzbek cotton in the previous five years, 
defining a scam that involved the periphery and the center of the Soviet 
                                                                
27 Martin McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
370; Fedor Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR (Moskva: Algoritm, 2012). 
28 McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 371. 
29 Kinokompaniya Pigmalion, Zoloto Dlya Parii. Khlopkovoe Delo (Russia: Rossiya 
Telekanal - RTR Planeta, 2010). 
30 According to Vaksberg, Kalinichenko was apparently working on the corruption 
cases in Uzbekistan but he was recalled to Moscow and was well experienced and 
known for his incorruptibility. This move was allegedly orchestred by Kunaev who, 
later, would become one of his victims. Arkadii Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 138. 
31 Dmitry Gordon, “Byvshiy Sledovatel’ Po Osobo Vazhnym Delam Pri General’nom 
Prokurore SSSR Vladimir Kalinichenko: ‘Vsesil’nyy Ministr MVD SSSR Shchelokov 
Prinyal Resheniye O Moyem Fizicheskom Ustranenii. V Otvet Na Eto Andropov Prikazal 
gruppe ’Al’fa‘ menya Okhranyat’,’” Bul’var 46, no. 473 (2004). 
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productive system.32 Investigations proceeded and the CC CPSU started to 
stress the CPUz even more, in order to get a proper response to the problem. 
Indeed, the crisis in the cotton sector – in terms of quantity and quality – did 
not regard just Uzbekistan but all of the cotton republics. Then, on 19 January 
1984, even a CC CPSU Politburo meeting was devoted to the cotton problems 
and noticed: 
The CPSU Central Committee draws attention to the abnormal situation 
created by the production, the organization of collecting and processing of raw 
cotton when, while its billet output of cotton fiber from crude fell from 32.5% 
in 1971-1975 to 31 in 1976-1980, 29.6% in 1981 to 28.6% in 1983, while the 
share cotton low weight [fourth quality] varieties during this time increased to 
40 percent compared to [the previous] 25-30 percent.33 
The resulting resolution ordered to the republican party CCs and SMs of 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan 
– as well as the central Soviet ministries of agriculture, water management, 
light industry – "to consider these issues, to take the necessary measures to 
eliminate existing shortcomings, to increase the responsibility of managers of 
agricultural and procurement agencies and enterprises of cotton industry for 
the quality of cotton products."34 Substantially, the whole cotton sector of the 
USSR was being scrutinized by the CC CPSU. 
In Uzbekistan one of the most difficult periods for the longstanding 
republican establishment henceforth began. While the corruption scandals 
inside the party and state organs ranged and spread, the new Uzbek leader 
clumsily tried to dismiss the facts as a serious, but essentially isolated, 
phenomenon and tried to opportunistically satisfy Moscow with what she 
wanted. Indeed, Usmankhodzhaev pretended to provide guarantees to 
Moscow and, after years of Rashidovian triumphalism, the XIII CC CPUz 
plenum of 9 January 1984 denounced the shortcomings of the Uzbek 
agricultural system, admitting that many of the investments made for the 
development of the cotton did not have an effective return. In fact: 
In the previous year, four oblasts did not realize the cotton plan: Jizzak, 
Syrdarya, Namangan and Andijan as well as 45 raions. In the last three years 
                                                                
32 Of these 3 billion rubles, 1.6 billion was spent on infrastructure and "1.4 billion in 
salaries, which no one has received [...] In other words, only the robbed additions over 
five years costed at least 1.4 billion rubles. These funds were distributed in bribes from 
bottom to top" and at the end of the process, came to Moscow. Ibid. 
33 NSA, Box 25, file R7428, p. 1 
34 NSA, Box 25, file R7428, p. 2. 
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the irrigated lands have been expanded to 275,000 hectares but the area 
devoted to cotton amounted only at 10 thousand hectares, that is 3.5%. [...] 
Just in Kashkadarya were invested 685 million rubles and created 55 thousand 
hectares of irrigated land but the cotton increase, compared to 1980, 
amounted only for 37,000 tons. A similar situation was found in Jizzakh and 
Syrdarya. [...] For the improvement of agriculture in the oblast of 
Surkhandarya, Namangan and Khorezm for years of the current FYP were 
invested nearly 200 million rubles in each oblast. In Surkhandarya and 
Khorezm, cotton production increased respectively by 16 and 24 thousand 
tons, but in Namangan decreased by 51,000 tons.35 
In any case, on that occasion the annual party commitment to provide to 
the Soviet state 5,965,000 tons of raw cotton and 430,000 tons of fine fiber 
cotton,36 and to invest 2.455 billion rubles in the sector,37 was also 
reaffirmed. In this very early phase, the attitude of the new Uzbek leader was 
still cautious. On the one hand, Usmankhodzhaev tried to use once again the 
card of the ‘cotton growth miracle’ to legitimize his power, while on the other 
hand he was enforcing the purge that Moscow was implementing in the 
whole country. It was impossible to obtain the results on cotton – even on 
paper, as had been previously done. Moreover, as we will see, the 
consequences of this schizophrenic attitude would be disastrous. The main 
results were, then, obtained in terms of ostracism. In fact, in that plenum, 
Usmankhodzhaev made a public accusation against a figure who had been 
powerful, feared and protected by Rashidov’s regime38: the former chairman 
                                                                
35 Prot. 13/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2447, ll. 19-20. 
36 The plan was forecasting the production dividing it on oblast basis: Karakalpak ASSR 
had to provide 400 thousand tons of raw cotton, Andijan 590, Bukhara 485.7, Jizzakh 
381, Kashkadarya 620, Navoiy 185.83, Namangan 455, Samarkand 492.47, 
Surkhandarya 525, Syrdarya 425, Tashkent 425, Fergana 575, Khorezm 405. Cf. Prot. 
13/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2447, l. 61. 
37 Prot. 13/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2447, l. 62. 
38 "The case against Yakhyayev had begun under Brezhnev, with the Uzbekistan 
Prosecutor's Office, the team of investigators led by the Prosecutor of the Uzbek SSR, 
now the Deputy Prosecutor of the RSFSR A.V.Buturlin. The case file consisting of six 
volumes, and identified many heinous crimes. However, at the request of Rashidov, 
addressed to Brezhnev, it was decided to terminate the investigation on Yakhyaev. On 
30 December 1980, the Genprokuror USSR Rudenko ordered to withdraw from the 
USSR Prosecutor's Office of Uzbekistan the team and banned A.V. Buturlin to continue 
the investigation." GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 34. 
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of the Uzbek MVD, Khaydar Khalikovich Yakh'yayev,39 who was identified as a 
guilty individual who: 
abused his power, violated socialist law, had an amoral lifestyle with a family 
and so many lovers [to whom] he gave jobs in the MVD organs, conferring 
titles and official high rank positions. Illegally, he gave them apartments and 
residence in the city of Tashkent […]. For all that, he had no rights. When he 
wanted to get rid of these women, he organized provocations and persecution 
against them for subsequent allegations of speculation and corruption, 
organizing hidden photo shoots and even wiretaps and other illegal actions. 
Without any legitimate reasons, those who knew about his unjust behavior 
were blackmailed and underwent inspections without even the consent of the 
prokuror. When he was in the people's control committee, he did not work 
well, behaving amorally and making unacceptable transgressions. All this has 
created damage to the authority of the people's control bodies and their 
workers. [...] The buro of the CC CPUz assumes that Yakh'yayev has betrayed 
the trust of the party and cannot be a member of the CC CPUz. His expulsion 
is, therefore, voted by 100% of the CC members.40 
A great figure of Rashidovism had thus been marginalized. However, the 
CPUz denied that the problem was systemic, and continued to sing its praises 
about the miracles of Uzbek agriculture. Nevertheless, the practice of 
reporting with great fanfare the results of the republic to the CC CPSU 
continued. Indeed, in a memorandum sent on 10 January 1984, 
Usmankhodzhaev informed the CC CPSU about the results of the above-
mentioned plenum, announcing to Moscow the great results of Uzbek 
industry: the plan had been allegedly fulfilled already on 26 December 1983, 
had been exceeded in financial terms for 304 million rubles, with industrial 
output increasing by 5.1%. In this official statement, Usmankhodzhaev also 
confirmed a crop of 5.930 million tons of raw cotton in 1983. At the same 
time, Usmankhodzhaev reported that, as a result of the plenum, the work 
style and methods of some party committees and ministries - that “worked 
with obsolete methods, without initiative and without trying to improve” -  
                                                                
39 Khaydar Khalikovich Yakh'yayev (1927 - 2013) was a military from Samarkand, 
member of CC CPUz since 1966, Minister of MVD UzSSR (11 March 1964 – 5 July 1979) 
and first deputy chairman of peoples’ committee of control of UzSSR until December 
1983. He was considered a right-hand man of Rashidov, ruthless and able to hold off 
domestic opponents. Over allegations of abuse of power and unethical behavior, buro 
CC CPUz chides and removed him from his post in December 1983. Prot. 13/1984, 
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2447, ll. 98-99. 
40 Prot. 13/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2447, ll. 98-99. 
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had been criticized, and gave a first list of the cadres to be reshuffled.41 Then, 
on 31 January 1984, a CC CPUz buro meeting discussed the dramatic situation 
in Bukhara and the necessary removal of the FS Bukhara obkom, A.K. 
Karimov, revealing the how the local ruling elite42 was covering the serious 
shortcomings of the oblast.43 Thus, the Karimov example became a sort of 
‘school case’ by which the party set the need to improve the work style of its 
cadres at the central and, especially, at the local level. The course that the 
Uzbek dynamics was following mapped on to the evolution of the Soviet 
party. Then, 1984 appeared as a year of ‘controlled chaos’, with the 
republican leadership that was renovating its commitments for the annual 
production of cotton44 and the Soviet Gensek that was pretending to rule the 
country from a hospital room. Then, after five months spent in agony, the 
“fiery patriot of the socialist homeland”45 Yuri Andropov died on 9 February 
1984 and Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko took his post, betraying the hopes 
of the new generation of Communists who hoped for authentic change.46 The 
                                                                
41 As a result of the plenum, A.U. Salimov was removed from the CC CPUz secretariat 
and became the chairman of the presidium of the SS UzSSR, Rano. Kh. Abduallaeva, 
became a member of buro of the CC CPUz as well as G.K. Kadyrov who became a new 
member of the buro. The former chairman of Uzbek MVD (1964-1979), Khaidar 
Yakhyaev was expelled from the party "for errors in the work and personalists 
behavior." RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, ll. 3-6. Yakhyaev became a key figure in the 
Uzbek cotton affair and was arrested in August 1985. He declared to that he gave 
bribes to Shchelokov and Churbanov. For this connection, in 1988 the Uzbek writer 
Raul M. Mir-Haidarov argued that Shchelokov was the effective 'godfather' of the 
Uzbek mob. Raul’ Mirsaidovich Mir-Khaydarov, Peshiye Progulki (Moskva: Molodaya 
Gvardiya, 1988). 
42 On 22 February 1984 Vidadi Izzatov - the head of the traffic police of Bukhara oblast 
- was arrested in his office together with Murtazaev, the chief of the Bukhara oblast 
KGB. Izzatov was sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment. Sergey Plekhanov, “Delo 
Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” Klub «Olimpas», 1991, 12, 23. 
43 The extract of the document is reported in the appendix. Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 
17, op. 153, d. 2455, ll. 164-168. 
44 K.A. Akhmedov, first deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR confirmed the commitments 
of the republic to produce at least 5.930 million for the homeland. PV, 20382, 9, 11 
January 1984, p. 2. Also in early March, during the meeting of the party-economic 
active was reminded the commitment for 6 million tons. PV, 20436, 63, 13 March 
1984, p. 1. 
45 PV, 20409, 36, 11 February 1984, p. 1. 
46 According to Boldin, Ustinov was proposed for the Andropov’s succession. However, 
he declined and agreed to support Gorbachev as the Chernenko’s deputy, in the post 
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famous quote of Chernyaev to describe the general disappointment is 
emblematic: “The miracle didn't happen. Chernenko was elected.”47 Basically, 
no one believed that Chernenko could make a substantial contribution to the 
Soviet cause and, as was apparent soon after his appointment, he did not. His 
leadership has been remembered as one of the emptiest in terms of its 
contents,48 also considering the advanced age (72) of a person who was 
already in a state of terminal illness. 
Chernenko is generally considered a Brezhnevian who wanted to reverse 
his predecessor’s policies.49 This is partly true, considering that the new 
Gensek did not have a determinant role in cleaning and reforming campaigns 
and also the Andropovian ‘demonstrative actions’ were substantially slowed 
down.50 At the same time, besides the idea that ‘old times were coming back’ 
and the KGB had weakened its activity, Gdlyan affirms that the “poorly 
talented country ruler and seriously ill Chernenko seemed not intended to 
change anything [however,] Andropov’s line was continued by inertia”51 and 
the new Gensek gave the ‘go-ahead’52 in anticorruption policies. In fact, 
Chernenko – apparently not a resolute figure and probably under the guide of 
personalities like Ligachev – continued the Andropovian anti-corruption policy 
and under his brief reign Medunov, Shchelokov and Churbanov were finally 
pursued. Nonetheless, he was too weak – physically and even charismatically 
– to leave the image of a leader who wholeheartedly fought corruption. He 
                                                                                                                                            
of chairman of the secretariat CC CPSU. Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The 
Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His Chief of Staff, 180. 
47 Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2000), 6. 
48 In his program, Chernenko was advancing a ‘fundamental’ ideological debate on 
redefining what type of socialism existed in the Soviet Union: developed socialism or 
developing socialism? McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 370. 
49 However, some scholars do not agree on this interpretation, finding a more tolerant 
approach in Chernenko retaining the Andropovian moralization campaign as a 
parenthesis in Soviet history. Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption 
Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 45; F. J. M. Feldbrugge, “Government and Shadow 
Economy in the Soviet Union,” Soviet Studies 36, no. 4 (1984): 528–43. 
50 Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de 
L’aigle Biceṕhale (Longueuil: EǶditions Kéruss, 2007), 60. 
51 Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Nikolai Veniaminovich Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo 
(Moskva: Gramota, 1996), 28. 
52 Ibid., 25–30. 
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did what he could. At an electoral meeting in Moscow in March 1984, the 
new Gensek pointed out that: 
the Party and the state have intensified the struggle against such disgraceful 
manifestations as the squandering of state funds, hoodwinking and the abuse 
of office, embezzlement and bribery. This is not a temporary campaign […]. In 
this there will be no special allowance for anyone.53 
Even later, he reminded the party of the need to put an end to the 
practice of bribery, speculation, squandering, abuse of office, and theft of 
socialist property, arguing corruption was “one of the factors hindering 
economic reform and rises in productivity.”54 Besides, the new Gensek did not 
have the particular charisma necessary to present himself as a paladin of 
socialist morality. Yet, he was able to give the message that anticorruption 
campaigns in Uzbekistan were not ending and Moscow wanted to see clearly 
over the republic, to uproot the local patrimonial structures and to gain back 
that power that seemed to be lost in the previous decades. 
4.1.3 A cold spring 
As mentioned, besides the lower profile of the new Gensek, the most 
peculiar operations at a political level were enforced during his short reign 
and the CPUz welcomed the course of the new Soviet leader, confirming the 
previous commitments. Indeed, the buro CC CPUz of 16 February 1984 finally 
brought to bear evidence of the systemic inefficiency and malfeasance within 
the Ministry of cotton cleaning industry (MCC) of the UzSSR, the 
administration that had become the base of the systemic scam that was 
investing Uzbek kolkhozes and the processing plants in the European USSR. In 
the meeting was evidenced how: 
The collegium of the MCC UzSSR has not taken the decisive steps on 
strengthening the state discipline in cotton preparation system. In 1983, 
during the period of cotton processing, the workers of a series of harvest 
points and cotton preparation stations in Andijan, Bukhara, Kashkadarya, 
Samarkand, Surkhandarya and Ferghana violated the requirements of state 
standards and the basic instructions during the cotton storage and cotton 
deliveries. […] All this has distorted the [cotton] conditional weight concealing 
a cotton that had atrocious quality. The MCC UzSSR, V. Usmanov and his 
deputy A. Akbarov, knowing that these violations were ruthless, did not adopt 
                                                                
53 Pravda, 3 March 1984, p. 2, reported in Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-
Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 225. 
54 Ibid. 
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the measures for the elimination of these phenomena. The ministerial 
collegium did not reveal the responsibility for textile factories’ leaders and 
tolerated violations of state productive and planning discipline throughout the 
system and allows the lack of control over the industries and organizations 
activities55 as well as in accounting and implementation of directives and after 
that some dishonest workers abuse their power, deceiving the state and 
making theft of socialist property. [The MCC] does not take the measures to 
create stable cadres. [In response,] in 1983, in the textile factories, one fifth of 
the directors has been changed - as well as a sixth of general engineers - and 
many managerial figures had been removed from their posts. In some cases, 
incompetent persons even became directors of factories without any special 
education and experience in the system work.56 
This report at the buro produced evidence of a situation where, besides 
the triumphalist announcements of the previous years, the cotton processing 
sector was decreasing in a republic where the production of the fibers in the 
tenth FYP dropped compared to the eleventh FYP by an average of 2.12%.57 In 
a moment when the republic had to face a political (and even a physical)58 
earthquake, the CPUz assumed a cautious attitude that balanced between a 
harsher criticism and a weaker triumphalism, even in the next meeting. 
Therefore, during the XIV plenum of the CC CPUz (20 February 1984) the 
typical economic triumphalism59 was promoted and this narrative was 
                                                                
55 Prot. 86/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2459, l. 15. 
56 Prot. 86/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2459, l. 16. 
57 Prot. 86/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2459, l. 39. 
58 Meanwhile a political storm was overwhelming Uzbekistan, the republic was even 
hit by a real earthquake of 9th Richter grade that on 20 March 1984 damaged the 
oblasts of Bukhara, Navoi, Samarkand and Khorezm for which the Uzbek government 
and party were demanding 265.7 million rubles for reconstruction. In the 
memorandum of the CC CPUz and the SM UzSSR to the SM USSR, was reported the 
balance of the earthquake damages for which officially 2 people died, 385 injured and 
23 hospitalized and had been damaged 4.506 million m2 of housing, schools for 
382,000 places, hospitals for 19,300, policlinics for 12,400, pharmacies for 290, 354 for 
obstetrics, 74,900 for pre-school institutions, 703 distribution points, 2,700 offices 
places, 12,700 in people’s food points, 244 clubs, libraries for 3.6 million books, 388 
municipal services, 170 administrative buildings, 286 km of water, gas and telephone 
networks. GARF, f. R-5446. op. 155, d. 309, ll. 1-26. 
59 In the plenum was affirmed that “in the last three years had been delivered in 
advance to the plan 293 thousand tons of cotton, wheat by 366 thousand tons, 964 
thousand tons of vegetables, 223 thousand tons of fruits and berries, 253 of grapes, 
35 of milk and 50 million eggs. [...However] for three years, the volume of gross 
agricultural production compared to the previous three years has increased only 8% 
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encouraged to an even greater extent in the press, which kept promising 
excellent results in agriculture, which seemed to remain the raison d'être of 
the republic.60 Therefore, the schizophrenic game to report as much good as 
bad news to Moscow continued, but the latter would have survived on the 
first and probably this strategy was functional to Usmankhodzhaev who 
wanted to demonstrate how the republican organs were engaged in the 
struggle against the ‘negative phenomena.’ Nevertheless, a clear strategy was 
not. 
In fact, on 12 March a meeting of the party-economic aktiv was held and 
the republican economic leaders exposed the critical situation of cotton 
production, revealing how in 1983, 46 raions, 400 kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
did not realize the cotton plan and in 19 raions the cotton harvest was less 
than 25 quintals per hectare.61 This data was effectively disavowing the 
triumphalism of the previous decade. Moreover, a meeting of the CC CPUz 
secretariat on 30 March 1984 revealed the dramatic situation of crime that, 
after staying stable for a number of years, was dramatically rising in the cities. 
In the city of Tashkent alone, “crime detected through the criminal 
investigations in the last year it has risen by 33.3% in general, and for the 
most serious offenses 43.8%. […] in 1983 were 16 unsolved murders, 27 
serious injuries, eight rapes and 39 highway fatalities.”62 Besides the 
seriousness of these facts, these stories still were still presented in smaller 
terms, while the systematic nature of the scams would be revealed by the 
organs – mainly centrally oriented – that were investigating in the republic. 
Therefore, during the meeting of the CC CPUz buro of 23 April 1984 was 
diffused a report – annex 1 – that announced the results of the joint work of 
                                                                                                                                            
instead of 11% that was expected in the plan.” Prot. 14/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 
2448, l. 12. 
60 For the 60th anniversary of the UzSSR, still appeared the - maybe impossible - 
agricultural promises to reach 5.980 million ton of raw cotton, in which 450,000 tons 
of fine fiber cotton; 2.950 million ton cereals in which 565,000 ton rice; 1.356 million 
ton vegetables; 370,000 ton fruit, 530,000 ton grapes, 360,000 ton meat and 1.020 
million to0ns milk; 30,000 ton silk cocoons and 1.17 billion eggs. PV, 20447, 74, 28 
March 1984, p 3. At the same time, in the post-Rashidov, the press started to be less 
celebrative towards the FS CPUz and even the figure of Usmankhodzhaev was less 
publicized. 
61 Prot. 17/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2508, l. 18. 
62 Prot. 70/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2491, l. 2. 
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the TsSU, PCC, and prokuratura. This incredible document63 reveals the 
systematic dimension of the scam in some regions, where other sectors were 
involved and where pripiski spread to all levels within the party and the state 
organs. This warning note was destined to extend the scope of the internal 
investigations and, then, of the purges against the negative phenomena in all 
the sectors of the republic. Then, during the XV plenum CPUz (4 May 1984), 
the card of purges was used, denouncing Vali Muratkhodzhaev – the former 
Minister of finances of the UzSSR – who was accused through a series of 
simple and sharp allegations that were foreshadowing a climate of purges 
against the former Rashidovian establishment. On that occasion, 
Muratkhodzhaev was openly criticized for: 
abusing power, violating party discipline, behaving immodestly and making 
unacceptable actions to resolve personal issues related to housing and cars. 
[...] His house, 220 square meters, was donated to his sons, and in 1981 he 
used false documents to receive another flat with 4 rooms. In 1977, he helped 
a daughter to illegally receive a three-room apartment albeit had already been 
allocated a house to her family. Muratkhodzhaev and his son were trading 
cars. [...] Also his son Mukhitdinov was treacherous for producing false 
documents and for trading cars and, in 1972, he was even sentenced to 10 
years. [... For these reasons] Muratkhodzhaev is dismissed from his posts.64 
This kind of ‘soft motivation’ – far from the mass frauds and millionaires’ 
treasures that we have seen previously – identifies the trend that had been 
set within the republic. Here we are speaking about the fact that we have 
seen a moralization campaign that could serve as an exceptional opportunity 
to rid the system of internal enemies. Sometimes it was simply enough to use 
accusations of moral inadequacy — accusations that were typical of a society 
now entering a phase of decline where there existed a simultaneous anger 
about the future and a sinister nostalgia. Then, on 12 May, while the King of 
Spain arrived in Uzbekistan for an official visit, the UzSSR was still keeping in 
commemorating Rashidov. A plaque commemorating him was put on a 
building at the Samarkand University,65 while memories of him continued to 
                                                                
63 The document was elaborated by the economic department, the department of 
party organizational work, the general department of the CC CPUz and the 
department of administrative bodies of the CPUz. It was signed by D. Makhmudov, 
deputy head of the protocol sector of the general department of the CC CPUz. Prot. 
91/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2464, ll. 21-25. The document is fully reported in 
the appendix. 
64 Prot. 15/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2449, l. 93. 
65 PV, 20483, 110, 13 May 1984, p. 1. 
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influence the initiatives that the defunct leader had implemented in his 
political career. Therefore, his name was remembered also on 23 May 1984 
during the inauguration of the VIII festival of Asian, African, and Latin 
American cinema.66 
The risky strategy of the sekretar nol’ to balance a weaker triumphalism – 
with a good dose of nostalgia – and the commitments of the CPUz to clean 
the republic would give distorted results and were effectively impossible to 
be implemented in the short term. In fact, this narrative did not reflect the 
actual real situation of Uzbek agriculture. In reality, the situation was much 
more in conflict with Moscow than Usmankhodzhaev’s commitments and 
promises suggested. Uzbek agriculture was, in fact, entered in a new critical 
phase due, again, to the unfortunate weather conditions. In late May, many 
cases of poor cotton seeding (requiring a second round) were recorded 
because the land remained frozen and it was necessary to repeat the process, 
causing a material damage in terms of scheduled times,67 production, and 
costs.68 
4.1.4 The ‘veteran’ and the ‘pentito’ 
In the spring of 1984, while investigations spread all around Uzbekistan, 
which uncovered cases of laxness, inefficiency, and dishonesty, a very serious 
case interested Kashkadarya obkom and led to a political storm in the whole 
oblast that hit the longstanding FS of the local obkom, Ruzmet Gaipovich 
Gaipov. Gaipov was a famous war veteran who became a very powerful figure 
protected by Rashidov, who appointed him to the top post of Kashkadarya in 
1968. Already in the previous summer, the situation in Kashkadarya was 
under the lens of the party who sacrificed the head of the regional 
government: in fact, during the plenum of CC CPUz of 4 July 1983, was 
announced the dismissal of B. Elbayev,69 chairman of Kashkadarya 
obispolkom, who was denounced as a person who 
                                                                
66 PV, 20491, 118, 24 May 1984, p. 1. 
67 Essentially, the maturation of cotton was delayed in 10-12 days’ growth raising fears 
a worse outcome in terms of quality and quantity. PV, 20541, 168, 24 July 1984 p. 1. 
68 PV, 20501, 128, 5 June 1984, p. 1. 
69 “Kashkadarya’s former oblispolkom chairman, B. Elbayev had built luxurious housing 
for his children and the erstwhile party raykom First Secretaries N. Khikmatov, T. 
Tillayev, D. Khushnazarov, A. Umirov, Kh. Kalilov had engaged in deception and 
falsification” Nicklas Norling, “Myth and Reality: Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan” (Johns 
Hopkins University, 2014), 227. 
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behaves immodestly and abuses power for personal interests, living in Karshi 
in a beautiful house of 250 m2 and in Kitab where he built the house for the 
children to whom were illegally given two parcels of land that were exceeding 
more than six times the norm. [Furthermore,] he helped his relatives to obtain 
land, cars and the building materials70. 
Again the theme of houses and living standards became a moralizing issue 
to get rid of inconvenient figures. Besides, if this was to be a method legally 
applied to all offenders, it meant that the entire Soviet nomenklatura had to 
be ousted. Such allegations were symptomatic of a purge. More seriously, on 
the same occasion N. Kholmatov, the FS of Shakhrisab raikom, was also 
accused, which violated the discipline of the state, by falsifying the data of 
the cotton harvest and creating the illusion of prosperity in his work.71 At that 
time, Rashidov probably preferred to sacrifice these two minor scapegoats in 
order to prove the effects of his ‘demonstrative’ actions, and still had enough 
power to defend Gaipov. However, when the first died, the second lost any 
protection from above. The situation in the region was so dramatic that in 
December 1983, a party controllers group of the CPC – headed by I.V. 
Krakhamalov – arrived in Kashkadarya and revealed a huge mass of negative 
phenomena in the oblast and asked for more actions to uproot the 
malfeasance from the region.72 Considered a situation that was creating too 
many embarrassments with Moscow – that as we have seen was constantly 
updated by the judicial and party supervisory bodies – Usmankhodzhaev had 
no choice but to intervene against Gaipov. Then, in the meeting of the CC 
CPUz buro on 6 February 1984, it was deliberated: 
R.G. Gaipov, the FS Kashkadarya obkom, was appointed in 1968 and in the first 
years of work had positive initiative but later he became responsible of many 
shortcomings in leading the party organization, in the economic and cultural 
development and in the selection and education of cadres [...He was] 
immodest and due to the checks that have been made after many complaints 
and the declarations of the oblast's workers, it was revealed that the leaders 
of some sovkhozes and kolkhozes in the rayon were implementing pripiski on 
the preparation of cotton and other agricultural productions. Also there were 
violations of the principles of the labor party with cadres. To the important 
management posts were put people who were personally affiliated [to Gaipov] 
who did not have political, moral and managerial qualities. [...] The workers 
who have compromised were protected from the critics and sanctions, and 
                                                                
70 Prot. 11/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2319, l. 116. 
71 Prot. 11/1983, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 152, d. 2319, l. 117. 
72 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 41. 
266 
 
kept their posts in the nomenklatura. Gaipov must be fired from his job and 
expelled from the party and sanctioned by the CPSU. [However,] whereas he is 
a veteran of WW2 and hero of socialist work, [it is prudent] to implement this 
[resolution] for the reason of his retirements.73 
This indicated that, besides acknowledging the guilt of the ‘veteran’, the 
party did not want to create a moral scandal and pushed for his official 
retirement. This situation led to the removal of Gaipov on 17 February 1984 
and his replacement by Narmumin Turapovich Turapov. However, despite the 
hoped results of the moralization campaign in Kashkadarya, the situation was 
much more serious and had deep roots. In a special report – appendix 9 - 
circulated at the CC CPUz buro on 29 February 1984, it was indicated that a 
clique of workers that were overlapping their posts and were affiliated to 
Gaipov, constituting the ‘executives’ of the falsification machine in 
Kashkadarya did actually and truly exist. From this warning report so it 
emerged that a part of the population – probably patronized under local 
figures - was colluded in supporting the falsification machines.74 Thus, in the 
aftermath of Gaipov’s dismissal, dozens of letters from the region started to 
arrive to the CC CPSU in Moscow, denouncing the high levels of corruption in 
the previous establishment and targeting mostly the former FS. Besides 
revealing the high level of corruption within the oblast, the beginning of 
investigations did not only open the Pandora’s Box, but did other things as 
well. In the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’, the worst emerged during the subsequent 
donos wars that, in most of the cases, were very politicized and were 
occasions for the local opposition to struggle for the succession or to take 
revenge on the ruling establishment. The dynamic was straightforward: once 
a figure had been dismissed, there was a rain of complaints from people who 
wanted to link their misfortunes, or denouncing affiliates, against a person 
who was already considered a culprit, sending any kind of accusations and 
compromising materials in a bellum omnium contra omnes. And this was 
typical in the Soviet system where, besides the subsequent verifications and 
trials, a dismissal, a replacement, and a retirement were automatically seen 
as evidence of guilt. However, unfortunately for the accused, often these 
slanderous statements were confirmed by investigations. 
                                                                
73 Prot. 84/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2457. 
74 This condition is reminiscent of some parts of southern Italy, where the powerful 
local camorra clans get the support of a population that is essentially absorbed by a 
criminal system. We know from examples like southern Italy that this happens when, 
in some very difficult social and economic contexts, state power is missing. 
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For example, after Gaipov’s dismissal, an anonymous letter – very detailed 
but written in poor Russian - was directly sent to Chernenko and 
Usmankhodzhaev on 12 March 1984 and reported about the diffused 
corruption in the oblast where cadres were not appointed by merit but by 
money and where the post of the FS of a raikom could be bought for 100,000 
rubles and chairman of a sovkhoz between 20 and 40 thousand rubles. In the 
letter, the anonymous complainer was revealing facts that, in a while, would 
be at the center of a judicial investigation that was again managed by 
Gdlyan’s team.75 The document also gave important examples of the ‘cotton 
scams’ and detailed the prices for bribes, stating that besides the removal of 
Gaipov, in the oblast there were still many crimes that had been "just 
liberally" – to intend easily -  reprimanded and there were still more than 100 
millionaires that were out of control. Thus, the anonymous author directly 
addressed his complaints to the Gensek and to the FS CPUz, demanding to 
send for another month the controllers of Krakhamalov and to finally make 
order in the oblast.76 For its minutia in detailing the facts, this letter became a 
                                                                
75 According to the letter even the second secretary of the obkom, I.I. Golovachev - 
that was the responsible for cadres - in 16 years in power had accumulated more than 
2 million rubles and other valuable items that were stocked in his driver's house. To 
remove the people that were not liked by Gaipov he used anonymous slanders and 
blackmail, and he helped Gaipov in the machinations and had an immoral lifestyle 
helping his two lovers G. Khamraieva and S. Niyazmativa who worked in the obkom CC 
and illegally obtained their houses. The letter then declared that also B.P. Kunchenko, 
the secretary for agriculture, replaced the 'honest' Kh. Tashev who was sent to 
Tashkent to cover a minor post [it is not improbable that the person who writes is one 
of the 'honest' removed people or one of their affiliates]. According to the letter, 
Kunchenko as well had many lovers and for his immoral behaviors was nicknamed the 
'cock'. All this was tolerated by Gaipov who laughed about, and Kunchenko helped 
Gaipov for machination and supported him to get prizes and awards. RGANI, f. 5, op. 
90, d. 49, l. 39. 
76 The letter keeps denouncing also Ya.I. Iliadi, the director of technique of oblast's 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, had a trader soul and did profit - made millions in cash and 
gold - selling machines and spare parts. He bought from Gaipov the post of FS Karshi 
gorkom - replacing the 'honest' A.I. Bityukov who was sent to Tashkent to cover a 
minor post - and he worked for Gaipov as his intermediary for bribery. The fourth 
millionaire of the oblast was the FS Karshi raikom, I. Achilov, who became rich with 
cotton falsifications. Under his order, the factories of cotton cleaning of the raion were 
selling to kolkhozes and sovkhozes false receipts. Every year were falsified in the 
oblast about 15-20,000 tons and every kilogram costed 30-40 kopeks. [This meant 
that, according to these figures, every year just in Karshi raion cotton cleaning plants, 
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political case that passed under the lenses of the CCs in Moscow and in 
Tashkent. In fact, in a memorandum of the CC CPUz and CC CPSU of 29 March 
1984 it was reported that the last party controls led to further replacements77 
in Kashkadarya oblast – where, from the beginning of the investigations the 
FS obkom had been removed, the chairman and the secretariat of the 
oblispolkom, five FS raikom and one chairman of raispolkom – while the party 
was still evaluating the removal of the obkom’s second secretary.78 
Substantially, the whole Kashkadarya elite was under the review of party and 
judicial organs and the situation was aggravated by a mysterious person – 
presumably from the local nomenklatura – who spilled the secrets of local 
power. As mentioned, the very powerful Gaipov was dismissed after 15 years 
in power. However, his adventure was not finished there, since he was 
directly investigated during the ‘cotton affairs’ campaign. The rest of the story 
is well known. On 25 March 1985, the investigative group led by Gdlyan went 
                                                                                                                                            
the scam was annually amounting from 4.5 to 8 million rubles and then these figures 
were destined to rise when they reached the top of the pyramid in the Soviet top 
management]. In 1983, Achilov went in competition with the FS of Kamashinski raion, 
Allayarov, declaring that he had – in theory – fulfilled the plan for first. To surpass 
Allayarov, everyday Achilov was inflating data for 450-500 tons and did the same also 
for milk and meat, "living as an American millionaire", with 5 houses, 7 cars, an amoral 
lifestyle and many women lovers as Z. Sharipova - raikom instructor who even had a 
baby from him - and R. Barnaieva - secretary of the sovkhoz 'Avrora'. Just in the last 
four years, the Karshi cotton factory registered more than 65,000 tons of 'cotton 
waste' and the Beshkenskaya factory 15,000 determining damages for more than 12 
million rubles. Thanks to his and Golovache's bribes, Achilov's brother became the 
director of the obkom orgotdel, determining the access to the party due to a payment. 
These machinations had been found in the Chirachinki raikom and in the Kashi gorkom 
and raikom, where he also put his relatives in the management posts and he built his 
own house spending more than 140,000 rubles. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 40. 
77 Indeed, it was revealed the workstyle weakness of the Achilov brothers and of 
another FS raikom, A. Umirov, who were all removed from their posts. 
78 In fact, the party reported that were not registered violation in the cadres’ 
appointment policy in the Karshi raion and Golovachev did not have lovers, cars and 
dachas, he lived with his family in a normal house and he did not have a rule in the 
purge against the former obkom's second secretary G.G. Svetlenko. However, "the 
controls have confirmed the involvement of Golovachev in the defects revealed in the 
oblast and the CC was evaluating his removal. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 42-44. The 
dismissal of Golovachev was even more supported by the controls that the responsible 
of CPSU orgotdel, E. Ponomarev, effected in the oblast, revealing that Golovachev was 
appointing cadres out of the party principles. The decision on the fate of the second 
secretary was thus postponed to the CC CPUz. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 45-46. 
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to arrest Gaipov in his house in Khorezm. They were welcomed in the lounge 
while the former FS went into his bedroom, took a precious oriental knife, 
and stabbed himself several times, dying a few hours later. When the group 
entered into the room, Gaipov was soaked in his own blood but still alive. 
Meanwhile,  his wife and daughter were shocked and realized the guilt of the 
former FS.79 Another suicide was added to the list of the ‘cotton affairs’ 
culprits and another treasure was discovered.80 
The Kashkadarya affair is a typical case of a purge – and massive judicial 
investigations – against a member of the former Rashidovian establishment.81 
However, the main basis for a struggle against that was Jizzakh, where 
Rashidov's clan was supposed to be based.82 The oblast, that had substantially 
become untouchable during the previous FS’s regime, was already at the end 
of a war that can give space to possible conspiracy scenarios. In early 1984, 
                                                                
79 In the immediate aftermath, his son, pilot commander of the Aeroflot division in 
Tashkent brought to prokuratura office “half a million rubles and a chest full of gold 
rings and bracelets. Incidentally, this did not serve to save him from being arrested 
himself.” Then, were found valuables and money in the amount of more than a million 
rubles. In October 1985, in connection with the identified facts of bribery, 
embezzlement and other crimes, Gaipov’s sons Arslan – Head of the Tashkent airport 
– and Adylbek – Deputy Director of Karshi gorpromtorga – were arrested. Given the 
severity and specific socially dangerous acts committed by Gaipov, a decree of the 
Presidium of the SS USSR (8 December 1987) deprived post mortem Gaipov of all his 
awards including a Hero of Socialist Labor (1980), four orders of Lenin (1957, 1973, 
1976 and 1980), an Order of the October Revolution (1971), two orders of Red Banner 
of Labor (1965 and 1973), a Red Star (1946), a medal of Glory '3rd degree' (1944) and 
a medal "for courage" (1945). Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 122. 
80 About Gaipov's treasure McCauley reports that "one estimate put it at tens of 
millions of rubles, mainly in gold. One of his raion Party secretaries returned 600,000 
rubles and gold bonds worth 500,000 rubles to the state. One of his daughters was 
unfortunate. She was caught red-handed trying to hide a sack that contained 300,000 
rubles." McCauley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 373. 
81 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 94–95. 
82 Jizzakh was a small oblast that was established by Rashidov at institutional level. 
According to Carlisle, such formation had no meaning to exist as a separate oblast and 
“did not exist as a separate administrative unit until it was officially created on 
December 29, 1973. Located in central Uzbekistan, there seemed no apparent 
economic or other grounds for it being singled out in this fashion unless we postulate 
Rashidov's personal intervention. The Jizzakh oblast constituted 4.6% of the republic's 
territory and only 3.3% of its population. Its ethnic make-up was 75% Uzbek and 8% 
Russian. It contains no major cities or centers of republic-level importance." Ibid., 126. 
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the CC CPUz warned the CC CPSU about the theft from the Jizzakh obkom 
archive of 13 secret personal files, an inventory, four reporting presentations 
(predstavlenie), and three resolutions of the obkom. This theft of secret 
documents was alleged to be connected with certain personalities – in or 
from the obkom where Rashidov was a native – who wanted to get rid of 
some evidence in a moment when the party was going to move to the next 
step in the investigations.83 At that moment, the usual slanderous letters that 
were sent to the central committees in Moscow and in Tashkent also 
appeared and some of them, in the same detailed and anonymous format, 
were directly accusing the (supposedly rival) factions within the party and 
specifically indicating the influence of the Jizzakh-Samarkand groups.84 
Against these hypotheses, Usmankhodzhaev replied declaring the effective 
low influence of that group in the party.85 In this way, the ‘Ferghaner’ 
Usmankhodzhaev seemed to defend the minority of Samarkand-Jizzakh - that 
was supposed to be his main opponent faction86 – while at the same time also 
Moscow did not show a clear strategy. 
                                                                
83 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 31. 
84 A letter directly sent to Chernenko from "the workers of the CC CPUz" on 13 March 
1984 requested to act against corruption and embezzlement within the Uzbek party, 
especially in the party control commission - where the director U. Atakusiev and his 
two deputies were accused of being responsible of covering falsification on cotton and 
other agricultural production in change of huge sums of money - in the obkoms of 
Samarkand and Jizzakh and against the prevailing influence of these groups within the 
CPUz. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 48. 
85 Usmankhodzhaev directly responded on 20 April 1984, stating that in the CC CPUz 
apparatus there were 229 managers and from them four from Jizzakh oblast (1.74%) 
and 12 from Samarkand oblast (5.24%), who were covering the posts of: a director of 
department, 2 deputy directors of department, a member of the party commission, 3 
directors of section, 1 secretary assistant and eight instructors. All of them were 
graduated and have experience in the party work. The CC CPUz did not have 
compromising material on them and, about Atakulov, were not revealed abuses of 
power and not objective solutions to problems. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 49. 
86 This is testifies to how there was cooptation of rival factions in the Uzbek power 
system and how often – besides the brilliant corollaries – the territoriality of clan 
politics has been often exasperated in political science literature. Demian Vaisman, 
“Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan,” in Muslim Eurasia 
Conflicting Legacies, ed. Yaaeov Roi (London: Frank Cass, 1995); Collins, Clan Politics 
and Regime Transition in Central Asia; Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and 
Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia, Perceptions and Pact (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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 In the Kashkadarya affair we have seen how complaining (donos) letters 
became revelatory and helped to conduct the investigations and to orient the 
purges against those elements that were considered guilty by the party. In 
the Jizzakh case, the story followed also the dynamics of the ‘pentito’ 
(repentant), a typical figure of the Italian ‘antimafia,’ indicating those former 
mafia members who – after being arrested – decide to ‘repent’ and to 
collaborate with the judicial system in order to help the investigations.87 Also 
in Uzbekistan something similar happened and led to extraordinary results. 
On 28 February 1984, Kayum Shadievich Shadiev – a famous local figure 
who was director of a cotton factory in Jizzakh from 1950 to 1960, rose his 
career within the party and then in 1978 became the director of 
Dzhizakzavodkhlopkoprom, the cotton processing industry of Jizzakh – was 
arrested. His case was directly linked to the aforementioned ‘Russian cotton 
affair’ that we have seen became a state affair under the lens of the CC CPSU. 
On 14 March 1984, the KGB reported to the Central Committee in Moscow, 
the self-complaint that Shadiev gave on 5 March. In this very well formulated 
document, the director stated that in the ten centers of cotton processing he 
discovered ten criminal cases and more than five million rubles had been 
hidden/embezzled from the budget. In 1981 he denounced five cases to the 
prokuratura but without results as well to the raikom secretaries but no 
measures were taken at that time, probably because of political protection. In 
the results of the 1982 plans, there were additions for 32,000 tons and he, 
the general accountant V.A. Kharchenko, and the director of the department 
R.A. Byelousov had been invited several times by the MCC V.U. Usmanov and 
by the general accountant of that ministry Deridovich to manipulate and 
‘correct’ the reported figures.  
Then, Shadiev declared that, at that time, he had refused and, according 
to him, even the chairman of the SM UzSSR Khudayberdyev intervened and 
demanded that he correct the figures, while he again rejected the invitation. 
However, he declared that at the end he also accepted to become an active 
part in the machinations in that vicious system, receiving from 1979 annual 
bribes from the cotton factories. He listed all the taken bribes with dates, 
names of the directors, and the monetary sum. In his description, it seems 
that the size of bribes – 49,000-150,000 rubles each – depended on the 
quantity, the period – before or after processing – and the factory, realizing a 
                                                                
87 Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia. Italy’s Fight Against Organized Crime (London: 
Macmillan, 2000). 
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total of 730,000 rubles. Then he declared that – from that sum – he also spent 
a great deal of money to bribe superior officials in the ministries and, again, 
listed all his ‘upper’ bribes: 10,000 rubles in 1982 and in 1983 to the deputy 
MCC UzSSR T.A. Normukhamedov, 10,000 in 1983 to the obkom director of 
transports Yuldashev Mirzakhmetov, and 35,000 in 1979 to the former obkom 
FS Tukhtamish Baimirov88 – and then 50,000 in each year (1980-1982) – to 
whom he gave the sums directly in his office or in the lift. The total sum of 
these bribes was 225,000 rubles. In this confession, Shadiev wanted to give 
the image of a conscientious man and declared himself destroyed by remorse 
and depression. He unconditionally put himself at the disposal of the 
investigative and judicial authorities and also provided a detailed list and all 
the contacts and the places where the remaining 605,000 rubles were kept 
and that he wanted to return.89  
This collaborator of justice had, then, contributed to the investigations 
about the high corruption in the region and in the cotton sector and opened 
new scenarios. Indeed, the prokuratura notified to CC CPSU (12 April 1984) 
that due to the Shadiev case were implicated in the criminal case I. Muminov 
– director of the Uchitepinskii factory, S.S. Sultanov – director of the cotton 
preparation station, and M. Khalmatov – the classifier of the preparation 
point. These figures were systematically making fake receipts and embezzling 
more than 1,870,000 rubles in the 1980-1983. Also Shadiev himself 
embezzled by taking bribes from the directors of cotton cleaning for more 
than a million rubles, so much more than what he declared. Similar cases 
were opened in the rest of Uzbekistan as well as in Azerbaijan and in RSFSR.90 
The Shadiev case represented a real earthquake in the political implications 
during the cotton affair. The case was then followed by the Prokuratura USSR 
that on 29 April 1984 reported to the CC CPSU the situation and confirmed 
the sum and the implication of the MCC UzSSR Usmanov, his deputy 
Normukhamedov, as well as the former FS Jizzakh obkom Baimirov and the 
chairman SM UzSSR Khudayberdyev in the falsification of state accountability 
on the plan for cotton cleaning. The investigation was extended to more than 
100 top managers in the republic and a group with the best elements of MVD 
                                                                
88 After the creation of the oblast in 1973, Seit Memotovich Tairov became the FS 
Jizzakh obkom until 1978 when he was replaced by the ‘Rashidovian’ Tukhtamish 
Baimirov who ruled the obkom until 1980. Then, Parda Ismailov toke that post until 
1983 when he was replaced by Khabibulla Abdumazhit Shagazatov. 
89 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 1067, ll. 3-7. 
90 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 1067, ll. 13-14. 
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and prokuratura headed by Aleksey Vasil'yevich Chizhuk – deputy director of 
the investigative department of prokuratura USSR – was created. The 
prokuratura document ended by stating that Usmankhodzhaev had been 
informed on the developments of the case.91 This meant that, substantially, 
the FS CPUz could follow the developments of the story but, despite his 
position, he could not intervene.  
Finally, in a memorandum of the CC CPSU of 26 May 1984 it was reported 
that Normukhamedov has been arrested and the Shadiev sons – one, a 
director of a Jizzakh obkom department and the other, a director of a 
department in the CC CPUz – were fired from their posts. However, the fate 
would be more generous just a decade later for some of them.92 Even the 
secretary of Jizzakh obkom B. Shakarov, the director of the CPC N. Kushakov, 
and the FS Jizzakh gorkom Ubaidulla Turakulov were expelled because they 
were relatives of Shadiev. As well, the directors of the party organizational 
work department and another obkom department director were fired. 
Investigations were also needed to determine the involvement of 
Khudayberdyev, Baimirov, and Usmanov.93 As we will see, besides the 
Shadiev case there seemed to be a local Jizzakh affair, it had a broader echo 
on the whole republic94 and gave elements to enlarge the case against the 
Uzbek government and other figures in the SM UzSSR. This was, in other 
words, just the tip of the iceberg. 
 
                                                                
91 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 1067, ll. 8-9. 
92 Shadiev had seven sons: Khakim, Nabi, Kasym, Fazyl, Raul, Kabul and Fattakh 
(Patokh). The latest is a London-based Uzbek oligarch with Belgian citizenship who 
made his fortune through the business of mining, metals, oil, gas, and banking. He is 
currently one of the top 300 richest people in the world on the Forbes list of 
billionaires. 
93 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 1067, l. 11. 
94 In summer was discovered that the housing enterprise Dzhizakstroi received from 
the ministry of housing UzSSR extra budget expenses – that was fixed to 24.5 million 
rubles and in the last three years had been spent 3.8 million rubles in salaries from 
which 2.2 million had been illegally taken because were the outputs of falsification 
and in 1982-1983 about 100,000 rubles in salaries were provided through false 
documentation. PV, 20551, 178, 5 August 1984, p. 2. 
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4.2 The XVI plenum CPUz and its aftermath 
The size of the investigations on the ‘cotton affairs’ and the related purges 
within the CPUz assumed a systemic dimension: just between July 1983 and 
May 1984 five top officials were expelled from the CC CPUz,95 and the party 
proceeded more aggressively to oust the previous generation of politicians. In 
the buro CC CPUz meeting of 13 June 1984, where it was revealed that in the 
latest years increased theft, over-spending and resources losses throughout 
the republic - in 1981 was 3.9 million rubles in 1983 to 5.196 – was again 
enforced the grip of the party over regional leaders and a power reshuffle of 
cadres. Then, on 18 June 1984 when Viktor Alekseevich Khaidurov, the FS 
Syrdarya obkom since 1974, was replaced by V.A. Antonov – a Russian ethnic 
who was sent from the central organs in Moscow – it became evident that 
much of the dynamics of the Uzbek cotton affair depended on exogenous 
factors. In fact, the CC CPSU wanted to reaffirm its grip over the republican 
party and state organs and, when became clear the size of the corruption 
scandals, it orchestrated a major event that overwhelmed the CPUz during 
what appeared as an ‘extraordinary’ CC CPUz plenum where the results of the 
mentioned CC Commission led by the CC CPSU official Mogilnichenko were 
presented and that passed the baton, in terms of purges, from central to local 
levels. 
The XVI plenum of CPUz was held in Tashkent on 23 June 1984. Ligachev – 
who in the meantime became CC Secretary in December 1983 – chaired that 
meeting representing the CC CPSU, declaring that substantially Moscow was 
passing the case on the republican communist party active. In his 
questionable words, “the center didn't dictate policy and play[ed] the role of 
the Supreme Court.”97 This statement is plausible at this stage of the story. 
There is a lot of mystery – and also speculation – surrounding this 
extraordinary event. In any case, we have the occasion to match the very real 
contents of the materials, crisscrossing the publications with the original 
verbatim reports.98 
                                                                
95 Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU (Houndmills & New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997), 149. 
96 Prot. 95/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2469, l. 13. 
97 Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 219. 
98 The materials of the XVI plenum CC CPUz had been even published in a special 
edition – confidential and just destined for the only CC CPSU members - that was 
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The XVI plenum was officially devoted to the strengthening of “discipline, 
cadres' formation and the need to improve the frame and the managerial 
methods of the party, the economy, culture and education of people.” On 
that occasion, the FS CPUz Usmankhodzhaev stated: 
it is necessary to watch and to reevaluate the party activity in contrasting the 
negative phenomena [in a republic where emerged] an atmosphere of self-
celebration, ignoring the principles of collegiality, there was no criticism and 
no self-criticism [...] and where had been violated the principles and 
enthusiasms of the party […it is] important to keep the struggle with no 
compromise in order to exclude the causes of these defects in the life of 
organization of the republican party.99 
According to the FS, the worst situation was revealed in the cotton 
cleaning sector where, year by year, the plans had not been fulfilled, the 
quality of produced fibers dramatically decreased, and the wastage increased. 
In Usmankhodzhaev’s words: 
There are multiple causes but the most serious is that V. Usmanov, the 
appointed minister [MCC], was not only not taking adequate measures but he 
was also camouflaging the reality and misinformed the management of the 
republic where persisted an organized system of theft, falsification 
embezzlement and theft to the workers of the republic [where] corruption was 
covering many categories of workers and managers of ministries, companies, 
and fields100 
Then, he publicly revealed how in the oblasts of Jizzakh, Khorezm, 
Kashkadarya and Bukhara, dozens of workers of cotton cleaning sector had 
been arrested and millions of embezzled rubles had been confiscated by 
investigators. He commented: 
This is a black stain on the good name of the republic and our shame [...] 
Cotton was, is and will be our pride and our point of honor [...] Dirty hands do 
not have to touch 'white gold.'101 
Furthermore, the FS declared something that countered previous trends, 
by revealing that the situation in the cotton sector in the UzSSR – even 
                                                                                                                                            
anyway reducing the full contents. Anyway, I found the way to find and to get the full 
original verbatim report of the plenum that is available in RGASPI. 
99 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 53. 
100 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 54. 
101 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 54. 
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locally102 – was not so optimistic, thereby constituting a money-losing 
agricultural system. He stated that in 1983, 347 sovkhozes finished the year at 
a loss and many kolkhozes and sovkhozes survived because of subsidies and 
credits, recording a total debt that amounted to 2.8 billion rubles,103 
recording shortcomings even in Tashkent's housing, where in the last three 
years 340,000 m2 had not been completed and more than 30,000 people 
were still without a home. The fault was given to the Tashkent gorkom and 
gorispolkom and to the official responsible for housing, U.U. Umarov. Then, 
the FS declared that in the previous eight years, the party controls organs had 
realized more than 72,000 controls in the republic, verifying enterprises, 
organizations, institutions, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in a third of them 
has been revealed to be report-padding and 700 people had been put in front 
of party responsibility for their guilt. Besides announcing that the struggle 
against scam had been strengthened, he affirmed that the efforts were still 
not enough to eradicate the negative phenomena. According to the FS, the 
scam of pripiski had been conceived to 
create the illusion of wealth and on this base the theft of socialist property 
increased. It cannot be tolerated that the people involved in these thefts are in 
a great part managers. In the last four years, due to theft of socialist property 
had been dismissed more than 900 heads of state companies, organizations, 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes. and almost 4,000 managers of industry, brigadiers, 
accountants. A ninth of the thefts of socialist property is done by top 
managers. In a Tashkent textile factory, there was a group of 'swindlers' that 
produced unregistered clothes that were sold on the black market, producing 
a damage to the state for 12 million rubles. In that factory had been pursued 
59 people. As well, the deputy director of Kashkadarya court has been arrested 
for corruption and many the workers of courts in Bukhara and Samarkand 
oblasts. Just in the last year, the commercial rules had been violated in a third 
of the shops, [...As well] were discovered 3000 cases of speculation over Uzbek 
agriculture products that are sold on the black market at special prices and just 
in the Tashkent oblast the number of crimes has increased by 20% from 1981. 
As well, in the last year for the negative phenomena had been fired almost 900 
people from which 135 pursued with criminal allegations, while in the law 
enforcement and political cadres 1225 communists had been sent.104 
                                                                
102 During the XVI plenum CPUz, also the FS Namangan Radzhabov, confirmed that the 
oblast was in financial debt towards the state for the cotton production, denouncing 
also the diffused familyism and zemlyachestvo. Prot. 16/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, 
d. 2450, l. 78. 
103 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 55. 
104 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, ll. 56-57. 
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Thus, according to the FS, the recipe to strengthen discipline consisted in 
sending ‘communists’ to cover the management posts, intending that a 
replacement of cadres was in process, with the support of CC CPSU that was 
sending experts in Uzbekistan in the famous krasnyi desant campaign that will 
be considered in the next chapter in order to define a transition under 
external control. In his speech, the FS CPUz even stated that the republican 
communists had great faith of the CC CPSU and "everybody of us with his own 
activity must deserve this trust."105 Then Usmankhodzhaev reprimanded the 
typical attitude of politicians to interfere with investigations of the judicial 
organs and stated: “the workers of party and soviets do not have to interfere 
with the activity of investigative organs. For example, the former FS 
Leninabad raikom had intervened by exonerating two criminals”106 and was 
dismissed from his post for his actions. Then, Usmankhodzhaev continues the 
list of negative examples that had been discovered in the republic and 
proceeded to publicize some facts that we have already analyzed. In fact, he 
stated that in Kashkadarya: 
B. Elbaev, the former chairman of Kashkadarya oblispolkom was illegally 
building houses for him and for his family as well as did his deputy A. 
Mustafaev and the former FS of the Shakrisab raikom N. Khikmatov that was a 
'forger' who was pursuing anyone who criticized him. Even the FS of 
Chirakchin, T. Tillaev, lied officially to the party and the FS Andijan raikom, D. 
Khuzhnazarov was finally removed for his immoral behaviors as well as the 
former FS Ulianovsk raikom, A. Umirov who had a primitive approach in work 
and in personal behaving and did falsifications.107 
Then, he also provided the greatest example of malfeasance in the 
Kashkadarya oblast, blaming directly the former ‘boss’ of the obkom Gaipov. 
In the FS’s words,  
the subjectivism of the FS Kashkadarya obkom, R. Gaipov, and the arbitrary 
methods of work created an atmosphere for many negative phenomena. The 
vicious workstyle in the obkom damaged the economy and the organization of 
the party in the oblast where had been recently invested 675 million rubles for 
its development but did not bear any fruit.108 
 
                                                                
105 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 62. 
106 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 57. 
107 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 58. 
108 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 58. 
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As well, in the Bukhara oblast: 
The principles of cadres’ policy had been violated even in Bukhara, where the 
decisions were based on zemlyachestvo and personal kinship. The former FS 
Bukhara obkom, A. Karimov, put in the posts of oblast prosecutor and in the 
top management of local UVD and OBKhSS those people with whom he had 
close ties of friendship. They were corrupted and made several thefts and 
from them the investigations had been sequestered cash and goods form 
more than 7 million rubles.109 
With regards to Karimov, the harshest comments were made in a speech 
made by S. Gainev – FS Gizhduvan raikom and member of CC CPUz – who 
condemned the former FS Bukhara. He had chosen 
the leaders to familyism, kinship and personal dedication. All officers of the 
administrative bodies were affiliated, and all these people were the groups of 
corrupters. The example to Karimov was so taken by others. During the years 
of Karimov, prospered the ‘bare board,’ authoritarianism and disrespectful 
attitude towards other opinions. Obkom and raikom interfered in the 
businesses of all the agriculture organs.110 
Even in the same occasion, Usmankhodzhaev commented the critical 
situation in the Jizzakh oblast – that did not fulfill the plan in 1983111 – where 
had been revealed  
abuses of power, familyism and thefts related to cotton. The former FS Jizzakh 
obkom, Tukhtamish Baimirov, and other members of the obkom buro had 
been found guilty for violations in the cadres’ policy and for covering 
falsifications. Even the former FS Jizzakh gorkom, U. Turakulov covered people 
who violated law as the director of a milk factory who was saved from the 
first's intervention even giving him as a present a zhiguli car from the 
gorkom.112 
Another interesting point is that the FS revealed falsifications even in the 
Navoi oblast that – as we have seen in the second chapter – was not an 
agriculture-based oblast and was therefore indirectly denouncing the 
shortcomings in the strategic sector of mining as well. Then, the FS CPUz 
denounced other negative phenomena that had been discovered in the 
republic. For example, three obkom secretaries, seven FSs obkoms, 48 
secretaries of raikoms and gorkoms as well as several members of Komsomol 
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did not fulfill the productive duties and were working badly. Morever, many 
managers were violating the constitution for several causes and were 
exonerating their sons from military service, as well as 76 party and soviet 
nomenklatura members that were abusing their power. In General, many 
management cadres were denounced for having “the aspiration for private 
property and suffered from greed and accumulation”. Among them, 
Usmankhodzhaev reported that even the former ministers of food industry 
V.S. Sadykov, finance V. Muratkhodzhaev, the director of Goskomizdat (the 
State Committee for Publishing, Printing and Book Trade) Z.I. Yesenbaev and 
the general director of Uzbekneft, A. Ismailov and others “abused of power, 
implemented falsifications and enforced the management of not qualified 
workers who were granted with material benefits." He also reported that 
many managers had been only formally punished for their abuses and then 
were reinstated in other top management posts. In his words, just in the 
“Samarkand and Ferghana oblasts, a third of the managers that have been 
dismissed from the previous positions were recollected in new managerial 
posts and similarly did a half of those dismissed in Syrdarya.”113 Then, he gave 
a final account of the top management purges, declaring that  
in the current year alone, five executives of CC CPUz had been expelled from 
the party and seven deputies of SS UzSSR had been expelled from the their 
posts as had three FS obkoms and eight from gorkoms and raikoms. 
[However,] not everything is ok in the work of the nomenklatura and its 
reserves in the CC CPUz and in the obkoms and the nomenklatura [lists] are 
often unfairly enlarged, and in the formation of reserves there is formalism 
and often there are no [names] worthy of a possible appointment and 
therefore there are several cases of cooptation. In the last FYP, among the 
secretaries of obkoms, gorkoms and raikoms the level of coopted [cadres] 
amounted to 54% and in the last three years it rose to 69%.114 
The FS CPUz was in this way denouncing the systematic size of the 
negative phenomena in some key sectors and oblasts of the republic. 
Apparently, we could think that this was a strategy to enforce a purge rivals. 
However, on this occasion it seems that Usmankhodzhaev was just following 
the course of the investigations and probably he did not have much discretion 
in guiding the purges. To some extent, Sekretar nol’ was hostage of the CC 
CPSU and the central judiciary organs, while the internal war within the CPUz 
cadres raged in its higher dimension. Continuing his long intervention, he also 
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gave examples of the shortcomings and waste, such as with A.K. Irgashev, the 
director of Uzbekgidroenergostroi, who had inflated the request for the 
reconstruction of the administrative building for more than 600,000 rubles115 
and observing how, besides the previous enthusiasms, from the beginning of 
the current FYP, 470,000 tons of cotton fiber and 51 million m2 of fabrics had 
not been realized.116 
In the plenum other figures intervened who related their speech to the 
same issues, presenting similar denunciations even from below. An example 
of this was the speech made by N.M. Zheleznov, a worker employed at the 
railway repairs, who stated that in the city of Tashkent and throughout the 
republic there was speculation, toadyism, amateurism, and large-scale thefts 
in the system of the Ministry of Light Industry and in the MinZag (Ministry of 
the produced goods) and in the MCC. “But the list can be endless and the 
concern of the CC CPSU to Uzbekistan is understandable.”117 Then, V.A. 
Golovin, the head of the KGB UzSSR and a member of the CC CPUZ, revealed 
that corruption, theft, and the heart of the fraud system was in the cotton 
cleaning andprocessing industries. He gave the example of Shadiev – the 
Jizzakh ‘pentito’ who directed the Dzhizakzavodkhlopkoprom – revealing the 
results of the further investigations on the facts that we have introduced in 
the previous paragraph. In his speech, Golovin stated that investigations on 
Shadiev and Dzhizakzavodkhlopkoprom proceeded under the instruction of 
the CC and together with the prokuratura organs. “It is an example of the 
exponential scale of thefts because it was also implicating a merchandiser. 
During Shadiev’s arrests gold had been seized, as had diamonds and cash 
worth 300 thousand rubles.”118 He then commented that: 
the organs of prokuratura investigate the mechanism of the crime but now it is 
clear that these thefts of state funds were allocated for the production of 
various agricultural outputs that never existed. These plunderers 
manufacturing falsifications and paying with bribes, dragged into crime also 
[the simple] workers. The chief of these thieves was Shadiev, the former 
director of Dzhizakzavodkhlopkoprom, who confessed to taking bribes for 
more than 1.2 million rubles. In 1948, this guy, when he was leader of the 
cotton factory, had already been sentenced to two years in prison for abuse of 
power and in 1961 in the personal file showed a rebuke because he built a 
house with excesses and building abuses. In all this time, and even after, he 
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remained as director until 1962 when he was the manager of the Samarkand 
Zagotkhlopkotrest119 and was involved in an investigation of the analog case 
on which he was arrested by the KGB now, with the difference that in 1962 he 
managed to avoid prosecution for still unclear reasons, because at that time all 
its workers, 27 people were sentenced from 1 to 15 years. The Samarkand 
obkom buro, on 24 May 1962 had decided to expel him from the job, but he 
always remained in his post, and in 1969 he even became the 
zagotkhlopkotrest executive of Gulistan and in 1980 and has become the 
"Dzhizakzavodkhlopkoprom" director from where he was expelled like a 
millionaire in 1984, after his arrest by the organs of the KGB.120 
Then, the KGB head opened a polemic, stating “but where was the 
vigilance? Why did this biography [meaning CV] give the right to so high a 
post?”121 This question suggested that the KGB was probably not satisfied 
enough with the actions of the CPUz and called for further action on the 
apparatus of the state and the party. Then, P. Kayumov – chairman of the 
technical and labor educational committee of the UzSSR – confirmed the 
importance of educating the cadres on criticism and self-criticism.122  Finally 
also Yegor Ligachev – who was chairing the plenum and representing the CC 
CPSU for this important event – underlined the importance of strengthening 
discipline and making order in all the spheres of social life and how 
Uzbekistan – where the Soviet state has invested more than 43 billion rubles 
in the last eight years – was important for the Soviet cause. The calm words of 
Ligachev appeared as a renewal of trust for the CPUz.123 However, in the 
second part of his speech, the CC CPSU secretary, who was acting as a sort of 
deputy to Chernenko, harshly denounced the environment of diffused 
malfeasance in the republic, where the familial ties and circular dynamics 
were tolerated in an atmosphere of indulgence where some communists 
abused their power, had massive houses and many cars.124 Therefore, 
Ligachev recognized that corruption was under the struggle and there had 
been changes in the past 18 months,125 concluding his speech by declaring 
that Chernenko had asked him to say that 
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the Politburo of the CC CPSU retains that the party’s active and the 
Communists of the republic under the leadership of the CC CPUz can and must 
enforce order, and CC CPSU will help for this task.126 
With this conclusion – that also sounded like a threat - it seemed that 
Moscow did not fully trust the CPUz and wanted to put Tashkent under 
stricter control. Even Ligachev would remember that due to the commission 
investigation that presented its results at the XVI plenum CC CPUz, the CC 
CPSU chose to send "many party and government economic officials from 
various regions of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia to normalize the 
situation",127 constituting a physical tie between the republic and the Staraya 
Ploshad. Another interesting point is that, despite a general misunderstanding 
on this event, the name of the departed Rashidov was never mentioned. 
In the aftermath of the Tashkent plenum, despite the protocol and the 
encouraging narrative used there, Ligachev reported his real impressions to 
the CC CPSU. In his memoirs, Chernyaev reports his impressions, stating that 
an, 
example of the regime's decay was contained in a report that Ligachev gave, 
“The Situation in the Uzbek Republican Party Organization.” The evidence of 
corruption was horrifying. The amount of cottonseed harvested was 
supposedly increasing, but that of fiber produced was dropping from one year 
to the next. The state had been robbed of hundreds of millions of rubles. Up to 
340,000 tons of cottonseed was “withheld” every year through false reporting. 
A minimum bribe was 10,000 rubles, while an average annual salary was about 
2,000 rubles. In Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, Party bosses had villas, estates, 
and even palaces built for themselves. A panel in one metro station cost two 
million rubles. In the meantime, half a million people were living in clay huts 
with no water, gas, sewage, and very often no electricity. The same in 
Samarkand, Uzbekistan’s second-largest city. All kinds of “administrators” had 
two to five houses, some of them country estates. They owned up to five 
personal cars. Over the past three years the CPSU Central Committee had 
received 30,000 letters from Uzbek citizens about this. Not a single one was 
looked into. In the Kashkadarinskaya region alone, Ligachev reported, the 
entire Internal Affairs staff had to be arrested. Up to seven million rubles’ 
worth of valuables were confiscated from those “police.” Another fraud was 
exposed in the republic-wide Ministry of Internal Affairs: 700 “dead souls,” 
nonexistent communists made up to bolster the local party’s apparent 
significance. Nepotism was also rampant, with relatives holding all major 
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posts. Several thousand administrators had already been fired, and about 
1,500 taken to court.128 
4.2.1 In the aftermath of the plenum 
Hence, the XVI plenum constituted a watershed in recent Uzbek history 
and would be one of the first major occasions when Moscow would comply 
Tashkent to intensify its efforts against the ‘negative phenomena.’ A first 
event but, as we shall see, not the last. In the immediate aftermath of the XVI 
plenum, there was another important meeting, this time of the CPUz party-
aktiv, on 30 June 1984. On that occasion, the plenum commitments were 
confirmed and while other details to the line to follow were provided.129 
Substantially, the plenum was defining the guidelines of the new strategy, but 
now the party was supposed to elaborate a tactic. From that moment, 
Moscow formally claimed the end of patrimonial system in the periphery of 
the empire while Tashkent was searching for scapegoats to offer to the CPSU. 
However, the result would be a harsher attack against the local establishment 
and a self-destructing war within the Uzbek apparatus. After confirming the 
commitments of the party, Usmankhodzhaev yielded the stage to the second 
secretary Osetrov, who confirmed how: 
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129 The protocol reported: “to increasing the responsibilities of management and of 
the law enforcement bodies in the fight against crime and in the conformity of 
socialist law stemming from the XVI plenum solutions that demonstrated the 
incompatibility with the flaws, strong criticism and self-criticism, mistakes in work and 
determination to strengthen discipline in the light of the requirements of the XXVI 
CPSU congress and the CPSU plenums of February and April 1984.129 […] the same 
Chernenko during his meeting with the voters said that: "the party and the 
government have strengthened the fight against negative phenomena such as the 
squandering of public funds, fraud, abuse of power, corruption and theft. This is not a 
temporary campaign; this is a line that will be followed in a continuous and rigorous 
manner. There is no mercy for anyone and we will not show mercy; no one should have 
any illusions on this point. There is a need for high responsibility and the requirement 
of managers is to focus. Standing on these questions of the party organizations and 
collectives of workers, all Soviet people, is the effective work of the people's control 
organs, organs of law, and order and justice.” Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 
2509, ll. 3-4. 
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Today, unfortunately, the style and methods of work of the organs of the 
prokuratura, the MVD, and Justice do not correspond to the [party] needs, and 
this is why they were criticized during the XVI plenum of Uzbekistan.130 
The ‘Moscow watchdog’ then recalled the cases of massive theft in 
Kashkadarya, Bukhara, Jizzakh, Khorezm e Tashkent and in Karakalpak ASSR, 
and in particular he reminded to the party-aktiv the case of Aslanov – a 
former director of the consumer union of the Romitan raion – from whom 
were seized nine kilos of gold, 3.5 kilos of pearls, 974 gold coins of tsarist 
minting, more than a thousand jewels, 170,000 rubles in cash and three 
cars.131 Osetrov kept his harsh rebuke against the tolerance within the 
prokuratura UzSSR departments, stating: 
in these situations, the prokuratura of UzSSR showed no hardness and did not 
define its role and, in particular, that of N.B. Burikhodzhaev [the prokuror of 
the UzSSR]. The prosecutor should not think that he can permit everything, but 
also must have the harsh opinion to act the decision when state interests 
require this. And if our prosecutors would behave as provided by law and 
would check on a timely eradication of theft of state and people's property, 
corruption, speculation, then we could not have the consequences that are 
now in the industry of cotton cleaning, in trade and other departments of the 
economy.132 
In this very confidential meeting, Osetrov also criticized the activity of the 
BKhSS departments – and the MVD organs in general – that were not doing 
enough to prevent crimes in the republic.133 Thus, the second secretary 
criticized also the inefficiencies in the justice system, declaring that: 
                                                                
130 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 4. 
131 Finally, Aslanov was accused of bribery and speculation and was condemned to the 
death penalty by the SC UzSSR, while his collaborators had been imprisoned. PV, 
20820, 147, 29 June 1985, p. 4. 
132 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 5. 
133 The second secretary CPUz commented: “the orders of the party, government and 
MVD on the protection of socialist property are not performed sufficiently and the 
OBKhSS forces are focused on small and obvious cases and only in half a year, there 
were 377 cases of speculation, and only 20% of theft cases have been completed 
during last year while the prevention of crimes decreased compared to 1982, in 18% 
less. The companies of the agroindustrial complex are not seriously controlled.  [… 
Parallel to this] It increases the number of intentional homicide, theft and other 
crimes, and in the last 3 and a half years have been made in 2,500 murders, 2,193 
rapes, 3,520 robberies and burglaries and 20,000 thefts of citizens’ property.  […Thus, 
the second secretary condemned the incompetence of the security organs and 
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Also courts often tolerate violations of constitutional rights of citizens [and just 
in the last months] have not been imprisoned for 42% of people who were 
convicted of speculation [and] for large-scale thefts in the republic only 2% of 
the defendants found guilty are condemned to the maximum punishments.134 
Thus, Osetrov evidenced the systemic size of the problem that was – in his 
opinion – starting from the cadres’ policy and then reflected on the 
administration. Nevertheless, he did not believe that the nature of the 
problem was in the cadres’ policy, but rather in the management system. 
Hence, he finally stated: 
we must say that these defects are caused by the weakening of the party 
leadership and the flaws in the selection, placement and education of cadres, 
the development of critical and self-criticism, the organization of control and 
verification of the execution of accepted solutions.135 In the MVD organs was 
diffused the practice of the appointment to executive posts people who had 
no political, moral and organizational qualities. And this practice had been 
implemented by the former Ministers of the republic and Yakhyayev and 
Ergashev […] in 1983-1984 for abuse of power and unethical behavior had 
been expelled 46 top managers from the police and 371 were punished. [Even 
locally,] many abuses had been implemented by the UVD of Kashkadarya, 
Navoi, Surkhandarya and Syrdarya and in the MVD of the Karakalpak ASSR.136 
[The defects in the cadres’ policy was also reflected in the local prokuratura 
departments because] the constitutional term of the prosecutor's work is 5 
years, but many worked for 10, 15 and even 20 years in the same location.137 
[For example], a former prosecutor of the Dzhambai raion, T. Kadyrov, was 
corrupt and extorted large sums of money for covering plunderers and 
                                                                                                                                            
brought the landmark case of] a guy [who] has been condemned six times, in the last 
he was arrested for drug possession and was liberated by an investigator of the OVD. 
In the same day, this guy murdered a person.  […Then, he reaffirmed the 
commitments of politics to do not interfere in the investigations] During the XVI 
plenum, I.B. Usmankhodzhaev has underlined that “the intervention of party and 
soviets' workers in the operating activities of investigative bodies must be 
terminated.” [and condemns the example of] Kurbanov, the former FS Leninabad 
raikom, has personally released two criminals.” Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, 
d. 2509, ll. 6, 7, 9, 12. 
134 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 13. 
135 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 14. 
136 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 15. 
137 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 17. 
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speculators. […] The bribe is a dangerous enemy of the revolution and of the 
new system.138 
After the Osetrov accusations, the stage passed to a figure that effectively 
appeared overloaded with responsibility for the misdeeds. In fact, in the 
party-aktiv meeting the chairman of the MVD UzSSR, N.I. Ibragimov, also 
intervened. He declared that the security forces have applied the measures in 
the performance of operating activities and, from the XVI plenum, the 
controls over the managers’ activity were further strengthened.139 To some 
extent, the chairman of the Uzbek police wanted to underline that an 
increase in the revealed case was linked to an improvement of the MVD work. 
Indeed, he confirmed how, 
in the last six months has increased the number of revealed thefts cases for 
+6.2%, corruption for +34.6% and speculation for +3.8% and were revealed 
groups of looters who did their business in the industry of cotton cleaning, 
sovkhozes, kolkhozes, state commerce, consumer cooperatives, financial 
bodies, construction and other sectors of the economy. From these criminals 
had been seized money and valuables for more than 6 million rubles.140 
Then, also the deputy prokuror of Syrdarya, V.S. Surganov, tried to follow 
the same narrative and declared that was fired the former deputy prokuror of 
Gulistan, K.E. Karashev and even the investigator of the same department Kh. 
Kholdarov for discrediting reasons, as well as 127 police men in the last year 
and a half.141 Therefore, the measures to struggle against these “negative 
phenomena” were still intended as insufficient: on that occasion S.A. Shishkov 
- deputy general prosecutor of USSR – also intervened, denouncing a general 
lack of punishment in Uzbekistan, indicating how the many responsible of 
these crimes were not fired and trialed but were just moved to other posts.142 
Then, he confirmed the criticism towards the UzSSR organs, stating: 
measures are badly taken on material damage compensations, and this follows 
the irresponsibility and waste, and the final result of all this can be seen in 
cases like the theft of several million in the productive unit 'Guzal' […] Many of 
these forgers, even after the court decisions, remain in the same posts. The 
mandate of the deputy [that guaranteed a certain grade of immunity] has 
                                                                
138 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 18. 
139 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 25. 
140 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 27. 
141 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 33. 
142 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 62. 
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become an indulgence for the absolution of sins.143 [Then he proceeds, 
denouncing the rotten that was also within the prosecution organs] for 
example, the prosecutors of Ulianov and Chirakchin rayon - in the Kashkadarya 
oblast - under the influence of local leaders have refused to open criminal 
cases of falsification of cotton in the two sovkhozes of the Ulianov raion – 
receiving a sum of 890,000 rubles – and in the kolkhoz of Chirakchin raion for 
520,000 rubles. And these examples are not unique.144 
Thus, this party-aktiv meeting was the completing event that together 
with the XVI plenum defined a watershed moment in UzSSR history. In fact, 
from this moment, the CPSU started to enforce its grip over the Uzbek 
leadership more strongly, suggesting that the negative phenomena were a 
systemic problem, and putting the CPUz under the effective supervision of 
the CC CPSU that seemed to demand a deeper cleaning. Usmankhodzhaev 
then reaffirmed the commitments of the party to strengthen the discipline 
and thanked for the support of ‘communists’ who had replaced the vicious 
workers.145 This implication of ‘communists’ appears a little enigmatic. Did he 
intend that the CPUz – or a part/faction of it – was reaffirming its influence on 
the administration of the republic or a new generation of ‘communists’ was 
arriving from the rest of USSR to cover the posts that before had been 
granted by the korenization to the native Uzbeks? Both trends were actual in 
Uzbekistan and both hypotheses will be verified in the following paragraphs 
where, as we will see, the reshuffle of cadres would have serious effects on 
the political life of the republic. 
The calls for cleaning the republic were finally publicized in the press and 
media, adding another dimension that would confirm a hypothesis of 
legitimation through moralization campaign by the FS CPUz. In fact, 
Usmankhodzhaev wanted to reassure Moscow about its commitments to 
improving the cotton situation as well as in other sensible agricultural 
productions and other speculative sectors, such as the consumption goods’ 
distribution,146 gold147 and construction sites.148 Nevertheless, these 
                                                                
143 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 62. 
144 Prot. 18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 63. 
145 In the conclusive intervention at the party-aktiv, the FS CPUz specified that just 
from March 1983, in the MVD UzSSR were sent more than 1,600 communists. Prot. 
18/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2509, l. 71. 
146 In May 1984, the PCC registered irregularities - such as like theft, losses and bad 
warehousing - even in ministry of trade, the consumption goods distribution and the 
final shops in the UzSSR, registering a damage for 2.685 million rubles just in 1983. 
GARF, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 8299. 
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demonstrative actions seemed to formally act for the FS CPUz consent rather 
than in substantial effects.149 Indeed, after the XVI plenum even in 
newspapers there were more public calls to “increase discipline and 
responsibility of cadres”, reporting the commitments within the Tashkent 
obkom IV plenum, as well in the Tashkent gorkom VI plenum, and in the V 
plenum of Kashkadarya obkom.150 This moral mission was justified as a 
measure to evolve “from feudalism to developed socialism.”151 The effect of 
this publicity that was mobilizing the public opinion – and probably many 
political speculators – was a new wave of donos that flooded the CCs in 
Moscow and in Tashkent. The logic of donos – which we have already come 
across in the previous chapter – seems to correspond to the logic of a famous 
Russian joke that was cited at the beginning of this chapter152 and to some 
extent to the prisoner’s dilemma. In a moment of witch-hunts, it seems to be 
good to be the first to accuse. However, it depends on how in-depth the 
initiator – in our case the party – is determined to go with its purges. 
Finally, in July the former MVD UzSSR, Kh. Yakhyayev, was accused and 
sanctioned for gross misconduct153 when G. Shamshiyev, the Secretary of the 
PCC UzSSR, alleged that the former chairman of the republican MVD had 
                                                                                                                                            
147 Already in May 1983, the PCC was indicating the increasing thefts of socialist 
property also in the gold sector - especially in the state enterprise "Uzbekzoloto" – 
that just for 1983 already amounted for more than 1.5 million rubles, while for the 
1980-1982 were on an average of 852 thousand rubles and in 1977-1979 742 
thousand. GARF; f. 8131, op. 28, d. 6044, l. 1. 
148 In the memorandum 5/471 addressed to Chernenko, Usmankhodzhaev and 
Khudayberdyev wanted to reassure the center about the situation in the republic also 
about housing and the use of the funds that had been destined for the Tashkent 
reconstruction after the 1966 earthquake stating that productivity increased by 64% 
during the years of the tenth and eleventh five-year plan, taking advantage of the 6.8 
million square meters of completed buildings and 78,000 new places in schools, 
31,800 places in nurseries and kindergartens and 4370 hospital beds, developing 
municipal services, transport and, very quickly, the subway. Considering that in 1990 
the Tashkent population will reach 2.4 million inhabitants – from 2 million in 1983 – 
was effectively presenting the need for more funds in order to develop services and 
structures for that new mass. RGANI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 128, ll. 66-69. 
149 Leon Aron, Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009), 133. 
150 PV, 20534, 161, 15 July 1984, pp. 1-2. 
151 PV, 20544, 171, 27 July 1984, p. 3. 
152 Ты не посадишь – тебя посадят. Ты не уберешь – тебя уберут. 
153 In October 1985 Yakhyaev was finally arrested and became part of the ‘trial of the 
century.’ 
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engaged in systematic abuse of his power, amoral ways of living, toadyism, 
and other rascal behavior.154 Then came the turn of another notorious 
corrupter – the above mentioned Usmanov – who had been at the center of 
previous debates. The situation for him would change during the CC CPUz 
buro meeting of 25 July 1984. In fact, on that occasion, the work of the MVD 
was discussed, as were the improvements in its organs – such as the OBKhSS 
– revealing how in 1983-1984 461 dangerous groups of looters and 32 
corrupters were fund, and just during the last year and a half 377 criminal 
cases had been made on speculation and about 20% of cases of robbery had 
already been completed.155 One eleventh of thefts had been conducted by 
the same chief officer (manager) of the group, revealing that in a year and a 
half had been found 331 officials implicating. three quarters of these groups 
held these activities for many years.156 According to the report, just in the last 
year, 217 criminal cases on speculation in agricultural products had been 
opened and about 60 tons of fruit and vegetables were seized by speculators. 
In February 1984, some residents of the kolkhoz "50-letya UzSSR" in Tashkent 
were prosecuted and 2,845 kg of apples were seized.157 Just in 1983 from the 
OBKhSS 40 people were fired, of which 20 were members of the CPSU, and 19 
for violation of discipline and law and some of them had brought criminal 
proceedings and 79 were punished for disciplinary violations.158 Then, the 25 
July buro meeting also confirmed the dismissal of Usmanov, the MCC who 
had been at the center of a polemic in the past months. The MCC UzSSR – 
who was also a deputy of the SS UzSSR elected in the circumscription n° 238 
of Kitabski, in the Kashkadarya oblast – had been criticized in the previous 
plenums and now was finally dismissed with a resolution of the buro from the 
post of MCC and expelled from the CPSU 
for the admission of serious mistakes in choosing leadership and positioning of 
cadres and the failure to adopt measures to suppress the phenomena of 
falsification, abuse, theft of socialist property and corruption that had widely 
spread in industry. [...] Also, for not having fulfilled the trust of his electors, he 
resigned from his post in the SS UzSSR.159  
                                                                
154 PV, 20537, 164, 18 July 1984, p. 3. 
155 Prot. 99/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2473, l. 44. 
156 Prot. 99/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2473, l. 45. 
157 Prot. 99/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2473, l. 46. 
158 Prot. 99/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2473, l. 47. 
159 Prot. 100/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2474, l. 29. 
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In an additional document that was reporting the effective motivation for 
his removal – appendix 5 – was added: 
the deputy of the SS UzSSR, V. Usmanov, being the MCC of the republic, did 
not take the appropriate measures for suppressing the serious violations of 
the discipline of the state during the processing of raw cotton. As a result, at 
many processing points, falsifications of cotton were spread and the spurious 
increase in the quality and manufacturing false receipts. As a result, from 1981 
to 1983, were not delivered 294 thousand tons of spun fibers and its 
production decreased to 27.5%, while the plan was expected to be at 28.9%. 
The weak control over the activity of the cotton factories, the low level of the 
control-revision work resulted in the fact that many industrial workers have 
been involved in criminal groups that cared for the theft of socialist property 
on a large scale. […] Evidence of these phenomena are discovered in the oblast 
of Jizzakh, Bukhara, Kashkadarya, and Khorezm. With the resolution of the CC 
CPUz buro of 25 July 1984, he is removed from the ministry and expelled from 
the CPSU. The Department of party-informational work thinks that V. 
Usmanov has lost the voters’ trust and cannot perform the duties of deputy.160 
Therefore, the CC CPUz buro estimated the level of falsification for 
294,000 tons even in the fiber production just for the period 1981-1983, 
determining the dismissal and the prosecution of Vakhab Usmanov161 for his 
responsibilities.162 The warning results of the cotton industry in UzSSR was 
therefore directly alarming the SM USSR.163 Far from casually – just the day 
                                                                
160 Prot. 100/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2474, l. 132. 
161 Vakhab Usmanov was imprisoned in Lefortovo prison where he spent his last days 
in depression waiting for his destiny. His cellmate, Lev Timofeev, evidenced how 
Usmanov was feeling frustrated of his accusations describing him as “faithful to his 
professional duties and a conscious manager” who was simply playing the game of 
socialist shadow economy. He felt as a scapegoat of a system where high cadres were 
familiar with phenomena like bribes, falsification and embezzlement were “normal, 
everyday, customary economic practice” and was not seen as a guilt. During his period 
in Lefortovo, he collaborated with investigators, denouncing more than 400 people 
from whom he received or to whom he gave bribes. Finally, he got an exemplary 
punishment when in August 1986 he was sentenced to the highest measures of 
punishment: death by firing squad. Lev Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 52–70. 
162 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2454, l. 132. 
163 A special commission instructed by the presidium of the SS USSR defined the 
productive inefficiencies in the cotton industries of UzSSR in 1983, denouncing defects 
and shortcomings for 30,738 tons of cotton thread - for a value of 90.7 million rubles - 
and for 219,891 m2 of fabric for a value of 136,5 million rubles. GARF, f. Р-5446, op. 
144, d. 797, l. 11. 
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after the Uzbek buro meeting that led to such harsh accusations against the 
system of cotton cleaning that was then identified as the pivot of the scam – 
on 26 July 1984, the CC CPSU and SM USSR approved the resolution n° 808 
“about the means to improve the quality of raw cotton and cotton products” 
that was putting new strict rules to warehouses, depots and factories on the 
procedures to receive cotton.164 This measure seemed to be necessary in 
order to limit the embezzlement and the falsifications related to ‘white gold.’ 
After the plenum, a first measure was to link the payment to the effective 
supply – in terms of quality and quantity – of cotton.165 However, the central 
institutions would have a skeptical attitude to provide further credit to 
Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes of UzSSR. Then, the SM USSR disposed on 13 
September 1984 to the Gosplan and ministries of finance, agriculture, 
Gosbank, and CSD of USSR that wanted to identity financial performance of 
kolkhoz and sovkhozes in Uzbekistan on the basis of 90% of revenues for the 
raw cotton delivered to the state, specifying that it was not possible to give 
credit for undelivered cotton.166 Furthermore, the Uzbek leadership was 
reporting shortcomings in terms of quality167 and was asking for a flexible 
approach and to provide financial support to the republican farms.168 
                                                                
164 In the memorandum 3M-4170 of 24 August 1984 of the deputy chairman of 
Goskomtsen to Sm UzSSR, TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 6724, l. 10. 
165 In the memorandum N° 10-12-140 of the CC CPUz and the SM UzSSR (14 
September 1984) addressed to Gosplan USSR, and Soviet ministries of agriculture, 
light industry and finance advised that had been taken the priority measures 
implemented in the regulations of the CC CPSU and the SM USSR of 26 July 1984 n. 
808 in order to "increase production, reduce losses, improve quality of raw cotton and 
cotton products" that was linking the payment of raw cotton depending on the quality 
and content of fibers. According to the Gosplan, the republic had to supply for 1984 a 
quantity of 5.965 million tons from which had to be produced 1.7725 million tons that 
equals to 29.72% of fiber, against the 27.27% of the period 1980-1983. GARF, f. R-
5446, op. 144, d. 944, ll. 1-2. 
166 These measures found the opposition of kolkhozes and sovkhozes that were 
presenting the risk of labor unprofitability in the Uzbek farms. However, the central 
government did not want to assure other credit, considering that still in 1984, 
sovkhozes and kolkhozes of UzSSR did not delivered raw cotton for a value of 355 
million rubles. GARF, f. R-5446, op. 145, d. 999, ll. 1-3. 
167 The quality decrease had been explained by the memorandum 10-12-148 of the CC 
CPUz and Soviet Ministrov UzSSR to the SM USSR (17 September 1984) where it was 
reported that quality was higher when cotton was cropped manually and from 1971 it 
had started to be cropped mechanically. As well, there were problems related to the 
intensive monoculture that was reducing the fertility and quantity of hummus. As well, 
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Evidently, the scandals related to bribery went deeper, entering in all 
levels of patrimonialism within the republic. The scandals kept overwhelming 
the local leaderships169 and were reported in the press at both local and 
national levels. For example, at the end of July 1984 PV revealed a situation in 
Bukhara where several scandals related to cotton and the difficult situation in 
the agricultural sector emerged,170 resulting in the reaction of the IV plenum 
of the Bukhara obkom that assumed measures for strengthening the cadres, 
revealing poor economic standards in cotton production, and the prosecution 
of many officials among which 56 were fired because of their financial 
culpability. Even some officials employed in factories, as the manager I. 
Mamatov of the Bukharazagotkhlopkoprom – the Bukhara cotton processing 
complex - had been sanctioned by the party as well as the directors of the 
Gizhduvanski, Peshkunski and Karakulski complexes – respectively M 
Samatov, D. Muyasarov, S. Sadullaev. This complaint has been made by the FS 
Romitan raikom, Kh. Saidov who also denounced that in 1981 he was director 
of a sovkhoz that declared it had fulfilled the plan while, in reality, it had 
                                                                                                                                            
there was the ‘Vilta’ infection that was withering plants and hit almost 30% of the 
productive areas. The results were weaker fibers and more salinized lands. As well, 
was registered a reduction of fertile minerals in land – that in 1983 reached 0.5% while 
the demanded standard was 0.8% – and also the intensive use of pesticides made 
cotton weaker. Also the implementation of the quality mark GOST 1971 was not 
bettering the quality of cotton and created a disorder in wages of machinists and 
manual croppers. GARF, f. R-5446, op. 144, d. 944, ll. 8-9. 
168 The CC CPUz and the SM UzSSR were informing Nuriev and the whole SM USSR (17 
September 1984) that “However, in many farms of the republic from the first day of 
raw cotton harvest, was substantially missing the first industrial quality cotton. The 
commission – established by the SM UzSSR to analyze the numerous figures of cotton 
from different farms of the republic – showed that raw cotton for a normal growth 
plant (with high yield and boll opening in strength fiber) do not have a first and 
basically refers to the third industrial grade, with the processing of the first industrial 
batch gave 30-33% yield of fiber and high absolute seed weight. Experts and scientists 
are studying from the reasons of low strengthens cotton fiber, but were not able to 
well and fully establish the nature of this problem.” Substantially, the Uzbek party and 
government were demanding more money to the republican kolkhozes and sovkhozes 
saying that the quality of cotton was too low and needed for more funds. GARF, f. R-
5446, op. 144, d. 944, l. 6. 
169 On 28 July 1984, during the IV plenum of Andijan obkom was reported that the FS 
Balykchinski raikom, D. Malikov, had built his house with illegal means. RGANI, f. 5, op. 
90, d. 105, l. 74 
170 Just in the Bukhara raion, none kolkhozes on eleven were in debt.  PV, 20561, 188, 
17 August 1984, p. 2. 
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produced only 34% of the planned share. Then, he complained that the 
production had officially risen from 35 to 47 quintals per hectare in 1977-
1981, but in actual fact this increase was only "on paper." Saidov also 
complained that the organization of the party turned a blind eye to the 
negative situations that were happening in the whole of Uzbekistan where, in 
the last eight years, had been invested in agriculture improvements 581 
million rubles, but this did not give any substantive result. Similarly, also in 
the Andijan obkom it was revealed that a reduction in production from the 
planned figures had taken place. Moreover, 18 tons of raw cotton more than 
planned had been used for the production of fiber, and 28,000 tons of 
unusable cotton were wasted. Also in this case, the directors of the cotton 
processing plants had been fired.171 Meanwhile, during the V plenum of the 
Syrdarya obkom, it was declared that some of the party officials were corrupt 
and had an "immoral" lifestyle, abusing the power for their positions. Thus, 
the chairman of the Gulistan gorispolkom, Sh. Davidkhodzhaev, the manager 
of the Yangiervodstroi trust called N. Kozub, the director of the sovkhoz 
"Ruzkoi" M. Kushbakov and the member of the oblast consumer union T. 
Faizev—amongst others—were all dismissed from their positions. It was also 
reported that the former director of the sovkhoz ‘Leningrad’ B. Shavkiev put 
his relatives in important posts as specialists and that deficiencies in cotton 
production were covered by some directors who committed “crimes against 
socialism”. Furthermore, the FS Gulistan raikom was pushing the prosecutor 
to close the case.172 
On the one hand, the party was actively publicizing its results in cleaning 
the situation in the republic while, on the other hand, these press campaigns 
risked discrediting the CPUz. In fact, the Usmankhodzhaev’s strategy. aimed 
at enforcing massive purges and consequently gettin legitimation from 
Moscow -, was likely to backfire. In fact, in some cases the party adopted 
tones which were reminiscent of the tabloid press and created bad feelings 
between the party, the population and even the press that in many occasions 
was accused of inciting discontent. In fact, at the end of July an argument 
between the Pravda editor V.G. Afanasiev – who was seen as responsible for 
publishing overly critical articles in July 1984 – and the CC CPUz emerged on 
the risks of discrediting the party commitments in the struggle against the 
negative phenomena. Thus, on 2 august 1984 Usmankhodzhaev wrote a 
letter to Chernenko, to reassure him about the normalization of the situation 
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in the republic where the party was "improving the level or organizational 
discipline, and responsibility of cadres." For demonstrating firmness, 
perseverance, and proximity to the CC CPSU line, Usmankhodzhaev thanked 
Chernenko declaring that the units of CC CPSU are "very helpful and always 
their assistance and support [...] at the same time, I cannot say the same 
about the difficulties that we met on our way. Some days ago, we ran into a 
strange and unpleasant fact of which Radzhabov, FS Namangan obkom, has 
already informed you recently [When he spoke] at the CC CPUz plenum, he 
did not criticize the redactor of the newspaper but he has proposed to 
improve the contents of published materials in the central press and to apply 
an objective approach in rising problems."173 On this polemic, on 27 
November 1984 a memorandum of CC CPSU signed by Ligachev and 
Zimyanin,  gives reason to the Uzbek party and defends Usmankhodzhaev and 
Radzhabov. Parallel to this, even Afanasiev apologized.174 In the October 1984 
plenum of the CC CPSU, Usmankhodzhaev confirmed his commitments to 
enforce the organizational party work of CPUz in order to fight the negative 
phenomena and to keep the cotton production.175 Despite the fact that 
Moscow had wanted to agree with Usmankhodzhaev, the first 
counterproductive effects of a campaign that threatened to claim victims and 
alienate the population were clearly evident. However, the climate of 
heaviness and uncertainty that was spreading in Uzbekistan concerned the 
Uzbek party that, especially from that moment, would cautiously assume a 
more tolerant view towards traditional institutions linked to religion and local 
power dynamics. In fact, parallel to the commitments to uproot ‘feudalism,’ 
the party was also presenting a narrative that was rediscovering, tolerating 
and re-institutionalizing with a wider publicity the traditional institutions like 
the makhalla.176 Apparently, this was the psychological response that the 
party had in this moment of deep crisis for the patrimonial system. 
In August 1984, while the CPC UzSSR revealed similar cases of inefficiency, 
violations of property, thefts and shortages even in wheat, grain and also in 
                                                                
173 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 134, l. 20. 
174 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 134, l. 22. 
175 Inamzhon Buzrukovich Usmankhodzhayev, Resheniya Oktyabr’skogo (1984 G.) 
Plenuma TSK KPSS - Programma Deystviy Partiynoy Organizatsii Uzbekistana Po 
Dal’neyshemu Po"yemu Sel’skokhozyaystvennogo Proizvodstva, Vsey Ekonomiki 
Respubliki (Tashkent: Izd-vo TSK KP Uzbekistana, 1985). 
176 Pravda, 20545, 172, 29 July 1984, p. 3. 
295 
 
leather productions,177 a new wave of purges and arrests overwhelmed the 
political leadership of the UzSSR. On 11 August, the former FS Bukhara 
Karimov was finally arrested178 and on 13 August was the turn of Odilov. 179 
After the initial investigations, the Namangan oblast KGB department 
reported on 19 August 1984180 to the newly appointed FS Namangan obkom 
Nazir Radzhabovich Radzhabov that during the investigations in the Papski 
raion many ‘negative phenomena’ had been revealed. The negative situation 
was caused by Akhmadzhan Odilov, the former general director of the ‘Lenin’ 
Agroindustry unit and whose honesty was being disputed in the party.181 
Meanwhile, the KGB was also having operative problems in dealing with that 
figure, considering his powerful ties and the fact that his relatives and 
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affiliates wanted to organize protests to dissent against his arrest.182 The KGB 
report was even indicating that in the days after the local obkom plenum, 
many goods were transported from the agroindustrial complex to Tashkent. 
Furthermore, after the arrest of Odilov's son other things were transported 
through Puncan. In parallel, Odilov destroyed some documents, and in 1982 
only, he ordered to inflate productive data on the development of lands in 
order to obtain 600,000 rubles.183 Then the KGB department of Namangan 
sent on 24 august 1984 a report to the FS Namangan obkom Radzhabov, 
literally entitled "The History of a Kapo"184 that we want to fully report in the 
appendix because of its extraordinary and indicative contents, revealing a 
situation of abuse and semi-slavery for thousands of people under Odilov’s 
power. 
Odilov was a close affiliated of Rashidov and was well inserted in the 
falsification system. After his arrest in 1984, his diary containing hundreds of 
contacts was found in Uzbekistan and in Russia. Some of them were famous 
people, and near some names there was the letter "p" that indicated the 
Uzbek word pora (‘bribe’).185 His story of sadism became so famous in USSR 
that in 1988 Uzbeknauchfilm even made a film called "Plata" about him, 
collecting memoirs of victims that remembered his whipping, tortures, and 
abuses on workers that were treated as his own properties by the sadistic 
leader who could with impunity take scalps of his victims. The images of the 
apparently simple guy who built his own private empire with roughly 30.000 
subjects, his personal militia, his large underground ‘private jails’ and his 
collection of knives, whips and torture instruments he used are terrifying.186 
For the breadth of the scandal that undermined the sensibility of the Soviet 
society, the ‘Odilov affair’ became crucial and will also be considered in next 
chapters. 
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In parallel to the Odilov’s arrest, on 13 August also Kallibek Kamalov – FS 
Karakalpak obkom since 1963 and one of the main allies of the former FS 
CPUz187 – was also removed from his post and ‘exiled’ as Consul General of 
the USSR in Constanta (Romania).188 Also, American intelligence carefully 
followed the purges in the remote periphery of the USSR, reporting the 
content of Usmankhodzhaev’s speech at the 60th anniversary of the 
Karakalpak ASSR in Nukus on 26 December 1984. 
It seems, we have every reason to say today that the autonomous republic's 
party, soviet, and economic organizations have drawn the correct conclusions 
from the plenum's resolutions. They are persistently struggling to eradicate 
existing deficiencies and are mobilizing all of their reserves and resources for 
the subsequent raising of the level of public production. Allow me to express 
my firm conviction that the united and determined Karakalpak party 
organization is handling the assigned tasks honorably.189 
The document specifically reported that at the ceremony the new 
generation of FSs was participating. This included U.U. Umarov, FS Tashkent 
gorkom, S.M. Nesterenko, second secretary of the Tashkent obkom, I. D. 
Dzhabbarov, FS of the Bukhara obkom, V.P. Yesin, FS of the Navoi obkom and 
M. Khudaibergenov, FS of the Khorezm Obkom.190 The story of the Karakalpak 
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FS, his level of autonomy in ruling the ‘republic within the republic’ and then 
the size of the purges is indicative of the general decentralization that the 
state assumed in the Brezhnevian years and that was going to be 
recentralized in the 80s, indicating the defects that were not typical of the 
agriculture but also of other economic sectors within the republic. In fact, the 
CC CPUz buro meeting of 15 August 1984 approved the resolution 437/54 of 
CC CPUz and SM UzSSR that was conceived to struggle against the 
shortcomings also in the gold sector, where there had been revealed serious 
defects that did not meet modern requirements: “with very slow rhythms 
advances the modernization of active mines and gold extraction factories, 
and efficiently using the technological equipment.”191 Also considering these 
defects in the republic, the buro kept its mission of cadres’ reorganization 
“according to the XVI plenum directives, discuss the tasks on increasing the 
responsibilities of management, the executive bodies for the fight against 
crime and pursuant to the socialist law,”192 and “approving the methods on 
the strengthening of the labor inspection by the law enforcement organs.”193 
The buro even prepared a memorandum addressed to the prokuratura, MVD 
and SC and the MJ of the UzSSR in order understand the reasons and 
reviewing criminal cases to proceed with further investigation - with a 
particular attention to the cases of theft, forgery and corruption.194 
Nevertheless, this ‘bacchanalian’ approach did not seem to present an 
effective management strategy.  
4.2.2 The last cotton battle 
As usual, in August the preparation for the cotton harvest season started. 
However, this cotton harvest would not assume the same level of enthusiasm 
of the Rashidovian years and the republic seemed to be more committed to 
unveiling scandals in the economic and political life of the UzSSR. Just after 
the arrest of Usmanov, a new wave of scandals and criticism proceeded again 
in the cotton cleaning system that was not efficiently fulfilling the hoped 
output after the increasing investments195. This had the effect of exposing the 
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fake enthusiasm of previous years. This was also evident in the press, where 
there were enforced calls to “lead defoliation”196 in the “white way”, a 
formulation that since mid-80s started to be preferred to the ‘white gold’ 
narrative that dominated in the past.197 Therefore, in the light of the ‘negative 
phenomena’, the calls in the press to improve efficiently the cotton 
processing and the work of the cadres proceeded,198 while the CPUz restated 
the commitments to award the merits of the most virtuous kolkhozes and 
soykhozes  with financial prizes.199 Thus, the party stressed the importance of 
properly using the machines – an investment that was not payed back in 
terms of qualitative results – and invited the local party organizations and the 
unions to take adequate measure about.200 Then, the triumphalist calls and 
the patriotism demanded for the ‘cotton battles’ was, substantially over, 
leaving space to the field of criticism that was, anyway, getting the support of 
the Soviet organs.  
1984 then witnessed a shift in narrative that the CPUz was endorsing, with 
a clear criticism that, along the lines proposed by the CC CPSU, was functional 
to the legitimation of the new post-Rashidovian leadership of Uzbekistan. 
After the triumphalism of the previous years, now, in the middle of the cotton 
harvest season, the party was admitting shortcomings and delays in the 
harvest and invited the workers to better the rhythms of crop, exalting the 
most virtuous raions and making daily statistics about them, as a sort of 
'Medals table' on the cotton harvest, designed to show the actual efforts and 
encourage workers, and providing banners, medals, and material prizes to the 
most Stakhanovist workers.201 
This criticism was, however, enforced by the pressure that Soviet judicial 
organs put to the UzSSR party and government. In August 1984, the SC of 
USSR and UzSSR were called to punish more severely the crimes against 
socialist property and during the plenum of the SC UzSSR, the supreme court 
of the republic called to ordinary courts to fight against those who do not 
work and do not contribute to the common cause and even against those 
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who drink that should be sent in care. The courts must also check the 
requirements of the construction code. But not all courts conformed with the 
guidelines of the XVI plenum CPUz.202 Then, on 3 October 1984, the 
prokuratura also put pressure on the Uzbek government, informing that new 
investigative groups had been constituted to fight “against the losses and 
thefts of cotton” also reporting the cases of officials who were inflating 
cotton with water. Just in Bukhara, were investigations that had been 
intensified during the ‘Bukharan affair’, and where more than 150 tons of 
totally watered cotton and several losses were found.203 Even during the XVII 
plenum CC CPUz (20 October 1984) there was a call to “increase efforts to 
strengthen discipline and restore order” and to implement the points of the 
XVI plenum.204  
However, the internal debate appeared much harsher than in the press, 
and during the plenum, Usmankhodzhaev informed the party about the latest 
developments in the moralization campaign and declared that lately had been 
changed 22 secretaries of obkoms – including five FSs – more than 70 
secretaries of gorkom, raikom of which 30 FSs.205 Then, he declared that the 
first secretary of Tashkent gorkom, Sh. Faiziev, abused his power and moved 
to a big private house where three families once lived and expanded it with 
banya and a swimming pool, spending more than 10,000 rubles. His sons and 
other relatives – from the university years – had been admitted into the party 
and promoting their careers faster. He was removed from his post. Then, 
Usmankhodzhaev revealed that, during the investigations on the thefts in the 
Bukhara oblast, had been discovered a group of former local party and 
government leaders – from which there was also the former FS A. Karimov 
who confessed of taking bribes for more than a million rubles.206 As well, on 
that occasion Usmankhodzhaev denounced the already-ousted 
R.G. Gaipov, the former FS Kashkadarya who had defects in the work, in 
economic development, and culture of the oblast, in the choice of cadres and 
as well for his immodesty he was relieved from office. Similarly, Z.I. Esenbaev - 
director of the Committee for publications – abused his power, violated the 
party and the state discipline and he illegally gave apartments to his sons by 
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drawing on the committee funds. He gave the job to his sons and helped them 
in their career growth. He violated the financial discipline and during the 
planning and the release of some literature, he was pursuing his personal 
benefits. On 15 May 1984, he was ousted from his posts. 207 
In addition, the FS CPUz recalled the cases of U. Turakulov, FS Jizzakh 
gorkom, who “abused his power, violated the principles of cadres, protected 
the people who he had compromised with, was immodest of resolving 
housing issues of his family and relatives. He was also ousted on May 15.”208 
Also M. Kamalova – former FS of the Kirov raikom of Tashkent city – abused 
power and was immodest of enhancements to her housing situation.  She was 
removed, too. T.R. Tillaev was the FS Chirakchinsk raikom and violated the 
requirements of the CPSU charter and the principles of the cadres' selection. 
He was lifted from the post on 29 February 1984. Also the member of the CC 
CPUz, A.K. Karimov was found to have abused his power and to have acted 
corruptly. He was  dismissed from his posts,209 along with A. Odilov, a 
member of the CC CPUz, who abused of his power and violated the socialist 
law and the norms of the morality of the party and the former MCC V. 
Usmanov, was indicated for the mistakes in management, the selection of 
cadres, fraud, and corruption.210 At media level emerged from the plenum, 
the call of the FS CPUz to make a general check on those 115,000 people who 
work in the CPUz. In Usmankhodzhaev’s words: 
Communists who had sharply and radically analyzed shortcomings and their 
roots, have made concrete proposals to strengthen discipline and order, 
improve the Party's leadership of the national economy, the improvement of 
organizational and ideological work, the creation of the spirit that rejects the 
deviations from the norms of party life […] In the struggle for the improvement 
of the situation included all parts of the political system. Taking concrete 
practical measures to eradicate bribery and profiteering, waste and theft of 
socialist property, abuse of officials to intensify the struggle for the 
strengthening of the rule of law. for the improvement of law enforcement. 
Increased responsibility of executives, all the frames for the overall 
organization called discipline. In his speech at the meeting of the Union of 
People's Controllers CPSU General Secretary Comrade KU Chernenko named 
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Uzbekistan one of the regions. which made an important and fairly step to 
eliminate the negative phenomena.211 
Thus, after this plenum, the party was publicizing a link between the 
negative phenomena to the failure of the industrial plan and even 
denouncing the defects found in other sectors as the worse quality of primary 
goods as the bread products.212 Furthermore, in the autumn 1984, besides 
the wider manifestations of tolerance, the party seemed to be visibly worried 
about the diffusion of Islamism within the small communities of the republic, 
inviting the youth, their educators and mass media to struggle against 
something that seemed to be a spillover from the backwardness of 
neighbouring Afghanistan, where Soviet troops were involved in a bloody 
war.213 
While negative phenomena were still discovered in the cotton sector,214 
on 9 November 1984 there appeared a huge appeal in the PV calling for 
patriotism of the Uzbek people in the cotton fields.215 Such a measure 
indicated that besides all the measures that had been implemented to 
improve the cotton crop in the republic, the situation remained critical and 
required all the efforts of the population. However, while agriculture could 
not be determined in terms of yield and climatic conditions the party could 
carry on the domestic front with which to please Moscow and proceed with 
purges in order to impose figures that were more liked to Staraya Ploshad: an 
example was the power reshuffle in the Ferghana obkom with the Russian 
Aleksander I. Barulin becoming the new second secretary to assist the 
longstanding FS Umarov.216 As well, on 19 November the longstanding 
chairman of the SM UzSSR was officially removed from his post, as was one of 
Rashidov’s main allies Narmankhonmadi Khudayberdyev.217 At the head of 
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the UzSSR government was appointed Gayrat Khamidullayevich Kadyrov, who 
kept his that post until October 1989 when he became deputy minister of 
electrotechnical production and instrumentation of the USSR. The ousted 
Khudayberdyev – who became one of the top-level accused in the cotton 
affair showed that the Uzbek cotton affair t was becoming even more 
systemic and political.  
The witch-hunt tones became evident even considering that in the normal 
plenums – that were devoted to other political, social and mainly economic 
issues – it was often remembered the data on the purges and the size of the 
scandals. Indeed, also in the XVIII plenum CC CPUz of 22 November 1984 was 
revealed the arrest of Berdy Karimov, director of the kolkhoz "Komsomol" in 
the Urgench raion, who had been caught in the act of taking a bribe of 3,000 
rubles. He had leased more than 100 hectares to the people and took from 
them not the production but the money [he administered as if it were his 
stuff] because he had to buy false receipts of cotton [non] produced and 
during inspections have found more than 147 thousand rubles and bonds 
with a 3% loan.218 The purge continued in Tashkent as well, where the PCC of 
the city reported that in 1983 and in the first nine months of 1984, 360 
managers had been prosecuted for embezzlement and other 96 had been 
expelled from their posts.219 
Then, also during the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the UzSSR, 
Usmankhodzhaev that declared to represent everybody in the republic – from 
which 630,000 members of CPUz where are represented 84 national groups – 
made a very long speech, where he mentioned the commitments revealed 
from the XVI plenum as the main political priority for the republic. In his 
words, the plenum 
revealed serious shortcomings in the management of the economy of the 
republic, in the work with the staff, the education of the people. These 
weaknesses negatively affected the efficient use of productive capacity 
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created in the republic. Decision XVI Plenum became a turning point in the life 
of the Republican Party organization. They called warm approval all workers, 
provide positive changes in party political work in the social and economic life 
and public consciousness. The decisions of the plenum endorse a full 
utilization of existing production potential, favorable climatic conditions, rich 
labor resources.” The implementation of these tasks results, have been slow 
and hesitant, especially in the lower levels. Still affected by fear of the new, 
inertia in economic thinking heads of several ministries and departments, lack 
of initiative, perseverance, responsibility for their work.220 
After thanking Chernenko and the CPSU, he stated that: “We assure that 
we will continue to firmly pursue a policy of further enhancing organization, 
strengthening discipline and order in all spheres of life and activity.”221 What 
seemed to opportunistically follow the Andropovian course then became a 
priority in the political agenda and maybe also an identity issue for the Uzbek 
political community of mid-1980s. Then, on 13 December, even the Minister 
of Finance Karimov ensured in PV the commitment of the financial 
administration in fighting against negative phenomena222 while it was always 
more evident that a main scapegoat was not found. Neither the deceased 
Rashidov, whose name remained highly respected and seemed to represent a 
mark of efficiency, was pilloried. Conversely, for the good results in 
production, on 14 December the Tashkent textile factory entitled to his name 
was also awarded, emphasizing the role of Rashidov to the cotton cause.223 
However, the times were changed and in just one year the nostalgia for the 
former leader and the ‘six million battle’ was over. The search for a scapegoat 
became an evident issue that was manifested also on 20 December when PV 
published an amazing declaration by Golovin, the head of the Uzbek KGB 
who, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Uzbek Cheka-KGB, 
indicated the attempts of Western conspirators to take advantage of the 
situation in the republic. He stated: 
                                                                
220 PV, 20655-20656, 282-283, 9 December 1984, p. 4. 
221 PV, 20655-20656, 282-283, 9 December 1984, p. 4. 
222 "Ministry of Finance insure that politically mature and competent people, who 
possess high moral qualities and a feeling for what is new and who are intolerant 
toward any display of wastefulness and bad management, head all key sections." FBIS, 
“JPRS-UPS-85-022, 12 March 1985, USSR Report. Political and Sociological Affairs,” 73. 
223 PV, 20648, 289, 15 December 1984, p. 1. Further, it was announced in great fanfare 
that it was exceeding the planned figure of 18 ton of fiber. PV, 20678, 5, 6 January 
1985, p. 1. 
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the Western special services did not give up their hopes of taking advantage of 
certain negative aspects of our reality either. The XVI plenum of the CC CPUz 
determinedly identified and censured cases of violations of state discipline and 
developed fundamental measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future. 
KGB organs drew the necessary conclusions in connection with the basic 
points advanced at the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Uzbek 
Communist Party.224 
Therefore, after Rashidov’s death, 1984 became a second watershed 
moment in the history of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ with agricultural 
production drastically decreased – thanks to the difficult weather situation 
and probably also because of a limitation amount of pripiski – the increasing 
scandals also at local level,225 and a purge within the party that was assuming 
a systematic dimension. The responsibility of the situation could not be 
attributed to a leader who was dead, but it was true that those higher 
officials of the old regime that just under Rashidov had made their political 
and, perhaps, economic fortune was effectively involved. On this regard was 
emblematic the donos campaign – reported in the appendix - against Rano 
Khabibovna Abdullaeva, the mild face of the former Rashidovian 
establishment and the person responsible for ideology inside the CC CPUz, 
who was also deputy chairwoman of the SM UzSSR.226 
 
                                                                
224 Ibid., 69. 
225 Also at the end of December, the CC CPUz buro discussed the specific situation in 
the Balykchinskiy raion (Andijan) where the party took “decisive steps to eliminate the 
shortcomings and derelictions. […] It is necessary to regard the results of its work with 
higher principles and more exactingly and to be more energetic in putting all sections 
of the economy's organizational development and the indoctrination of people in 
order. The selection, assignment, and training of personnel and the consistent struggle 
against any type of negative phenomenon and tendency should occupy a special place 
in the activity of the rayon's party committee and the primary party organizations. [...] 
The Central Committee Buro required the ministry to eliminate existing shortcomings 
and to take effective steps aimed at raising the role of economic propaganda in the 
struggle for the fulfillment of state plans and socialist obligations.” Ibid., 75–76. 
226 Cf. Rano Abduallaeva personal file. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 6396. 
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4.3 A new wave of purges in the UzSSR 
At the beginning of 1985, the party renewed its commitments and duties 
to heal the situation in the republic in order to eliminate the ‘negative 
phenomena’ and to transform the cadres in efficient and dynamic figures. 
However, such a narrative of ‘formalism’ and ‘bureaucratism’227 became a 
further allegation against a part of the Uzbek leading society and a pivotal 
issue in the Uzbek purges. These allegations were typical arguments that the 
party used to clean the nomenklatura lists and to exclude some undesirable 
names. Similarly, the typical anti-traditionalist arguments were used in order 
to defend the priorities of state atheism. Thus, the republic that had been 
slave of the Rashidovian narrative of the ‘great cotton’ and the ‘six million 
tons’, was now replacing this mythology with the moralization’s one, while 
the party kept stressing the socialist duties of the Uzbek SSR workers for 
1985, and the need to concentrate all the forces on improving the quality of 
cotton and on giving effective profits to the country.228 Nevertheless, an 
effective reform of the system was little more than a vague mirage.229 
4.3.1 The ‘zero tolerance’ approach 
In early 1985, scandals started to emerge also in the Tashkent productive 
system – that was supposed to be the main industrial complex of the republic 
and probably the most controlled – when from mid-January 1985, testing 
statistics in the kolkhoz and factories were noting many misrepresentations in 
the productive registers and parts of production had been concealed. For 
example, the Tashkent textile factory in the production volume had added 
1,770,000 rubles more than the real share, claiming in the plan of January-
April 1984 to have produced the 100% of the plan, while in real there were 
shortcomings and defects and the production had not been realized for 6%.230 
The effects of these new scandals were predominantly at an organizational 
                                                                
227 With accusations of bureaucratism the former FS Balykchy raikom D. Malikov and 
the second secretary of Dekhkanabad raikom, S. Alimov had been fired. PV, 20681, 8, 
10 January 1985, p. 1. 
228 PV, 20685, 12, 15 January 1985, p. 1 
229 In parallel, systemic solutions that could overthrow patrimonialism were studied, 
becoming a part of the next perestroika agenda: among these plans, there were 
reform programs aimed at transforming collective farms in a more autonomous 
regime of benefits and production, linking the benefits to the quality of produced 
cotton and organizing tenders of procurements. 
230 PV, 20686, 13, 16 January 1985, p. 3. 
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level, and a reshuffle of power posts within the UzSSR government. During 
the CPUz buro meeting on 16 January 1985 it was also suggested that in 
Surkhandarya they were not endorsing the radical and hoped changes in the 
working methods and style of the obkom, gorkoms, raikoms and primary 
party organizations, and the obkom buro did not control the implementation 
of the XVI plenum decisions.231 The first effects of these new scandals were 
that, on the same day, a decree of the presidium of the SS UzSSR unified the 
MCC within the ministry of agriculture and put also the cotton cleaning and 
processing jurisdiction under the leadership of A.I. Ikramov.232 The day after, 
there was another change in the UzSSR government and B.G. Alimdzhanov 
was appointed MJ UzSSR, M. Rakhimov the first deputy chairman of the PCC 
UzSSR, and Kurbanbayev deputy of the same organ.233 On 18 January, Sh. 
Khajdarov became the chairman of the state committee of the UzSSR and also 
at party level the Russian Yu. P. Gudkov234 was appointed the second 
secretary of the Khorezm obkom.235 Similarly, on 23 January, V.A. 
Smeyushchev was appointed second secretary Andijan obkom.236 The size of 
these new scandals – that were reporting financial movements in some 
kolkhozes of Tashkent oblast were money was stolen or destined to other 
purposes – also hit a prominent figure, Mirzamakhmud Mirzarakhmanovich 
Musakhanov237, the FS Tashkent obkom in power from 1970 who was forced 
to retire. In his place was appointed Timur Agzamovich Alimov238 on 22 
January 1985.239 
In that moment, the situation seemed to be particularly serious, and the 
FS CPUz started to endorse at local levels the necessity of these measures in 
order to improve the situation of the whole republic. After the Rashidovian 
                                                                
231 Prot. 112/1985, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 154, d. 2505, l. 35. 
232 PV, 20687, 14, 17 January 1985, p. 1. 
233 PV, 20688, 15, 18 January 1985, p. 1. 
234 As we will see, the appointment of a new second secretary in an obkom was always 
a bad sign, because it could be considered as Moscow’s Trojan horse to proceed 
within the local structures. Indeed, Gudkov would have a particular role in managing 
the purge within the Khorezmian party committee and also against its FS. 
235 PV, 20689, 16, 19 January 1985, p. 1. 
236 PV, 20693, 20, 24 January 1985, p. 1. 
237 As we will see, he also was implicated in the Gdlyan’s criminal investigations. 
238 Alimov kept the post of FS Tashkent obkom until 10 September 1988 when he was 
replaced by Mirakhmat Mirhadzhievich Mirkasymov who lasted until 28 October 1989 
when Salidzhan Mamarasulov replaced him. 
239 PV, 20692, 19, 23 January 1985, p. 1. 
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cotton triumphs, the new commitments that Tashkent was demanding to the 
peripheries was in terms of purges. Emblematic was Usmankhodzhaev’s 
speech at the Karshi electoral district for the elections in soviets on 24 
February. In the capital of Kashkadarya – where the former ruling 
establishment related to Gaipov had been uprooted – the FS CPUz declared 
that the controls found numerous additions in reporting on procurement of 
raw cotton and other agricultural products and the XVI plenum CPUz 
“criticized the vicious style and methods of the former leadership of the 
Kashkadarya region." However, he noted how the oblast improved his 
situation after the V plenum of Kashkadarya obkom, where also the local 
communist started the way of criticism:   
They laid the foundation for the great work on improvement of the entire 
economic-economic, ideological, political, and moral situation in the region 
[...], identifying the causes and origins of many of the negative phenomena in 
the main correctly apprehended and vigorously supported by the Communists 
and all working people in the area. [Then he demanded for an increase of 
measures] However, we must frankly say that the line XVI Plenum of the 
Central Committee on strengthening the discipline, organization, order, 
increasing the responsibility of cadres in some places is enforced 
inconsistently, without the proper dedication and focus. Accumulated over the 
years, bliss, muddy trends, inertia of thinking and work are still strongly 
affecting the work of individual organizations and officials. [...] It must be said 
clearly and unambiguously. Return to the old methods will not. Party Heading 
for the comprehensive strengthening of order in all spheres of production, 
social relations, education is irreversible, it is strongly and actively supported 
by the people, and the Central Committee, relying on party committees, 
primary Party organizations, all working people of the republic, will continue 
to put it into effect.240 
In his long speech, Usmankhodzhaev finished by demanding an impossible 
task, namely fulfilling the excessively onerous plans honestly: 
[I’m] not pleased with us and the situation in agriculture. In the past year, all 
districts of the region have not fulfilled the plans of cotton pieces.  Cotton 
yields remain low. But the increase in returns per hectare remains mainly in 
the intensification of agricultural production, the implementation of the Food 
Program. Serious deficiencies exist in other sectors of agriculture. In 1984, no 
region has not ensured the implementation of plans of grain, the area did not 
cope with the plans pieces of fresh fruit and grapes. Some managers tend to 
justify failures in the fact that they refused to implement the plan at any price, 
                                                                
240 PV, 20697, 24, 29 January 1985, p. 2. 
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not engaged in fraud and postscripts. This is nothing but an attempt to distort 
the line XVI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan. It is necessary to faithfully and honestly fulfil plans.241 
Basically, the FS CPUz saw no other management strategies, or was afraid 
of them. Finally, he demanded improvements in a situation that had not given 
brilliant results and had registered shortages even in industry, construction, 
housing,242 electricity, water, heating, and public structures, such as hospitals 
and schools where generally "it remains low quality of public services 
provided to the population."243 In this way, the FS CPUz manifested the open 
criticism for the negative practices of the previous years and a new zero 
tolerance attitude that was far from the triumphalism of the previous years. 
However, typical of some weak leadership with a poor perception and a weak 
grip, Usmankhodzhaev was claiming results but was not able to identify a 
strategy nor a final aim at which point his mission could be considered 
completed, assuming both a systemic and, indeed, a monstrous size. Under 
his leadership, from the beginning of the cotton affairs in 1983 to January 
1985, 40 of the 65 oblast Party secretaries, ten of the 13 obkom first 
secretaries, and 260 gorkom and raikom secretaries had been removed from 
their posts. One-third of the chairmen and their deputies of the oblispolkoms, 
gorispolkoms and raispolkoms were removed in this period and "ninety new 
officiate were also brought into the top echelon of the republic ministries and 
state apparatus."244 
In February, the reshuffle of cadres proceeded and involved the general 
accountability of the republic245 and the FS CPUz renewed its commitments to 
proceed with deeper purges, but he began to understand that this battle was 
creating unrest and leading to several issues in terms of legitimacy. However, 
he was overshadowed by a typical political myopia – or perhaps from 
opportunism – that identified the problem as one that was essentially 
                                                                
241 PV, 20697, 24, 29 January 1985, p. 2. 
242 Parallel to the cotton affairs, in the mid-80s in the UzSSR appeared many scandals 
related to the allocation of housing and people that they got houses without even 
having registered in the queues or unjustifiably receiving some greater sizes than 
expected. PV, 20706, 33, 8 February 1985, p. 2. 
243 PV, 20697, 24, 29 January 1985, p. 2. 
244 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 114. 
245 As well, in early February 1985, also the chairman of the department of statistic of 
the UzSSR was changed and replaced with M.K. Sadykov. PV, 20710, 37, 13 February 
1985, p. 1. 
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‘upstream’ and not in heavy measures that had been enforced in the cadres’ 
policy. Then, on 27 February a CPUz buro meeting was held, in which a 
document – annex 6 – was circulated where the situation in the republic 
about the struggle against the negative phenomena that was evidently 
deteriorating the morality frame within the republic was reported: 
the XVI plenum made the realistic analysis of economic, social and socio-
political situation of the republic, and the evaluation of the activity of the party 
organs, of the soviets putting the task of increasing all the forces of the Party 
organizations and workers to eradicate the phenomena and the negative 
trends and to restore the moral and psychological situation of the republic.246 
The report also specified that in 1984 the buro had regularized the CPUz 
nomenklatura that was reduced by 1302 units and on 1 January 1985 counted 
cumulatively 3990 units,247 and according to the FS, this reduction was 
functional to the moralization campaign. Nevertheless, such an attitude 
would inexorably irritate the local elite. As it was reported in the document: 
The CC CPUz in 1984 has performed the decisive measures on the resignation 
of several executives who have not confirmed in the trust. Just from the CC 
CPUz had been removed Muratkhodzhaev, Yakhyaev, Khikmatov, Gaipov, 
Turakulov, Yesenbayev, Kamalova, Anpilogov, and the from the control 
commission Tillaev, as well had been expelled from the party [CPSU] Karimov, 
Usmanov and Odilov who had compromised [their situation] with errors in 
work and in personal behavior, and 73 were removed from being deputies at 
the SS UzSSR and at local soviets. For negative reasons, during this year have 
been fired 47 workers of the party organs within soviets that were part of the 
CC CPUz buro and secretariat nomenklatura. Just after the XVI plenum had 
been replaced eight obkom secretaries, 70 secretaries of gorkom and raikoms, 
25 chairmen of ispolkoms of oblasts, cities and raions. It was strengthened the 
leadership of the SM UzSSR within the ministries and institutions. […] Proceed 
the measure to strengthen the organs of prokuratura, courts and police at 
republican, oblast, cities and raion levels with the cadres that have been 
trained. The party organizations and collectives of workers sent 3,600 persons 
in the MVD organs of the republic and also more than 770 communists.248 
A purge of this magnitude not only created discontent among the local 
elite but also created problems about their inclusion within the regime. As we 
saw in the first chapter, the inclusiveness was – and is still nowadays – a 
fundamental feature of the politics in the Central Asian polities, a potentially 
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248 Prot. 116/1985, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 154, d. 2509, l. 63. 
311 
 
explosive context. However, this time the party did not seem to know about 
that.  
In late February 1985, the effectiveness of the Soviet regime was in doubt, 
given that the Gensek actually disappeared from the political stages and was 
visibly dying. In the PV of 1 march 1985 was published an alleged meeting of 
Chernenko with the candidates of the elections of the RSFSR soviets. 
However, the figures in the picture were visibly actors in makeup. Besides the 
tragicomic show of the late weeks of Chernenko in life, there were a part of 
lower ranks figures that were effectively managing the drifting Soviet state, as 
in Moscow as in Tashkent. Indeed, on February 28 there was a meeting of 
second secretaries of the UzSSR gorkoms and raikoms that met to discuss the 
implementations of the XVI plenum guidelines. Substantially, the ‘Moscow 
watchdogs’ were defining the new stages of the purges in the local units of 
the Soviet periphery.249 A first result of this new phase of ‘local purges’ 
emerged during the XXVIII plenum of Karakalpak obkom where the second 
secretary A.I. Balakin was replaced – officially for ‘changing job post’ – by D.D. 
Berkov and the obkom secretary K.E. Yusupov was removed for scarce results 
in works and replaced by M.K. Aralbayev, while K Rizaev – a member of the 
local CC – was expelled.250 This new course of local purges would not even 
save the same judicial organs: in early March, the former prosecutor of 
Dzhambai raion (T. Kadyrov) was sentenced for bribery, the Samarkand city 
prokuror (A. Alibayev) was fired and arrested as well as the chairman of the 
OVD in the Pastdargom raion (N. Akhralov) was fired for falsifying documents 
and housing abuses.251 As a result, also the CPUz denounced problems in the 
justice apparatus – as in the SC UzSSR that was not analyzing the cases in 
their depth252 – and even in the Uzbek academic society where were revealed 
too many ties of kinship or special privileges.253 
Despite the typical criticism, the purges within the justice apparatus 
assumed harsher tones in 1985. In fact, after the dismissal of M.T. Tursunov, 
the deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR, followed a series of purges that 
decimated the SC UzSSR: on 25 January 1985 Bakhshulla Aviezovich Navruzov, 
the chairman of SC UzSSR was removed from his post and replaced by 
Sadikzhan Zhigitalyev; on 31 January another member of the SC - Vakhid 
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Mamadzhanov – was fired as well as A.L. Gorenkova on 16 February. At their 
place were appointed A.D. Ishmyetov, A. Rakhmanov and M. Safayev. On 28 
February 28 were removed from the SC UzSSR also M. Kuranov and Yu.Kh. 
Nasimov while were elected as members of the republican SC, R. 
Abdulkhasanov, A.A. Kadyrov, A. Sarabyekov and T. Shamiyeva. On 18 March 
was also removed K. Nasirov.254 The seriousness of this phase appeared also 
in the SC UzSSR plenum of May where the SC’s commitment to severely 
punish any of its members who had been involved in corruption was 
reiterated.255   
Parallel to the purges in the justice organs, the criticism towards 
agriculture was also pursued. In a long speech at the presidium SS UzSSR 
meeting devoted to the situation of agriculture in the republic (2 March 
1985), Usmankhodzhaev presented the results of 1984 in the light of the 
decisions of the XVI plenum, confirming the unity of the republic with the 
party and the Union. The FS CPUz exclaimed that 
At the enterprises of industry, construction and transport organizations in the 
fields and farms, collective and state farms are now more widely deployed 
socialist competition for the successful implementation of the plans of 1985 
and the 11th Five-Year Plan as a whole.256 
Then, confirming the political commitments of the agricultural issues, he 
announced the situation in the republic where 
Only in the last four years on the development of agroindustrial complex of 
Uzbekistan had been spent about 10 billion rubles of state capital investments. 
[...] The average annual gross agricultural output has increased in the current 
five-year plan by 11 per cent compared with the tenth five-year plan. Our 
country has fulfilled the plans of four years for the procurement of grain, 
kenaf, tobacco, potatoes, vegetables, melons, fruits, grapes, wool, astrakhan 
smushek and silk cocoons. […About cotton he affirmed], during the past year it 
has been very difficult for agriculture. And yet, despite this, Tashkent, Andijan, 
Ferghana, Namangan and Syrdarya oblasts coped with cotton productive 
plans. Honorably discharged plans 53 raions, 382 kolkhozes, 155 sovkhozes, 25 
raions have produced 35 and more quintals of raw cotton per hectare. Among 
them – Moskovskiy. Leninskiy, Buvaydinskiy, Namanganskiy. Turakurganskiy, 
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Angorskiy, Leninyul'skiy, Galabinskiy, Kommunisticheskiy, Leningradskiy, 
Khivinskiy, Khankinskiy and others.257 
Then, the FS admitted that there had been a reduction of cotton 
production. However, he wanted to affirm that besides the quantity decrease 
there had been significant improvements in cotton quality and in the 
produced fiber: 
Last year, the republic had prepared 5.292 million tons of cotton. As a result of 
the approved Politburo and the Federal Government of a new system of 
payment for cotton harvested by the final result, based on fiber yield and 
quality increased responsibility of managers, specialists and workers of all 
farms. fiber yield compared to previous years has increased significantly, and 
the losses have decreased. All this made it possible to get from the available 
raw 100 thousand tons of fiber more, collective and state farms of the republic 
it has brought an additional 528 million rubles.258 
Far from the previous years’ triumphalism, the Uzbek leadership seemed 
to be able to renegotiate the cotton productive commitments: 
CPSU Central Committee, the government of the country, and personally the 
Comrade KU Chernenko treated with great attention to our request. We are all 
well aware how important place is occupied by the cotton in our country's 
economy. The need for the industry in the cotton fiber is increasing every year. 
Providing them the textile and other industries is an extremely serious 
problem. Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Federal 
Government have met our request, have accepted our offer, thus again 
showing great attention to the concerns of cotton growers of Uzbekistan. In 
1985 the cotton productive plan for the republic is established in the amount 
of 5.700 million tons, or 300 tons less than the job five years. In terms of fiber 
it is more than 100 thousand tons. I wish that all correctly understood that it 
means a reduction plan. Cotton - the pride of our country, its priceless wealth. 
People's well-being, beauty and prosperity of our villages - are all connected 
with cotton.259 
However, Usmankhodzhaev kept following the balance between positive 
and negative results that we have characterized as a typical issue of post-
Rashidovian CPUz narrative. Indeed, the FS CPUz focused on the shortcomings 
revealed during the XVI plenum and stated: 
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As a result, the country was unable to fulfill the plans of the past four years, 
five-year plan for the production and procurement of cotton, meat, milk, eggs. 
We did not match the results of 1984, and we did not deliver the plan for 
673,000 tons of cotton, 316,000 tons of grain, 150 thousand tons of fruit and 
grapes, 26 thousand tons of meat, 100,000 tons of milk and some other 
products. 82 district, 697 collective and state farms have not coped with the 
plans in terms of pieces of cotton. [...] Comrades! We are facing a very big 
problem. Resolving them requires of each of us honest, fair labor, mobilizing 
all available opportunities.260 
Again, the FS pointed out the problem but was not able to offer an 
acceptable method of resolution. Nevertheless, he anticipated some of those 
themes that would be central in the next Gorbachevian path of technologic 
‘acceleration’ even for cotton harvest - that seemed to be still lowly 
technologized.261 In his words: 
Comrades! The capacity of the cotton production is in improving its quality - 
the main source of income of the collective farms and state farms, all workers 
of the village. Therefore, the primary task is to improve agricultural 
technology, timely and qualitative execution of all agricultural activities, 
widespread adoption of the practice of cotton science and technology, the 
experience of the foremost. They will ensure rapid development of the 
industry, to obtain early and high cotton harvest.262 
Then, Usmankhodzhaev, indicating the negative trends of Uzbek 
agriculture, affirmed the party commitments to the Soviet agriculture 
In 1985, should not remain a single loss-making farm in the country [...We 
should keep in mind the words that] Comrade KU Chernenko [stated]: "from 
all the leaders are required the highest partisanship and ideology, competence 
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and responsibility, ability to work with people." Following these instructions of 
Comrade Chernenko, the party organization of the republic consistently and 
persistently implements decision XVI Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan on improvement of qualitative composition of 
the cadres. [...] I must say that we firmly get rid of those managers whose 
activities do not meet the increasing demands and of those who do not listen 
the opinion of the Party organizations, ignores it, and use their official position 
for personal gains. For the serious mistakes in the work of overcoming a 
number of heads of ministries and departments as well as the chairmen of 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes.263 
Then, Usmankhodzhaev discussed the perpetual need to improve cadres 
among the party, evidencing a managerial impotence of the republican 
leadership that was not able to find a solution. In his words: 
We cannot tolerate the fact that within the 466 workers in the official 
nomenklatura of agriculture, only 79% have a college degree, and about 20 
percent of the leading specialists have only a secondary education. In the 
departments and offices of the ministry there are people who absolutely do 
not know anything of the situation or needs of agriculture, and have neither 
experience nor diplomas in agricultural universities. And in 
Minplodoovoshchkhoz [ministry of fruit and vegetables production] only one 
third of the managers and specialists has higher education, and likely only half 
is specialized with secondary education. More than 80% of agronomists, 
livestock specialists, veterinarians, and 85% of economists in the kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes of the republic have no special higher education. The statistics 
shows how needed are highly skilled agricultural profiles. These facts should 
not but cause concern. For example, in Bukhara region, 20% of the chairmen 
of collective farms and 40% of the directors of state farms related to the 
Minplodoovoshchkhoz have no agricultural education. It is characteristic that 
[negative phenomena] did not decrease over the last four years, [because of] 
the increasing number of managers of agricultural production without special 
education. All this should not, but in fact does, affect negatively the work.264 
4.3.2 The rise of Gorbachev 
Besides the commitments for purges and improvements in agriculture, in 
March 1985, the Soviet political scene was shaken by a revolutionary event. 
The old and sick Chernenko died on 10 March 1985. Despite the eulogy for an 
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old man who had been defined “the last Bolshevik,”265 nobody was seriously 
worried about this news, presaging the cynical idea that it could not get any 
worse than this. To the post of the Gensek was appointed the young and 
energetic Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader who tried to 
save the USSR through his ambitious plan of reforms – perestroika and 
glasnost266 – enforced after 1987. 
In this context, we will not get into the details of Gorbachev’s reformism 
nor his ‘universalistic’ appeasement strategy with the West during the closing 
stages of the Cold War. Notwithstanding the importance of the new course 
that Soviet politics followed with the election of Gorbachev, we will mainly 
focus on the effective course of perestroika in the UzSSR assuming that, 
despite the hopes of the ‘winds of change’, authentic change never arrived in 
Uzbekistan in any shape more substantial than slogans. Or rather, the change 
of perestroika was effective in terms of massive change of the ruling class. 
Curiously, this political phase that would lead to what was probably the most 
liberal phase of contemporary Russian history, is remembered in the opposite 
way in Uzbekistan, where Gorbachevism seemed to assume for some extends 
a Neo-Stalinist appearance,267 representing the continuation of heave 
moralizing campaigns that had been endorsed by Andropov just two years 
before. In this regard, Holmes comments that the new Gensek “breathed new 
life into the anticorruption campaign […making] it clear in a number of ways 
that Andropov was his role model among recent Soviet leaders, and this was 
reflected in the adoption of many of his predecessor’s policies.”268 In fact, 
especially in the first years of his leadership, Gorbachev also had the problem 
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267 Holmes is cautious in evaluating this Gorbachevian attitude, commenting: “The full-
blooded anti-corruption campaign did not emerge immediately after Gorbachev’s 
accession to power, however. At first the emphasis tended to be more generally on 
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Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 225–26. 
268 Ibid., 225. 
317 
 
to relaunch a 'healthy' image of a party that appeared so rotten after so many 
corruption scandals. He adopted a propagandistic approach that was aimed 
to publicize even more loudly the corruption cases, to condemn openly the 
culprits and to take distance from them. In this way, Gorbachev seemed to be 
able to affirm his personal power269 and to demonstrate the honesty of his 
maneuvers and to legitimize his power with that self-critical narrative typical 
of perestroika. Gorbachev initially did not understand that the economic 
system had to be changed, thinking that the solution could be in rooting out 
corruption and tightening control. As Colloudon comments 
By identifying the “bad guys" and by offering a moral explanation for 
corruption, the Kremlin was obviously trying to demonstrate that the blame 
should not be put on the entire system.270 
It can seem odd but, to a different extent, Gorbachev could draw 
inspiration from Usmankhodzhaev’s strategy of ‘blaming and criticizing’ in 
order to strengthen the legitimacy of your position. For both this strategy 
would be catastrophic within a few months. 
As Rashidov did with Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov, 
Usmankhodzhaev also was experiencing, in less than two years in power, the 
third Gensek in his career at the post of FS CPUz. Again, he tried to 
opportunistically follow the course of Moscow’s politics, linking the purges to 
the slogans of uskoreniye, glasnost and perestroika while continuing the 
strategy of criticism and purges within the party and state apparatuses.  
Just after Gorbachev’s appointment, on 20 March 1985 the former deputy 
minister MVD UzSSR Kakhramanov was arrested, defining the implication of 
the MVD USSR and CC CPSU in the scandal,271 hinting that the Uzbek affair 
had a ‘Soviet’ dimension. Then, at the XIX plenum of the CC CPUz (29 March 
1985), the FS CPUz confirmed the commitments of the party to eradicate the 
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negative phenomena, narrating a battle “without compromise” as the main 
effort of the Uzbek party in the name of the CPSU. In the FS’s words:  
The XVI plenum revealed serious faults in the various spheres of economy and 
social life of the republic, violations in the style and methods in the leadership 
of the party, and the Leninist principles in the selection and education of 
cadres. We analyzed the mistakes and expanded the uncompromising fight 
against negative phenomena, and eradication of everything that interferes to 
move forward.272 
Then, the FS reported the power reshuffle within the CC CPUz, indicating 
that from January 1984, 10 new workers became the heads of the CC 
departments, while 31 obkoms and 187 gorkom and raikom secretaries had 
been removed. In total, in this period 88 senior executives had been replaced 
and were included in the CC CPSU nomenklatura as well, and more than a 
thousand that were part of the CC CPUz nomenklatura. He added that, 
lately, the CC CPUz and the obkoms have taken the decisive measures on the 
leadership of the Party committees. From the beginning of last year, have 
been replaced 73 FS of gorkoms and raikoms. It was done a great job in the 
organizations of the Kashkadarya, Bukhara Karakalpak obkoms where, in the 
posts of FSs were chosen the most loyal people [affiliated to the FS obkom] on 
the base of zemlyachestvo, subservience and personal loyalty.273 
Then, the misdeeds of figures like K. Yusupov – the former secretary of the 
Karakalpak obkom who was responsible for the ideological work – were 
denounced. The latter “violated the moral norms and abused his power. In 
the last year, he renovated his apartment three times […] these phenomena 
are possible because the party committees are spineless.”274 Then, 
Usmankhodzhaev denounced serious defects also in the academy where the 
"phenomena of corruption were discovered in the Universities of Samarkand, 
in the Tashkent technological, textiles and medical universities and in the 
Bukhara technological university."275 Then, the FS CPUz was again leveraging 
the course of the Soviet politics, announcing that, 
enforceability of the work on strengthening the discipline depends on 
glasnost. And we must use the media and propaganda in a more active way. 
[...] Almost it has been completely revamped the leadership of the MVD and of 
the prokuratura UzSSR and similar efforts have been done in the MJ and the SC 
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UzSSR and in their departments. [...] The prokuratura enforced about 4500 
notices to various different level executives on the inadmissibility of law 
violations.276 
He also presented the bill of the purges on the economic and justice 
sectors of the republic, stating that 
for theft, forgery and corruption and other abuses in the last year they were 
sentenced 315 directors of enterprises, more than 900 chairmen of 
departments of industries and almost 500 accountants. [...] Recently in the 
MVD, the prokuratura and the court organs were dismissed 450 officers who 
had been compromised and more than 150 of these were convicted for 
various crimes.277 […] only in the cotton industry, there was damage to the 
state for more than 190 million rubles, and from the criminals convicted for 
these cases were seized in addition to values over 35 million rubles.278 
During the plenum, Mogil'nichenko - the deputy head of the party 
organizational department of the CC CPSU that we encountered in the 
previous chapter279 also intervened – revealing how the CC CPSU was 
attentive in observing the developments of the republic’s political life. He 
added that from the previous year in the UzSSR 139 criminal cases against 
managers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes had been opened and 535 had been 
condemned. However, he disavowed the rumors on a possible enlargement 
of the criminal responsibility on minor posts. In his words, "nobody is going to 
lead to criminal responsibility those persons who have been involuntarily 
involved in dishonest methods of work." He was exonerated the workers 
from the criminal aspect of the cases and commented the necessity to 
strengthen the training of the workers. For this reason, “due to the request of 
the CC CPUz, one hundred workers of the republic had been sent in the party 
schools of other regions.”280 This was presaging a sinister ‘re-educational 
mission’ of the Soviet party for the workers of the UzSSR. However, he 
confirmed our suppositions about how Moscow wanted to hit just the 
responsible culprits of the machinations – and so the ‘big fish’ of the scandals 
– while reserving for the minor culprits some inferior punishments and 
reprimands. This attitude confirmed the ‘politicity’ of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ 
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more than an extended criminal case. The indications of the plenum where 
received at state level that proceeded with a further power reshuffle. Then, 
on 30 march, during the first session of the SS UzSSR, was elected the 
presidium, the SM and also the PCC and the SC UzSSR, affirming a step 
forward in ousting figures that appeared compromised.281 
Also at local (raikom), at unions’, at soviets282 and at managerial levels 
there was a reorganizations of cadres that were implemented ‘along the 
guidelines of the XVI plenum.’283 An immediate result was the appointment of 
a new FS Jizzakh obkom – on 3 April, Khabibulla Shagazatov was replaced by 
Islam Sultanovich Umarov284 – and many power reshuffles at the regional 
level. The results of the purges were announced with great fanfare in the 
plenums that were held in the first weeks of April in every obkom of the 
republic,285 while cases of incredibly diffused malfeasance and very local 
scandals286 were reported also by the official newspapers that – besides 
promoting the socialist ‘truth’ – were often endorsing the features of the 
tabloid formats.  
Parallel to the criminal-corruption scandals, the prokuratura UzSSR was 
still revealing in spring 1985 serious counterfeiting episodes of livestock and 
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food production data by some kolkhozes’ directors in the regions of Jizzakh 
and Andijan where, moreover, Ruzimatov the accountant of the kolkhoz 
‘Pravda’ had declared more than 842 tons of food goods that had never been 
produced and also 315 tons of silage and 10 tons of flour.287 Indeed, the 
effects of pripiski on the economy seemed to worry more the government 
that the offenses of the criminal cases, revealing a deeply critical situation: on 
19 April, the SM UzSSR exposed that already in the first quartile of 1985, 65 
industrial complexes in the republic had not realized the plan.288 
The importance of improving the economic production standards was not 
underestimated, even in Moscow where the new Gensek advanced an 
ambitious plan to clean the country from corruption and alcoholism, to 
establish a more effective rule of law and to reach the international economic 
standards. A programme that was defined by Yakovlev as the “statement of 
nonsense.”289 Indeed, on 20 April 1985, during a famous CPSU Plenum, 
Gorbachev announced the uskoreniye (literally "acceleration"), a political 
slogan intended to promote the acceleration of social, technological and 
economic development of the Soviet Union. This line thus encouraged a 
straightening of the cadres’ discipline and became an imperative order which 
was revived in the next party meetings. As a consequence of this new line, on 
April 23, the CC CPSU approved a resolution to reform economic 
management and elected Chebrikov, Ryzhkov and Ligachev as full members 
of the politburo.290 Substantially Gorbachev was carrying out the reform 
agenda that Andropov had hoped for, but he was not able to carry it to 
fruition, due to an evident lack of time. In terms of purges, the Andropovian 
line as well lingered and this was reflected in this reshuffle of cadres that not 
just in Uzbekistan but also in Moscow was promoting a new generation of 
politicians who seem to have repudiated the Brezhnevian methods and 
presented themselves with a more managerial approach. Also in Uzbekistan, 
Gorbachev’s calls had a wide echo and were enforced by the CPUz as a 
renovated legitimizing narrative. In the name of uskoreniye, glasnost and 
perestroika – that were upgrading the Andropovian concept of moralization 
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campaigns also in terms of efficiency of the economy and politics – the purges 
in the UzSSR apparatuses had a renovated vigor. 
At the end of April, the Party control organs detected inefficiencies on all 
levels of the UzSSR economic system: just the Dustlikski raikom plenum 
exposed that many kolkhozes - that had already received large investments in 
terms of technical modernization in last years - had unnecessarily lost an 
additional 30 million rubles, maintaining a negative productive trend in the 
production of cotton, milk and meat291 while in parallel cases of accountants 
guilty of embezzlement and pripiski were discovered.292 Also in Namangan, in 
an important cotton cleaning factory, falsified documentation on the cotton 
deliveries was still found.293 
The situation in the economic sectors of the republic kept warning the 
party that kept endorsing a cure that was based on purges of responsible. 
Substantially, Usmankhodzhaev preferred to cut the patient’s leg rather than 
disinfect the wound. During the XX plenum CC CPUz (14 May 1985), the FS 
CPUz justified the cadre reshuffles stating that 
the goal of these cadres’ changes that were made after the XVI plenum is to 
clean [or better to purge] the compromised persons - stratifications of the past 
- to restore social justice and to redress the situation.294 […however, we are] 
concerned by recidivists of corruption. In the first trimester of the current 
year, 100 corrupters and 60 scammers had been condemned as well as a 
thousand of officials who made thefts and abused their power. It still 
continues the speculation in agricultural products and the majority of these 
facts occur in the oblasts of Andijan, Tashkent, Namangan, and Ferghana.295 
The day after, during a buro session circulated a document – annex 8 – 
that added another scandal related to housing in Khorezm: 
on the party-organization work in Urgench, a city where there are still abuses 
of power during distribution of houses. In the last two years, were illegally 
distributed 93 apartments, many of which were assigned to the local leaders, 
as A. Bulgachev - the deputy director of the agency Sredazinspektsya, A. 
Sabirov – the former FS of the gorkom Komsomol, K. Inoyatov - the raion 
prokuror, R. Tyan the chairman of the traffic police department of the 
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oblispolkom UVD and others.296 […just in Urgench] in the period 1981-1985, 72 
communists had been condemned and over the past four years, had been 
dismissed 15 workers that were included in the gorkom nomenklatura for 
negative phenomena and 37 for defects in the work.297 
Thus, in Khorezm as well were discovered many of typical cases of 
malfeasance within the local elite298 that would lead to a systemic purge and 
to a change of the obkom’s FS within a few months. After the calls of the 
previous months against the speculations and the jobbing of the directors of 
enterprises that were violating law and socialist morality, the struggle against 
the ‘negative phenomena’ was again enforced at the center of the CPUz 
agenda. Indeed, the buro meeting of 14 June 1985 presented a resolution of 
the SM UzSSR that evidenced how the measures on the eradication of 
speculation in agricultural and flowers products was insufficient, denouncing 
how in some kolkhozes and sovkhozes managers allowed the squandering of 
land and gave it for rent, creating profit for themselves. Furthermore, the 
speculators bought products from the people to resell them in the official 
agricultural system or in the black market: indeed, episodes of flowers 
purchased from the peasants and resold at higher prices in the major cities 
around the country were revealed.299 
Linked to the negative situation in the republic were also some cultural 
issues. In fact, despite the scandals and changes within the party, is also 
interesting that in these years the use of the Uzbek language started to be 
even more recalled by a local elite that, at least at cultural level, was 
manifesting impatience towards Moscow. Indeed, is interesting to reveal the 
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diffusion of the great Gorbachev’s speeches and announcements in the 
national idiom300 as a way to catch the attention – and maybe the support – 
of a rising nationalism within the republic. The almost usual criticism of the 
party was furthermore searching for external scapegoats to blame: as Golovin 
in the XVI plenum blamed the Western conspirators that were taking 
advantage of the negative phenomena in Uzbekistan, the CC CPUz was now 
individuating the US as promoters of Islamic fundamentalism in the 
republic.301 While, in the first hypotheses we can find most of the causes of 
the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’ in the Soviet planned economy and it seems 
difficult to argue theories of foreign conspiracies, the second hypothesis, 
related to the Islamic revival linked to the war in Afghanistan probably was 
not far from reality. However, this is another story.302 
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4.3.3 UzSSR between criticism and purges 
Despite the scandals related to the cotton falsification and corruption in 
Uzbekistan, the anticorruption policy had been implemented at All-Union 
level, becoming a pillar of Gorbachev’s early period in order to oust rivals 
within the party and heal – at least symbolically – a country adrift. In fact, also 
in Moscow there was a consistent party reshuffle and on 1 June the Gensek 
was able to oust Romanov, one of his main rivals, who was removed from the 
politburo while Shevardnadze became a full member and the day after 
replaced Gromyko in the MID USSR while the latter became the chairman of 
the Presidium of the SS USSR.303 In this structure, also Boris Nikolayevich 
Yeltsin – the former FS Sverdlovsk obkom and the future President of Russian 
Federation304 – was promoted to the secretariat of the CC CPSU. Due to 
corruption scandals in the Moscow trade sector – already mentioned in the 
previous chapter – Yeltsin, the rising star of Staraya Ploshad, was finally called 
to clean out the corruption in Moscow city and was finally appointed on 23 
December the FS of the local gorkom – effectively "Mayor" of the Soviet 
capital – replacing the compromised Grishin305 who had lately been 
marginalized from the Soviet political echelons. Also Yeltsin had a 
determinant role in the Uzbek cotton affair, representing the CPSU power in 
the UzSSR. In late 1985, during a Party Conference in Tashkent, under the 
instruction of Gorbachev, he forcefully demanded “criticism and self-
criticism” within the Uzbek Party, and for “new cadres of party leaders”. He 
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183. 
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called for admitting to “unprincipled behavior, corruption, and patronage of 
careless workers, friends, and relatives of mercenary motives.”306 On that 
occasion, Yeltsin accused the members of the CPUz of “making bribe-taking a 
habit”307 demanding for a full internal reform and a better selection of the CC 
cadres. These harsh calls – that probably frightened also Gorbachev308 - had 
an immediate effect for Usmankhodzhaev that had no other choice than 
obeying and to ensure good - or at least real - results in agriculture. 
A first manifestation of enthusiasm for the minor improvement in the 
UzSSR cotton sector was in late June 1985 when the party started to 
announce that the fiber production in the republic had qualitatively increased 
from 28.2% in 1983 to 31.5% in 1985, and this good result was further 
allocating to the UzSSR kolkhozes an additional budget of nine million 
rubles.309 Then, in summer 1985, Usmankhodzhaev kept the enthusiasms for 
Gorbachev reformism310 and followed its narrative patterns. In fact, on 5 July 
a meeting was held of the party-economic aktiv, that was devoted to the 
uskoreniye of the scientific and technological progress and automation to 
develop the economy. On that occasion, the FS CPUz, confirmed the 
commitments for the economic reconstruction (perestroika) and more 
technological development, and finally made an announcement that was 
partially recalling the tones of developed socialism era. Indeed, in his words, 
“the basic foundations of our economy is more than 74 billion rubles. In 
industry, there are more than 1,500 enterprises and associations, including 
                                                                
306 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 114. 
307 Ibid. 
308 According to Timofeev, Gorbachev feared a possible delegitimization and 
manipulation by his internal opponents. Therefore, he probably wanted to end the 
case "designating it as a local matter (which it should have been from the outset). The 
irresponsible proposals of other politicians to investigate the matter to the end only 
irritated him. For instance, Yeltsin toured Uzbekistan while a Central Committee 
secretary and reported on the corruption upon his return: "Suddenly, Gorbachev 
became angry, saying that I didn't understand anything at all, and that 
Usmankhodzhaev was an honest Communist, and that he had simply been forced to 
fight against Rashidovism, and the old mafia was vilifying him with false denunciations 
and slander." Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers, 67; Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An 
Autobiography (London: Summit Books, 1990). 
309 PV, 20818, 145, 27 June 1985, p. 1. 
310 In July 1985 the Gensek even endorsed a formal resolution of the SS USSR for the 
protection of socialist legality. Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption 
Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 226. 
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about 240 comprehensively mechanized and automated."311 However, this 
call was just the introduction for something more, while triumphalism had 
been definitively buried in the past. Indeed, Usmankhodzhaev concluded his 
speech thought the now ritual criticism, saying that the only way to 
implement the socio-economic acceleration was through new honest people 
taking responsibility and leadership: 
On the improvement of indicators in the economic development beneficial 
impact unfolded throughout the struggle against negative phenomena, firm 
and consistent line on strengthening the party and government discipline and 
improvement of work with the staff. During the implementation of decisions 
XVI Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan 
implemented decisive measures to strengthen the Party, government, 
government, law enforcement and economic bodies loyal to the Party, honest 
people. Uncompromisingly undertaken against anti-social manifestations, 
particularly malfeasance.312 
Substantially, the FS CPUz was so linking the purge campaign with the 
replacement of a new generation of cadres (who would impose their own 
patrimonial networks) as a final aims of perestroika. This ideological revision 
was then working and legitimizing the unpopular internal measures and the 
fashionable slogans that Moscow was proposing also to reduce defects and to 
restore a healthy image of the cotton and its related sectors.313 Therefore, 
from summer 1985, Usmankhodzhaev started to find accreditation for his 
policies, linking them with the need to respond properly to the increasing 
environmental problems – a subject that potentially collects the 
condemnation of everyone – that were so seriously threatening the republic. 
                                                                
311 PV, 20826, 153, 6 July 1985, p. 1. 
312 PV, 20826, 153, 6 July 1985, p. 1. 
313 Also in light industry sector, the party increased its surveillance on the industry of 
cotton-processing and its machinery. Also in this sector, many serious facts had been 
discovered in 1985 as the case of the Tashkent Uzbekkhlopkomash that just in 1984 
benefited from 190 thousand rubles more than they should because its managers 
declared a sale price (495.6 rubles) higher than planned (485.5) and did not complete 
the plan. Also the Tashkhlopkomash delivered five uncompleted production lines at 
the price of 3,785,000 rubles despite it registered the planned production as 
completed. The factory manager had always claimed to have executed the plans, but 
finally was confirmed the machination. However, he was not sentenced nor fired on 
the spot, as he admitted the mistake committing to recover the lost production. Then, 
after failing to honor his commitments, he was finally fired from his post. PV, 20838, 
165, 23 July 1985, p. 3. 
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To a minor extent, the struggle against the abstract category of ‘polluters’ 
assumed an increasing prominence and would forge a key issue in central 
Asian politics that Tashkent would be exploited also in the next decades. A 
third element typical of Gorbachevism and that Usmankhodzhaev tried to 
exploit at his advantage was glasnost, the transparency reform that was 
aimed at allowing more intellectual freedoms and opening the information of 
the party and the state issues.314 This new line – that as we have seen had its 
origins in the Andropovian era – was so revealing scandals of corruption, blat, 
and other second economy phenomena also in the lower-medium of the 
republic’s bureaucracy.315 As mentioned, these stories cannot be considered 
as a part of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ – that we have identified for its highly 
political dimension – but are anyway indicative of the environment of 
dishonesty prevalent among the offices of the country's power. The witch-
hunt, the will to purge, and the search for scapegoats to offer to the public 
had some bizarre implications and was symptomatic of a party that was able 
to organize an informational machine to reveal the criticism within the 
republic but that, however, was not able to find a care to the problem and 
was just repeating the Moscow’s slogans that the CC CPSU wanted to hear – 
with a balance between the positive results in economy and commitments of 
the party to clean the negative situation in the republic.  Indeed, the CPUz 
was so keeping in publicizing the virtuous sectors of the republic,316 while was 
reaffirming the XVI plenum commitments also in occasions where such call 
appeared odd. For example, the FS CPUz recalled the duties derived from the 
XVI plenum also in speech that was focused on the youth culture and sports 
in the UzSSR.317 
                                                                
314 PV, 20834, 161, 17 July 1985, p. 1. 
315 PV started to report cases of widespread corruption especially within the mid-levels 
apparatchiki that were extorting bribes from the population in exchange for favors - 
such as help from a public officer on the allocation of the home that could cost from 
200 to 3000 rubles. PV, 20838, 165, 23 July 1985, p. 4. 
316 PV stated that in the first half of 1985, the Uzbek industrial system was more 
efficient than expected, producing 48.3 million rubles more, and fulfilling 107.4% of 
the planned level. This record was imputable especially for energy and chemical 
industry. At the same time were revealed that the production of consumer goods 
decreased for an estimated value of 40.4 million rubles. PV, 20842, 169, 27 July 1985 
p. 3. 
317 PV, 20843, 170, 28 July 1985, p. 2. 
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Then, in August 1985, another cadre reshuffle was enforced personally by 
Usmankhodzhaev318 and interested the higher spheres of some very strategic 
– and cotton intensive – oblasts. In fact, on 3 August 1985, Abdukhalik 
Karimovich Karimov – a deputy of the SN USSR and the FS Surkhandarya 
obkom since 1977 – was replaced in this latter post by Salidzhan 
Mamarasulov,319 who left the same position in Andijan where, in his place, 
was appointed on 5 August Makhmut Maripovich Aripzhanov.320 At this 
juncture, Usmankhodzhaev had the occasion to kill two birds with one stone: 
in order to implement purges and to get rid of those figures who were under 
attack for their honesty – or maybe for their political rivalry with the FS CPUz 
– while he could also avoid that bosses’ remained too long in a post in the 
same region, creating dangerous patronage relations that, as we have seen, 
have led to the shocking facts of Bukhara and Kashkadarya. As usual during 
the changes of FSs in the obkoms, a new donos war continued in the form of 
anonymous letters. Substantially, as it was in the ancient Rome, this informal 
practice of quarrel was not just tolerated but was also protected – and maybe 
fostered – because these letters were considered as a useful tool of 
information for the party and judicial organs and got their protection against 
any intervention against them.321 Thus, the CPUz buro session of 14 August 
                                                                
318 PV, 20849, 176, 4 August 1985, p. 1. 
319 Mamarasulov kept that post of FS Surkhandarya until 2 December 1989 when he 
was replaced by the ‘Karimovian’ Eshbaevich Khakim Berdyev. 
320 Aripzhanov replaced the FS Andijan obkom Salidzhan Mamarasulov who had 
worked in that post from 1978 when he took the place of Usmankhodzhaev. His 
dismissal was motivated by the shortages in the food production system in an oblast 
that was less efficient in producing meat and milk. PV, 20851, 178, 7 August 1985, p. 2. 
He kept that post until Karimov's power reshuffle in 1990 and was considered a man 
who was formed in the CC CPSU apparatus and had a deep devotion to Moscow. PV, 
20850, 177, 6 August 1985, p. 1. 
321 In fact, there were many illegal attempts to cover up cases and to limit donos. 
These letters arrived to the CC CPUz from all the oblasts of the republic, denouncing 
abuses of power of bureaucrats and officials. However, these were often ignored to 
the point that exasperated citizens preferred to write to the magazines and local 
newspapers. According to a complaint received by the CC CPUz, U. Atakulov and his 
deputy G.V. Nasal, were kicked out of the CC CPUz buro for not taking into account 
and ignoring these complaints and for their ruthlessness in their evaluation of the 
cases. Also V.A. Zortov, who was the first deputy prokuror of the UzSSR, was fired 
because he had tried to prosecute R. Dil'muratov, a professor at the Karshi Technical 
University who had published a complaint on Literaturnaya gazeta on 18 September 
1985; and also the former investigator of the prokuratura UzSSR A. Alibayev who was 
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1985 discussed this practice,322 further demanding to the judicial organs to 
enlarge the investigations in order to define whether these accusations were 
mere slanders of were effectively facts based on real evidence. Then, the SC 
UzSSR confirmed its commitments to better check more thoroughly the cases 
of abuse of power and misappropriation of public funds and 
embezzlement.323 
New scandals emerged in other sectors: in summer frauds to the air 
companies were revealed, with officers that used to tout plane tickets on the 
black market,324 and was also endorsed a harsher campaign against soviets’ 
deputies that often were not responsible in checking activities and did not 
perform audits on their work.325 Parallel to the purges, in August there was a 
government reshuffle and some prominent figures affiliated to the post-
Rashidovian establishment were promoted to higher offices of the SM: after 
Khodzhaev’s dismissal,326 on 16 August, the trusted deputy chairman of the 
SM UzSSR, V.G. Dukhanin, became the minister for social housing, managing a 
sector that was at the center of many controversy; and the day after, the 
minister for land improvements and irrigation,327 I. Kh. Dzhurabyekov, 
                                                                                                                                            
going to open a case against Dil'muratov, was arrested and sentenced. PV, 20964, 291, 
20 December 1985, p. 1. 
322 According to the internal report, just in 1984 and in the first semester of 1985 more 
than 7,400 anonymous letters – 21.5% from the total amount of the letters – arrived 
to the CC CPUz and in 46.7% of these in 1984 – and 37.6% in 1985 – were reported 
facts that had been verified by the investigative organs and were enforced proper 
measures about.322 The party so reported that in this period, has increased the 
amount of anonymous letters with declarations of abuse of power that just in the 
current year amounted to 1783 letters. After the checks had been dismissed 252 
executives of the party soviets and agricultural organs. Prot. 129/1985, RGASPI, f. 17, 
op. 154, d. 2522, l. 38. 
323 PV, 20857, 184, 14 August 1985, p. 3. 
324 PV, 20859, 186, 16 August 1985, p. 4. 
325 PV, 20861, 188, 18 August 1985, p. 1. 
326 Akram Rustamovich Khodzhaev - a geolog and long-time leading figure in the state 
administration - from 1965 served as deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR and rose in 
the Uzbek political echelon after the disgrace of Nasriddinova. 
327 This ministry kept a crucial importance also in mid-‘80s when the irrigation network 
of the republic was 197,000 km. From this number there were 25,800 km of ariks and 
142,000 km of canals operative in UzSSR. Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta 
Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-1991 Y.y.)”; Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi 
Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fan va Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix 
Shohidligi va Saboqlari, 292; Asat Niyazovich Abdullaev, “Khlopkovaya Monokul’tura v 
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became deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR;328 on 19 August M. Salakhitdinov 
became the minister of education,329 on 28 August, B. K. Kasymkhodzhaev 
became the minister for food production,330 on 20 September, the Russian 
ethnic (from Chelyabinsk) Boris Fedorovich Satin was appointed as FS 
Tashkent gorkom, and on 25 September T. Nabiv became the minister of 
agricultural housing, as well as many senior management of the construction 
plan of Tashkent had been changed.331 Then, following the Soviet government 
changes – on 27 September Ryzhkov replaced Tikhonov and became the 
chairman of the SM USSR – also in the UzSSR, I. Kurbanov was appointed 
deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR on September 29,332 on 8 October K. 
Sapayev became the minister for land improvements and irrigation of the 
UzSSR,333 on 26 October Matbua Amirsaidovna Akhmedova the minister of 
culture334 and on 29 October V.I. Ogark became the deputy chairman of the 
SM UzSSR335 as well as Kh. Dzhurabyekov on 11 December.336 This SM 
reshuffle seemed so to resolve a question of executive stability, ensuring to 
the party a number of loyal figures – and supposedly honest – in some sectors 
that had been the center of political controversy in the previous months. 
 However, the main warning signs remained in agriculture337 where more 
scandals – also about laxity and mismanagement in work338 – were inflaming 
                                                                                                                                            
Uzbekistane I Ee Posledstviya (1917–1991 Gg.). Avtoreferat Dissertatsii Na Soiskaniye 
Uchenoy Stepeni Doktora Istoricheskikh Nauk.” (Akademiya Nauk Respubliki 
Uzbekistan Institut Istorii, 2010). 
328 PV, 20861, 188, 18 August 1985, p. 1. 
329 PV, 20862, 189, 20 August 1985, p. 1. 
330 PV, 20870, 197, 29 August 1985, p. 1. 
331 PV, 20893, 220, 26 September 1985, p. 1. 
332 PV, 20897, 224, 1 October 1985, p. 1. 
333 PV, 20904, 231, 9 October 1985, p. 1. 
334 PV, 20921, 248, 27 October 1985, p. 1. 
335 PV, 20923, 250, 31 October 1985, p. 1. 
336 PV, 20957, 284, 12 December 1985, p. 1. 
337 Far from the '6 million triumphalism' of the beginning of the 80s, the annual cotton 
crop decrease in 1980-1985 from 5.579 million to 5.3818, wheat from 2.5183 to 
1.5412, rice from 0.5046 to 0.4817, vegetables from 2.4591 to 2.3856 and melons 
from 1.0463 to 0.7909. Uzbekiston Fanlar akademiyasi Tarix instituti, Uzbekiston 
Respublikasi Fan va Texnika Davlat Qummitasi. Tarix Shohidligi va Saboqlari, 294. 
338 Emblematic was the case of Kasym Karimov, director of the kolkhoz "Esh Leninci" 
who was accused of serious mismanagement. In the previous year, his kolkhoz had 
only achieved 66% of the plan and the director had left at the mercy of events the 
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the republic while the CPUz was demanding again for more efforts in the 
cotton fields339 – as well as in the silk production340 – and imperative honesty 
in the cotton processing factories in order to increase the quality of produced 
fiber.341 This final condition in work was a sine qua non that party had even 
reaffirmed in the CPUz buro meeting of 25 September,342 while 
Usmankhodzhaev promised to Moscow to deliver at least 5.730 tons of raw 
cotton.343 For the day of the revolution’s anniversary there was a 
regurgitation of Rashidovism, and the fifth million ton of cotton harvested 
was announced with great fanfare in Uzbekistan.344 Evidently, the old means 
of propaganda, although no longer useful with Moscow, served to bring 
                                                                                                                                            
whole production because he never went to work. He was immediately fired. PV, 
20875, 202, 4 September 1985, p. 3. 
339 Again there were calls in the press to for improve and speed up with defoliation. 
PV, 20885, 212, 15 September 1985, p. 1. 
340 As mentioned, silk was another key agricultural production of the UzSSR. However, 
also this sector presented several shortages and pripiski. In October 1985 was 
revealed that a spinning company had produced false receipts claiming to have 
received 2,380 kg of silk cocoons and taking for it a sum of 12 thousand rubles. PV, 
20914, 241, 20 October 1985, p. 2. A scandal invested the small center of Margilan 
that is considered the center of Uzbekistan's silk producing industry. During the XXXVII 
Margilan party conference, 62 communists were sanctioned and expelled from the 
party: of these, 20 were expelled - including S. Bakhramov, director of the local health 
department and R. Kasymov, director of a company manufacturing silk cocoons. PV, 
20938, 265, 19 November 1985, p. 2. 
341 In its calls in the press, the CC CPUz reminded to the readers the latest stories of 
those officials in the cotton cleaning factories who had abused power and were 
replaced by new cadres that had sense of initiative, were honest and organize work 
according to modern requirements. Now, the cotton industries have changed the 
cotton receiving conditions according to new criteria of quality and fiber content. 
Then, was affirmed that in 1984, from 5.292 million tons of Uzbek raw cotton had 
been produced 1,599,200 tons of fiber, recording a higher production of 100 thousand 
tons from the previous year when officially had been harvested 5.921 million tons of 
cotton. PV, 20886, 213, 17 September 1985, p. 2. 
342 In the buro session of 25 September was reported that Kakhramon Sabirovich 
Sardiev, general manager of the textile factory in Bukhara, was fired from his because 
compromised with unacceptable work style. Prot. 133/1985, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 154, d. 
2526, l. 21. 
343 PV, 20914, 241, 20 October 1985, p. 1. 
344 PV, 20928, 255, 6 November 1985, p. 1. 
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people together in the effort for the great cause of cotton345 and maybe were 
more popular than the moralizing calls346 or the purges within the party.347 
Furthermore, the narrative of perestroika and the 'time for changes' was 
spread in the internal party debate and in the official press348 intertwined 
with the calls to adhere to the guidelines of the XVI plenum, and these 
demands had a deep echo also at local level,349 and in the ministries. For 
example, in announcing the budget for the 1986, the minister of finance 
                                                                
345 In 1985 (the first year under Gorbachev's leadership) investment in Uzbekistan fell 
by 4 percent (from 7.145 to 6.811 billion rubles). However, "all other areas of the 
economy [were still] sacrificed to increase the cotton output." Boris Z. Rumer, “Central 
Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 71. 
346 In November 1985 still appeared the stories denouncing the effective 
sophistication mechanisms of the falsifications – that we have already mentioned in 
the third chapters. For example, A.A. Babadzhanov, the director of the Mangitski 
cotton processing factory, in September-October 1985 received money from 
representatives of the sovkhoz ‘Mangit’ and from the kolkhozes ‘Lenin’ and 
‘Akhunbabayev’. In return, the director declared to have received 300 tons of cotton 
that was never delivered. All the culprits were arrested. PV, 20936, 263, 15 November 
1985, p. 1. 
347 As mentioned, the party imposed tolerance zero for the officials who intervened in 
the investigations to cover their or some of their friends’ activities. In Dhambai were 
fired some prominent party members among whom there was also B. Yunusov, FS 
Dzhambai raikom - because he did not declare and covered his brother who had been 
involved and convicted for embezzlement. At his place was appointed A. Sattarov. PV, 
20942, 269, 23 November 1985, p. 2. 
348 PV, 20948, 275, 30 November 1985, p. 3. 
349 Following this line, during the XXVIII conference of the Yakkabag raikom, 43 people 
were removed from their posts, 22 expelled from the CPSU, 8 removed from the 
apparatus of raikom. S. Bakyev, FS of the raikom was convicted for fraud, abuse of 
power, misappropriation of public funds and for his irresponsibility. He was fired and 
condemned. Were also sentenced M. Khudayberdyev - the director of the kolkhoz 
'Engels', and the directors of district textile companies M. Avlaev and R Dzhuraev. (PV, 
20952, 279, 5 December 1985, p. 2). Similarly, Abdi Umirov, the FS Ulyanovsk raikom 
in Kashkadarya, was expelled from the CPSU after 35 years of career, because he was 
accused of fraud, abuse of power and for immoral behavior. He had built a network of 
blackmail in which forced the kolkhozes to make false statements in production, 
threatening to fire their managers if they did not fulfill it or to denounce them for 
being unpatriotic. As well, some directors of sovkhozes and kolkhozes had been 
convicted. PV, 20955, 282, 8 December 1985, p. 2. 
334 
 
UzSSR Islam A. Karimov – the future FS CPUz and president of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan – stated that: 
Through consistent implementation of the policy guidance XVI Plenum of the 
CC CPUz during this period in the republic there has been some change in the 
methods of management, more began to be used prudently allocated material 
and financial resources to stabilize the financial and economic situation of 
collective farms and state farms and ginneries.350 
1985 ended with the greatest results of purges351 in the UzSSR 
establishment. However, it is interesting to note that the replacements were 
substantially all around the republican parties and just in Central Asia 
Gorbachev pushed to ‘retire’ – for corruption scandals and mismanagement 
that were followed by purges352 – three of the republican FS: on 2 November, 
the Kyrgyz FS Turdakun Usubaliyev – in power from 1961 – became at the 
center of a corruption scandal – ‘the Kyrgyz livestock affair’353 – and was 
                                                                
350 PV, 20958, 285, 13 December 1985, p. 4. 
351 On 19 December 1985, the two former FSs obkoms and deputies at the SN USSR, U. 
Umarov (former FS Tashkent Gorkom and elected in the electoral district 116) and A. 
Karimov (the former FS Surkhandarya, elected in the electoral district 112) resigned 
from the SN USSR. PV, 20964, 291, 20 December 1985, p. 3. 
352 William Fierman, “The Soviet ‘Transformation’ of Central Asia,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 26. 
353 In RGANI, I found evidence of a non-famous case that I wanted to call the 'Kyrgyz 
livestock affair' related to the production of sheep – officially 11 million while 
hundreds million cattle ‘disappeared’ – and horses which number decreased in the 
early 1980s, while the number of cows did not increases as expected in the plans. 
There were many cases of rustling that happened in the state companies for meat 
production and were implicating also the participation of Tursunov, the ministry for 
meat and milk production. Usubaliev – the FS of Kyrgyzstan from 1961 – was alleged 
to tolerate this system, to abuse his power also in promoting his literature activity and 
to promote his family and affiliates in the nomenklatura - his cousin was at the head of 
the KGB, his son was the dean of the University, his brother in law directed the 
department of party history and other relatives in the direction of the magazine 
Selkhoziast, or in the scientific institute of pedagogical research, in the republican 
ispolkom etc. for a total of 23 relatives in the top echelon of the Kyrgyz SSR as well as 
38 FSs raikoms were alleged to be his of his wife's relatives. These facts were 
denounced in a letter to the prokuratura USSR that forwarded it to the CC CPSU on 26 
July 1984. RGANI, f. 50, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 52-69. Then, in a memorandum of 28 
September 1984, the CC CPSU effectively revealed the responsibility of Tursunov – 
who was fired – and cases of affiliation and kinship in the party nomenklatura and in 
Usubaliev whose books were published not completely with licit methods. RGANI, f. 
335 
 
finally replaced by Absamat Masaliyev.354 Then, on 14 December the Tajik FS 
– in power from 1982 - Rakhmon Nabiev was replaced by Kahar Mahkamov 
and on 21 December 1985 the Turkmen FS Muhammetnazar Gapurow – in 
power from 1963 – was replaced by Saparmurat Niyazov. Rashidov probably 
would find the same fate of his colleagues but - perhaps luckily for him - he 
died before. 
Substantially, the emergence of the new Moscow leadership partially 
changed the narrative of the CPUz that kept stabilizing its double legitimizing 
discourse that linked the Gorbachevian reformism to the aim of cleaning the 
republic. As we have seen, fall 1985 was probably the climax the systemic 
phase, which began with appointment of Usmankhodzhaev as FS CPUz in 
November 1983, had a breakthrough during the XVI CPUz (June 1984), and 
reached its climax with these final purges in late 1985 within the Uzbek party 
and state administrations. However, this was just the beginning of the 
heaviest season of the Uzbek cotton affair, which we will analyse in the next 
chapter during what we can interpret as ‘Moscow’s receivership,’ when the 
media case was spread in the whole Soviet society and when the party 
endorsed the de-Rashidovization course. Although the ‘Uzbek khan’ had died 
and been buried with all honours, his legacy was still influential in the political 
life of the UzSSR and was blacklisted. 
                                                                                                                                            
50, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 71-73. Another memorandum of the CC CPSU revealed that from 
the party was receiving more than three thousands letters every year from Kirghizstan 
and a third of them contained denounces, while the share of anonymous letters - 
revealing abuses in the party and state organs - had more than doubled from 1982. 
These abuses were carried out in the personal interest (like beautiful houses, dachas, 
costly repairs, sales of cars, rudeness at work and in personal life, cruelty and 
immorality, choice of cadres based on kinship, zemlyachestvo and personal loyalty) or 
not taking measures against their behavior, as in the case of the son of the deputy 
minister for meat and milk, D. Chokoieva, who was arrested for rape. Some complaints 
had been verified and led to arrests and seizures of property. As well, were revealed 
cases of buildings abuse or kolkhozes and sovkhozes that were not fulfilling the plans 
and made forgery and theft. RGANI, f. 50, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 74-80. This situation reflects 
the impressions of Buttino who collected in Central Asia different stories about the 
state of abandonment of farms and livestock - that in many cases starved - in the early 
80s. 
354 Lately in 1986, during the XVI congress of Communist Party of Kirghizstan was 
revealed that about 500 managers were dismissed. As well, in Tajikistan were also 
removed about 400 high managers. Sébastien Peyrouse, “De La Mort de Staline À La 
Perestroika (1953-1991),” in Histoire de l’Asie Centrale Contemporaine, ed. Pierre 
Chuvin, René Létolle, and Sébastien Peyrouse (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 169. 
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5 THE ‘UZBEK RUBICON’ (1986-1989) 
 
Everything is rotten, through and through! –
Gorbachev1 
‘Sharafrashidovshchina’ became a synonym of 
intrigue and blasphemy, hypocrisy and ambiguity, 
disgrace and corruption, empty rhetoric, and self-
glorification – Nishanov2 
After my treatment, I will be ready to work together 
with you and make a contribution to our common cause 
– Usmankhodzhaev3 
 
In this chapter, we will analyze the third and final stage of the ‘Uzbek 
cotton affair’. As mentioned, in the first, ‘silent’ phase in 1983, Rashidov tried 
to follow Moscow’s moralization narrative while investigations had an 
inner/local dimension among separate minor cases. Substantially, the 
longstanding Uzbek leader believed he was able to manage this crisis and to 
turn it in his favor. However, his death inexorably changed the situation. In 
the second stage, under Usmankhodzhaev, the CPUz followed the course of 
the greater investigations of the prokuratura USSR, endorsing a systemic 
campaign of purges against the party and state establishment. In the third 
phase, the Uzbek establishment proceeded with internal purges on a truly 
                                                                
1 With this famous expression, Gorbachev privately expressed his views to his 
associate Eduard Shevardnadze in 1985. Dmitriı ̆Bal഻termants, Theodore Hermann Von 
Laue, and Angela Von Laue, Faces of a Nation : The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 
1917-1991 (Golden: Fulcrum Publishing, 1996), 211. 
2 The expression ‘Sharafrashidovshchina’ had a negative connotation and it could be 
translated as ‘in Rashidov’s way’ in order to define a sort of ‘Sharafrashidovity,’ the 
essence Rashidovism. This singular affirmation was made during Nishanov's speech in 
Tashkent on the occasion of the commemoration of the 117th anniversary of Lenin's 
birth. PV, 21362, 94, 24 April 1987, p. 2. 
3 These were the latest words that Usmankhodzhaev uttered before his dismissal from 
the post of FS CPUz in January 1988. Prot 8/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2007, l. 6. 
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grand scale, laying the blame for this squarely at the feet of the former FS 
CPUz Sharaf Rashidov. Just as Khrushchev had denounced Stalin and his 
personality cult three years after his death, a similar dynamic emerged in 
relation to Rashidov. Indeed, at the XXI CPUz Congress in January 1986, 
Rashidov became the main scapegoat of the entire panoply of republican 
failures and the CPUz promoted a new ideological dispensation, under which 
the memory, symbols – and, indeed, the remaining faction – of the former FS 
CPUZ bore the brunt of a comprehensive program of de-Rashidovization. 
However, in this last phase of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’, the ‘moralizing 
policies’ simply backfired against their key protagonists, initiators and 
paladins of Andropovian severity. These figures essentially became victims of 
their own belligerent system. Subsequently, the latest ‘properly Soviet’ leader 
of the UzSSR, Rafik Nishanov, seemed to be trapped by the need to respond 
to Moscow ahead of local concerns. This, in turn, led to resentment and a 
rather heavy political atmosphere as Uzbekistan essentially became a 
trusteeship of the Soviet power. Rather quickly, signs of impatience emerged 
among the Uzbek elite and the general population that - after decades of 
peaceful Brezhnevism - seemed increasingly reluctant to accept interference 
from Moscow and its negation of korenization. 
Therefore, we have the impression that Nishanov – who was probably the 
most loyal Soviet statesman in the Soviet Uzbek scenario – returned from the 
north in something akin to Julius Caesar’s March on Rome. In crossing the 
‘Uzbek Rubicon’4 he sought to affirm his power with his own ‘army’ – the 
Moscow-oriented red troopers (krasnyi desant) – in the ‘peripheral center’. 
Indeed, we can read this last Soviet Uzbek story as a kind of caesarean tale ‘in 
reverse’, in which the ‘center’ – represented by Nishanov – returned 
triumphantly to the peripheral homeland where he expected to find the 
support of the elite – which to quite an extent had many features in common 
with the Roman senate – and to impose his ‘illuminated dictatorship’ and a 
reformist program, much as Julius Caesar had done after his return.  
                                                                
4 The second secretary of the CPUz, Vladimir Anishchev, used the expression 
‘Uzbekistani Rubicon’ to describe his experience in Uzbekistan in 1986-1989, during 
which time he ascended to this high post. According to him, the Uzbeks had called on 
Moscow to address the situation in the republic in a context in which the people had a 
lot of confidence in the party. The beautiful title of his long book betrays to an extent 
the expectations that make no relevant comparisons with the caesarean history. Also 
his analogy of the river Rubicon is not entirely clear. Vladimir Petrovich Anishchev, 
Vostochnyi Ornament (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo A2-A4, 2009), 509–53. 
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However, just as soon as those elites started to feel like victims of an 
intrigue, the signs of discontent towards Soviet power exploded into violence, 
and they were finally able to push Nishanov off the political stage. Therefore, 
as had Julius Caesar before him, the Uzbek ‘illuminated dictator’ was ousted 
by a conspiracy of political events. While the Uzbek ‘ides of March’ did not 
put to an end Nishanov’s life, they nevertheless heralded much violence for 
the republic. Even though the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ has been narrated as a 
direct offensive campaign from Moscow, we can partially reject this 
interpretation. We know – from the available archival material covering 
discussions from the politburo – that the Uzbek problem was simply not a 
priority in Gorbachev's political agenda. He, as is well understood, had more 
pressing concerns at this time. Rather, the Uzbek cotton affair is better 
understood as the effect of a power struggle within the CPUz, in which the 
leading figures opportunistically followed what they read to be Moscow's 
imperatives in order to maximize their own political advantage. 
5.1 De-Rashidovization 
In this delicate phase, the Uzbek ruling leadership had to demonstrate to 
Moscow that the situation was under control and that it was properly fighting 
to eradicate the ‘negative phenomena’ from the republic. However, the 
dramatic calls that emerged in the XVI plenum of 1984 did not bring decisive 
results in terms of purges. At the same time, even agricultural production was 
poor. Uzbekistan, a republic that was supposed to be 'agriculture intensive', 
was thus unable to provide even the minimal food requirements for its 
population.5 
5.1.1 Showdown 
On the eve of 1986, the UzSSR awarded its most deserving scientists while 
at the same time it was endorsing a purge against the republican intellectual 
and scholar society.6 Behind an apparent tranquility, the republic was 
                                                                
5 FBIS, “JPRS-UAG-86-012. 16 May 1986. USSR Report. Agriculture,” 1986, 21–24. 
6 The purges of intellectuals began with the dismissal of important figures related to 
the ideological work of the CPUz, such as Ziyat Esenbaev – chairman of the Uzbek 
State Commission for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade (January 
1984), Sarvar Alimdzhanovich Azimov – chairman of the UzSSR Writer's Guild (April 
1984), and Abid Sadykovich Sadykov – chairman of the AN UzSSR (September 1984). 
Then, from January 1986 a number of prominent figures in the Uzbek intellectual 
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entering a new turbulent year when the measure7 to fight more efficiently 
against the negative phenomena had been hardened and the purges against 
the ruling leadership taken with a decisive impact. 
Therefore, 1986 started with the news of the dismissals of the minister of 
health of the UzSSR S.M. Bakhramov (30 December 1985) and the 
appointment of Uchkun Sadykovich Rakhimov as the new chairman of the 
MVD UzSSR (31 December 1985). Apparently, Ibragimov’s use of Andropovian 
methods simply was not sufficient to get results on the moralizing campaign. 
So, the party dismissed a figure who had been one of the first supporters of 
investigations and purges,8 becoming the first hero and the first victim of the 
purge machine that he himself had constructed in the previous months. 
Parallel to these sinister signs, the first cases of injustice - towards figures 
who had been removed, badly prosecuted, exonerated, and finally 
rehabilitated - emerged.9 This situation thus emerged as a case of 
‘falsifications of falsifications’ and confirms the hypothesis that often, behind 
the investigation and subsequent purges, there were political interests and 
struggles between local elite groups – of which the donos letters were the 
clearest evidence – as well as competition for resources. Thus, in this 
scenario, the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’ were highly politicized and did not always 
result in the actual culprits being caught or effective honest leaders being 
appointed, but often lead to the opposite result. 
                                                                                                                                            
society were also dismissed. Salim Pulatov – minister of higher and specialized 
secondary education (August 1985) was the first key example. He was followed by 
Uktam Aripov – Rector of the Tashkent Medical Institute (November 1985), Saidkarim 
Kadyrkhanov – professor of economics at the Tashkent economics institute and 
deputy secretary of the institute's party committee (January 1986), Anvar 
Agzamkhodzhaev – dean of the law faculty at Tashkent state university and member 
of the AN UzSSR (January 1986), A. Shamaksudov – dean of the department of 
journalism at Tashkent state university (January 1986), and Nikolai Timofeev – editor-
in-chief of the PV (January 1986). John Staples, “Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a 
Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case,” Past Imperfect 2 (1993): 33–34, 44–45. 
7 In 1986 the laws of criminal procedure against abuse and other negative phenomena 
in the republic were also hardened. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2739. 
8 PV, 20974, 1, 1 January 1986, p. 1. 
9 One case involved the former FS Namangan gorkom, Ibrakhim Kamalovich, who was 
removed from his post for misusing party resources for private purposes. However, he 
was rehabilitated and restored in his post because it was discovered that the criminal 
proceedings against him had been falsified. PV, 20977, 4, 5 January 1986, p. 3. 
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In the very week after Ibragimov’s dismissal, a similar fate befell another 
figure who had played a leading role in initiating the purges associated with 
the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’. On 7 January, the second secretary of the CPUz – 
Timofei Nikolaevich Osetrov10 – was replaced by Vladimir Petrovich 
Anishchev.11 This was quite a strange dismissal: despite Osetrov was 
appointed in June 1983, he was considered an honest face of the late 
Rashidovism, acting in the republic as an effective ‘Moscow watchdog.’ Then 
on 8 January, a buro meeting revealed that the former first deputy prosecutor 
of the UzSSR has also been expelled from the party because he had poorly 
evaluated the case of a former deputy director of the CC CPUz commission (R. 
Dylmuratov). For this fact, the members of the SS UzSSR S. Usmanov, V. 
Mamadzhanov, Kh. Atakusiyev were also sanctioned.12 Therefore, within a 
week, some of those key protagonists that could be considered the initiators 
of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ were purged by the system that they had created. 
                                                                
10 The dismissal of the experienced Osetrov followed the ‘classic’ course seen 
throughout the cotton affairs. Osetrov had been accused of bribery, dismissed from 
political posts, arrested on 13 December 1986, and kept in the special facility n° 4 of 
the MVD USSR in Moscow. The FS Bukhara obkom, Abduvakhid Karimov, testified to 
his bribery and even Yuri Churbanov stated he had received from him a bribe of 25 
thousand rubles. Osetrov denied these accusations in all his 14 confrontations with 
investigators. In May 1987, he was accused of having overseen some 52 bribes totaling 
1,002,298 rubles. On 30 May 1989, Osetrov was released from custody and the case 
was dismissed. The prokuratura USSR then offered him a formal apology, restored his 
membership in the party and confirmed a pension for him. See his personal file in 
www.centrasia.ru and Viktor Ivanovich Ilyukhin, Vozhdi I Oborotni. Prervannoye 
Rassledovaniye (Moskva: Paleya, 1994); Viktor Ivanovich Ilyukhin, Oborotni: Kak Bylo 
Nadumano “Uzbekskoe” Delo (Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1993). 
11 Vladimir Petrovich Anishchev (born in Voronezh, 24 July 1935), graduated from the 
Voronezh Aviation College (1954), the Mechanical Department of the Voronezh 
Institute of Civil Engineering (1970), and from the Academy of Social Sciences under 
the CC CPSU (1978). In 1961 he was the FS Levoberezhni Komsomol raikom, rose to 
the post of deputy head of the raikom in 1972, and in 1974 became FS of the Leninski 
raikom. In 1978 he chaired the Voronezh gorispolkom and in 1979 became the FS 
Voronezh gorkom. In 1980 he was appointed as deputy of the SS RSFSR. In March 1985 
he was appointed inspector of the CC CPSU and in January 1986 he became the 
second secretary of the CPUz until 1989, when he came back to Russia and became 
the chairman of the PCC RSFSR. After his dismissal, Anatoly Stepanovich Efimov, 
became the second secretary of the CC CPUz. Anishchev, Vostochnyi Ornament. 
12 Prot. 142/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2304, l. 20. 
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The desultory state of the Uzbek economy was revealed the next day. On 
9 January 1986, during the CPUz plenum, Usmankhodzhaev gave a speech 
stating that just 5.38 million tons of raw cotton had been collected in 1985.13 
Despite some weakly positive results, seven oblasts and half of the raions and 
kolkhozes had not realized the plan.14 For these evident failures, the FS 
blamed the organs, citing inefficient application of the plan’s indicated 
discipline. Summing up the situation, he noted: 
Was there any possibility to realize the investment plan for 1985? Yes, if the 
party, soviet organs and kolkhozes, directors, and specialists of kolkhozes had 
followed the FYP discipline[!}15 
Then, the FS CPUz also provided evidence of many defects in the livestock 
breeding system16 and exclaimed: “The point that we have now reached is 
simply unacceptable.”17 Finally, he gave the word to the representative of 
Moscow, the newly appointed second secretary CPUz. On that occasion, 
Anishchev gave a long speech recalling the commitments made in the XVI 
plenum and invited those people who betrayed the trust of honest people 
and acted against the moral integrity of the party to resign.18 Then, he blamed 
some compromised figures who had been effectively recycled into other 
positions of power and were thus not actually punished. Thus, he finally 
                                                                
13 These figures were much lower than the over 6 million tons that had been 
announced with great fanfare just five years before. However, Leslie Dienes suggests 
that this reduction might not reflect a decrease in productivity at all, but simply an 
increase in the honesty of the official reports. Despite the simplicity of this statement, 
it does – at least in part – appear plausible. In actual fact, a number of articles 
emerging after 1987 actually claim that, despite the great investments made, Uzbek 
cotton production basically did not grew after 1969. Leslie Dienes, Soviet Asia: 
Economic Development and National Policy Choices (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 
143; Boris Z. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 71. 
14 Although these figures fell well short of the promises given previously, he recalled 
how the oblasts of Ferghana, Namangan, Tashkent, Syrdarya, Andijan, and 
Surkhandarya – as well as 66 raions, 664 kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and more than 
16,000 brigades – had nevertheless done their job and that the quality of the cotton 
had increased. However, he reported that in the republic still 152 companies were in 
productive deficit, while the agro-alimentary industry's productivity had not increased. 
Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, l. 6. 
15 Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, l. 9. 
16 Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, l. 10. 
17 Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, l. 13. 
18 Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, l. 41. 
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proposed the expulsion of prominent personalities in the party19 and gave 
some practical examples of scandals and purges within the CC CPUz that had 
been implemented in the previous months.20 His report highlighted the 
                                                                
19 “I.I. Golovachev, second secretary of the Kashkadarya obkom, who has violated the 
rules of life of the party and its principles, […] promoting many prominent people of 
the oblast who are now on trial. These people were chosen on the basis of patronage 
and servility and protection prospered in the oblast […]. In the kolkhozes of the oblast 
many cases of falsified data and corruption had been recorded. Golovachev knew 
everything but did nothing, nor was he honest. In March 1984 he was relieved from 
his post. […] I. Achilov, former director of the sovkhoz “50” in the Nishan rayon [was 
dealt with similarly]. Between 1975-1984, he was the FS Karshi raikom and violated 
the rules of party life, did not listen to the opinion of the buro, was conciliatory 
towards those important people who were guilty of fraud to the government. [Finally, 
he was] arrogant [with his subordinates], forcing them to write false data on grain 
production, and exceed by a factor of two the actual volumes produced. 
[Substantially] only 40% of the milk plan was effectively achieved [...] these anti-
government activities in 1983 led the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the raion to be in 
deficit for 700 thousand rubles. Also K.B. Mamedov, who was the FS Chinaz raikom, 
indulged in falsified data in agricultural production. [Furthermore, under his 
responsibility] the practice of blank receipts, corruption and theft of government 
resources in very high numbers prospered. For these crimes, on 5 December 1985, he 
was relieved of his duties. […] Also S. Marasulov, FS Kirov raikom, stacked the receipts 
and protected his son who had killed a child of three years old in a car accident. He 
was finally removed on 26 September 1985. D.V. Bobokulov, FS Alat raikom, cheated 
the productive data on production and made errors in choosing cadres. P. Kurbanov, 
FS Nishan raikom, in 1983 falsified cotton production data, increasing the harvest data 
artificially, recording losses of almost 3 million rubles, and embezzling public funds. On 
January 1985 he was fired.” Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, ll. 42-44. 
20 “in the Namangan oblast disappeared 3.5 million rubles, and there were many 
violations of socialist law as corruption, forgery and even in the judicial organs - as 
Rakhimov, director of the Justice Department of the oblast - in the courts' staff and in 
the college of lawyers. For these facts, were fired and expelled from the party 70% of 
members of raions' and cities' judicial cadres. [As well,] Atakulov, member of the CC 
CPUz, was dismissed on 18 December 1985, as well as U. Asatov was fired 22 
November 1985 because he systematically received bribes and embezzled public 
funds. [...] Also R. Makhmanov member of the CC CPUz and FS Khatyrchi raikom lost 
the sense of responsibility for his district, falsifying data and implementing frauds for 
10,000 tons of cotton in three years, leading to misappropriation of public funds. He 
was expelled on 27 December 1985. A. Primov, in 1977-1984 was the FS Ellikkali 
raikom and violated rules, discipline and the moral of the party and state, abusing his 
power and stealing 80,000 rubles. Tursunmurat Umarov, manager of the CC CPUz 
general affairs, received bribes and had covered up a number of cases, protecting the 
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systematic dimension of the ‘negative phenomena’, implicating party officials 
at the highest levels in the widespread malfeasance. Apparently, this 
statement created a sense of bewilderment among the leading establishment 
– and for Usmankhodzhaev personally – who stood publicly accused of having 
not done enough to eradicate malfeasance in the republic. In turn, the FS 
CPUz seemed to blame the ministerial bodies and the local parties, in which in 
the meantime a parallel purge persisted at all administrative levels. 
Indeed, on the eve of 1986, entire regional leaderships and ministries 
were being reshuffled. During the XXII Samarkand obkom conference, for 
example, the previous leading group was dismissed and a new FS – Rashid S. 
Ashuralyev – and a new second secretary – Yu. S. Fasil'yev – were elected. 
Additionally, the other obkom secretaries were replaced.21 Then, on 13 
January 1986, Kh. R. Kujbakarov became the new minister of bread products 
and T. Shayakubov the new minister of geology while the FS Navoi obkom, 
Vasili Pavlovich Esin – who had been in power since the foundation of the 
oblast (and the obkom) in 1982 – was replaced by the former FS Vyborg 
gorkom Anatolii Stepanovich Efimov.22  
Soon enough, another political earthquake would hit another 
longstanding figure: Mad'yar Khudaibergenovich Khudaibergenov, the FS 
Khorezm obkom since 1968. Already in the aftermath of Rashidov’s death, the 
very powerful ‘Khan of Khiva’ was under a hailstorm of perfectly crafted 
                                                                                                                                            
FS Bukhara obkom A. Karimov, the general manager of the agro-industrial complex 
Odilov and other managers of law enforcement. On 26 October 1985, he was expelled 
from the party. [Also] M.G. Khvan, director of the kolkhoz “Politotdel”, in 1983 he 
falsified the data for 400 tons of cotton obtaining bribes and giving in return to those 
workers who had falsified the data a sum of 70,000 rubles. In turn he bought a car 
with the money of the employees of the kolkhoz. On 16 December, he was expelled 
from the party. [For similar stories], N. Khikmatov, FS Kyzyltep raikom was expelled on 
27 December 1985.” Prot. 21/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2298, ll. 48, 53-56. 
21 PV, 20983, 10, 12 January 1986, p. 2. 
22 The Leningrader Efimov formally kept the post of FS Navoi obkom until September 
1989 when the oblast and the obkom were integrated into their Samarkand 
counterparts. Then, he was appointed as chairman of PCC UzSSR and in June 1989 he 
became the second secretary CPUz, a deputy of CPDSU and member of CC CPSU in 
1990. It is interesting to note how the Navoi oblast, far from agricultural issues and 
central for strategic production items, such as uranium, gold and copper mining, was 
directly ruled by non-natives. 
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donos letters.23 At that time, the CC CPSU opened a political case and took 
evidence from the second secretary CC CPUz, T.N. Osetrov, who said that the 
slanders had not been confirmed.24 However, the investigative group headed 
by Gdlyan worked on this case, and was able to collect evidence against 
Khudaibergenov25 - and his malfeasance with Rashidov26 - pushing for his 
removal. Finally, on 13 January 1986, the FS Khorezm was replaced by 
Mirakhmat Mirkhadzhievich Mikrasymov, the former FS Almayk gorkom.  As 
                                                                
23 A group of 'party veterans' wrote an anonymous letter in January 1984 denouncing 
the situation in Khorezm where Rashidov spent the last days of his life and where 
there was an evident "rise in the number of millionaires and of real Khans and 
landlords." The group essentially suggested that the FS Khorezm obkom Mad'yar 
Khudaibergenov was responsible for this. Under his example corruption mushroomed. 
Falsifications, fraud and the appointment of people close to him in positions of upper 
management – such as the FSs raikoms, of the UVD, of the trading depots, and of the 
cotton cleaning factories – were the principal charges. All these figures had worked 
together with him for at least 15-20 years. Every year these people had been giving 
valuable items, such as diamonds and kilograms of gold – and yet “this had not been 
not enough for him. […Khudaibergenov] was responsible for other immoral actions 
typical of capitalist societies". In this framework, the director of a cotton cleaning 
factory became the director of the kolkhoz 'Akhumbabaiev' and his son a secretary of 
the oblast's Komsomol. These posts had been bought from Khudaibergenov for 50,000 
rubles each as well as other posts in the management of cotton cleaning factories in 
Khorezm oblast where every year 100,000 tons of non-existent cotton were realized 
on paper. Then, the letter reported that every year the FS Khorezm obkom received 
100,000 rubles from the FS of each raikom, 50,000 from the director of every cotton 
cleaning factory, 25,000 from each top manager in housing and trade, and from each 
director of the kolkhozes. The letter ends by stating: "The person responsible for these 
actions should be shot!" RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 31-32. 
24 In the aftermath of these donos, the Khorezm obkom had taken measure, and in 
1983 alone expelled from the CPSU 35 workers, 12 managers and 248 citizens 
condemned for theft and speculation, 359 workers were investigated under suspicion 
of wrongdoing, of whom 22 were fired from their posts. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 
33-34. Then, on 25 February 1984 the CC CPUz commented that party controls had not 
revealed the negative phenomena indicated in the donos. As well, neither the KGB or 
the MVD found any evidence, describing Khudaibergenov as a devoted socialist 
worker. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 35-37. 
25 Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Nikolai Veniaminovich Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo 
(Moskva: Gramota, 1996). 
26 Khudaibergenov admitted that he was personally gave bribes to Rashidov: 
something around 1 million rubles in money and half million in gold and jewels. 
According to Nikolai Ivanov, he was the only real repent of his sins. Nashe Kino, 
Kremlevskie Pokhorony. Sharaf Rashidov (Russia: NTV, 2008). 
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well, in the same day also the FS Syrdarya obkom, V.A. Antonov, was 
substituted by Aleksandr Fedorovich Klepikov, another Russian ethnic who 
was already the second secretary of the obkom. In turn, Antonov was 
promoted to the CC CPUz.27 
The first two weeks of the year thus started with a massive power 
reshuffle that even included the second secretaries of the obkoms.28 Parallel 
to the purges, it is interesting to note how the party also changed its narrative 
related to cotton. After decades of triumphalism surrounding the raw cotton 
crop, there was a revolutionary change. As we have observed in the previous 
chapter, the USSR budget started to finance cotton on the base of the 
qualitative production – namely, in terms of fiber produced. Therefore, the 
CPUz renovated its commitments to get an annual production of 1.8-1.93 
million tons of cotton fiber by 1990, without mentioning the raw 
production.29 
Then, during a CPUz aktiv meeting (22 January 1986), Usmankhodzhaev 
tried to justify the objectives that the party had accomplished in the previous 
few months. On that occasion, he stated that effectively in the XVI plenum CC 
CPUz of June 1984 had been found violations of the standards of party life 
and were called measures to root out protectionism, corruption, forgery and 
fraud. All this was simply the beginning of great and difficult work that aimed 
to prove the Leninist work style of the CPUz.30 Then, the FS CPUz reported 
that each year in the republic 500,000 tons of raw cotton had been falsified31 
and this huge falsification happened only as a result of the intense pressure in 
the '70s to meet the increased demand for cotton production. Moreover, the 
                                                                
27 PV, 20984, 11, 14 January 1986, p. 1. 
28 B.A. Allamuradov became the second secretary of Syrdarya - while the other 
secretaries were S.D. Davlyatov, A.A. Azimbyekov, and Yu.Yu. Yuldashev. In Khorezm, 
Yu.P. Gudkov was appointed second secretary while E.A. Rakhmanov, G.N. 
Masharipov, and Z.A. Batyrov were promoted to the obkom secretariat. In Bukhara 
obkom, the second secretary became Yu.B. Kurochkin while S. Bakhranov, A.A. Isakov, 
and V.G. Razmaev were promoted to the Bukharan secretariat. In Navoi obkom, D.M. 
Dzhanibyekov became the second secretary and V.A. Kovalenko, Yu.S. Saidzhanov, Ya. 
Sultanov were promoted to the secretariat. Then, during the XXII Tashkent obkom 
conference (18 January 1986) S.M. Nesterenko was appointed as second secretary, 
and to the secretariat Sh.Z. Kamalkhodzhaev, V.G. Gordyenko and S.D. Sajdaliev. PV, 
20989, 16, 19 January 1986, pp. 1-2. 
29 PV, 20985, 12, 15 January 1986, p. 2. 
30 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 5. 
31 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 6. 
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adopted strategy had been to increase the size of cotton fields at the expense 
of food agriculture.32 Then, Usmankhodzhaev invited the SM UzSSR to 
improve the style and methods of the resources management.33 At the same 
time, he recalled the results of the party cadres’ reshuffles, noting that in the 
preceding two years, 62% of employees of the nomenklatura of the CPSU had 
been changed as well as 45% of the CPUz staff, underlining the minor but 
effective commitments of the republican establishment.34 Then, at the end of 
his long speech, Usmankhodzhaev also affirmed his personal commitments 
saying that when he was at the head of the control committee, a case related 
to the CC CPUz member Atakulov had been discovered.35  
The Uzbek leader wanted to demonstrate his commitment and good will 
in combating the negative phenomena. Perhaps this approach was enforced 
because he also felt threatened by suspicions that he himself had inflamed in 
the previous months. In the meanwhile, other scandals emerged in the press, 
narrating in great detail the levels of malfeasance. However, this was 
functional to prepare the public opinion to accept cadres reshuffle.36 
5.1.2 A weighty absence at the congresses 
In these first months of Gorbachev’s leadership, Moscow’s anticorruption 
campaign intensified, leaving the FS CPUz with little other choice than to obey 
dutifully. The failures in agriculture and the constant scandals that drew 
considerable public attention certainly undermined Usmankhodzhaev’s 
credibility as a leader with an effective strategy. At the same time, the 
sekretar nol’ wanted to shift the focus of responsibility and argue that 
circumstances were simply the result of Moscow’s hard line. Basically, he 
wanted to affirm the necessity of these measures in a moment of emergency. 
                                                                
32 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 7. 
33 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 10. 
34 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 15. 
35 Prot. 22/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2299, l. 32. 
36 For example, the story of A. Saitkulov, director of the sovkhoz “Timoshenko”, got 
wide traction. Saitkulov had not fulfilled the plan and had also bought false vouchers 
from the textile factory where he was supposed to deliver raw cotton. PV, 20993, 20, 
24 January 1986, p. 3. Other scandals narrated in the press were related to the 
housing and construction sectors and this was probably designed, at least in part, to 
prepare public opinion for another reshuffle. Not coincidentally, on 24 January A.G. 
Manannikov became the new minister for construction of the UzSSR. PV, 20994, 21, 
25 January 1986, p. 1. 
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To justify the persistent negative phenomena and the heavy unpopular 
measures to contrast them, Usmankhodzhaev elaborated a strategy aimed at 
finding someone who to blame and to whom upload the responsibilities for 
the republic’s recent failures. Someone who could not reply.  
This attitude emerged during the most important political event of the 
Uzbek cotton affair season. Between 30 January-1 February 1986 was held 
the XXI Congress of CPUz that would further fluster the republican political 
scenario. The previous congress had been held in 1981 when both Rashidov 
and Brezhnev were still alive. Just five years later, the situation had shifted 
dramatically in Uzbekistan and the CPUz took a stance openly rejecting its 
inconvenient past and the legacy that Rashidov had bequeathed to the 
republic. Indeed, explicit criticism of Rashidov – who emerged as the 
scapegoat for the whole Uzbek cotton affair – became diffuse. In an 
astounding move, Usmankhodzhaev’s opening speech37 to the Congress 
contradicted in painstaking detail almost every aspect of the glowing eulogy 
he had delivered just two years before at Rashidov’s funeral. Then, after 
recalling Gorbachev’s words at the April 1985 plenum,38 the FS CPUz 
presented a detailed explanation of the still negative situation in the republic, 
as follows: 
In the CC CPUz, in the obkoms, in gorkoms, and in raikoms, the former FS CPUz 
Rashidov Sh. had imposed a vicious work style, solemnity, and self-
glorification. He, additionally, ignored criticism and self-criticism, showed a 
loss of modesty – and, in some cases, of sheer decency – and diverted from 
the personality of the party. All this has caused intrigue, formalism, 
indifference, abuse of power, theft, and fraud.39 The cadres, of course, were 
not chosen for their moral, organizational, and political qualities but were 
selected for family relations, zemlyachestvo, personal loyalty and on the basis 
of whatever quid pro quo they could provide. The control of the managers was 
weakened and in some places – especially in Karakalpak ASSR and the oblast of 
Bukhara and Kashkadarya – was simply non-existent. Some of these leaders 
were protected from controls and possible criticism and were self-celebratory. 
These figures who took bribes and stole public money – the traitors of the 
                                                                
37 Inamzhon Buzrukovich Usmankhodzhayev, Otchetnyy Doklad Tsentral’nogo 
Komiteta Kompartii Uzbekistana XXI S"yezdu Kommunisticheskoy Partii Uzbekistana, 
30 Yanv. 1986 G. (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1986). 
38 Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU (Houndmills & New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1997), 75. 
39 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 20. 
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party – in these conditions were at ease. [This situation] allowed the 
falsification of facts –  deliberate fraud against the central organs – in order to 
receive prizes and awards. Rashidov protected persons such as Yakh'yayev and 
Odilov – who were state criminals – and at the same time pursued the honest 
communists who wanted to catch the offenders and speak the truth. All this 
has caused great damage to the education of cadres, revealing corruption and 
protectionism, and triggering the psychology of private property and the 
accumulation of agricultural goods. Some of the powerful workers diverted on 
the way of decomposition and moral degeneration. And these persons were 
members of the buro and secretariats of particular obkoms, workers of the CC, 
ministers and oblispolkoms, managers of the city and raion departments and 
also economic cadres. This dark fraud was hidden by these figures, who 
masked their maleficence with the façade of the innovative and dynamic 
workers. From the tribunes, they uttered the right words, claiming to fight 
against defects. Of course, they could not go back for the progress of the 
republic. We have to acknowledge that their influence had hurt the life of the 
party organs, of the Soviet government, and of the economic organs. The 
communists and the workers accused the CC buro because it was not 
effectively combatting these antiparty activities. Although this whole situation 
is difficult, these reproaches are fair and reasonable. Really, you must believe 
me and the comrades A. U. Salimov, G. Kh. Kadyrov, R. Kh. Abdullaeva, V. K. 
Mikhailov, who say that all those who today are members of the buro, and 
even at that time were in jobs as managers and worked in the environment of 
Rashidov, we were, one might say, under the hypnotic spell of his personality 
and could not go against his will. We did not have enough civil courage and 
party principles [to rebel against him]. All of this was the breeding ground for 
abuse and serious violation.40 
Usmankhodzhaev, who had sat with Rashidov within the buro CC CPUz 
since 1978, was effectively minimizing his own responsibility and declaring his 
total weakness and ignorance – even arguing that he was under hypnosis (!) – 
about what was going on. Then, in an attempt to exculpate himself, he 
recalled the above mentioned idea of the ‘emergency situation’: 
Today is not easy to talk about this topic. Perhaps for someone such 
assessments and conclusions seem very strong and sharp. But we have to 
report everything to the congress, because – while not completely unaware of 
the stratification of the past – we cannot go forward. I must admit that the CC 
CPUz had the courage and the strength to reveal the true state of affairs in the 
republic. Only after the intervention and support of the CC CPSU, was it 
possible to reveal everything. At the XVI plenum CC CPUz held in June 1984, 
the clear errors and obvious failures in the management of the economy and 
                                                                
40 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 21. 
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of the social sphere had been criticized, as had the serious violations in the 
activity of the party, in the soviet, state and agricultural organs, and in the 
public organizations of the republic. And the hard work that took place after 
the plenum showed that the possible abuse and perversion had spread on a 
large scale. The fight against these things must be acute and without 
compromise, as is the Bolshevik way. That is why the secretariat and the buro 
of the CC CPUz were forced to take emergency measures to clean up the party, 
and the soviet and state organs from compromised individuals, and to 
strengthen all areas from top to bottom and enhance [the work of the] honest 
and faithful party workers.41 
Then, the FS CPUz thanked the CC CPSU for its help and support in 
cleaning the republic up and in forging new class of honest cadres: 
The CC CPSU is providing us with a vast and internationalist package of 
assistance, sending the party workers and Soviet workers from the apparatus 
of the central organs and other regions of the country [to enforce] the 
permanent work in the republic. They brought a new approach in the activities 
of the CPUz and contributed the experience of the great party organizations. 
[Because of this] we were able – to some extent – to change the moral and 
psychological situation in the republic, to strengthen party and state discipline, 
and to bolster all the vigorous forces for the fight against falsification, theft, 
bribes, and other abuses.42 
Pointedly, Usmankhodzhaev called for greater effort against the ‘negative 
phenomena’ in order to heal the republic from malfeasance. 
But evaluating in a sober and real way the situation in the light of modern 
party needs, we are well aware that what has been recently implemented, 
should be regarded as a clear set of emergency measures for the liquidation of 
the obvious failures and the serious violations. Negative phenomena have 
simply gone too far and we should make a great effort and persevere in our 
resistance to correct the situation. For a year and a half, the republican CC has 
struggled to remedy the situation and to restore the Leninist style of work 
within the party leadership.43 
Then, in order to justify the persistent failures, Usmankhodzhaev also 
admitted strategic errors in the months prior to the speech and drew 
attention to the role of perestroika as the key to resolve the republic’s 
problems: 
                                                                
41 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 22. 
42 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 22. 
43 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 22. 
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However, it is necessary to admit that many of our cadres under the new 
[party] conditions have been ready for perestroika, which was pursued by the 
party [meanwhile] the defects discovered in some places had been liquidated 
in a blundering, timid, and cautious way by the authorities in the past. In this 
hard task, some issues remain unresolved and negative consequences 
persist.44 
Then, referring to the Uzbek situation, he cited one of the last of Lenin's 
articles “Better Fewer, But Better”45 to suggest that, 
the party must not inflate success and exaggerate the importance of what has 
been done [...] The committees, party organizations, and the management of 
agriculture will have to undertake more strongly the social processes and to 
create the dynamic sweeping away of the past that prevents us from moving 
forward.46 
Thus, Usmankhodzhaev moved on to discuss economic issues, announcing 
the results of the eleventh FYP47 and the tasks to ‘accelerate’ the socio-
economic development of the republic – or what, in Gorbachevian terms, was 
being called uskoreniye. However, despite he denounced the many defects in 
the cotton sector,48 he reconditioned the previous ‘Rashidovian-like’ 
commitments for cotton, setting for the twelfth FYP an annual production of 
                                                                
44 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 23. 
45 Vladimir Ilich Lenin, “Better Fewer, But Better,” in Lenin’s Collected Works. Vol. 33 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), 487–502. 
46 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 23. 
47 Announcing the economic results in the last FYP, the FS CPUz evidenced how the 
growth of gross domestic product was 19%, the national income increased by 23% and 
reached 21 billion rubles and the volume of industrial production increased by 26%. 
Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 24. For the twelfth FYP (1986-1990) 
he announced the goal of increasing the gross national income by +20%, industrial 
production by +24-27%, and average annual gross agricultural production by +14-16%. 
Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 25. He followed this with criticism of 
the local party organizations and particularly those of some oblasts – such as the 
Samarkand one – which were producing serious inefficiencies and “where the local 
obkom [wa]s negligent.” Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 29. 
48 The FS CPUz affirmed that cotton growers were good and worked well. However, 
they still could not reach the commitments made for selling the cotton to the state 
under the five-year plan. Then, Usmankhodzhaev affirmed that in the previous harvest 
season alone (1985), 11,000 brigades and half of raions and kolkhozes had not realized 
the plan. At the same time, he was able to report that 7,500 brigades, 320 kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes, and 22 raions had realized the cotton plan before 1 November 1985. 
Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, ll. 32-33. 
351 
 
5.8/6 million tons of raw cotton and to produce 1.8/1.93 million tons of 
fibers.49 The tone of these promises was significantly less triumphal and were 
presented as mandatory obligations.  Usmankhodzhaev recalled how the 
whole CPUz – some 640,000 members50 – was devoted to this duty. 
Then, Salimov – the chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR – 
intervened, denouncing almost all of the FSs of the Kashkadarya and Bukhara 
local committees, the ministers (and most of the deputy ministers) both of 
internal affairs or related to the cotton industry, as well as any other leaders 
he viewed as corrupt and mired in fraud and abuse. According to the Uzbek 
head of state, certain figures were totally ‘unsuspected’ and it was difficult to 
detect their guilt because they had very powerful protectors. For example, he 
recalled the cases of Gaipov, Karimov, Yakh'yayev, and Odilov. Then even 
Salimov directly referred to the former FS CPUz, stating: “The phenomena 
that Rashidov fostered must be uprooted and finally they must not appear 
anywhere anymore.”51 In this critical posture, the FS Namangan obkom, 
Radzhabov, also commented on another legacy of the former leadership – the 
tragic child labor in cotton fields that we have already mentioned in the 
second chapter. This was, of course, a fact that everybody knew in the 
republic and that no one could denounce.52 
                                                                
49 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 34. 
50 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 56. 
51 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 89. 
52 Radzhabov defined this phenomenon as a “strong moral injury and even physical 
harm to children who are [supposed to be focused on] studying and who are [instead] 
involved in cotton harvesting.” Considering the size of the phenomena, Radzhabov 
was touching on a very sensitive issue that embarrassed the whole party. In 1986 a 
resolution of the CC CPUz forbidding the use of students in the cotton harvest was 
approved. PV, 21461, 193, 22 August 1987, p. 1. However, despite official prohibitions, 
child labor seemed to be not merely tolerated by the party, but to a significant extent 
even institutionalized as a last resort to achieve the harvest at any cost. Finally, it 
seemed that the best the party could do would be to limit its social effects: “in the last 
year was decided to involve children for no longer than a month, but not everybody 
follow this rule.” (Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 100). However, in 
summer 1986 many cases were reported of children in summer camps and those aged 
13 to 16 years being engaged in the brigades to work with adults harvesting cotton for 
7 to 10 hours a day. PV, 21271, 3, 4 January 1987, p. 2. Tragically, the problem of child 
labor was never resolved in any meaningful way, and in fact continued to recur 
through subsequent decades. 
352 
 
At the congress, criticism arrived also from the other regional leaders.53 
Then, also A.V. Buturlin, the chairman of the prokuratura UzSSR, outlined the 
scope of the investigations, declaring: 
during the last six years, data on cotton has been massively falsified, […] and 
the state has paid 2.866 billion rubles for cotton that was never produced. [...] 
Moreover, even 1.178 billion rubles worth of workers’ salaries has been 
recorded but never paid to workers themselves  [...For these facts,] about 
2500 people and almost the entire management of the MCC UzSSR has been 
sentenced.54 
For all the above mentioned defects in the republic, the party congress 
confirmed Rashidov as the main culprit: 
because of Sh. Rashidov, in the Party committees at all levels of management 
of social and economic development there was a vicious work style, criticism 
was ignored and there was no self-criticism, and the serious deviations from 
norms of the party life, social justice and Soviet law were not evaluated. […] 
There was [personalism and] violations of the collegiality and of the Leninist 
principles. The control over the managers’ activities has been weakened all 
over, but especially in some places like Karakalpakstan.55 […] the members of 
the buro, of the CC, obkoms, gorkoms and raikoms had not always taken a 
stand against the deviations from the principles of the CPSU charter.56 
Rashidov was identified as a scapegoat to wash the party conscience and 
to redeem the sins of a seemingly ineffective leadership. At the end of the 
congress, the group of the party aktiv demanded that the CC CPSU continue 
the practice of sending the workers of the central apparatus of the party 
organizations from RSFSR and other republics to Uzbekistan in order to 
“enforce an effective management base.” Then the congress ended with a 
directive that ordered a Soviet version of the Latin damnatio memoriae to 
continue in relation to the former FS CPUz: 
                                                                
53 The FS of the Karakalpak obkom, Salykov, admitted that “in the past years the 
Karakalpak ASSR was falsifying cotton data for about 10% of the Uzbek production and 
just in 1982-1983 no less than 21 million rubles ended up in someone else’s pockets in 
the form of bribes. Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 114. Also 
Aripdzhanov, the FS Andijan obkom, stated that 29 directors of kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes had been ousted from their posts for corruption, and that 29 directors of 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes and several executives of enterprises had been replaced for 
the same reason. Prot. T2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2297, l. 20. 
54 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 173. 
55 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 215. 
56 Prot. T1/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2296, l. 216. 
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Judging the vicious style and methods of the leadership of the former FS CPUz 
Sh. Rashidov that have achieved the appearance and spread of many serious 
shortcomings and negative phenomena, the Congress instructs the CC CPUz to 
reconsider the perpetuation of the memory of Sh. Rashidov.57 
According to Allworth, the denigration of the defunct leader and the 
purge against his establishment had the unintentional but serious 
consequence of hurting “Uzbekness” and the “Uzbek national self-image”58 it 
would surely exacerbate the 'imperial disaffection' of a part of those cadres 
that for a quarter of a century had contributed to the cause of the former 
leader. Nevertheless, the most evident effect of the de-Rashidovization 
program was in the composition of the republican central committee. Indeed, 
the new CC CPUz led to an almost complete turnover of the ruling UzSSR 
elite. In fact, until that moment, 40 of 65 obkom secretaries – including 10 of 
13 FSs – and over 260 gorkom and raikom secretaries had been replaced, 
while a third of the chairmen of the gorisplokoms and raispolkoms faced 
criminal charges. Only 34 of 177 members of the CC CPUz elected in 1981 
were reconfirmed in the 1986 congress, while 76 of the 85 candidates were 
not reelected, inverting a reconfirmation trend that had been positive in the 
previous congresses.59 Of the 1981 buro only 2 members – Usmankhodzhaev 
and Salimov – survived after 1986 while “all of the previous buro's candidate 
members disappeared.”60 Similarly, three quarters of gorkom and raikom 
officials changed from the 1981 to the 1986 congress.61 However, this 
reshuffle within the UzSSR was not a merely Uzbek prerogative. As Graziosi 
evidenced, this ‘generational change’ in the UzSSR was in line with overall 
Soviet policy where – especially after the XXVII Congress CPSU – just a half of 
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58 Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the 
Present : A Cultural History (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1990), 312. 
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cadres that had were effective in 1980 kept their posts.62 Another interesting 
consequence of the XXI congress is evinced in the composition of the new 
buro. In fact, it was more ‘russified’ considering that the number of non-
native central appointees jumped from five (1981) to eight (1986).63 Similar 
consequences were in evidence in the CC CPUz secretariat and its 
departments.64 In the immediate aftermath of the XXI CPUz congress, there 
were reshuffles also in the state management.65 Events in these first two 
months of 1986 were just the primary signs of what would emerge as 
probably the toughest year for the republican elite during the Uzbek cotton 
affair.  
Another wave of de-Rashidovization purges was then implemented after 
the most important event in the Soviet political system of 1986. During the 
XXVII CPSU Congress (25 February - 6 March 1986), Gorbachev called for 
radical economic reforms and endorsed a new campaign to reassert control 
over recruitment and promotion of cadres. In the Gensek’s view, perestroika, 
                                                                
62 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 518. 
63 Donald S. Carlisle, “The Uzbek Power Elite: Politburo and Secretariat (1938–83),” 
Central Asian Survey 5, no. 3–4 (1986). 
64 The only people to keep their posts were the native K. Tairov - at the head of the 
general department - as well as the two non-natives V.I. Suskin - head of the Water 
Department - and S.A. Asriyants who led the agricultural machine construction 
department in 1981 and now was in charge of the heavy industry and machine 
construction. In parallel, two Uzbeks heading departments in 1981 were promoted. 
Kadyrov (chairman of SM UzSSR) and A.S. Ikramov became full secretaries. 
Additionally, the two Russians who headed the organizational party work and the 
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Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev.” 
65 Indeed, on 4 February M.S. Tashpulatov become the new minister for energy and 
A.A. Azimbekov the minister of automobile transport. PV, 21004, 31, 5 February 1986, 
p. 1. Similarly, on 12 February, K.A. Akhmetov became a member of the state 
committee of the UzSSR on price regulation while the prominent technocrat Islam 
Abduganiyevich Karimov – former minister of finance and director of the republican 
Gosplan – became the new deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR. PV, 21011, 38, 13 
February 1986, p. 1. As well, on 20 February 20, K. Kh. Makhamadalev became deputy 
chairman of the SM UzSSR and V.I. Antonov become the deputy chairman of the agro-
industrial committee. PV, 21017, 44, 21 February 1986, p. 1. 
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the ‘reconstructing revolution’ could only occur with a more effective ruling 
elite.66 
Gorbachev was openly calling for a revitalization of the system and 
condemned:  
Brezhnev's laxity in dealing with subordinates, his tendency to leave officials in 
place even after they had gotten too old or demonstrated their incapacity for 
their jobs […Moreover,] his complacency in the face of nepotism and 
corruption had contributed to a serious erosion of the center's power vis-a-vis 
the major party and government bureaucracies.67  
In their speeches, both Gorbachev and Ligachev cited corruption in the 
Central Asian republics, confirming the Andropovian commitment to fight 
corruption and alcoholism all around the country. This attitude would have its 
peak with the participation of Ligachev who, especially at this very moment, 
carried on the cleansing of the nomenklatura. Finally, the Gensek’s speech 
directly recalled the situation in Uzbekistan, stating: 
Perhaps in their most glaring form, negative processes stemming from an 
absence of criticism and self-criticism manifested themselves in Uzbekistan. 
Having lost touch with life, the republic’s former top leadership made it a rule 
to speak only of successes, paper over shortcomings, and respond irritably to 
any criticism. In the republican Party organization discipline slackened, and 
persons for whom the sole principle was lack of principles, their own well-
being, and careerist considerations were in favor. Toadyism and unbridled 
laudation of those “senior in rank” became wide-spread. All this could not but 
affect the state of affairs. The situation in the economy and in the social 
sphere deteriorated markedly, machinations, embezzlement, and bribery 
thrived, and socialist legality was grossly transgressed. It required intervention 
by the CPSU Central Committee to normalize the situation. The republic was 
given all sided assistance. Many sectors of Party, governmental, and economic 
                                                                
66 A CIA report suggested: “One of the congress's most important results was its 
authoritative condemnation of the laissez-faire leadership of the Brezhnev era and the 
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67 Ibid. 
356 
 
work were reinforced with cadres. These measures won the approval and 
active support of the Communists and the working people of Uzbekistan. 
There is something else that causes concern. The shortcomings in the republic 
did not appear overnight, they piled up over the years, growing from small to 
big. Officials from all-Union bodies, including the Central Committee, went to 
Uzbekistan on many occasions and they must have noticed what was 
happening. Working people of the Republic wrote indignant letters to the 
central bodies about the malpractices. But these signals were not duly 
investigated.68 
During the CPSU congress, the FS CPUz Usmankhodzhaev also noted that 
the “canker of demoralization and degeneracy affected many cadres with the 
greatest power” and called for a stricter accounting.69 Substantially, the 
Uzbek leader agreed with the criticisms of Uzbekistan made by Gorbachev in 
his speech, and again blamed the nature of Rashidov's leadership, affirming 
that a political debate at CC and local level was judging the former leader.70 
                                                                
68 Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 
27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Delivered by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. February 25, 1986 
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 101–2. 
69 CIA, “The 27th CPSU Congress: Gorbachev’s Unfinished Business SOV 86-10023 - 
April 1986,” 17; Christian Schmidt-Häuer, Gorbachev: The Path to Power (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1986); Vladislav Martinovich Zubok, A Failed Empire. The Soviet Union in the 
Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2007); Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev, 
General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. February 25, 1986; Borys Illich 
Oliın̆yk, Valentin Sergeevich Pavlov, and Nikolaı ̆ Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Gorbachev: 
Anatomiya︡  Predatelඁstva (Moskva: Algoritm, 2013); George W Breslauer, Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin as Leaders (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His 
Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994); Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with 
Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000); Mikhail 
Sergevich Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996); Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo 
Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
70 Usmankhodzhaev revisited part of his speech at the XXI Congress CPUz, affirming 
that, because of Rashidov’s fault “it was diffused a vicious style that ignored the 
criticism, losing modesty and in special cases also the decency. […] From this 
formalism, the work style, indifference, abuse of power and theft degenerated. This 
rust has involved those people who had many powers. Of course, the party had a lot 
of damage, and decreased the attention on the organization of industry and on […] the 
production quality [...while] agriculture production data were inflated. [...Now] we are 
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Furthermore, as it was remarked in the congress, also security organs, KBG 
and its chief Chebrikov were ensured with “greater powers to deal with 
dissent or corruption.”71 Therefore, during the first two plenums of the CPSU, 
under the slogan of uskoreniye, the newly elected leadership advanced a 
clear campaign to combat formalism, corruption, nepotism, and centralism 
within the party with every means.72 This involved the open criticism of the 
“corruption rings” evidently thriving within the communist parties of 
Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Turkmenistan, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan.73 
On these occasions, Gorbachev called for an increase in “criticism and self-
criticism”, claiming it was as critical “for us as air.”74 Furthermore, as we saw 
in the second chapter, for the twelfth FYP (1986-1990), a plan of acceleration 
(uskoreniye) of technology in the economic production was endorsed. 
However, as we have seen in the second chapter, many great projects related 
to irrigation were finally dropped – or postponed indefinitely – arousing the 
discontent of the Central Asians. The plan’s commitments were thus 
formalized in a declaration of directives for reforms that, despite the 
Gorbachev’s enthusiasm, were basically unrealistic and tried to do ‘too much’ 
at once.75 Calls to increase the quality of cotton fiber were heard76 and – 
based on the recommendations of the AN UzSSR – the need to break the 
                                                                                                                                            
in great debt to the government. The production potential and technical-scientific 
capacity which was created in Uzbekistan with the help of all peoples of the USSR - 
and especially the great Russian people – did not [produce the return required]. The 
party now lives because of our promptness on eradicating these violations and on the 
results of our work [...] With the support of the CC CPSU, in the republic today we 
have finally reached a normal and healthy atmosphere for the good work. PV, 21024, 
51, 28 February 1986, p. 2. 
71 This attitude was defined by western analysts as a symptom of ‘Neo-Stalinism.’ 
However, Stalin’s terror remained tied to the historical dimension and incomparable 
with the Gorbachev’s agenda. It seems more pertinent to define this attempt as a 
form of Neo-Andropovism (i.e. the restoration of the practice of ‘demonstrative’ 
action). CIA, “The 27th CPSU Congress: Gorbachev’s Unfinished Business SOV 86-
10023 - April 1986,” 18. 
72 Graeme Gill, The Collapse of a Single-Party System: The Disintegration of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
17. 
73 Ibid., 19. 
74 Ibid., 27. 
75 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 515. 
76 Even Usmankhodzhaev recalled that in 1985 100,000 tons of cotton fiber had been 
produced more compared to previous years. PV, 21024, 51, 28 February 1986, p. 2. 
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cotton monoculture in the UzSSR was declared.77 The many good intentions 
of the congress would be, in fact, unexpected and the lack of a clear strategy 
would be revealed in the poor economic results in subsequent years. 
5.1.3 The external moralizers: the Krasnyi Desant saga 
During the cotton affair story, we have often met the expression krasnyi 
desant, which literally translates as ‘red landing’ or ‘deployment of red para-
troopers.’ Figuratively, the expression refers to the ‘descent’ into Uzbekistan 
of communists from the center who were deployed in order to enforce the 
work of the CPUz cadres as well as Moscow’s control over the periphery. 
Following our ‘caesarean’ analogy, these communist troopers could be 
thought of as an additional force crossing the ‘Uzbek Rubicon’ to reinforce a 
‘red dictatorship’ of the CC CPSU over the republic. However, there is very 
little clarity and perhaps a bit of mythology around this story. In fact, political 
opportunism has seen the expression subject to much misapplication during – 
and especially after – the Uzbek cotton affairs. Even the term krasnyi desant 
can be read with a distinct negative connotation - i.e. as an unwelcome 
intrusion into another's domain - and its application should always be read 
carefully, with an eye to the purpose of the author employing it. The main 
theme of the krasnyi desant saga is that Moscow was weak in reasserting its 
authority in cadres’ matters of the CPUz’s organizational work. Then, the CC 
CPSU started to send centrally-oriented ‘communist reinforcements’ in order 
to take control over recruitment in the republics and “eradicating ethnic and 
clan networks among officials.”78 As mentioned, there is limited literature 
dealing with the Uzbek cotton affair. What is available reports how Moscow 
sent some hundreds of CC CPSU officials to support the work of the CC CPUz 
during the mid-80s. This fact is generally accepted as credible; many political 
statements at the plenums and congresses of the CPUz document it. 
However, we still do not have enough material to evaluate the real extent of 
this ‘communist army’ but, in any case, we can proceed by analyzing the 
newly available material. 
In the famous XVI plenum CC CPUz of June 1984, Ligachev – the head of 
the cadres’ organizational department of the CC CPSU – evidenced how the 
                                                                
77 TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 6978, l. 81. 
78 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 132. 
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nativization policy was “fostering abuses.”79 He chaired the plenum and he 
also determined the support of the CC CPSU in order to restore the order in 
the republic by controlling cadres’ appointments80 and also by proposing the 
“interrepublican exchange of cadres.”81 To what extent? The vagueness of 
these affirmations are not helpful. In response, Usmankhodzhaev – as 
mentioned in the previous chapters – also thanked the CC CPSU for its 
‘support’ on several occasions. Again, the indefinite terms used by the FS 
CPUz do not give a clear indication of the size of the phenomenon. The 
‘critical’ literatures – and the Uzbek post-Soviet narrative – propose that 
Moscow sent even thousands82 of ‘Slavs’ – from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - 
to Uzbekistan in order to fill the most critical posts of the CPUz, defining a 
policy that substantially slowed down korenization.83 This practice of cadre 
replacement with ‘external elements’ had been enforced by both 
Usmankhodzhaev and Nishanov, who confirmed in their testimonies how just 
in the period 1984-1987, almost 90.4 % of the party nomenklatura was 
replaced and about 300 high officials were sent from the Soviet ‘central 
regions’ to replace the ‘dismissed’ national cadres.84 Within this figure, 55 
officials were directly sent from departments in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus.85  
                                                                
79 Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 114. 
80 Moscow was pushing to strengthen its grip over Uzbekistan and the best way 
seemed to be the control of nomenklatura. However, this system was often bypassed 
with the appointment of people who were not on the approved lists. Critchlow, 
“Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on 
Elite Recruitment,” 137; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1963). 
81 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 134. 
82 According to Razzakov, about 4,000 ‘troopers’ were sent to Uzbekistan in order to 
fill several posts of the dismissed Uzbek cadres. Fedor Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee 
SSSR (Moskva: Algoritm, 2012). 
83 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 115. 
84 Inamzhon Buzrukovich Usmankhodzhayev, Prodolzhaia Delo Oktiabria Communist 
Uzbekistana. Tom II (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1987), 4; Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, 
Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Raﬁk Nishanov Rasskazyvaet Marine Zavade I Yurii 
Kulikovu (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2012), 258; Demian Vaisman, “Regionalism and 
Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan,” in Muslim Eurasia Conflicting Legacies, 
ed. Yaaeov Roi (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 117. 
85 NSA, Box 26, file R 10052, p. 1. 
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As mentioned, at the XXI congress CPUz in 1986, Usmankhodzhaev also 
recalled the need for a “permanent” importation of Party and law 
enforcement officials from other republics.86 However, the official figures 
appear much inferior than the proposed ‘thousands of red troopers’ 
narrative. This hyperbolic interpretation has been followed even by some 
prominent scholar. For example, Allworth argues that, in this period, 
Russians and Ukrainians held most positions of power in the hierarchies, 
whereas Uzbeks sat in many visible seats but had no authority (in this they 
resembled the Kazak puppet khans placed on the throne of eighteenth-century 
Khiva by Uzbek tribal politicians). Such an arrangement deprived Uzbeks of the 
chance to identify with a political organization and leadership of their own.87 
However, what was the real extent of this exchange of cadres? Analyzing 
the primary cadre reshuffle within the CPUz and the Uzbek republic, we can 
assume that the 'Russians' most likely held more key power posts especially, 
in the upper echelons.88 However, the Uzbeks remained formally – and in 
practice – the dominant majority in the power institutions of the republic. In 
fact, in 1987-1989 more than 86% of the FS raikoms were natives, indicating 
                                                                
86 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 136. 
87 The author continues, declaring: "The continuing debacle in local leadership 
remained a principal obstacle to Uzbek group cohesion. Soviet political life in Central 
Asia did not allow Uzbeks to overcome the nineteenth-century legacy of arbitrary rule 
under Nasrullah Khan and his heirs who, like many subsequent Manghit and Soviet 
Uzbek leaders, offered conspiratorial, destructive, secretive, venal, antipopular, self-
serving, and inhumanly ideological models. By the 1980s, a new Central Asian leader 
to match the ideal khan or amir had yet to crystallize in the imagination of Uzbeks or 
other nationalities in the region. Until some features and symbols of actual 
sovereignty returned to the Uzbek scene in a voluntary relationship between an Uzbek 
leader and his own nationality, a vision of the good Uzbek leader was likely to remain 
elusive." Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present : A 
Cultural History, 312. 
88 While the native Uzbeks had seven posts out of 11 in the CC CPUz buro in 1981, by 
1986 these were six of 13. Similarly, while in 1981 three quarters of the buro 
candidates were Slavs, this proportion changed in 1986 when three fifths were Slavs. 
Also in the secretariat, by 1986 Slavs held three of six party secretaryships, while 
before they had never held more than two. Anne Sheehy, “Slav Presence Increased in 
Uzbek Party Buro and Secretariat. Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 94,” 1986; Staples, 
“Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case.” 
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that Uzbeks kept a preponderant share of power also at the local level.89 At 
the same time, this ‘support from the CC CPSU’ was probably the normal 
practice of the central party in dealing with a republican filial that was facing 
a critical moment. Indeed, in Uzbekistan there was no evident pretext – such 
as the Kunaev-Kolbin shift in Kazakhstan – to justify this degree of 
‘interference’ by Moscow in the internal affairs of the republic. 
Therefore, in order to define the extent of the problem, we can proceed 
by analyzing the role of those 'Russians' that replaced the local officials during 
the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’. Among the most prominent desantniki – or 
desantlar in the Uzbek language – was the aforementioned B.F. Satin, who 
directly came from the CC CPSU secretariat to cover the post of FS Tashkent 
gorkom. He effectively took an office that had heretofore seemed to be 
reserved for Uzbeks and became the first non-native in that post since WW2. 
Others are often cited, such as V.G. Kretov, who came from the Leningrad 
gorkom to head the OrgOtdel of CPUz. That post had generally been reserved 
for non-natives. Another was Aleksey V. Buturlin who came directly from the 
Genprokuror office to head the prokuratura UzSSR.90 Anishchev came from 
Voronezh gorkom to take the post of the second secretary CPUz, replacing 
Osetrov, a Russian ethnic who had been working in Uzbekistan since 1970 and 
was a clear Russian CC CPSU careerist official in the republic. Anishchev’s 
appointment thus replaced one Russian ‘central’ official with another. In the 
list of desantniki are usually included also: the secretary of the CPUz, Victor 
Nikolaevich Lobko; the two members of the SC UzSSR, Aleksandr Ivanovich 
Lipatov and Svetlena Nikolaevna Mel'chenko; the chairman of the PCC UzSSR, 
Viktor A. Khaidurov,91 and; Valintin Ogorok, the first deputy chairman of the 
SM UzSSR.  
All these figures were undoubtedly important but they would not have 
significantly changed the ethnic composition of the cadres. In fact, as we have 
mentioned in the first chapter, some secondary/deputy posts were anyway 
reserved to non-nationals. Examples include the deputy chairmen of the SM, 
deputy chairmen of the SS, second secretaries of obkoms, gorkoms, and 
                                                                
89 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 146. 
90 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 129. 
91 See Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 324 (30 August 1984); Radio Liberty Research 
Bulletin 94 (24 February 1986); Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 333 (3 October 1985); 
Radio Liberty Research Bulletin 254 (28 June 1984) cited in Staples, “Soviet Use of 
Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case,” 43. 
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raikoms, deputy chairmen of oblispolkom, gorispolkom and raispolkom. Also, 
posts in the republican CC secretariat, and the directions of key CC 
departments – such as administrative organs, organizational-party work and 
agriculture, in the republican KGB, in the republican PCC, in Gosplan, in 
Profsoyuz, and in the AN were generally reserved for Russian natives. 
Critchlow comments that “it is reasonable to assume that these people were 
representative of the contingent on which Moscow had traditionally relied to 
protect its interests against the encroachments of nationality and local 
autarky.”92 Nevertheless, the most desantniki did not, in fact, fill primary 
posts, but rather secondary places – often much more powerful in substance 
than the first ones - that were often reserved to the central appointees in the 
state administration, in justice and in the police. Another exemplary case was 
the appointment of Eduard Alekseevich Didorenko to replace Davydov in the 
post of deputy chairman of the Uzbek MVD, one of the top law enforcement 
positions.93 
Then, we can consider the purges in the UzSSR during the ‘cotton affairs’ 
as an heterodirected phenomenon encouraged from the center. However, 
these power reshuffles concerned more directly local actors, rather than 
external ‘red troopers’, partially refuting the idea that Uzbekistan was simply 
‘in receivership’ to Moscow. In this regard, Buttino affirms that 
Despite the purge, the Uzbek component continued to be numerically superior 
in the ranks of the party and retained their ordinary processes of power 
relations, including the appointments in the apparatus and in positions of 
responsibility at the local level.94 
Critchlow adds: 
After several years of pressure from Moscow, it was likely that the Central 
Asian members of the party had been able to defend themselves and to nullify 
the initiatives from above. Many of the purged local leaders had in fact found 
                                                                
92 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 140. 
93 However, Didorenko became a typical example of those central figures that were 
poorly tolerated by local communities. He was removed on account of popular 
protests against his rule in 1989. Robert M. Cutler, “De-Authoritarization in 
Uzbekistan?: Analysis and Prospects,” in Owards Social Stability and Democratic 
Governance in Central Eurasia: Challenges to Regional Security, ed. Irina Morozova 
(Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005), 132–33. 
94 Marco Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi (Rome: Viella, 
2015), 31, 330. 
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other places of power and many Russians inserted from the outside to control 
the Party had simply replaced other Russians. In 1989, in the CC CPUz buro 
there were seven Central Asian and only six Russians. At lower levels, the 
native prevalence was overwhelming: 86% of the district secretaries (raikom) 
were Central Asians and, within them, the Uzbeks were dominant. District 
secretaries had a determining role in regulating and controlling the activities of 
the Party at the local level and had the power to decide on the admission of 
new members into the Party and their expulsions. To the purges and the 
related corruption scandals, the ranks of the Party reacted defensively without 
great fanfare.95 
More serious was the issue related to primary posts – such as the FS of 
the republican party – which, symbolically at least, represented the core 
metric of korenization success. Indeed, at higher/primary levels, the ethnic 
composition of the leadership seemed to align quite closely with the ethnic 
composition of the republic. In 1985, 11 obkom FSs were natives meanwhile 
only two oblasts – Navoi and Syrdarya – were headed by non-natives. Again, 
it seems that, despite the krasnyi desant, Moscow wanted to respect – or 
maybe simply had to accept – the korenization compromise.96 In any case, it 
is interesting to note that the Uzbek purges were also directed at some non-
natives who had been educated in the Republic97 or had spent long periods in 
Uzbekistan – such as Melkumov or Orlov98 – and who had thus had time to 
establish informal ties. This practice was not new and restyled a political 
move that was typical in the even in pre-revolutionary Central Asia.99 
                                                                
95 James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to 
Independence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 137–55. 
96 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
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Ibid., 140. 
98 Georgy Mikhailovich Orlov was the deputy chairman of the presidium SS UzSSR and 
director of the organizational department of the CC CPUz. He was also criminally 
involved in the ‘cotton affairs’. 
99 Konstantin Konstantinovich Pahlen, Mission to Turkestan, Being the Memoirs of 
Count K. K. Pahlen, 1908–1909 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 156–57. 
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Nishanov’s recent memoirs provide another window into the situation. In 
them, he – and also the second secretary Anishchev100 - claims that Ligachev 
and Usmankhodzhaev had responsibilities in the krasnyi desant strategy. 
However, he condemned a policy he also supported when he was at the head 
of the CPUz. Nishanov argues the “absurdity”101 of a party that was 
“importing” cadres in a context where more than 2 million ‘Russians’ who 
already “knew the republic” lived.102 Moscow probably did not want 
‘Russians’ as much as it needed ‘loyalists.’ Therefore, we can assume that 
these measures were not predominantly about ‘ethnicity’ per se but were 
simply about increasing the influence of Moscow on the local party of 
Uzbekistan through the appointment of ‘central’ Russians or 
sovietized/centrally-oriented Uzbeks. Nishanov himself was a perfect example 
of an Uzbek who has spent the greater part of his career out of Uzbekistan 
and remained thoroughly committed to the Soviet cause.103 However, a 
quarter of a century later, he clumsily tried to promote himself as an 
illuminate patriot committed to the Uzbek national interest. Apparently, his 
attempts did not achieve the desired outcome, as he still remains a generally 
disliked figure in Uzbekistan. Therefore, the issue of krasnyi desant – although 
in all likelihood mythical than real – became a crucial aspect of the rising 
Uzbek nationalism within the national “prestigious elite.”104 These groups 
                                                                
100 According to Anishchev, “the "Russian troops" [campaign] was organized at the 
request of the CC CPUz. Lately, I read [this story] on the minutes of its meetings which 
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Zavade I Yurii Kulikovu, 258–60. 
102 The desant practice could be read also in terms of Putnam’s "elite-mass 
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and scholars who had a special role in affirming nationalism. In his words, the 
"prestige elite is ancillary to the "conveyor belt" function of the political elite in linking 
the leadership with the masses, but in performing that function is often found to 
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started to narrate the desant as a way to propagate the notion that 
Uzbekistan was being placed ‘in receivership’ to Moscow and as a means to 
wedge internal ‘traitors’ conspiring with the center in this. In fact, according 
to Critchlow, Uzbek  
communists were being accused of incompetence and unreliability at all levels 
of the hierarchy in the republic, and in many cases charged with criminal 
behavior. At the very top level of power in the republic, former First Secretary 
Rashidov was posthumously denounced [as a] latter-day Uzbek khan with 
Party card, golden stars and prizewinners’ icons.105 
The ‘desant’ policy and the related narrative would create a lot of 
resentment among the frustrated Uzbek elites, becoming then a key factor 
pursued by Uzbek nationalists106 that undermined the legitimacy of 
Gorbachev’s perestroika107 – and its representatives – in the republic, 
extending the circumstance of ‘desantniki’ to many other replaced cadres’ 
categories. In fact, we have to recall that at the XXI CPUz congress, 
Usmankhodzhaev also proposed an “internal” strategy to replace – within the 
borders of the republic – the ruling elite. In FS CPUz’s scheme, it was possible 
to broaden the pool from which the bureaucratic elite were recruited, 
proposing a new generation of cadres that included industrial workers, 
women, youth, and even non-party members, as well as non-natives. Thus, it 
was also possible to enforce the education and training of the new cadres 
within structures in the RSFSR or in the other republics of the USSR108 in order 
to train a new generation of Uzbek cadres who went to study in the higher 
Party schools in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, and even in 
Tashkent.109 To conclude, although the krasnyi desant was an effective 
                                                                                                                                            
pursue its own agenda. In Uzbekistan it has played an enormous role in rallying 
national opinion to oppose Moscow's policies and directives." Critchlow, “Prelude to 
‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on Elite 
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105 Ibid., 135–36. 
106 According to Rumer, the desantniki were interpreted as "the catalyst to a 
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campaign to put Uzbekistan under Moscow’s control – or at least to help the 
local party in endorsing purges and appointing new cadres – it had an 
unintentionally opposite effect. In fact, Moscow's policy – in its mythical or 
real form – had anyway the unintentional effect of causing a local resistance 
in the form of Uzbek/anti-Soviet reactions. 
5.1.4 Rashidov’s damnatio memoriae 
In the aftermath of the two congresses, the purges and the power 
reshuffles in the country continued with much vigor and were mainly focused 
on those sectors of the party and state that had been considered responsible 
for mismanagement110 and for tolerating the negative phenomena. On 1 
March 1986 the new members of the SC UzSSR were appointed. They 
condemned the inefficiency of the previous supreme judges of the republic111 
and pointed critically at the climate of general laxity within the judicial and 
the law enforcement organs. In spring 1986, the newspapers even started to 
publish the letters and the personal stories of indignant citizens against the 
abuses they had suffered. For example, letters were received denounced the 
lack of controls in agriculture brigades where wastage and abuse of workers 
were the norm amidst a general climate of silence.112 Other letters were 
published denouncing the abuses in the distribution of prizes. These awards 
were often assigned to collective farms that simply overestimated their 
production and declared false data.113 Similarly, many stories of kolkhozes’ 
directors were diffused, reporting how wealth was accumulated by drawing 
on workers' wages or by siphoning the salaries of non-existent workers.114 
Pursuing this policy, it seemed that the party – through the press and the 
media115 – was actively mobilizing the population to denounce the negative 
                                                                
110 On 21 March, U.K. Ismailov became the new minister for local industry. PV, 21044, 
71, 22 March 1986, p. 1. 
111 PV, 21026, 53, 2 March 1986, p. 1. 
112 PV, 21037, 64, 13 March 1986, p. 2. 
113 PV, 21038, 65, 14 March 1986, p. 3. 
114 PV, 21045, 72, 23 March 1989, p. 2. 
115 The need for transparency became more effective and were called even in the 
press: in an editorial on PV of 11 May 1986 was reaffirmed the need to consider the 
citizens' letters and complaints with more attention and respect. PV, 21084, 111, 11 
May 1986, p. 1. 
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phenomena and to get more donos.116 This strategy would allow the CPUz to 
acquire new material against perpetrators and also to secure the support of a 
population by mobilizing it against the ‘plunderers.’ Just three years after the 
‘cotton battles’, the party seemed ready in this way to mobilize the 
population for an internal war between elites. However, despite the warnings 
in the press, the UzSSR leading cadres were mostly worried about the real 
condition of the country. Then, in the CPUz buro meeting of 26 March 1986 
cases of abuses of power and purges of prominent figures all around the 
republic were revealed, also at obkom and raikom levels that had seriously 
compromised the economic production.117 Subsequently, yet more data 
emerged from PCC USSR that suggested the ineffective work of sovkhozes 
and irrigation. The results were quite dramatic in the ‘cotton oblasts’ like 
Kashkadarya, Syrdarya and Jizzakh.118 Given the circumstances, Uzbek 
                                                                
116 Also during the plenum of the SC UzSSR of 25 April 1986, the party requested to the 
judicial organs be more careful in listening the complaints/requests of the citizens. PV, 
21074, 101, 27 April 1986, p. 2. 
117 Prot. 4/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2311, l. 19. 
118 In the Kashkadarya oblast alone, despite hopes of achieving 25 quintals per 
hectare, production reached just 13.7 in 1985. It had, in many raions, reached as high 
as 29-59 quintals per hectare between 1981-1985. The soil increasingly became 
salinized and less amenable to agriculture. For example, in the sovkhoz ‘Kh. 
Alimdzhan’ in the Oktyabrski rayon, an irrigation network over an area of 4,116 
hectares was built, of which 3,110 hectares contained highly saline soil that was not 
productive at all. And it was impossible to wash salt away. Another 754 hectares were 
not in use, while drainage systems were inefficient. Similarly, in the sovkhoz ‘10’ the 
irrigated land covered 5034.5 hectares in 1975, but the drainage was built for only 
29.6% of that, with the remaining parts only receiving drainage works very late in the 
piece. As a result, the land that had not been previously drained rapidly salinized. The 
workers tried to wash the soil with water but it did not really help. The productivity of 
the salty soils could – at a maximum – achieve 8.9 quintals of cotton per hectare. As a 
result, in this sovkhoz alone the losses totaled some 2.1 million rubles. GARF, f. 9527, 
op. 1, d. 8978, ll. 7, 14, 21, 28. Also the PCC of the Syrdarya oblast also denounced 
similar facts, even declaring that cotton production had become more expensive. In 
1985, the real cost to produce a ton of cotton was 100.40 rubles, while in the plan it 
had been set at just 79.39 rubles. The situation was even worse in some of those areas 
that had been considered as the flagship of the Rashidovian regime: the lands that 
were ‘reclaimed’ from the desert. In fact, the Golodnii, Jizzak, and Karshi steppes – 
officially 921,000 hectares under agriculture, 760,000 hectares irrigated and 165 
sovkhozes – had seen investment of more than 3 billion rubles. However, this 
investment – approximately half of the republican annual budget – did not achieve the 
desired results and productivity remained low. In 1985, the average productivity of 
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agricultural production seemed destined to rapidly decline. Then, the hunt for 
culprits began in earnest. The CPUz was looking for a scapegoat for this long-
term critical situation and casting it as legacy of the previous regime was an 
easy fix. At the CC CPUz plenum of 29 March 1986, Usmankhodzhaev gave a 
speech in which he renounced agricultural triumphalism in all its forms and 
further endorsed a new wave of clear criticism. He affirmed that “already this 
year, more than 40 companies have not realized the plan and have not 
produced for 44 million rubles”119 while the republic is committed to annually 
produce 1.830 million tons of cotton fiber by 1990.120 Then, he confirmed the 
CC CPUz concerns for the organizations of the obkoms, gorkoms and 
raikoms,121 recalling how 
                                                                                                                                            
cotton was 15.8 quintals per hectare, while a figure of 19.2 had been expected in the 
plan. Similarly, the productivity of rice was 26.4 (the plan was set at 37.1) and for 
forage 57.6 (82.9 planned). The aggregate production had thus generally declined and 
in 1984-1985 alone – when the annual production of cotton was set at 417,000 tons – 
only 309,200 tons (74% of the plan) were harvested. Indeed, 57 sovkhozes out of 89 
actually failed to fulfill the plan. Similar disappointments were recorded for rice: 
227,700 tons were planned but only 179,800 (79%) were produced. For this crop, fully 
15 out of 16 sovkhozes failed to reach the plan. 40,800 tons of vegetables had been 
planned, but the final production was just 20,800 (51%); 90% of sovkhozes failed their 
commitments. For milk production, only 18,900 tons (85% of the plan of 22,200 tons) 
was achieved, with 51 of 88 sovkhozes failing to meet the grade. In 1985 alone, 
roughly half of sovkhozes and kolkhozes recorded financial losses – totaling 28.4 
million rubles – where a profit of 31.2 million rubles had been expected. GARF, f. 9527, 
op. 1, d. 8978, ll. 39-41. In Jizzak alone, the weak irrigation system left 4,800 hectares 
of irrigated fields unusable and 20,000 hectares of irrigated fields (20% of the total) 
without an effective drainage network. These fields could produce only 7-8 quintals 
per hectare. A further 7,000 hectares experienced stagnation of dirty water, creating 
soil salinization. The situation in Karakalpakya was even worse – here, 22 km of 
irrigation canals and drainage networks were weak and effectively not working. This 
meant that some 6,000 hectares of irrigated lands were effectively unusable. Criticism 
from the PCC emerged even in those sovkhozes that did make the grade. In the whole 
UzSSR where 110 sovkhozes were under construction and only 55 had been built in 
time while four needed more than 10 years to be finished, 15 need from 5-10 years 
and even 2 sovkhozes in Golodnii steppe were under construction from 1961 (!). The 
final warning of the PCC USSR is that too many investments had been destined to 
open new lands without improving what was already effective and not fully used. 
GARF, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 8978, ll. 44-45. 
119 Prot. 2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2301, l. 15. 
120 Prot. 2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2301, l. 19. 
121 Prot. 2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2301, l. 23. 
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leaders of ministries pay attention to violations. In the Bukhara oblast, from 40 
managers who had been accused of fraud, only 29 have been charged. In the 
consumers' union of Ferghana oblast, falsifications of 47,000 rubles were 
unveiled but the party has not taken action on these facts.122 
In this way, Usmankhodzhaev reminded the plenum how, over the 
previous five years, the party had expelled more than 11,000 Communists of 
whom 6,000 were put on trial for theft, corruption, and speculation. Of these, 
some 4,000 had been unveiled just in the previous two years.123 In parallel, 
the tones became worrisome even at the regional level.124 As mentioned, 
during perestroika this ‘internal’ self-criticism was functional to the political 
legitimacy. However, it often concealed the more dramatic situation in the 
country.125 For all these problems in the republic, the main culprit was again 
the defunct Sharaf Rashidov. Then, on 30 April, Usmankhodzhaev wrote 
memorandum n. 1-726 SS addressed to the CC CPSU in order to report the 
extent of Rashidov’s abuses.126 Then, the CC CPSU seemed to be warned on 
such facts and even demanded for an advice to Chebrikov – head of the 
Soviet KGB – and Rekunkov - the Genprokuror USSR.127 At the same time, 
some of the desantniki were applying pressure to specific figures of the CC 
CPUz – as Anishchev - in order to extend the criminal cases against other 
allegedly guilty colleagues related to Rashidov.128 Thus, an unsuspecting – and 
                                                                
122 Prot. 2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2301, l. 24. 
123 Prot. 2/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2301, l. 32. 
124 Then, during the Bukhara obkom plenum concerns for industrial production 
emerged. Production had been modest and lower than the previous years and losses 
for millions of rubles had been recorded. Additionally, the oblast had failed to fulfill 
the plan for cotton for the second consecutive year. PV, 21057, 84, 8 April 1986, p. 2. 
Similarly, in 1985 also in the Tashkent oblast, 20 kolkhozes and sovkhozes and a fifth 
of the brigades did not fulfill the cotton plan, while in Surkhandarya 80% of the crop 
was harvested manually and the level of mechanization was seriously backward. PV, 
21062, 89, 13 April 1986, pp. 1-2. 
125 For example, it is interesting to note that, despite the whole world was shocked for 
the most serious nuclear disaster ever, the Uzbek press was not even reporting the 
news of the Chernobyl disaster of 26 April 1986 in its aftermath. Also Anishchev 
reported that such information was just top secret. Anishchev, Vostochnyi Ornament, 
544. 
126 The document is fully available in the Appendix. 
127 The document is fully available in the Appendix. 
128 In fact, according to Anishchev’s account, on 7 May 1986, the investigators Gdlyan 
and Ivanov arrived to his office with a huge map full of arrows where they presented a 
very detailed scheme of the bribery system in the UzSSR. For each figure in the 
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maybe naïve – newly appointed second secretary of the CPUz was put in the 
midst of a personal struggle within the same CC where Nishanov, the 
‘revenant’ returned from a fifteen years exile and imposed his influence to set 
about coming to terms with his old Rashidovian enemies. This story is an 
extraordinary example of how, during the Uzbek cotton affair, Moscow 
promoted some figures who exploited the context for their own political 
interests. Nishanov was fighting on the Uzbek internal front while – as we will 
see – Gdlyan and Ivanov, were deploying their forces on the main muscovite 
battlefield. In both cases, these ‘heroes of perestroika’ would not win, while 
the country was collapsing under the weight of centrifugal forces. 
                                                                                                                                            
scheme there was a nickname – boyar, wolf, hare, fox, tiger, snake, bandit etc. – and 
at the end all arrows converged to Gorbachev. In his memoirs, Anishchev appears as a 
carefree character and in that moment he jokingly asked where he himself might be 
named as a person of interest in the scheme. Very seriously, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
responded that it was not yet there (but might well be placed there as time went on). 
After that meeting, Anishchev felt pressure to go deeper in the investigations and 
consulted with Evgeny Z. Razumov, a member of the CC CPSU responsible for 
streamlining the apparatus. The latter also confirmed the need to bring order in 
Uzbekistan so as to avoid shortcomings and defects in the cadres. At that moment, 
Anishchev replied that the situation was under control and he never saw any leader 
abusing power while Razumov firmly contested that it was necessary in any case to go 
deeper. Anishchev continues his story, declaring that while many letters denouncing 
negative facts arrived at the CC CPUz, he was still under pressure from the CC CPSU 
OrgOtdel that was pushing him and Usmankhodzhaev to keep the purges going and to 
uncover any and all abuses in the republic. Then he reported another very interesting 
fact. On 9 May 1986, Nishanov came to his office and asked him to create a special 
control commission to check Rano Abdullaeva, against whom many slanderous letters 
were arriving. Therefore, Nishanov asked ‘Moscow’s watchdog’ to focus investigations 
against a person who was the gentle face of late Rashidovism and a powerful figure in 
the CPUz with the responsibility of heading the ideological department. Anishchev 
showed his own doubts about the complexity of such a task and Nishanov replied 
“there is much to be checked and, mostly, we must deal with something not easy.” 
Indeed, Anishchev knew that Abdullaeva’s reputation was defended by Mogilnichenko 
and Ligachev and Nishanov replied “no hurry, this is not a criminal case but an 
investigation of the party. Haste may lead to mistakes and we need the truth.” Finally, 
the second secretary revealed his effective doubts and asked to Nishanov if there was 
any personal antipathy between him and Abdullaeva as the rumors suggested. Very 
firmly Nishanov replied that he knew Uzbekistan, what its people want, who is honest 
and who is not: “everyone knows the indecent affairs of Abdullaeva, but there are 
people that polish her shoes.” Ibid., 514–15, 540, 551–52. 
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The struggle against Rashidovism and its symbols proceeded. On the night 
of 20-21 May 1986, a corpse was exhumed by soldiers from the Tashkent 
center.129 Rashidov’s body was then moved to the Chigatay Muslim cemetery, 
a strange ‘honor’ for a Soviet atheist statesman. On 22 May, the politburo 
discussed the Uzbek mafiya and the role of Rashidov in the scam, concreting 
the condemnation of his memory.130 Finally, while the whole Soviet system 
enforced the new legislation about corruption,131 during the CPUz buro 
meeting of 4 June 1986, the damnatio memoriae against the former FS CPUz 
Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov was finally applied.132 This measure not only 
blackened and cancelled the name of Rashidov from everywhere but it even 
condemned removed the benefits to his family. In order to argue such a 
decision, the decree had an attached document - entitled “Information for 
the party activities on Sh. R. Rashidov”133 – listing the atrocities of the 
deceased leader. The results of de-Rashidovization and the damnatio 
memoriae of the former leader were partially presented even in the press,134 
while in parallel the Politburo endorsed a new managerial approach in 
agriculture.135 At the same time, other scandals136 emerged while another 
                                                                
129 Kinokompaniya Pigmalion, Zoloto Dlya Parii. Khlopkovoe Delo (Russia: Rossiya 
Telekanal - RTR Planeta, 2010). 
130 In his memoirs, Vorotnikov was critical of that event, reminding us of his 
indignation for Gorbachev who, he argued, was supposed to know the Uzbek scam 
facts. Vitaly Ivanovich Vorotnikov, A Bylo Eto Tak... : Iz Dnevnika Chlena Politburo CK 
KPSS (Moskva: SI-MAR - Sovet veteranov knigoizdaniya, 1995). 
131 The penalties against corruption and economic crimes were enforced by the SS 
USSR in late May 1986. Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption 
Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
226. 
132 The Decree of the CC CPUz and SM UzSSR, n. 282-21 (4 June 1986) is fully available 
in the Appendix. 
133 The document is fully available in the Appendix. 
134 On PV was reported the decree of the CC CPSU and SM USSR of 22 ay 1986, on 
deleting the perpetuation of Rashidov’s memory. Signed by Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. 
PV, 21107, 134, 7 June 1986, p. 1. 
135 PV, 21107, 134, 7 June 1986, p. 1. 
136 In the previous five-year cycle, a quarter of the industries had not fulfilled the 
production plan and had not replenished the system for hundreds of millions of 
rubles. In the warehouses of some industries obsolete production to the value of 
almost 90 million rubles had been accumulated. PV, 21121, 148, 25 June 1986, p. 2. 
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power reshuffle was pursued in the party and state apparatus against those 
figures who were alleged to be part of the Rashidovian scheme.137 
5.2 The (apparent) calm between the storms 
Just after the post-mortem denunciation of Rashidov, the FS 
Usmankhodzhaev faced the hardest moment of his political rise to power. 
Between mid-1986 and 1987, the party seemed to be on the way to cleaning 
its cadres, however at the same time the situation became more tense. A part 
of the Uzbek elite who resented the new course of Usmankhodzhaev was 
ready to strike back. Additionally, the public opinion was now – in the wake of 
glasnost – increasingly moved by cases of corruption, identifying the party as 
an obstacle to legality rather than a defender of it. 
5.2.1 Bearing a heavy legacy 
In a meeting of the CC CPUz secretariat of 8 July 1986 the relation 
between the 'negative phenomena' and the defects also in the educational 
system was discussed and outlined.138 Then, in the secretariat meeting of 23 
July 1986, another negative trend that was linked with the diffused drug 
addiction in the republic was exposed.139 Similarly, the press reported some 
                                                                
137 M. Sherkulov, the FS Samarkand raikom, was fired for failures in his leading role 
(PV, 21112, 139, 14 June 1986, p. 1), on 25 June V.K. Mikhailov, former deputy 
chairman of the SM UzSSR became the new minister for housing (PV, 21122, 149, 26 
June 1986, p. 1), and on 4 July V.I. Ogark became the first deputy chairman of the SM 
UzSSR (PV, 21129, 156, 5 July 1986, p. 1). 
138 On that occasion, it was stated that “in the Moskovski raikom the party did not 
assess well the officials who then became the school authorities. Over the past five 
years, in 52 schools 42 principals had been fired not only for problems in the 
educational and pedagogical method but mainly for “negative phenomena” displayed 
a poor example for teachers and, therefore, also for students. [...Unsurprisingly then,] 
teachers also commit crimes, felonies, and [practiced] religious rites and the 
newspapers and the radio do not report anything of these serious defects. This 
situation also explains why effective methods from the oblast education departments 
are not applied.” Prot. 11/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2349, l. 4. 
139 Indeed, it was revealed that over the previous three years in Karakalpakstan more 
than a thousand cases of illegal drug cultivation for about 330 hectares had been 
found. For this, 40 communists, 15 brigadiers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and 15 
appointed teachers were found to have ignored the phenomenon and not to have 
acted to stop it. Also 170 poppy culture farms across an area of five hectares had been 
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dramatic news about agriculture in the cotton region.140 All these disastrous 
results were presented as a consequence of the previous regime while in 
parallel a marginalization of the Rashidovian symbols proceeded. Therefore, 
in the buro meeting of 24 July 1986, another figure who had been at the 
center of the UzSSR political life was substantially repudiated by the CPUz. On 
that occasion, the CC CPUz demanded that the SM UzSSR reconsider its 
decree of 15 November 1984 “on the material-home care to the comrade 
N.A. Khudayberdyev”141 accusing the former longstanding head of the Uzbek 
government of many abominations.142 The news appeared just three days 
later in the newspaper describing the sins of Khudayberdyev who emerged as 
a sort of ‘ideologue of the cotton scam.’143 In parallel, the press kept 
reporting minor stories that revealed the high levels of collusion144 while the 
cotton harvest was exposed with even minor enthusiasm than the previous 
                                                                                                                                            
discovered and over 420 kg of narcotics seized. In Karakalpakya alone, the number of 
drug addicts had increased by one and a half times and it was discovered that there 
were even three communists and six school teachers among the addicted. Prot. 
12/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2350, l. 27. 
140 The Syrdarya oblast – which was supposed to be one of the main cotton producers 
– registered the worst crop rate of the whole republic (PV, 21137, 164, 15 July 1986). 
Similarly, also in Khorezm the whole agricultural production – not only cotton – 
declined by at least a factor of two in 1986 alone, and the regional productive system 
failed to deliver products with a value of 1.3 million rubles (PV, 21142, 169, 20 July 
1986, p. 39. 
141 Prot. 15/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2322, l. 2. 
142 As mentioned in the previous chapter, he was already under investigation for the 
revelations of the ‘pentito’ from Jizzakh. Khudayberdyev then was removed from the 
post of chairman of SM UzSSR in December 1984. The Memorandum Buro CC CPUz to 
SM UzSSR (24 July 1986) is fully available in the Appendix. 
143 According to the press, “during that buro meeting, it emerged that N.A. 
Khudayberdyev offered the false image of a developing economy, especially in terms 
of welfare, with false and inflated figures. He also led a counterfeiting campaign on 
the cotton harvesting volumes and other agricultural products, forcing the managers 
of the party, soviets, and economic organs to fulfill the plans by all means, foul or fair. 
Therefore, he permitted the emergence of a fake system, state fraud, corruption, and 
embezzlement of public funds and other abuses, causing considerable economic 
damage to the republic and even moral damage to the cadres. He has been expelled 
from the CPSU.” PV, 21147, 174, 27 July 1986, p. 1. 
144 For example, PV reported the story of Kuchkar Umarov, director of the cotton 
harvest and preparation of the Zagotkhlopkprom factory department, who demanded 
money from factory workers, abusing of his position. PV, 21164, 191, 19 August 1986, 
p. 4. 
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years, committing the republic for an increased production in terms of 
fibers.145  Furthermore, in late August 1986, the former MCC UzSSR, 
Usmanov, was finally tried and sentenced to death for false reporting, 
bribery, and protecting thieves.146 As mentioned, in his ‘forger career’, he was 
responsible of reporting annually to the Soviet state 500-900 thousand tons 
of nonexistent cotton.147 
All the mentioned facts were identified as a consequence of ideological 
decadence, while in parallel purges and power reshuffles148 proceeded 
gradually, entailing even a high level of moralism.149 Serious kinds of 
ideological problems were revealed by the party, which now endorsed a new 
strategy, linking the idea that ‘negative phenomena’ were “anticommunist 
factors” that had even undermined the solidity of communist ideology. 
Indeed, during the III plenum of the CC CPUz on 4 October 1986, 
Usmankhodzhaev assailed religious influence in the republic,150 emphasizing 
                                                                
145 The party reported that in 1983 5.9 million tons of raw cotton had been cropped 
and 1.5 million tons of fibers produced. In 1985, the harvest figure was reduced to 5.4 
million tons while the volume of produced fibers increased to 1.7 million tons. PV, 
21193, 220, 28 September 1986, p. 2. 
146 This news was reported in the official Soviet press, indicating an attitude of 
demonstrative punishment and ‘scapegotism’, which was typical of the post-Brezhnev 
USSR. Pravda, 28 August 1986, p 3; Izvestiya 5 September 1986, p 6 and Izvestiya 6 
September 1986, p. 3. 
147 Ibid., 101. 
148 On 16 September 1986, I.I. Mamatisaev became the new minister of finance of the 
UzSSR. PV, 21185, 212, 18 September 1986, p. 1. Then, on 24 September, B.I. Burov 
became the minister of consumers’ services. PV, 21190, 217, 25 September 1986, p. 1. 
149 For example, following the course of the anti-alcoholism campaign endorsed by 
Gorbachev, T.K. Rakhmatullaev, the second secretary of Yankingarbad gorkom was 
accused of alcoholism and expelled from the Tashkent obkom. Similarly, also the FS of 
the Angren gorkom was expelled because he negatively headed the committee with 
‘formalism’ and ‘irresponsibility’, ignoring the directives and the disclipline of the party 
and the government. PV, 21190, 217, 25 September 1986, p. 1. 
150 The religious infection revealed at the October plenum was touching even 
prominent members of the party. In fact, in November Sayid Takherov – a leading 
Communist and director of the telecommunications center in Tashkent – and Sabir 
Tarsuenov, leader of the local Komsomol were accused, having been discovered 
conducting semi-clandestine Quranic studies. Hiro – probably exaggerating – argues 
that the cotton affair was frustrating the Uzbek people and for this reason the 
desperate population was seeking refuge in Islam. In 1987 in a survey made at 
Tashkent university revealed that 60% of the interviewed declared themselves Muslim 
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the role of atheism and Marxist-Leninist thought as a priority to be advanced 
as a way to fight against the negative phenomena.151 As well, the head of the 
Uzbek KGB, V.A. Golovin, reported how the environment of malfeasance was 
a consequence of the moral deviation in the republic where in two and a half 
years more than 80,000 specimens of “ideologically harmful literature” had 
been seized.152 Then, criticized the bad influence of Rashidov in literature153 
and concluded the plenum announcing another purge.154 This plenum then 
coincided with a renewed antireligious campaign that blamed the 
intelligentsia for idealizing the past and its figures – such as Timur and Babur 
– and for attending Islamic funeral ceremonies or for placing Islamic emblems 
in private spaces.155 Such a renewed ‘intolerant attitude’ towards the 
                                                                                                                                            
while 33% said they were hesitant and only 7% stated they were atheist. Dilip Hiro, 
Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran (London & New York: Overlook 
TP, 2011), 133–34. 
151 PV, 21199, 226, 5 October 1986, p. 1. Then, the FS reported a case of malfeasance 
that appeared serious even if the press did not report it: "in the Turkul' raion almost 
20 executives were fired from their jobs. The raikom saw no need to report the 
reasons for the failure of these persons through the press. However, in the rayon 
many facts of fraud, theft, forgery and other violations had been discovered, but the 
newspaper had not reported anything and the same raikom had kept hush." Prot. 
3/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2302, l. 21. 
152 Prot. 3/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2302, l. 60. 
153 The ideological perestroika seemed to be a priority for the FS CPUz who even gave 
a speech entitled “on increasing the effectiveness of ideological work in the party at 
the request of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU” where he stated that too few books on 
Marxism-Leninism were in print, while atheist literature - and even children's books – 
were much more widespread. At the same time, he denounced the fact that four of 
Rashidov’s books had been published with up to 135 editions, and a circulation of 
more than one million copies. PV, 21199, 226, 5 October 1986, p. 1. 
154 Finally, the plenum decided to expel N.V. Dukhanov – the FS Navoi gorkom – from 
the CC CPUz because he violated the rules and morals of the party's life. It denounced 
how, in the previous two years, theft for more than 26 million rubles had been 
uncovered. He was also accused of being a personal friend of the people who violated 
socialist law – such as the directors of the cotton factories that had been condemned 
and given the maximum punishments. The above mentioned M. Sherkulov, FS of the 
Samarkand raikom, was also denounced for his “political myopia” and for not having 
implemented the decisions taken forward in the XVI plenum and for not rebuilding 
(“perestroikizing”) his work. Prot. 3/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2302, l. 126-127. 
155 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 146–47. 
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traditional elements of Uzbek society would lead to further popular 
disaffection for an increasingly self-referenced party. The conjecture of 
events would not be the best for the party. Indeed, in a moment when the 
whole Soviet society was living the enthusiasm of perestroika and entering a 
phase of transparency, any unpopular measure would be fatal for party 
legitimacy. 
Then, in a meeting of the secretariat of 8 October 1986 defects in the 
health system of the republic were also reported,156 while also the meeting of 
the SM UzSSR of 9 October revealed defects in the republican light industry 
sector, for which warehouses accumulated low quality and non-demanded 
goods with a value 112 million rubles.157 Then, on the buro meeting of 12 
                                                                
156 As a result, part of the ministry of health management was ousted, including the 
minister of health A.M. Khudaibergenov, as well as the deputy minister I.A. Savel'ev. 
Then, it was exposed that in the first semester of 1986 alone, the ministry of the 
health control revealed non-legal costs, shortages, thefts and embezzlement of almost 
one million rubles.  32 people were put under investigation by the prokuratura, while 
103 were expelled from their posts and 759 received disciplinary punishments. In the 
medical institutions of the Karakalpak ASSR illegalities and embezzlement for 31,600 
rubles were revealed, while 29,200 rubles’ worth was uncovered in the Tashkent 
oblast, 14,900 in Navoi, and in the general management of pharmacies 52,000 rubles. 
Some officials received salaries twice a month, involving accountants as well as prizes 
to non-existent people with a value of 16,000 rubles. While the checks also discovered 
cases of illegal abortions, infant mortality rose. Indeed, in the first seven months of 
1986 alone, the death of children reached 45.9 per thousand births, while the rate in 
1985 for the same period had been 45.5 and in some areas like Karakalpak ASSR it was 
even 68.9. To emphasize the poor level of preparation of the health apparatus, it was 
also stated that from 923 people who were confirmed in 1986, 91 or 9.8% were 
considered unfit for work and 202 or almost 23% were confirmed with conditions. 
Prot. 17/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2355, ll. 23-25. 
157 The ministry of light industry was then accused of non-innovating the production 
and not improving the quality, accumulating debts to Gosbank for half billion rubles. 
For this situation, the light industry minister M. Kh. Kurbanov was fired (PV, 21203, 
230, 11 October 1986, p. 2). Inefficiencies and economic failures were even revealed 
even in agricultural mechanization. For example, in 1986 the kolkhoz ‘Brezhnev’ in the 
Bukhara oblast had achieved less than half of the planned production. Even 
substantial funding had been invested for the mechanization of the cotton harvesting 
with the aim to produce at least 1,740 tons. However, only 82 (!) tons were produced. 
PV, 21215, 242, 25 October 1986, p. 3. Nevertheless, the industrial sector was 
apparently developing in a positive way and the CPUz announced that in the first 9 
months of 1986, the volume of industrial production increased by 6.6% (compared to 
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November 1986 was revealed that still in 1986, a third of the enterprises did 
not realize the plan and fell short of production targets to a total value of 
more than 100 million rubles, while the timing of cotton harvest in the whole 
republic had slowed down compared to the previous year.158 In order to cope 
with Moscow's enormous demand for cotton, 'hidden crops’ had been even 
discovered, cultivating cotton in the fields where it was not supposed to be.159 
The most serious problem evidenced by the CC CPUz was that, fairly often, 
the local party organs were careless, tolerating the economic inefficiencies or 
being complicit in fraud.160 
Thus, also in autumn 1986, the cadres’ replacements proceeded in the 
republican SC,161 in the government,162 and in other state agencies,163 while 
                                                                                                                                            
4.8% of the annual plan), producing more for 292.4 million rubles. Productivity even 
rose for 4.45%. PV, 21216, 243, 26 October 1986, p. 2. 
158 Prot. 25/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2332, l. 9. 
159 In 1986 alone, in 13 raions of the republic more than 15,000 hectares of illegal 
fields had been discovered, of which more than 13,000 hectares were claimed to be 
under cotton. For example, in the Shavat raion, compared to 1984, the space of the 
‘hidden’ fields increased from 283 to 1,288 hectares. Between 1984 and 1986 in 
Khodzhabad hidden fields rose from 582 to 1,627 hectares of which more than 800 
hectares was claimed to be covered by cotton. Prot. 25/1986, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, 
d. 2332, l. 13. 
160 For example, the enterprise "Znanie" was involved in a scandal when it was 
discovered that its executives falsified data and violated financial discipline, laying off 
people who might obstruct them. Apparently, the Party organizations and profsoyuz 
were indifferent to such malfeasance and did not denounce the executives. The first 
deputy director was fired and expelled from the CPSU. PV, 21231, 258, 15 November 
1986, p. 3. Then, the Uzbek prokuratura revealed thefts of 33,000 rubles and T. 
Belakova, the general accountant, was sentenced to 10 years in prison. PV, 21271, 3, 4 
January 1987, p. 2. 
161 On 14 October 1986, new members of the SC UzSSR were appointed. PV. PV, 
21207, 234, 16 October 1986, p. 1. 
162 On 12 November 1986, V.V. Sudarenkov become a deputy chairman of the SM 
UzSSR. PV, 21229, 256, 13 November 1986, p. 1. 
163 Norling comments that: “All of those standing “puzzled” [by] the allegations, the 
newspaper charged, were in fact guilty: N. G. Kurbanov, the Minister of Rural 
Construction, had been preoccupied with providing for his family and mistress; Kh.R 
Rakhimov, previous Director of the Agency of Foreign Tourism, had smoothed the way 
for his son’s acceptance [at] Tashkent University’s Oriental Studies division, which had 
“allowed his son to travel abroad”; U.A. Aripov, the former Rector of Tashkent’s 
Medical Institute, had endowed his five daughters with higher education in the 
university he was heading; and the then-head of [the] Uzbekistan Writers' Union, S. A. 
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the CC CPSU established safeguards for citizens against prosecutors’ 
abuses.164 Basically, it seemed that a phase of active self-defense had started. 
In that moment, the CPSU wanted to give a strong message of 
encouragement and on 24 November, Gorbachev even came to Tashkent, 
confirming the CPSU’s trust in the Uzbek party and in republican agriculture. 
However, the Gensek reaffirmed the need to improve the ideological work – 
even undermining the growing expressions of open religious piety through an 
invigorated atheistic propaganda – and to strengthen the role of the ‘human 
factor’ in the resolution of social and economic problems. Substantially, 
Gorbachev seemed to be worried about ideological disaffection among the 
people generally, which –  in his mind at least – were the result of negative 
phenomena and the spread of radical Islam.165 This ‘war on tradition’ was 
thus brought to bear in a republic in which tales of about clandestine religious 
expression, low respect for the position of women, and even cases of dowries 
paid for weddings were widespread.166 
In this phase of uncertainty and constant leadership changes at the upper-
medium level, a character that we have already met briefly before finally 
emerged as a critical protagonist. On 5 December, Rafik Nishanovich 
Nishanov,167 diplomat and former head of the MID UzSSR, was finally 
                                                                                                                                            
Azimov, was charged with reissuing works published years ago (an “operation” valued 
at 15.000 rubles) and of using public funds to pay for 800 plates of kebab at his son’s 
wedding.” Nicklas Norling, “Myth and Reality: Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan” (Johns 
Hopkins University, 2014), 234–35. 
164 On 20 November 1986, the CC CPSU approved a resolution to significantly increase 
the level of law enforcement for the protection of the rights and legitimate interests 
of citizens, while the SS USSR adopted a law on the procedure of appeal to the Court 
of misconduct by officials accused of infringing the rights of citizens. PV, 21409, 141, 
11 July 1987, p. 3. 
165 PV, 21240, 267, 25 November 1986, p. 1. 
166 PV, 21244, 271, 29 November 1986, p. 2. 
167 Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov was born in a peasant family in 1926. A member of the 
CPSU since 1949, he graduated from the Tashkent evening pedagogical institute in 
1959 when he became FS Oktyabrsky raikom. In 1962 he became chairman of 
Tashkent gorispolkom and in 1963 he was elevated to secretary and buro member of 
the CPUz. For his antagonism against Rashidov, he was "politically exiled" from 
Uzbekistan and in 1969 he started a diplomatic career in the MID USSR, becoming 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary USSR Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives 
(1970-1978) and Jordan (1978-1985). Between 1985-86 he was Minister of foreign 
affairs of the UzSSR. On December he finally became Chairman of the Presidium of SS 
UzSSR and Deputy Chairman of the SS USSR, reversing the situation in which he found 
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appointed as chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR, while Salimov “went 
to occupy another post.”168 This was a nice formulation to indicate a radical 
demotion.169 This maneuver indicated clearly that the political situation in 
Uzbekistan at this time was much more complicated than a simple struggle 
between ‘Rashidovians’ and ‘Post-Rashidovians’. In fact, in this political game, 
another faction reappeared: the ‘Anti-Rashidovians’ - the opponents of the 
former regime who had been exiled to Moscow in the early ‘70s. after 
Rashidov’s death, they returned in the republic, assuming with new (minor) 
power posts. Nishanov was indeed the main representative of this category of 
‘revenants’ and, probably, Gorbachev’s ‘grey cardinal’ in the republic. It is 
likely the case that Moscow simply did not trust Usmankhodzhaev and his 
group anymore. The poor results in the economy and the inefficacy of the 
purges – which in many cases simply dispatched wrongdoers to other 
managerial posts - simply left Moscow cold. Then, the CPSU role was 
enforced through the appointment of a loyal Soviet statesman as Nishanov 
who, more than Usmankhodzhaev, was the main responsible of 
personalization of the anti-Rashidovian campaign, attacking the former leader 
and his collaborators with a new impetus. Immediately, Jizzakh became a 
symbolic arena of this war. Indeed, during a meeting of the CPUz secretariat 
of 10 December 1986, were revealed other cases of forgery and serious 
deficiencies within the small region.170 Again, the press was able to reveal 
                                                                                                                                            
himself in 1970, when Rashidov was consolidating his power and he was ousted and 
replaced by Salimov. 
168 PV, 21248, 275, 6 December 1986, pp. 1-2. 
169 In fact, in 1986 Salimov became a candidate member of CC CPSU. However, in 
October 1988, he was incriminated for the "cotton affairs" and was ousted from that 
post during the Plenum CC CPSU on 28 November 1988. In June 1989 he was finally 
released. Of these events, Carlisle has commented: "There is much irony in that 
Salimov had stepped into Nishanov's post in 1970 when he was disgraced! In 1986, the 
individuals involved were the same and the cause of the change identical. However, 
the roles of victor and victim were reversed." Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet 
Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 127. 
170 “In the Jizzak oblast, there are falsifications in almost in all sectors of the economy. 
In 1986 alone, falsifications in more than 60% and concealments in 26% of the cases 
checked were discovered. These trends increased whereas in 1985 they were 
respectively 30% and 10%. 1.3 million rubles were added to the volume of industrial 
production, and 720,000 in the volume of investment capital. The value of 
manipulations in the implementation of municipal services was 303,300 rubles and in 
the volume of the retail turnover it was 112,000. Of ten industries that had been 
checked in January-December 1986, falsifications had been discovered in seven. Some 
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very serious scams within industry and the building sector, with a special 
focus also on the Ferghana oblast,171 one of those regions where the former 
Rashidovian leadership still survived.172 A very important reshuffle happened 
in Kashkadarya where the FS obkom Turapov – who replaced the ‘veteran’ 
Gaipov – was dismissed on 27 December 1986. In his place Islam 
Abduganevich Karimov – the future President of Republic of Uzbekistan – was 
appointed, obtaining his first relevant post in the party. 
However, these frenetic moves in the Uzbek party were not unique cases. 
In fact, on 16 December 1986, just before the III plenum of the CC CPSU, the 
longstanding Kazakh leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev173 – a survivor of the 
Central Asian purges of late 1985 – was also replaced under corruption and 
allegations of “local cronyism”174 or, as Boldin referred, for “accept[ing] gifts 
                                                                                                                                            
managers did not work and this is why they so easily commit abuses. [...] In a cotton 
cleaning factory in the Dustlik raion deficiencies in the organization of accounting have 
been discovered. The manager was punished with disciplinary sanctions and 
instructed to restore order. At the end of the period July-October 1986 data in the 
volume of output sales, of 126,000 rubles, and in the volume of production of 435,000 
were falsified. [...As well,] falsifications in construction in 24 companies out of 26 that 
had been checked, for a total value of 525,000 rubles had been revealed. [...] In nine 
months in 1986 33 people had been punished for falsification, of whom 30 received 
disciplinary sanctions and two, sanctions by the party. One was fired.” Prot. 21/1986, 
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 155, d. 2359, ll. 6-7, 9. 
171 A kind of widely diffuse abuse was pinned on some managers who stole and resold 
building materials. A very famous case was that of I. Kholmatov general engineer of 
the Ferghana construction company "Uzmestremstrojmontazh." PV, 21253, 280, 12 
December 1986, p. 3. A. Akbarov kept the post of director of the OrgOtdel Ferghana 
raikom for twenty years. Then, controls discovered a vast network of forgery for which 
he was fired. Also F. Numonzhonova, deputy chairman of the Ferghana raispolkom 
had illegally built a disproportionate home and was fired and sanctioned. PV, 21261, 
288, 21 December 1986, p. 2. 
172 The FS Ferghana obkom, Khamdam Umarov, in power from 1978, was one of those 
few Rashidovian who kept his post for most of the “Uzbek cotton affair” and the last 
to be dismissed, on 22 October 1988. 
173 Kunaev described his political career in his political memoirs, published in two 
volumes. See Dinmukhamed Akhmetovich Kunaev, O Moem Vremeni: Vospominaniya 
(Almaty: Dauir, 1992); Dinmukhamed Akhmetovich Kunaev, Ot Stalina Do Gorbacheva: 
V Aspekte Istorii Kazakhstana (Almaty: Sanat, 1994). 
174 Jack F Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 157–59; Graziosi, 
L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
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from subordinates.”175 The post was assumed by the ethnically-Russian 
Gennady Kolbin – the former FS Ulyanovsk – resulting in discontent in the 
nationalist fringes of the Kazakh population. In fact, this change of leadership 
was seen as a 'colonialist' move, provoking massive demonstrations and three 
days of street riots (17-19 December) in Almaty during the famous 
“Jeltoqsan” protests. Two people died and 1,200 were wounded, of whom 
774 were agents of the security organs.176 These episodes were the first 
evident signs of ethnic strife during Gorbachev's regime. The dismissed 
Kunaev was then discredited and ousted form the political life of the 
republic,177 while a purge campaign was endorsed in Kazakhstan along Uzbek 
lines. Although this is another story, the dynamics in the neighboring 
Kazakhstan were similar to those in Uzbekistan where, similarities 
notwithstanding, the power remained formally in the hands of native 
figures.178 
5.2.2 The glasnost effect 
1986 was most probably the climax of anticorruption policy in the 
Gorbachevian era,179 when purges reached their peak in the Soviet Union, 
and even in Uzbekistan. However, the policy was still actively pursued in the 
UzSSR through 1987 by the Uzbek party leadership, even as the intensity of 
                                                                
175 Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His 
Chief of Staff, 177. 
176 Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de 
L’aigle Biceṕhale (Longueuil: EǶditions Kéruss, 2007), 138. 
177 His final condemnation happened during the plenum of the Kazakh party in March 
1987 when the term ‘kunaevschina’, which directly recalled ‘rashidovshchina’, was 
invented. Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR. 
178 In 1987, when Uzbekistan was already in the eye of the storm, the investigator 
Kalinichenko – who had been knee-deep in the Russian cotton affair – went to 
Kazakhstan on behalf of the Genprokuror USSR Rekunkov to investigate abuses in the 
road transport system. Later this affair grew into large-scale arrests of party leaders. 
He recalled that during his first meeting with Dinmuhamed Akhmedovich Kunaev, the 
former Kazakh leader said: "Vladimir, I have heard of you, but I want you to say just 
once that Kazakhstan is not Uzbekistan, and that there is no chance that those things 
will happen here." Dmitry Gordon, “Byvshiy Sledovatel’ Po Osobo Vazhnym Delam Pri 
General’nom Prokurore SSSR Vladimir Kalinichenko: ‘Vsesil’nyy Ministr MVD SSSR 
Shchelokov Prinyal Resheniye O Moyem Fizicheskom Ustranenii. V Otvet Na Eto 
Andropov Prikazal gruppe ’Al’fa‘ menya Okhranyat’,’” Bul’var 46, no. 473 (2004). 
179 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 
518. 
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purges dropped off somewhat. In fact, in 1987 Usmankhodzhaev also 
followed through on his commitments to moralize the party and the 
republican organs, advancing a wave of minor purges. Despite the limited 
scope of the witch-hunt, 1987 became a crucial year in the transformation in 
the political dynamics of the ‘cotton affairs’. In fact, during glasnost, the 
corruption cases had a wider publicity - especially after the ‘Kunaev affair’180 - 
assuming a much spread dimension in the central media and press. This new 
media event started to thrill readers in the republic and across the entire 
USSR in a moment when ‘mafia stories’ and TV series about organized crime – 
such as the already mentioned La Piovra – were very popular. The effects of 
this new media dimension of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ were nevertheless 
ambivalent. On the one hand, the party was able to marshal the support of a 
population against the republic’s black sheep. On the other hand, the party 
itself was seen as the source of that corrupt environment in the first place 
and was exposed, even from the population and the newly-emerging civil 
society organizations, to wider criticism ‘from below’. Furthermore, the 
media dimension inexorably spread through Soviet public opinion the idea 
that Uzbekistan was basically run by a mafia system. Here, the narrative 
casted Rashidov as a kind of ‘godfather’, and the population as a mass of 
guilty forgers. For all these aspects, the Uzbek criminal saga started to be 
even more politicized and became the main arena in which was fought a war 
for power between the alleged heroes and the alleged villains. Parallel to 
glasnost, in 1987 Moscow enforced new legislation that forbade the party 
and state organs to reinstate figures who had been punished for bribery, 
embezzlement, pripiski181 as well as other reform attempts presumably to 
stiffen punishments against corruption182 and administrative penalties for 
                                                                
180 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 163. 
181 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 147–52. 
182 In 1987, the Presidium of the SS UzSSR asked for juridical feedback from the MJ 
USSR and Prokuratura in order to amend articles 153 and 154 of the criminal code of 
the UzSSR. Specifically, the proposed reform was aimed at changing the minimum 
punishment prescribed by law for bribery, which was set at 3-4 years. The SC, the MJ, 
and the Prokuratura USSR all responded in the negative, excluding this possibility since 
it contradicted the decree of the Presidium SS USSR of 1962 on the criminal liability of 
corruption and its reform of 23 May 1986. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2814, ll. 5, 8, 
10, 14. 
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those who committed environmental crimes, sold contaminated products,183 
or who failed to maintain proper crop rotation.184 
In Uzbekistan in January 1987 the usual – or dare we say ‘traditional’ – 
New Year’s Eve replacements were announced. To that effect, on 31 
December 1986, S. Kurbonov became the new chairman of the MID UzSSR185 
while S.M. Nesterenko was removed from his post as the second secretary of 
Tashkent obkom.186 In parallel, improvements in the economy for the 
previous year and small margins of economic recovery were timidly 
announced. The press reported that in 1986 national income had risen by 
3.4%, productivity by 3.5% and the volume of production by 5.8%.187 
However, these nominal data did not consider inflation and cannot be 
considered reliable according to market standards. 
Hence, the Uzbek cotton affair became a school case and even a 
(negative) argument in the Soviet political debate. Indeed, on 19 January 
1987 during a Politburo session, the Soviet head of state Gromyko debated 
on how to deal with camouflage in the country and malfeasance within 
cadres. Then, Gorbachev replied that “cotton in Uzbekistan is the most 
monstrous expression of what you say. And from the top [i.e. Moskow] there 
is pressure: Come on! The plan has to be met!”188 This criticism captured 
Moscow’s concern about cotton production in Uzbekistan, which in the 
previous harvest (1986) dropped by another 400,000 tons compared to the 
previous year, while more than 10% of the republican enterprises failed to 
realize production plans.189 In 1986 the plan for the cotton harvest was 
realized only for 87.5% of them, while 711,000 thousand tons of planned 
                                                                
183 GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2857. 
184 The presidium SS UzSSR introduced a law to enforce crop rotation on 29 May 1981 
that set fines and sanctions for the enlargement of irrigated lands. However, this law 
did not present consistent results and in a memorandum to the presidium of the SS 
UzSSR sent form the ministry of land improvements and irrigations of the UzSSR on 12 
April 1988, it was reported that the worst damage for agriculture was related to 
cotton monoculture. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2896, ll. 2-13. 
185 PV, 21269, 1, 1 January 1987, p. 1. 
186 PV, 21272, 4, 6 January 1987, p. 1. 
187 PV, 21281, 12, 16 January 1987, p. 1. 
188 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS... (Moskva: Gorbachev Fond, 2008), 121. 
189 PV, 21288, 20, 24 January 1987, p. 1. 
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cotton were not provided to the government.190 Basically, the republic was 
not sufficiently satisfying the Soviet planners’ commitments. 
On 27 January, while the Uzbek party announced other local 
replacements,191 in Moscow a plenum of the CC CPSU advanced the concept 
of glasnost with the idea of real elections and a secret ballot.192 On that 
occasion, Gorbachev linked the importance of glasnost as a way of fighting 
against corruption, and stated: 
The facts of a scornful attitude towards laws, hoodwinking and bribetaking, 
and the encouragement of servility and glorification all exert a pernicious 
influence on the moral atmosphere in society.193 
This new course also coincided with a major relaxation of press 
censorship,194 defining a major step in the definition of an “Uzbek cotton 
affair” in the public opinion. In fact, this media event was running parallel to 
the glasnost institutional transformations. According to Critchlow, the most 
evident results were that: 
                                                                
190 PV, 21295, 27, 1 February 1987, p. 2. 
191 On 27 January 1987 it was announced that 90 local leaders were removed in 
Bukhara obkom during 1985 and 1986 for deception. A rejection of change and a lack 
of collegiality remained prevalent. Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization 
of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU, 76. 
192 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 748. 
193 Holmes comments that the Gensek, “having referred to the indignation of the 
masses at the behavior of both corrupt and self-centered state officials […] singled out 
regions and ministries where ‘the degeneration of cadres’ and ‘violations of socialist 
legality’ had been particularly acute; the regions/areas listed were Uzbekistan, 
Moldavia, Turkmenia, a number of Kazakh provinces, Krasnodar Territory, Rostov 
Province and the city of Moscow, while the two ministries named were those for 
Foreign Trade and Internal Affairs. Gorbachev then proceeded to criticize the rampant 
embezzlement, bribe-taking, report-padding (and alcoholism) within the CPSU, 
following which he explicitly argued that it was these sorts of negative phenomenon 
that had led to the adoption of the policies of ‘acceleration’ (of social and economic 
development – the Russian word is uskoreniye) and perestroika. Thus two of the four 
domestic policies and buzz-words most directly associated with Gorbachev (the others 
being glasnost and demokratisatsiya) were here being justified as a reaction, inter alia, 
to corruption.” Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis, 227. 
194 Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran, 133. 
385 
 
Initially, the top leadership's response to Uzbek resistance was to keep on the 
pressure. For a time, obkom, gorkom, and raikom officials continued to be 
singled out for censure at Party meetings and in the press. But gradually, as 
the resistance movement broadened from the bureaucratic elite to embrace 
the cultural intelligentsia and other strata of Uzbek society, the campaign 
slackened.195 
In this regard, Coulloudon also affirms that, 
one of the most immediate side effects of glasnost was the aggravation of the 
preexisting lack of confidence in the official structures [...]. The more the 
Russian press published articles on widespread corruption, the more 
commonplace it made the phenomenon and the more indispensable the 
struggle against corruption seemed to be.196 
Indeed, with the media event more and more news also appeared on the 
purges, which from 1984 were actually claiming victims, while in 1986 alone 
almost a quarter of the chairmen of the local soviets were involved.197 
However, this improvement in the freedom of information and speech also 
was manipulated by a party that remained the main filter of evidence against 
any external198 or internal199 ‘distortive influence.’ Another level of criticism 
                                                                
195 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 150. 
196 Virginie Coulloudon, “Russia Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” in 
Corrupt Histories, ed. Emmanuel Kreike and William Chester Jordan (Rochester: 
University of Rochester Press, 2004), 257–58. 
197 A report of the presidium SS USSR indicated that, in 1986 alone, within the 
ispolkoms of the UzSSR, there were 1600 chairmen, 1689 deputy chairmen and 1601 
secretaries. From among these 387, 377, and 297, respectively, were replaced. 
Additionally, 86, 34, and 33, respectively, were ousted on account of having been 
compromised. Furthermore, in a Resolution of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR (4 
February 1987) on the improvement of the organizational work of officials – as 
required by the XXVII Congress CPSU – it emerged that in the local soviets, in the 
ispolkoms, and in the standing commissions an atmosphere for the development of 
criticism and self-criticism was absent. Neither was there a principled evaluation of the 
main assessment of the activity of organs and officials. Often, they did not have a clear 
sense of what glasnost implied, and the new managers did not understand the new 
tasks and worked with old methods without enforcing the acceleration of the social 
and economic development and of the plans. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2144, ll. 37, 
57. 
198 Indeed, another consequence of the media dimension was that critical articles and 
responses emerged against those international scholars who were engaged in Uzbek 
studies. For example, on 6 February 1987 the newspaper Ozbekiston Adabiyoti va 
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that appeared in the glasnost period regards illicit activities in dealing with 
the negative phenomena. The lack of warrants and the scarce respect for the 
rule of law in the republic were points of criticism: too often even the law 
enforcement organs were guilty of misapplying the law and abusing their 
powers. Exemplary was a denunciation that appeared on 11 February in PV 
where a huge article entitled “Perestroika and law” reported the defects of 
the judicial organs, denouncing: 
The arbitrariness of some detentions, arrests, and criminal prosecutions – the 
most flagrant violations of the rule of law and law enforcement. Now these 
facts are rare, and each one becomes an object of investigation, and the 
perpetrators are brought to strict liability. Much is being done to improve the 
professional level of personnel, and the development of their high moral 
position, civic courage, and incorruptibility.200 
Pursuing the usual formulation of ‘criticism and self-criticism’, the party 
admitted the defects in the republic and openly demanded that the law 
enforcement organs improve their work. In parallel, serious defects in the 
agriculture were still revealed. For example, in the previous year the republic 
did neither produced 5 million tons, and the party was admitting its defects 
and calling on the citizens to trust the judiciary organs as a way to reconstruct 
the republic and the whole country.201 The results find expression in the 
                                                                                                                                            
San”ati carried many articles criticizing the work of William Fierman and Michael 
Rywkin that revealed the difficulties of nationalities in Soviet Central Asia. The general 
tone in response spoke to the usual narrative of ‘brotherhood among nations’ and the 
commitments of Central Asians to the Soviet cause.198 Similarly, the Western news 
agencies were criticized for reports about protests in Kazakhstan, asserting that 
foreign journalists in the Soviet Union were abetting the CIA in its attempts to spread 
anti-Soviet propaganda. FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-87-013. 14 July 1987 - 275098. Soviet Union. 
Political Affairs,” 1987, 8–9. Despite these ‘propaganda wars’ on Central Asian issues, 
American intelligence started to focus on a much more serious problem related to the 
traffic of narcotics between Ferghana valley, Bukhara, and Turkmenistan. In February 
1987 alone, the Bukharan police seized nearly 100 kg of opiates and koknar – a sort of 
poppy seed tea – and three kg of charas hashish (nasha) from passengers on the 
Bukhara-1 Railroad and registered a warning about the diffusion of drug addicted 
people in Khorezm. Ibid., 109; Frank Shanty, The Nexus : International Terrorism and 
Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan (Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 
2011). 
199 An example is the ‘Minkin affair’, a secondary story that will be reported in the final 
annex. 
200 PV, 21301, 33, 11 February 1987, p. 3. 
201 PV, 21301, 33, 11 February 1987, p. 3. 
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stories of the former regional ‘bosses’, who were now under arrest. For 
example, on 13 February, an article appeared in Sovet Ozbekistoni that 
recalled the misdemeanors of the dismissed Khudaibergenov – who was at 
last under arrest for bribery202 – as well as “M. Vaisov, former first secretary 
of the Kushkapir raikom, and various rayon farm leaders [had been] expelled 
from the party and criminally prosecuted for filing false reports on a massive 
scale and other crimes.”203 
Other criticism emerged during the IV plenum CC CPUz (14 February 1987) 
where Usmankhodzhaev admitted that in the previous year the republic did 
not realize the economic plan for a value of 900 million rubles in products and 
that the average production in Uzbekistan had been four times inferior to the 
quality produced in the rest of the country.204 The FS CPUz affirmed that, in 
the previous year, the mechanized cotton harvest had amounted to less than 
2 million tons of raw cotton – only scant use of machines in the harvest – with 
a loss of more than 200 million rubles.205 He continued his report stating that 
because of the negative phenomena, in 1986 alone 750 managers, eight 
obkom secretaries, and 100 gorkom and raikom secretaries had been 
dismissed, as well as and 40 executives of gorispolkoms and raispolkoms,18 
ministers and many other officials from other agencies.206 In his advancing 
criticism, Usmankhodzhaev commented harshly that, despite the purges, in 
many places the situation was “as in Rashidov’s times”,207 thereby implying 
that a new wave of purges would soon overwhelm the republic. He thus 
invited all the key players to keep their guard up and to persevere through 
the cleaning work that had already begun. On that occasion, it was shown 
how the rate of turnover was often so high that officials were covering their 
posts just for a few months.208 Finally, Usmankhodzhaev, closed the plenum 
affirming: 
                                                                
202 Khudaibergenov "considered himself a leader who could do anything he wished 
unchecked by law, and indulged in self-interest and arrogance. He selected cadres 
without regard to their efficiency or qualifications, but only according to features of 
personal loyalty, servility, toadyism, and compatriotism." FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-87-013. 14 
July 1987 - 275098. Soviet Union. Political Affairs,” 4. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Prot 4/1987, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 156, d. 2062, l. 7, 9. 
205 Prot 4/1987, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 156, d. 2062, l. 10. 
206 Prot 4/1987, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 156, d. 2062, l. 20. 
207 Prot 4/1987, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 156, d. 2062, l. 50. 
208 On this purpose, Critchlow comments: “An indigenous official appointed to the key 
job of oblast executive committee chairman in Navoi oblast had to be dismissed only 
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With the XVI plenum and the XXI Congress of the CPUz, we have started [to 
enforce] these traditions of healthy and constructive criticism [that] we must 
continue and persevere.209 
This commitment sounded like a warning. Therefore, an immediate result 
of the plenum was the long-awaited addition of another big name of the Post-
Rashidovians to the list of purges. Salimov - who had been replaced in his post 
as chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR by Nishanov only months 
before - was now ousted even from his post at the CC CPUz, again to be 
replaced by Nishanov.210 This indicates that, thanks to Moscow’s support, 
Nishanov was becoming more and more powerful and was even able to 
marginalize the main allies of Usmankhodzhaev and to enforce a position in 
the buro and in the appointment of cadres.211 According to Anishchev’s 
memoirs, Nishanov himself was definitely not a naïve person.212 He probably 
had a Machiavellian political strategy that aimed to preserve Moscow 
consent, to oust his internal rivals at any cost and to advance his position 
within the party. This probably would not be too far from reality. 
Furthermore, after the February plenum, other purges hit top managerial 
figures of justice213 and agriculture,214 a sector that was still presenting many 
problems and was again at the center of the CPUz political agenda.215 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                            
eight months later, a raion first secretary appointed in Bukhara oblast lasted only one 
month longer, and a gorkom second secretary in Tashkent oblast was kept for only 
three months. All of them were removed for ‘negative reasons.’" Critchlow, “Prelude 
to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on Elite 
Recruitment,” 150–51. 
209 Prot 4/1987, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 156, d. 2062, l. 71. 
210 PV, 21307, 39, 15 February 1987, p. 1. 
211 PV, 21308, 40, 16 February 1987, p. 2. 
212 Anishchev, Vostochnyi Ornament, 552. 
213 On 4 March, there was another reshuffle of the SC UzSSR members. PV, 21336, 68, 
25 March 1987, p. 1. 
214 An example was Yu. B. Yuldashev, the director of the agricultural association of the 
UzSSR who was ousted and criminally prosecuted for abuse of power, and defects in 
controls and financial statements. PV, 21319, 51, 1 March 1987, p. 2. 
215 In fact, also in a buro meeting of the CPUz (11 March 1987) it was reported that 
over the previous six years an additional 48 million rubles for the development of 
agriculture in the republic had been invested. However, these funds produced very 
modest returns, while nominally productivity rose by 3.2% and wages by 30% (PV, 
21327, 59, 12 March 1987, p. 1). More threatening, the newspapers also reported that 
in the previous year, the republic had not realized the cotton harvest plan, while many 
funds and much energy was spent to develop the agricultural sector. According to the 
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the party wanted to focus on the undeniable difficulties of the country, 
highlighting them as a necessary step to face in order to implement 
perestroika. The CPUz publicized the idea that “perestroika is not like walking 
on an open road, but is, rather, to climb up the mountain on a trail that has 
never been open.” In order to succeed, it would therefore be necessary to 
strengthen the responsibility and discipline of cadres and to fight against the 
negative phenomena that slow the uskoreniye down.216 This kind of narrative 
– and maybe ideological program – was also advanced at the central level. 
During a Politburo session held on 24 March to discuss the situation in the 
country, Yakovlev recalled how corruption was an All-Union problem, stating: 
“When we talk about corruption, everyone thinks that it is not in us, but 
somewhere in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc. [but this is not the case].”217 
However, in 1987 the anti-corruption campaign had already passed its zenith, 
and these ideological references would often emerge in the public domain as 
mere slogans. In contrast, in Uzbekistan corruption remained one of the main 
political points of contention throughout the next months. 
During the V plenum of the CC CPUz (28 March 1987), Usmankhodzhaev 
gave a confused, colorful, and complex speech that was in the typical 
perestroika style. Some parts had been censored in the press, but we can 
easily fill the lacunae with archival material in order to represent a very 
important episode of 1987 in the Central Asian republic. In fact, 
Usmankhodzhaev’s speech sounded as odd as a desperate message of a 
leader that was seeking consent from upper and lower levels. The FS CPUz 
indeed appeared as a lonely leader that was finding himself with scorched 
earth around and tried to get the Moscow support at any costs. The plenum 
was also under the supervision of the senior officials of the CC CPSU 
Ponomarev and Cheremnykh who attended this Tashkent event. Parallel, in 
the plenum was formalized the appointment in the CC CPUz buro of M. Kh. 
Khalmukhamedov, a former worker in the apparatus of the CC CPSU who was 
considered as a loyal communist. In that event, the FS CPUz closely followed 
the new course of Soviet politics, confirming his total devotion to the 
implementation of perestroika and glasnost.  
                                                                                                                                            
news, the party had exhibited hitherto a fundamental unwillingness either to control 
and demand too much from its cadres, a situation that was no longer tenable in any 
way. PV, 21330, 62, 17 March 1987, p. 1. 
216 PV, 21334, 66, 22 March 1987, p. 1. 
217 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 150. 
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According to Usmankhodzhaev, these two ambitious reforms were slowed 
down by the legacies of “an atmosphere of complacency and permissiveness 
on a large scale entrenched theft, bribery, profiteering, unearned 
incomes.”218 Therefore, he recalled the need to implement the ideological 
work of Marxism-Leninism, instructing the cadres to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of Rano Abdullaeva. In fact, the former secretary protected under 
Rashidov’s influence, was in the middle of a donos war since 1984 and was 
arrested for bribery and accused of being Rashidov’s mistress. Her expulsion 
from the republican buro and secretariat was thus formalized219 for her 
                                                                
218 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 1. 
219 As mentioned, Rano Khabibovna Abdullaeva, ‘Rashidov’s pupil’, was in the middle 
of the political struggle already in 1984, when dozens of slandering letters arrived in 
the CC CPSU to denounce her misdemeanors. She was born in 1935 to a famous Uzbek 
geologist, Habib Muhammedovich Abdullaev. In 1955, she started her party career and 
she became FS of Uzbek Komsomol (1963-1971) and then she became Deputy 
chairman of SM UzSSR and Secretary of the CPUz on ideology until 1987. In her 
memoirs, she justified the use of gifts in Uzbek society, narrating the story of her 
arrest and how she had ‘overcome hell’: She felt to be in the middle of a conspiracy 
and neither Usmankhodzhaev nor Nishanov saved her, and indeed both acted in 
concert with Gdlyan who supplied them with this dirty dossier to compromise her. 
According to Abdullaeva, this was the typical Berian style. Then, she was arrested on 
29 October 1987 in her office at the Institute of Party History at the CC CPUz and 
deported to an old KGB building – which she defined as ‘Gdlyan's headquarters’ – 
where she was interrogated by Katusev – Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR – 
and Gdlyan. She was pushed to confess that she had received bribes and she even 
declared the great influence she had on – and that she had been the lover of – the 
defunct Sharaf Rashidov. This information was given to the Gdlyan-Ivanov team during 
her confessions on 25 November 1987. Then, she reconsidered her affirmations, 
stating on 22 December 1987 that she was an honest woman and not Rashidov's 
mistress. However, she did reaffirm that she had received bribes from Khudayberdyev 
(5000 rubles), from Radzhabov (7000), from Aytmuratov (5000), from Kamalov three 
times for 10,000 rubles and jewellery (rings) and earrings with diamonds, from 
Khudaibergenov (5000), from Kanyazov (4000), from Musakhanov (15,000) and from 
Karimov (12,000). She had several confrontations with the investigators who tried to 
extort confessions from her as two beriyantsy (Beria followers) put psychological 
pressure on her and threatened to arrest her children in order to extract self-
incriminating evidence. Her detention lasted until May 30, 1988 and was then 
extended to 30 December 1988 (and again to 30 May, 1989), and finally to 31 October 
1989. Her main accuser was Khudaibergenov and both accused her and denied their 
allegations but, after speaking with the KGB colonel Dukhanin – who was probably 
instructed to end the case and was part of the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair we will see later – 
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“serious shortcomings in conducting the party’s ideological work”.220 
Abdullaeva was thus one of the latest Post-Rashidovians to be dispossessed 
and, as we have seen, a part of the ambitious political strategy proposed by 
the ‘revenant’ Nishanov to oust his rivals. 
Again on that occasion, Usmankhodzhaev appeared even more 
marginalized and lonely in his leadership post and made a very sharp 
statement that would certainly have inflamed some nationalist minds of the 
party. Indeed, a very surprising point in his speech was the criticism of 
national (Uzbek) workers, which presented fake statistics, arguing that they 
ought to follow the example of the ‘European’ workers who toiled so much 
more effectively in the industry.221 Basically, in an already very tense context 
and in a colonial-like society – which was in many ways segregated – the 
figure who should have been the greatest exponent of the republican ethnic 
majority ended up glorifying the ‘colonizers’ and blaming those natives that 
he was supposed to represent. A strange, upside down discrimination thus 
resulted, whereby Uzbek natives were presented as the main culprits for the 
negative situation in the republic, including the still very common practices of 
bribery, corruption, and theft of socialist property.222 Thus, the FS CPUz 
evidenced the backwardness and formalism in the republic as a matter of a 
long-standing local mentality that had to be changed and he gave some 
practical examples stating: 
Let us examine how we work. In the past year in the country per hectare raw 
cotton was produced on an average of 24.3 quintals per hectare, and in 
Karakalpak ASSR the yield was 20.8, in Jizzakh oblast 18.6, Navoi 16.9, and 
Kashkadarya 14.3. Many kolkhozes in the country [produced] fewer than 10 
quintals. Judge all this yourself: Do we use the full capacity and the 
opportunities if we have to capitalize on our growth prospects? The answer 
                                                                                                                                            
she denied all the accusations against her. Finally, with the judgement of the SC USSR, 
on 15 January 1990, the charges against her were all dropped for lack of evidence and 
she was released. Her case was controversial because, according to Ilyukin – and even 
in her own posthumous version – she was forced to make those affirmations in order 
to accuse other people. Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo; Ilyukhin, Oborotni: Kak 
Bylo Nadumano “Uzbekskoe” Delo; Rano Abdullaeva, Preodolenie Ada (Moskva: 
Monolit, 2009), 19, 39, 56, 60–62, 109–10, 130–32, 134, 136. 
220 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 1. 
221 Prot. 5/1987, RGASPI f. 17, op. 156, d. 2063, l. 9. 
222 Prot. 5/1987, RGASPI f. 17, op. 156, d. 2063, l. 10. 
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can be only one. [These opportunities] are not used because many of our 
cadres live and work in the old way.223 
Then, after listing the shortcomings in several economic sectors of the 
republic he stated: “All this dictates the urgent need for restructuring of the 
economic mechanism.”224 Substantially, he was affirming that even the 
shortages and economic defects were the consequence of a backward 
mentality that had somehow survived in the republic.225 Then, again, the FS 
recalled the responsibility of Rashidov and those others who had dominated 
within his territorial base, stating how in Jizzakh in the previous year it had 
been promised to fulfill the plan for 102% but in reality had just further 
proven the propensity to ‘falsehood and inefficiency’.226 Then, he recalled 
how much, under his leadership, the party had made many efforts to struggle 
against the ‘official plunderers’, firing in the five years prior alone more than 
20,000 people from the apparatus. At the same time, he admitted that the 
payroll of the party nomenklatura had nevertheless increased from 333,000 
to 393,000.227 Then, Usmankhodzhaev reported how 1986 was the hardest 
moment and how in that year alone there had been serious cases of bad 
justice and 2,500 people had been imprisoned without charge.228 The FS also 
confirmed that many letters addressed to the party had arrived, as well as 
petitions and other manifestations of impatience from a part of the 
population – or the victim’s families – that was mobilized against the 
perceived injustice during the season of mass purges in the UzSSR. Probably 
even Usmankhodzhaev saw the danger of this situation, especially in a 
context of glasnost, where the potential for the public discrediting of party 
work was now so great. 
However, perestroika was affirmed to be the main mission of the Uzbek 
political agenda and also the FS CPUz affirmed “the main task: to accelerate 
the widespread development and perestroika, giving it a universal and 
irreversible scope.” Then, he stated that “the CC and obkoms should pay 
more attention to the gorkoms and raikoms – linking them to the most 
important party and helping them to improve the style and methods of 
                                                                
223 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 2. 
224 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 2. 
225 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 2. 
226 Prot. 5/1987, RGASPI f. 17, op. 156, d. 2063, l. 12. 
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work.”229 Fundamentally, in its great contradictions, the CPUz was narrating 
the perestroika openings230 and, at the same time, supporting a kind of 
centralization at party level. 
Then, Usmankhodzhaev affirmed that in 1986 alone, 22,000 executives 
had been denounced, of which more than 2,000 were officially reprimanded 
and punished with party sanctions. A further 158 leaders were ousted from 
the party for unsatisfactory reports, in a republic where 90% of kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes directors had been replaced. Then, at the end of his speech, the FS 
also confirmed that some of the former top figures of the republic had been 
arrested for embezzlement and bribery, including Osetrov, Khudayberdyev, 
Orlov and five former FS obkoms231 and one of these (Karimov) had even 
been condemned to death.232 Finally, the FS CPUz announced measures 
against those people exploiting the ‘negative phenomena’ against the party, 
stating: 
The buro of the CC [CPUz] considers it necessary to warn that it will not allow 
anyone to use the ‘fight against negative phenomena’ as a weapon against the 
people’s trust in the party […and that] every such attempt shall be punished 
most severely.233 
Usmankhodzhaev thus seemed to understand how many political risks 
were behind the ‘fight against negative phenomena.’ In fact, the argument 
that helped him to consolidate his power was inexorably becoming a 
boomerang against a leader that appeared weak and isolated in these tasks. 
The signs of edginess against him emerged also at the party local level where 
a call for ‘stability’ was launched, reports of the insufficient training of 
replacement cadres were presented, and evidence of the critical social 
situations in some regions where the purges were badly tolerated was 
                                                                
229 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 3. 
230 Usmankhodzhaev also mentioned that “[r]ecently we discussed at the meetings in 
groups and elected more than 9000 people as leaders of various ranks, including 70 
directors of industrial enterprises, 18 directors of state farms and 49 chairmen of 
collective farms, and 8000 team leaders. Developing the practice of electing leaders, 
party committees should manage these processes, to ensure a proficient atmosphere 
in the team. It is important to avoid formalism and to advance in democracy.” PV, 
21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 3. 
231 Prot. 5/1987, RGASPI f. 17, op. 156, d. 2063, l. 34. 
232 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment.” 
233 PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 4. 
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brought forward. An example was the Ferghana valley where the social 
situation exploded next234 and where – despite the purges and new 
opportunities – unemployment rates remained very high.235 
The situation appeared ever more critical and Usmankhodzhaev seemed 
to not be an effective leader able to heal the republic. As we have seen, he 
tried to follow Moscow’s narrative and the course of the investigations that 
the central prokuratura was massively enforcing in the republic. In parallel, 
under glasnost, he began to suffer more and more attacks from a large 
segment of the cadres – who did not like the radical policies of the FS CPUz – 
and by the more frequent victims of flawed justice. Similarly, the inner 
struggles within the party and the media event related to the ‘Uzbek cotton 
affair’ – which we will discuss further in the next chapter – would trouble the 
interethnic relations in the republic. Signs of impatience with the Russians – 
who were seen as ‘colonizers’ – and Uzbeks who were considered as 
‘corruptors’ in the rest of the USSR would come to the fore. It would thus be 
fair to say that the sekretar nol’, after four years in power, seemed effectively 
isolated and under constant attack by those who wanted to liquidate him. 
                                                                
234 Parallel to the plenum, many protests occurred in the Fergana valley against the 
Andijan chief judge, who had been appointed by Moscow and was disliked by the local 
population. PV, 21340, 72, 29 March 1987, p. 3. 
235 In this regard, Critchlow comments: "In the Fergana Valley in 1987, ironically a 
center of massive unemployment, there were positions for 23,500 economists with 
higher education filled by only 7,500 incumbents, of whom 2,800 had already reached 
pension age, and replacements were being received at the rate of only 700 a year. A 
raikom secretary in Tashkent claimed that by the time he could train instructors and 
department heads they were snatched away by higher authority […] Doubts about the 
impact on the economy were also openly expressed. The first secretary of 
Surkhandarya oblast questioned whether anything had really changed for collectives 
who had adopted the new work style: "Based on our experience, you can say it 
hasn't." In March 1987, the chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers observed, 
"According to all basic indicators, Samarkand oblast has begun to work worse than at 
the beginning of last year.” The first secretary of the Syrdarya obkom commented that 
in some places "rank-and-file working people are seeing that there is a perestroika in 
words but not in deed, that everything is as before." The head of an administration in 
Khorezm oblast was censured in the press for speaking up at an obkom plenum: "They 
should help us and not criticize. Otherwise there's no desire to work. What's 
happening is that perestroika is reduced to a settling of scores." Ibid., 148–49. 
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5.2.3 The fall of sekretar nol’ 
In the aftermath of the V plenum of the CC CPUz, a debate emerged about 
the inefficacy of perestroika. Apparently, the new course of reforms did not 
present the expected results, did not reached the agroindustrial sector - that 
was still mismanaging the fixed-cost methods - and did not change the 
productive priorities. All these elements were presented as a determinant 
circumstance that slowed down productivity growth.236 Similar defects were 
still revealed in the law enforcement organs and in the MVD where, again, 
perestroika had essentially not arrived in its ‘democratic’ dimension: rather, 
the ‘change’ was evident in terms of cadres reshuffle, withg more than 3,000 
officers and most of its leaders had been ousted in the previous two years 
alone.237 Substantially, the party revealed a general misunderstanding about 
perestroika that was schizophrenically considered both as a mean to heal the 
country and parallel as the main goal to pursue. However, despite the many 
slogans that were repeated as a ‘late Soviet mantra’, there was no certain 
strategy to pursue and probably neither a definition of what perestroika, in 
effective, was. In any case, it was also presented as a necessary solution to 
heal Uzbekistan.238  
Similarly, glasnost was presented as an essential mission to pursue. It is 
interesting to note how PV on 4 April 1987 released an interview of Rafik 
Nishanov, in which the rising star of the CPUz called for greater enforcement 
the methods of transparency (glasnost) especially during soviet elections.239 
Effectively, the chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR was acquiring 
much more relevance also in the press and, trying to garner greater consent 
from Gorbachev. By exploiting the course of the glasnost narrative, he was 
progressively overshadowing the unpopular Usmankhodzhaev. 
                                                                
236 PV, 21342, 74, 1 April 1987, p. 1. 
237 In early 1987, one of them was even arrested while 250 managers were removed 
from their posts because were considered ‘unreliable’. PV, 21343, 74, 2 April 1987, p. 
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it seemed to be necessary, considering the rapid decrease of UzSSR productivity. PV, 
21344, 76, 3 April 1987, p. 1. 
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Parallel to glasnost, the criticism of economic defects in the republic was 
even more enforced. For example, during the Tashkent obkom plenum on 7 
April 1987, it emerged that across the oblast, despite the massive investment 
in agriculture, cotton production had remained more or less at the same level 
for 15 years. Criticisms were also levelled against the gorkoms and raikoms 
for their inefficiency in accomplish economic goals.240 Similarly, the CPC USSR 
revealed that many anonymous letters had been sent to the SS USSR to 
denounce shortages and mismanagement in the agriculture and 
accountability in the Tashkent oblast.241 Furthermore, particularly serious 
problems were also highlighted in water management.242  
As we have mentioned, in the Uzbek cotton affair a great part of the cases 
were not, in fact, directly related to cotton. Indeed, in the Karakalpak ASSR 
similar cases in milk and rice production were discovered, even revealing 
evidence of opium cultivation.243 Similarly, in the plenum of the Khorezm 
                                                                
240 PV, 21348, 80, 8 April 1987, p. 2. 
241 Ie. falsification of additions to the agricultural production and of the construction 
as well as realization of new illegal lands. Of the local department of Gosbank, it was 
revealed that it was overestimating the value of works completed. GARF, f. 9527, op. 
1, d. 9333, ll. 1-11. 
242 In 1987, the presidium of the SS UzSSR stated that in the republic the legal 
requirements on rational and careful use of water resources for irrigation and 
environmental safety were inadequately enforced. The use of water resources 
remained "very expensive, ineffective and wasteful of water" because more than 70% 
of the channels do not have anti infiltration cover and 30% of the water does not 
reach the fields and 18km cubes of water are of drainage outflow, of which a large 
part is wasted. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2160, l. 174. 
243 On April 1987, the Presidium of the SS Karakalpak ASSR reported that in the 
autonomous republic 58,000 hectares of illegal fields were revealed and annually 
40,000 tons of non-existent cotton were falsified, as was a fifth of the milk plan. At the 
same time, the financial damage from thefts associated with cotton corresponded to 
more than 17 million rubles just in the years 1982-1983. For these facts, in 
Karakalpakya 36 managers were dismissed and 286 workers of the local MVD fired. 
Additionally, more than half of the executives of the prokuratura and courts were 
similarly discharged. In 1982-1983 alone, in the Karakalpak ASSR more than 500 thefts 
against socialist property were revealed, and a further 700 in 1985-1986, noting an 
increase in large-scale theft of something like 350%. Additionally, illicit expenses and 
theft in consumer cooperatives with a value of six million rubles were revealed. The 
damage done during the "cotton affairs" in 1982-1984 amounted to 22 million rubles. 
Forgery and thefts were revealed also in rice production and in 1984 alone 22 
individuals were criminally prosecuted. 970 tons of stolen rice were seized in these 
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obkom it was revealed that that the cotton plan had not been fulfilled for 
three consecutive years and in the oblast even in communications and 
transport fraud, theft, embezzlements and other crimes were revealed.244 
The CPUz was then elaborating a new strategy that could facilitate the 
criminal prosecution of party officials that – to some extent – had hitherto 
been protected by a degree of immunity. Indeed, in mid-April 1987, the 
necessity to expel wrongdoers from the party as a preliminary condition for 
implementing the judicial measures and arrests was debated in the party. 
This seemed to be crucial in a republic where ‘negative phenomena’ related 
to the mismanagement of public resources was still a real and present danger 
especially at regional level.245 In this phase of unfulfilled hopes and political 
uncertainties, the role of Usmankhodzhaev was much more marginalized, 
while Nishanov was even more present in the media and press, presenting 
himself as a sort of ideological champion of perestroika in the republic. It is 
interesting to note how he presented the new course of Soviet politics as a 
real doctrinal duty to Leninism and linked this narrative with the 
                                                                                                                                            
investigations. For these crimes, in 1985-86 criminal trials for about 800 people were 
opened. For abuse of power and defects in the work the former FS Karakalpak obkom 
K.K. Kamalov was expelled from the CPSU and criminally prosecuted, while the Nukus 
gorkom asked the Presidium of the SS USSR to cancel his title of Hero of Socialist 
Labor. In addition, the former members of the presidium of the SS and SM of the 
Karakalpak ASSR, two obkom secretaries and 21 executives of ministries and 
institutions were punished and expelled from their jobs. In total, for various violations, 
189 executives were replaced and seven deputies were expelled from the SS 
Karakalpak ASSR and 55 from the local soviets. Before, it had been common for 
executives to forgive lawlessness and violations related to livestock, the illegal opening 
of new fields, and the illicit use of technology belonging to the state. Various 
machinations, speculation, and resale of stolen goods were widespread, weakening 
the fight against tendencies to private property and even incidents of non-business 
income and livestock shortages. In 1984, in Karakalpakya, 460 instances of cultivation 
of opium poppies over an area of 215.8 hectares were revealed, rising to 5.46 hectares 
in 1986. The goal of doing everything to eradicate the phenomenon was thus set in 
1987. In any case, the production of cotton fiber had increased to 32.4% compared to 
27% in 1984. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2160, ll. 190-194. 
244 PV, 21351, 91, 21 April 1987, p. 2. 
245 In fact, in April 1987 the press revealed that in Kashkadarya oblast, 88% of obkom 
nomenklatura and 75% of gorkom and raikom nomenklatura had been recently 
replaced and 366 leaders were dismissed for ‘negative phenomena.’ PV, 21348, 88, 18 
April 1987. Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus 
Broke Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment.” 
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commitments of the moralization campaign in the UzSSR. In his speech in 
Tashkent for the commemoration of the 117th anniversary of Lenin's birth, 
Nishanov recalled the transformations in the republic and the defects that 
were due to the period of ‘Sharafrashidovshchina’, a neologism that became 
“synonymous with intrigue and blasphemy, hypocrisy and ambiguity, disgrace 
and corruption, nonsense rhetoric and self-celebration.”246 With his harsh 
words, Nishanov acknowledged his ideological influence on the party and 
affirmed that efforts to fight against negative phenomena were effective, but 
still not sufficient. This criticism was to some extent against the whole party 
and indirectly against the ruling FS. 
In spring 1987, open criticism emerged even on local issues247 and the 
mismanagement of some of the prokuratura officials who, as mentioned, 
were often committing errors in evaluating the cases and sometimes were 
even abusing their power.248 This situation led to a renewed purge within the 
republican prosecution offices. Similar condemnation emerged also in the 
parliamentary debates against those agencies that were supposed to 
internally control the party and state organs as the PCC and PCP.249 Despite 
                                                                
246 PV, 21362, 94, 24 April 1987, p. 2. An extract of the speech is reported in the 
appendix. 
247 The party revealed in the press that, in 1986, the Andijan oblast recorded a plan 
deficit of 63,000 tons of cotton because 127 kolkhozes and 87 sovkhozes had failed to 
realize the plan. PV, 21366, 98, 29 April 1987, p. 2. 
248 PV reported that many officials of the prokuratura abused their powers for their 
personal benefit and profit by any means. Many offices of the prokuratura “were even 
closed to decent and principled workers.” In the Samarkand University of Law, there 
were many children of the local prokuratura officials for whom a good job had already 
been guaranteed. Even there, facts of violation of socialist law occurred. Then, stories 
of poorly implemented justice, were reported. For example, K. Yarbabayev was 
sentenced in 1982 for no reason and was released only in 1986. Cases such as this 
were all too common. PV, 21381, 113, 17 May 1987, p. 2. Even in the local prokuratura 
department of Kattarkurgana several cases of poorly implemented justice for 
individuals unjustly convicted were registered, while the prosecutors did not provide 
adequate control over the proceedings as well as the Samarkand oblast prokuratura. 
PV, 21402, 134, 11 June 1987, p. 2. 
249 During the XI meeting of the V session of the SS UzSSR, the second secretary of the 
CC CPUz, and deputy V.P. Anishchev, denounced the case of Yakh'yayev – the first 
deputy chairman of the PCC UzSSR who was an “odious figure” who committed many 
crimes. They also denounced Mamatov – director of the PCC of the Altyarik raikom, 
who was corrupt and an extortionist and for this was condemned to eight years in 
prison. Finally, they denounced Yuldashev, the chairman of the PCC Chinaz raikom 
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the ‘major purges’ seemed to have been relegated to the past, this was just 
an illusion of normalization. In fact, the republic was facing probably its 
hardest period in terms of purges250 at mid-high administrative level, while 
revelations of negative phenomena had even increased. For example, on 2 
June, PV announced cases of fraud uncovered had increased in the second 
semester of 1986 and also in the first quarter of 1987,251 while other attacks 
against the CPUz arrived also from a part of the Uzbek intellectual society that 
blamed the party leadership for acting too late.252 
In summer 1987, while in Moscow perestroika had started to assume 
distinct tones of democratization,253 in Uzbekistan the purges proceeded to 
great fanfare. It was announced that, in the Tashkent oblast, “hundreds” of 
culprits had been recently expelled from the party for crimes, corruption, 
speculation and abuse of power. Nevertheless, Gorbachev seemed to be 
worried about the inefficiency of the system of replacing cadres, who were 
often simply laterally moved to other posts within the republic or were 
                                                                                                                                            
who abused his power and was a cheater and trader in cars. In Anishchev’s speech it 
emerged that in the previous two years alone, 17 workers of the PCC – of whom eight 
were executives – had been put to trial for the ‘negative phenomena’ and were ousted 
from their posts. PV, 21389, 121, 27 May 1987, p. 2. 
250 Gill also reports: “Half the workers in the CC CPUz apparat, 40 per cent of obkom, 
gorkom and raikom secretaries and 45 per cent of ispolkom chairmen were sacked 
during 1986 and 1987, according to Anishchev, who thought the nomenklatura system 
of appointments from above needed to be kept in order to ensure that suitable people 
remained in top jobs.” Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power 
and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU, 77. 
251 PV, 21393, 125, 2 June 1987, p. 2. 
252 For example, the scholar Kamil Ikramov, son of the former FS CPUz (1929-1937) 
executed during the great purges, denounced ‘Sharafrashidovshchina’ as the origin of 
the republic’s problems and criticized the delay in condemning such an immoral and 
immodest figure as the former FS CPUz. In fact, Ikramov described Rashidov as a 
“newly appeared Uzbek Khan with a party card, golden stars, and awards” and 
reported the already-mentioned history of Gulamov, one of Rashidov's early rivals 
mentioned in the first chapter. In his criticism, he said that Uzbekistan was following 
the Marxist evolution from feudalism to socialism bypassing the stage of capitalism. 
However, according to Ikramov, the republic was still at the first stage. Kamil Ikramov, 
“I Probil Chas,” Literaturnaya Gazeta, June 1988. 
253 On 25-26 June 1987, in a plenum of the CC CPSU, Gorbachev linked 
democratization to economic reforms. On that occasion, also, Yakovlev was elected to 
politburo. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 748. 
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“transferred to other work.”254 Then, in June 1987, a CC CPSU decree about 
the shortcomings in the Tashkent obkom organization called on party organs 
to not permit re-admission to the CPUz of “persons expelled from it for 
bribery, embezzlement, and padding reports.”255 Then in summer 1987, the 
party had to face also the organized mobilizations of ethnic minorities, who – 
now that perestroika was in full swing – were claiming their rights. A great 
example was the massive demonstrations of Crimean Tatars in Moscow and 
in Uzbekistan on 6 July 1987, who demanded the right to return from exile in 
Central Asia.256 In the immediate aftermath, on 9 July 1987, the politburo held 
a discussion about their return to Crimea and as well the possible 
reintegration of the Crimean Peninsula into RSFSR.257 Both problems would 
be exacerbated in the next decades, with resulting major violence.  
Another issue thrilling the population of the UzSSR at the time (and 
sometimes even mobilizing part of public opinion) was the misuse of the 
prosecutory organs. In 1987 these were at the center of a huge debate 
dividing the public opinion: some felt they were the heroes of law, while 
another part blamed the entire problem on the dishonest inquisitors 
themselves. The Genprokuror USSR, Rekunkov, made a direct intervention 
into this polemic, giving an interview that was published in the Soviet and in 
the Uzbek press where he announced that 70% of the city and raion 
prosecutors of the UzSSR – some of whom had themselves been accused of 
crimes – had been replaced and more than 200 law-enforcement officials had 
been dismissed. This was a complete failure of the control mechanism. The 
Prokuratura USSR had assigned 85 staffers to reinforce the upper echelon of 
Uzbekistan and a further 100 temporary investigators during the summer of 
                                                                
254 In July 1987 was announced that almost 1450 dismissed secretaries of primary 
CPUz organizations were at large working in kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Critchlow, 
“Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on 
Elite Recruitment,” 147. 
255 According to Critchlow: "The revolving door through which dismissed officials were 
able to continue their career in new positions was evidently due not just to 
skullduggery but also to the shortage of qualified replacement candidates. [...] The 
effect of high turnover on cadre replacement was exacerbated by the inadequacy of 
the reserve pool of candidates, which had allegedly been kept deliberately small by 
local officials in order to frustrate higher authority." Ibid., 147–48. 
256 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 748; Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le 
Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 139. 
257 NSA, Box 27, file 2934. 
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1987 alone.258 Then he mentioned how “these measures were due to 
“extraordinary circumstances” and were “temporary” and relied primarily on 
the need to increase the effectiveness of cadres, to educate them, and to 
improve their professional skills.”259 Rekunkov’s interview looked, to a 
significant extent, like a kind of mea culpa in order to justify the shortages in 
the republic and the defects of the prosecution organs in fighting the 
‘negative phenomena’.260 Then, Rekunkov announced improvements and a 
normalization of the situation in the republic with a reduction of economic 
crimes in 1986 that, according to him, was due to the heavy enforcement 
work of the Prokuratura USSR. However, there was still an environment of 
tolerance, and in 1986 alone the costs of absenteeism, downtime, and other 
violations of labor and production discipline cost 105 million rubles. Then, he 
recalled how, in three years alone, the number of denunciations from 
complainants in Uzbekistan to the prokuratura USSR had increased by 40%. 
For this, he argued, reform of the work of the prokuratura was a pillar to 
enforce perestroika in Uzbekistan and, indeed, across the whole USSR.261 
Basically, it was necessary to restore the people’s trust in the prosecutorial 
institutions.  
                                                                
258 Critchlow, “Prelude to ‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke 
Moscow’s Grip on Elite Recruitment,” 136–37. 
259 Therefore, he added: "the law enforcement bodies of Uzbekistan, completely 
resigned to the situation, not only failed to fulfill the functions assigned to them, but 
they contributed to the build-up of negative phenomena. Some workers embarked on 
a criminal path. For bribery, abuse, and other violations of the law many members of 
the prosecution authorities and MVD officials were brought to justice. More than 2 
thousand officials had been fired for discrediting actions. There were those who 
thought it best to wait and did not participate in the crimes […] but, nevertheless, did 
know what was going on, and remained silent and with a clear conscience paid 
monthly installments to the party and preached from the podium about the truisms of 
strengthening the rule of law. This is a direct betrayal of the interests of the party and 
the people – professional degradation caused enormous damage to our common 
cause, undermining people's belief in social justice." PV, 21409, 141, 11 July 1987, p. 3. 
260 PV, 21409, 141, 11 July 1987, p. 3. 
261 Holmes comments: At the end of that month, the Supreme Soviet passed 
legislation designed to increase the rights of ordinary citizens vis-a-vis officials [...] The 
latter legislation, in particular, was designed to encourage more whistle-blowing, as 
citizens have since then – in theory, at least – had a greater chance of having 
complaints against officials both investigated and acted upon. Holmes, The End of 
Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 227. 
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Another mea culpa arrived directly from Usmankhodzhaev in a meeting of 
the party aktiv on agriculture. Here, the FS CPUz announced that in the years 
1984-1986 the Uzbekistan only managed to produce around 5.2 million tons 
of cotton annually, a figure that was equivalent the rate achieved in the mid-
1970s.262 The Uzbek leader was effectively admitting that, despite the fight 
against negative phenomena, the party had not been able to satisfy 
Moscow’s demands on cotton. Basically, the Uzbek ‘cotton republic’ and its 
leaders admitted their failures to the Soviet cause. However, the major failure 
seemed to be represented in the inefficiency of the purges that had been 
implemented in the previous years. In fact, as mentioned, instances of the 
negative phenomena were still being exposed on a regular basis, while the 
strong response of the CPUz contributed to create an environment of 
intolerance in the republic. In fact, the dismissed figures who had not been 
arrested or imprisoned for the “cotton affair” were anyway able to create 
problems because their relatives or affiliates were, in the framework of 
glasnost, more able to organize petitions and protests out of the jails and 
prokuratura offices. In the critical context of Navoi,263 a group of party 
veterans had even organized a protest march to defend a dismissed – and 
allegedly guilty – official.264 Then, on 3 August, the Politburo sent a 
memorandum to Usmankhodzhaev and Kadyrov asking for a more resolute 
approach in the cadres’ policy and to resolve the problems in the cotton 
sector.265 
Assailed by the discontent of ever more segments of the national elite, the 
FS CPUz appeared as isolated in Tashkent as he was in Moscow, where he was 
rapidly losing the support of the CC CPSU. Then, during the VI plenum of the 
CC CPUz,266 internal dissent openly emerged within the party against the 
policies presented with such a great fanfare by the Post-Rashidovian 
establishment. Indeed, on that occasion Anishchev declared that the 
problems that had been identified in Tashkent were present throughout the 
republic, mentioning specifically formalism, protectionism, zemlyachestvo, 
and mestnichestvo as the origin of favoritism and patronage. Then, he 
                                                                
262 PV, 21427, 159, 12 July 1987, p. 1. 
263 In Navoi in 1986, the overall production decreased by 20.4 million rubles compared 
to 1985 and the production deficit for cotton amounted to 37 million rubles. PV, 
21435, 167, 22 July 1987, p. 1. 
264 PV, 21429, 161, 15 July 1987, p. 3. 
265 RGANI, f. 89, op. 36, d. 13. 
266 Prot. 6/1987, RGASPI, f. 17 op. 156, d. 2064. 
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declared that too many party committees were too tolerant of abuses and 
deficiencies.267 He even seemed to criticize the desant policy that apparently 
was against the criterion of arithmetical quotas in implementing recruitment 
directives and that seemed to violate the principles of korenization. 
As mentioned, mythical or real, the party had to reduce the scope of 
desantniki - or at least of its narrative – and was concerned, in the wake of 
the Kazak riots in Almaty, to avoid the emergence of that kind of scenario in 
Uzbekistan. As we have seen, even though the effective extent of the krasnyi 
desant policy was symbolically minimal,268 such theme was used against 
Usmankhodzhaev, who had started to be perceived within the party as a 
‘puppet of Moscow’ (“marionetka Moskvy”) and even as a traitor to the 
national interest. However, in the aftermath of the plenum, the idea emerged 
that the crisis was becoming chronic in the republic and such a negative 
situation had to be reformed at any cost. Again, the exploiters of the 
perestroika narrative had incredible advantages in this delicate phase and had 
                                                                
267 Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and Central-
Republican Relations in the CPSU, 77. 
268 In this regard, Chritchlow comments: “Three years after “interrepublican exchange 
of cadres” was proclaimed by Ligachev at the 1986 Moscow Congress, there were 
Slavs in prominent positions in the republic, but nearly all of their posts had been held 
by Slavs before the Congress, so that change was minimal. Central Asian incumbents 
retained their earlier slender majority of the Uzbek Party Buro and a majority of the 
new Party commissions created under the Gorbachev reforms of the Party apparatus. 
Perhaps the most striking evidence of Moscow's retreat was the fact that in 1989 
those two important Central Asian posts that had been wrested from native control, 
the Kazakh first secretaryship and the first secretaryship of the Tashkent gorkom, were 
restored to native tenancy. The preponderance of Uzbeks in obkom first 
secretaryships—that bulwark of the native elites—also remained unchanged. Indeed, 
a consolidation of oblasts put through in September 1988, was to reduce the number 
of non-indigenous incumbents of first secretaryships from two to one. […] The most 
telling sign that day-to-day control of the Party machinery remained largely in Uzbek 
hands was at the level of the raion organizations, whose important functions include 
recruitment to primary Party organizations, a major determinant of the overall 
composition of the Party. No comprehensive list of incumbents was available, but in a 
tally of seventy-one urban and rural first secretaries whose names were gleaned from 
the press in the latter part of 1987, in 1988, and in the first part of 1989, sixty-one (86 
percent) were identifiable by name as Muslims,” and only nine (13 percent) as Slavs, 
leaving one Ione Armenian in neither of those categories.” Critchlow, “Prelude to 
‘Independence’: How the Uzbek Party Apparatus Broke Moscow’s Grip on Elite 
Recruitment,” 151–52. 
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a very wide scope to criticize the party leadership for its inefficiencies. In 
contrast to the triumphs – fake or not – of the early ‘80s (the 6-million-ton 
triumphalism being the standout example), for 1987, the official cotton 
production plan total for the UzSSR was reduced to 5.250 million tons – so 
about one million less than seven years prior – and it is broken down in the 
following table. 
Cotton Production plan in 1987 in UzSSR (in thousand tons)269 
Region Raw Cotton Fiber 
Karakalpak ASSR 365 115.8 
Andijan 515 167 
Bukhara 410 134.9 
Jizzak 335 106 
Kashkadarya 521 166 
Navoii 150 47 
Namangan 415 133.9 
Samarkand 420 136 
Surkhandarya 480 148.5 
Syrdarya 379 117.5 
Tashkent 370 120.8 
Fergana 530 171.8 
Khorezm 360 114.8 
Total 5,250 1,680 
Nevertheless, the actual harvest was even lower than expected. In 
summer 1988, Kadyrov informed the SM USSR that the final crop (1987) 
reached only 4.858 million and that the share of lowest quality cotton had 
increased.270 In any event, the republican leadership would pay a heavy price 
for this shortage. In fact, the reduction of the raw cotton production was 
something of a disaster for the republican system and provoked the ire of the 
Soviet leadership, which was already involved in much more serious problems 
even on its internal front. At central level, there were harsh clashes between 
                                                                
269 The Chairman of SM UzSSR Kadyrov sent the memorandum n° 10-34-149 of 9 
October 1987 to the CC CPUz where he reported the production data of cotton in 
terms of raw crop and fiber. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 7207, ll. 106-107. 
270 In 1986, cotton of the 4th quality represented 9.4% of total production and in 1987, 
16.7%. However, the Uzbek government was able to reduce the costs of management 
from 3.1094 billion rubles to 2.2031 billion for January-August 1988. TsGARUz, f. 837, 
op. 41, d. 7412, ll. 7-8. 
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Yeltsin and Ligachev in the politburo (10 September 1987)271 gradually leading 
to both leaders splitting from the Gensek, while the solidity of the CPSU was 
rapidly crumbling under the weight of internal struggles. Similarly, in 
Tashkent there was an analogous scenario with a republican FS who was 
being forced to become much more transparent and factions exploiting 
perestroika themes and clashing within the CC CPUz. 
Then, Usmankhodzhaev tried to mobilize more popular support enforcing 
legislation that would remove any doubts about possible ‘colonial rule’ and 
would better meet the demands of the nationalist fringes of the UzSSR 
population. In early September 1987, the CPUz enforced a debate on the use 
of the Uzbek, Karakalpak, and other national languages, acknowledging that 
these languages were still poorly studied in the republic. Then, the CC CPUz 
announced a campaign to raise awareness of local languages and 
literatures.272  As well, in Moscow the party seemed to be taking heed of 
centrifugal forces and proceeded to discuss the problems of national groups 
within the whole country. During the CC CPSU secretariat meeting of 22 
September 1987 the lack of representativeness within the CC was discussed: 
It was said that among the workers of the apparat that there are no Azeri, 
Kyrgyz, or Tajiks. Only three departments – organizational party work, 
governmental advocacy and agriculture – have representatives of the national 
republics in senior positions, of whom one is Uzbek, two are Moldovan, and 
one Estonian.273 
The Soviet Union had to be reconstructed on the principle of peoples’ 
representativeness and this directive was evident at the All-Union level and 
even in Uzbekistan. However, in the UzSSR, besides the national compromise 
among ethnic groups, also the ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the clans 
seemed to be undermined and the latest wave of purges against the regional 
establishments created further discontent among the locale elites. In fact, in 
autumn 1987 the powerful Rashidovian Rashid Salakhutdinovich Ashuraliev 
was dismissed, having been the FS Samarkand obkom since February 1982. 
On 3 October 1987 he was replaced by the Nazir Radzhabovich Radzhabov 
who left his post as FS Namangan obkom, to be replaced by Buri 
Allamuradovich Allamuradov. This was a big deal. Radzhabov – one of the 
main Uzbek faces of the perestroika generation – was thus assuming the post 
                                                                
271 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 748. 
272 PV, 21477, 209, 12 September 1987, p. 1. 
273 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 226. 
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of a powerful Rashidovian in Samarkand, the alleged power center of 
Rashidov’s ‘clan’. However, Radzhabov’s appointment was a controversial 
measure inasmuch he was already at the center of a donos war from his 
appointment in Namangan in 1984.274 Thus, the actual FS Samarkand obkom 
was considered one of the greatest allies of Usmankhodzhaev, representing a 
famous example of that Post-Rashidovian generation of leaders who emerged 
after the XVI. Therefore, he was also in the center of an internal political war 
that, to some extent, attracted the support of the prokuratura investigations. 
Undoubtedly, his fate was marked. 
The 1987 cotton harvest was again disappointing. Production dropped 
from the previous year by 700,000 tons275 and that was delayed. In November 
– well behind the usual harvest schedule – the CPUz even mobilized public 
participation in the cotton harvest to the extent that even high school 
students were roped in.276 In parallel, another political crisis was about to 
engulf the Soviet Union. In fact, on 11 November 1987, the influential Yeltsin 
was ousted from the Moscow gorkom and on 18 November he was appointed 
first deputy chairman of the state committee for construction.277 Evidently, 
also at the All-Union level, the party no longer appeared as monolithic as it 
was supposed to. The signs of crisis were tangible. The recent power 
reshuffles in the sectors responsible for the myriad defects in cotton 
production,278 Moscow's impatience with the delays and agricultural failures 
in the UzSSR, the nationalist claims of the ethnic minorities, and the 
intolerance of local elites towards Usmankhodzhaev’s policy were key factors 
that would delegitimize the ruling FS CPUz. A further criticism of the 
ineffectiveness of party policy – and thus indirectly against Usmankhodzhaev 
– emerged even during the VII plenum CC CPUz of 17 December 1987.279  This 
was a last and desperate attempt to reaffirm the commitments of the party 
to improve the situation for the following year. However, at that time 
Moscow seemed not to trust anymore certain promises from Tashkent. 
                                                                
274 The content of these letters is reported in the appendix. 
275 PV, 21516, 248, 28 October 1987, p. 2. 
276 PV, 21532, 264, 15 November 1987, p. 1. 
277 Undoubtedly a minor post that would not overshadow the political career of a 
leader who gained popularity in the democratic minority of the party. Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union, 748. 
278 On 10 December 1987, Yu.P. Litvinyenko become the new minister for trade. PV, 
21553, 285, 11 December 1987, p. 1. 
279 Prot. 7/1987, RGASPI f. 17, op. 156, d. 2065. 
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Thus, 1987 was an emblematic year that defined the failure of 
Usmankhodzhaev’s moralizing recipe. His inconclusive attitude and his 
willingness to mediate would be seen as a sign of weakness. The unloved 
sekretar nol’ was therefore unable to present an image of determination and 
anyway failed the main task of the republic: namely, to fulfill the cotton plan 
for the fatherland. During his short reign, he was able to enforce a purge that 
was demanded with harsh tones from Moscow. However, these measures 
became much more functional to his political purposes. Until 1987, 90% of 
the chairmen of kolkhozes and sovkhozes had been removed from their 
posts,280 while he himself announced that from 1984 90.4% of the CC CPSU 
nomenklatura had been replaced as well as 76.6% of the CC CPUz.281 As we 
have seen, in these power reshuffles, thousands of officials were removed, 
prosecuted, and expelled from the party while 2,600 CPUz officials were even 
arrested and jailed.282 In place of these dismissed individuals, 
Usmankhodzhaev had tried to install a new ‘post-Rashidovian’ generation of 
politicians that were close to his entourage,283 and probably he also failed to 
have the consent of the regional power networks, becoming the main person 
responsible for the serious situation in a republic that would not heal. 
                                                                
280 Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to Gorbachev,” 136. 
281 Usmankhodzhayev, Prodolzhaia Delo Oktiabria Communist Uzbekistana. Tom II; 
Yaacov Ro’i, Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London-Portland: F. Cass, 1995), 
117. 
282 William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating 
Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 188–89. 
283 As Norling noted, "True to form, old colleagues and figures from Namangan and 
Andijan made notable career leaps under Usmankhodzhaev. Usmankhodzhaev had 
served as First Secretary of the Andijan obkom, Chairman of the Namangan 
oblispolkom, and head of the Ferghana gorsoviet; Ibragimov was previously First 
Secretary of the Ferghana obkom. Other examples of leading figures whose paths 
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5.3 Moscow’s viceroy 
1988 was an extraordinarily dramatic year for a host of reasons. In the 
whole USSR, perestroika was entering its ‘operative’ phase, while in parallel 
the firsts signs of nationalism and intolerance within many republics 
emerged.  This was particularly true in Uzbekistan. At the same time, the first 
indications of insubordination in the Baltic and in the Caucasus emerged. In 
Uzbekistan, the prospect of arresting decline was held out by the new 
political course of perestroika and the arrival of a new leadership team. 
5.3.1 The rise of Rafik Nishanov 
In Uzbekistan, purges and arrests continued to claim victims and the 
situation was still deeply uncertain. In preparing the next plenum, the 
secretary of CC CPUz, M. Khalmukhamedov, stressed the need for a radical 
change in ideological work and in the consciousness and thinking of party 
officials. Then, he emphasized the great importance of the press as a tool of 
democracy and transparency, in order to render politics effective, to improve 
economic education and to strengthen moral edification for public 
education.284 The wide dissemination of information was critical, and in 
pursuing this openness the party probably hoped to save its authority and 
moral integrity. However, a credible strategy to heal the republican situation 
was still missing and the only apparent solution was that someone had to 
take a step back. Then, during the VIII plenum of the CPUz (12 January 1988), 
the secretary of the CC CPSU Razumovsky285 stated that:  
The Comrade I.B. Usmankhodzhaev referred to the CC CPSU his resignation as 
FS CPUz, on account of the state of his health and his intention to retire. The 
Politburo of the CC CPSU approved the request because Usmankhodzhaev, for 
more than twenty-six years, had worked in the party and in the soviets and for 
more than four years was the head of the party organization in a very 
important moment for the party organs. [In fact, in this period the party 
organs] developed the fight to heal the life of the party and social life in the 
republic. Before the plenum, there was a meeting of the CC CPUz attended by 
most of the first secretaries of the obkom where they approved the decision of 
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the buro CC CPUz about Usmankhodzhaev.286 [...] CC CPSU has studied well all 
possible candidates, deeply analyzing all the alternatives, and decided to 
recommend to the post of FS CPUz Nishanov, Rafik Nishanovich,287 who is the 
chairman of the Presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet. [...] Nishanov has 
been invited to the CC CPSU, where the secretaries have talked to him, and 
was accepted by Gorbachev, with whom he had another meeting and this 
issue has also been studied in the CC CPSU Politburo meeting that took the 
decision to release Usmankhodzhaev for retirement and health reasons and to 
recommend Nishanov. [applause]288 
Then, the resigning sekretar nol’ stated that “in all the places that I 
covered, I tried to work well and honestly,” recalling how he had managed 
these “difficult” four years in Uzbekistan. He thanked the CC CPSU and the 
politburo for the support they had given over the years.289 “Now the situation 
has improved and the struggle that began with the participation of the CC 
CPSU against all negative phenomena is continuing.” Then, he declared his 
fatigue with the difficult work in recent times and his gratitude to everyone 
who approved his request to resign. Finally, he stated that he was on the 
mend but “after treatment I will be ready to work together with you and 
make a contribution to the common cause.”290  
Besides the nice utterance, Usmankhodzhaev resigned indicating vague 
reasons. In his words, there was the melancholy of an incredulous person 
who probably felt abandoned by the party.291 Usmankhodzhaev, in fact, knew 
well that he was about to face the hardest moment of his life and so resigned 
to save face. Besides the stories that emerged – which we will consider in the 
next chapter – after that plenum in January 1988 Usmankhodzhaev 
substantially disappeared from public life. Now, after Usmankhodzhaev’s 
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dismissal, the last member of the former Rashidovian establishment was 
finally ousted. He was the initiator and then became a victim of a system of 
suspicion and slander that would make him as one of the major accused of 
the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’. 
In his short reign after Rashidov’s death, he had to face a very tragic 
moment in which he felt the attacks – direct or indirect – of those fringes of 
the party that wanted to manipulate the ‘fight against the negative 
phenomena’ for their political interests. The ‘revenant’ Nishanov, was a clear 
example. After his return from ‘exile,’ he rose through the ranks in the 
republican apparatus and finally ascended to the leadership of the CPUz. If, to 
some extent, Usmankhodzhaev had been legitimized in his post by his long 
career spent in Uzbekistan, Nishanov was seen by a part of the Uzbek elite as 
an outcast, a careerist, and a collaborator in Moscow’s officiousness in the 
internal affairs of the republic. For a part of the Uzbek leadership that was 
still bound to the old establishment, his appointment seemed to push matters 
from the frying pan into the fire. Abdullaeva’s memoirs show us the partisan 
view on this leadership change, revealing evidence of the struggle within the 
CPUz apparatus: 
Usmankhodzhaev did not have the courage and the ability to follow the path 
of renewal. He was the typical leader whose word never converged with the 
facts. By nature, he was unprincipled and somewhat apolitical. Unfortunately 
for Uzbeks he was replaced by R. Nishanov – a man prone to deception and 
forgery. He did his best to hide his predecessor in prison and in this way to 
take his place.292 
Evidently, Nishanov did not have the support of the local elites but was 
backed by Moscow to the point of making him a strong candidate. In fact, 
Rafik Nishanovich appeared as a credible Soviet statesman, a “member of the 
Tashkent elite and a longtime Moscow-based Party apparatchik”293 who was 
defending Moscow’s demands for higher cotton production. Again, the 
effective production of cotton was the key issue to be legitimized from the CC 
CPSU and, in this consideration, even Gorbachev was not so different from his 
predecessors. Furthermore, Nishanov was personally esteemed by the 
Gensek who, as we will see, gave tokens of appreciation on several occasions. 
Under Nishanov’s reign, the purges and the krasnyi desant policy 
remained – and to an extent were even ramped up.  Despite the effective 
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scope of the Uzbek purges,294 Nishanov was criticized to be another sponsor 
of the ‘Russian-oriented chistka.’295 This narrative - enforced by the 
nationalist forces in Uzbekistan pushing the idea of the ‘Andropov’s polygon’ 
– created an idea of a republic torn by purges and represented the CPUz as a 
collaborator of Moscow’s ‘terror.’ Indeed, the new FS CPUz leadership 
suffered from the ‘weight’ of the glasnost era, when many scandals about the 
‘Uzbek cotton affairs’ emerged, sensitizing the population of the republic and 
creating a further alienation and disaffection towards the Soviet government 
represented by Gorbachev and Nishanov. According to Collins, this context 
delegitimized “both the CPU[z] and Nishanov, who was increasingly excluded 
from the informal functioning of the Uzbek political system.”296 
Under Nishanov’s reign, other anti-Rashidov Tashkenters previously 
disappeared from the political stage297 remerged and were finally 
rehabilitated and welcomed back to Uzbekistan to take minor posts.298 In any 
way we want to evaluate Nishanov – loved or hated; statesman or careerist; 
orthodox communist or political opportunist, etc. – he had to face a very 
critical situation in the UzSSR and secured the agreement of Moscow to 
recover what could be saved and to restore a healthy image of the republic 
after the failures of the preceding establishment. Again, the main strategy to 
pursue was self-criticism and cotton commitments. Indeed, on 19 January, 
the tolerance towards the practice of child labor emerged as an inconvenient 
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issue for the party. Also in PV, the party admitted cases of children who had 
died or become ill in the cotton fields. Therefore, considering the scarce 
results obtained from using child labor to harvest the crop – estimated for 
1987 at only 250 thousand tons – a political debate to reconsider such 
practices emerged within the CPUz.299  
In parallel, the criticism was then enforced also in agriculture300 and in the 
‘white gold’ sector. The CPUz admitted that average annual cotton production 
was estimated at 5.159 million tons in 1981-1985. The exact figure for 1986 
was 4.989 million tons and 4.858 in 1987,301 far below the levels that were 
publicized by Usmankhodzhaev some months before.  
On 30 January 1988, during the IX plenum CPUz, Nishanov emerged as an 
energetic leader fully devoted to the cause of cleaning, moralizing, and 
healing the republic from malfeasance. He reconsidered the figures of the 
scam and stated that between 1978 and 1983 over 4.5 million tons of raw 
cotton had been falsified at a cost of 4 billion rubles. For these facts, “many 
officials had been punished but some of them were not responsible for this 
economic sabotage.”302 Substantially, he stated that previous efforts were 
insufficient to combat against the negative phenomena, and harshly reported 
other exemplary cases of mismanagement in the party and in the government 
of the UzSSR. Despite the hard comments against the head of government, 
Kadyrov was able to keep his post for the whole Nishanov's mandate. 
Thus, criticism against opponents – and even allies - became a pillar of the 
FS CPUz political discourse. This ‘meta-criticism’ - damning the lack of 
criticism as the main problem of Uzbekistan - was a way to create a clear 
boundary from the previous regime. The Rashidovian ‘blind tolerance’ and 
the lack of effective criticism by Usmankhodzhaev were so denounced by 
Nishanov who kept prompting his political discourse on an alleged ‘objective’ 
(and systemic) criticism against everything and everyone at any cost.303 
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Nishanov’s approach had the clear effect of irritating the lower leadership, 
leading to a culture of criticism downwards that resulted in the middle 
bureaucracy being the victims of constant reprimand. Similarly, also the first 
deputy chairman of SM UzSSR, V.I. Ogarov, proceeded with an indirect 
criticism towards the former FS Usmankhodzhaev and the state 
administration, revealing how in 1986-1987 alone we were lost 2 billion 
rubles in economic inefficiencies, and during 1984-1987 alone about 200 
officials of the party nomenklatura had been ousted for the negative 
phenomena, abuse of power and forgery.304  
A recipe that was exposed during the IX plenum, was the 
“democratization of party and social life, affirming and strengthening glasnost 
in all spheres, criticism and self-criticism, initiative and creative research.”305 
Nishanov was perfectly following the moral narrative of perestroika and 
probably for his own purposes, blaming the previous leaderships for the 
social and economic shortages in the republic. The situation in the republic 
was so nervous that even Ambassador Matlock, during his visit to Tashkent in 
February 1988, noticed an atmosphere that due to the Uzbek affair was very 
tense and generally heavy.306 However, in Uzbekistan, during the buro 
meeting held on 24 February 1988, a campaign against ‘repositioning 
practices’ was announced on all fronts and Nishanov confirmed his 
commitments to effectively remove compromised figures. In his report, he 
stated: 
There are still phenomena of the repositioning of the cadres who have been 
fired for negative phenomena from their leadership posts. [...] Obkoms, 
gorkoms and raikoms show a liberal attitude and unjustified indulgence to 
people who were dismissed for forgery, bribery, abuse of power, theft, and 
other violations. As a result, many of the workers who were fired from the 
nomenklatura for negative phenomena had reappeared in [other] places of 
leadership.307 
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Then, Nishanov underlined the prevalence of this phenomenon in the 
obkoms of Bukhara, Jizzak, Karakalpakya, Kashkadarya, Ferghana, and 
Tashkent, affirming that: 
The unscrupulousness that is exposed in the party committees towards the 
managers who are compromised, the attempts to divert them from their 
responsibility and to prevent the process of uprooting the negative 
phenomena in the republic, generate the relapses of forgery, theft and other 
violations, undermining the confidence of the people in social justice and 
holding perestroika back.308 
Furthermore, he noted that the unjustified rotation of cadres was 
especially prevalent in the oblasts of Bukhara, Navoi, Tashkent, and 
Karakalpakya where in 1985-1987 almost a third of the gorkom and raikom 
secretaries had been in their posts for less than a year.309 Some more data on 
the phenomenon circulated in a CPUz buro’s document (annex 5), revealing: 
[O]bkoms, gorkoms and raikoms reconsidered their liberal decisions that had 
already been made against more than 100 executives who have made 
violations and that had been reprimanded or sanctioned by the party [...] 
Recently, more than 360 workers of the obkoms’ nomenklatura were fired 
because they were compromised, as well as 527 figures who did not fulfill their 
responsibilities and duties [...] At the same time, the analysis of the situation 
showed that the Party committees did not implement the CC CPUz buro 
resolutions. As a result, between workers of the nomenklatura of the CC CPUz 
who were fired for negative phenomena, a quarter of them is still operating, 
while in the obkom nomenklatura an eighth [of those fired] is still active.310 
Basically, the ‘limited tolerance’ of the previous years was over, 
disappointing all those figures who had been in some way ‘forgiven’ for their 
negative behavior. Far ahead, in the buro meeting of 9 March 1988, Nishanov 
warned of the dangers posed by nationalism in the spheres of economy, 
culture, and habits of the Uzbek people.311 Not casually, the moralizing 
mission of Nishanov was connected with aspects of the Uzbek culture and – in 
particular – with Islam, which in those weeks was reemerging as a challenging 
issue.312 Similarly, in a CC CPUz meeting on the implementation of perestroika 
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in the party and in the media (16 March 1988), the FS CPUz stated: “the key 
work to be done by the professional intelligentsia, scholars, and educators 
during the next stage of perestroika, as the processes of democratization and 
fundamental economic reform move ahead,” was reconfirmed.313 According 
to the FS CPUz, the “corruption, nepotism, patronage, squabbling, and 
nationalistic fervor that have been spreading at our universities are cause for 
concern.”314 
As mentioned, Nishanov increased the influence of other ‘revenants’ that 
were returning from ‘exile.’ A good example is Sarvar Alimdzhanovich 
Azimov315 who returned to Uzbekistan and on 18 March 1988 became the 
new MID UzSSR.316 This was a very delicate post that – as we have seen in the 
first chapter – had to mediate between the USSR and Middle East, even 
dealing with the Afghan problem. On 8 February 1988, Gorbachev announced 
the withdraw of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the CPUz and SM UzSSR 
had the responsibility of managing the first logistics of these operations. 
Between 6-8 April 1988, Gorbachev even came to Tashkent317 to meet with 
Najibullah and to define the terms of the Soviet withdrawal. On that occasion, 
Chernyaev reported that Gorbachev also wanted to “show his support for 
Uzbekistan, whose people had been completely demoralized318 by the 
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exposés of corruption there.”319 The formal international agreements on 
Afghanistan were made at Geneva on 14 April and from mid-May the first 
Soviet troops started to return, passing through the ‘bridge of friendship’ that 
connects the Uzbek city of Termez with the Afghan hub of Mazar-i-Sharif.320 
Besides Azimov, who in any case has been called to cover Nishanov’s 
former post in such a delicate moment, there was a further power reshuffle in 
the UzSSR and Usmankhodzhaev was finally ousted from his post in the 
presidium for ‘retirement reasons.’321 In addition to news about the 
leadership change it is interesting to note that, as a consequence of glasnost, 
the newspapers started to openly report the debates within the party and 
soviets’ sessions, revealing disconcerting details. For example, during the VIII 
session of the SS UzSSR, Sh. Yakubov, a member of the department of 
Gosbank USSR in Uzbekistan, analyzed the critical economic situation, baring 
that the economic problems were connected with the cadres’ management 
and to bureaucratic distortions and noting how the failure of the plans had a 
chronic character and state money was spent in vain.322 On the same 
occasion, also Aleksander F. Klepikov, the FS Syrdarya obkom, affirmed that 
the period of negative phenomena has affected not only the education of the 
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people but also the social and economic development of the oblast. In his 
words:  
Most of the leaders of the party, soviets, and agriculture organs in the years of 
rashidovshchina were mired in corruption, forgery, and zemlyachestvo. They 
reasoned according to their personal profit and not according to the people's 
needs. [...] This lenience passed from the top and established the right to 
dispose of the property of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz without control. This has 
resulted in not only in theft, forgery, and violations of socialist principles and 
social justice, but has also undermined the friendship among peoples.323 
In parallel, also at state level, criticism had been ‘institutionalized,’ 
becoming an issue in the political discourse of the republican bureaucracy. 
Then, during the plenum of the SC UzSSR, its chairman, S. Zhigitalyev, also 
reiterated that in some regions of the republic there was wastage of public 
funds, while groups of corrupters and thieves were firmly rooted in many 
oblasts. Then, he outlined that the damage they had caused to the economy 
of the republic, which ran to hundreds of millions of rubles, but in addition 
emphasized the moral loss that had been done to the consciousness of the 
people.324 At the same time, the ‘scapegoatism’ against the ‘monsters’ of the 
past was even exasperated by a part of the Uzbek intellectual elite. Then on 7 
May 1988, a meeting was held in Moscow between newspaper editors, 
writers, and cultural figures. There, the chairman of the USSR State 
Committee for publishing, printing, and the book trade, Nenashev - he should 
not be confused with Nishanov - referred about the deformations within the 
party apparatus, presenting the Rashidov’s case as an emblematic example.325  
This critical approach was well appreciated in Moscow. Also Gorbachev 
seemed to trust Nishanov and believed his honesty was in no doubt. Indeed, 
on 15 April 1988, during a meeting among the Gensek and the second 
secretaries of the republics, obkoms, and raikoms, Gorbachev affirmed: 
I was in Uzbekistan. I liked Nishanov. Together we went everywhere. I tried to 
support the people who suffered for rashidovshchina. When Rashidov, among 
other things, [was in power] the following “principle” always prevailed: “Since 
I’m the first secretary, then the only thing I produce are victories for the 
economy!”. This is a mindset that must be abandoned in every way.326 
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Interestingly, the replacement of Usmankhodzhaev with Nishanov can be 
read as a symptom of the central political trends marked by the 
marginalization of the ‘conservative’ faction. Despite Usmankhodzhaev was 
probably not a ‘conservative,’ he was associated with a ‘declining figure’ as 
Ligachev and had the support his organizational department for the whole 
Uzbek affairs. Probably, the replacement of a ‘Ligachevian’ figure with a 
‘Gorbachevian’ loyalist seemed to locally reflect the divisions of the center. 
Indeed, Gorbachev clearly appreciated Nishanov’s line of ‘objective criticism’ 
and trusted a leader who did not pretend to be a champion of the economy. 
Thus, even Nishanov’s modesty became a key legitimizing issue for the Uzbek 
leadership, following a typical narrative of Gorbachevism.  
Hence, the Gensek seemed to accept the principle that it was better to 
plan for less production, in the knowledge that it would actually be delivered, 
than inflated promises of plans that would never be fulfilled. He renewed his 
trust in Nishanov’s work to heal the republic and confirmed his mandate. The 
Gensek probably had no other choice than to trust the new FS CPUz, given he 
was the only figure demonstrably far from localist mentalities. In this phase, 
Nishanov seemed also to have won the consent of the CPUz ‘old guard’ and 
on 21 April, PV confirmed the support of the party ‘veterans’ to the 
Nishanov’s policy, repudiating the old leadership of the party.327 Then, 
following this narrative, other Uzbek figures of the pre-Nishanov regime were 
accused. During the CPUz buro meeting of 18 May 1988, the ‘Hero of Socialist 
Labor’ awards of the prominent figures Rakhimov328 and Khamraev329 were 
retracted and their moral condemnation enforced. 
                                                                
327 PV, 21658, 92, 21 April 1988, p. 1. 
328 B.R. Rakhimov was the FS of the obkoms of Khorezm, Andijan and Samarkand. "He 
exaggerated its merits and hid serious defects". He had received the title in November 
1973. Then, when Rakhimov was the deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR, he "had an 
irresponsible attitude to the leadership of the agro-industrial complex of the republic,” 
and "under the influence of Rashidov showed ruthlessness and condoned voluntary 
decisions that achieved the stagnation in the development of agriculture." Thus, he 
had "contributed to the squandering of funds, the spread of theft, corruption, fraud, 
and forgery that in the cotton industry alone between 1982-1983 came to some two 
million tons." Prot 64/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2022, ll. 14-15. 
329 N.R. Khamraev, "when he was the director of Gravsredazirsovkhozstroi, had taken 
the path of systematically violating socialist principles and inculcated the vicious 
practice of territorial development and diverting funds in the construction of 
unplanned goods. He did so using the patronage of Rashidov. Additionally, he created 
a fake atmosphere of welfare while forgery, corruption, and theft prospered. On 16 
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In the meantime, the press started to publish citizens’ complaints. Most of 
these were related to the need to reform the cadre system,330 while others 
narrated incredible stories related to Rashidov’s life of luxury.331 While these 
‘mafia’ stories certainly thrilled public opinion, the data on crimes and 
delinquencies remained alarmingly high. Indeed, on 6 June 1988, the buro 
discussed the warning data on crime and revealed that in the previous year 
alone in Uzbekistan, more than 66,000 criminal cases had been opened, with 
a sixth of them remaining unpunished.332 This was in line with the warning 
data of crime at All Union level. According to a US intelligence document: 
Crime [in USSR] has become more and more highly organized. The “peak” in 
reported economic crimes was in 1986-87. In those years 282,800 and 279,000 
crimes, respectively, were reported. During that same period 306,600 and 
302,300 individuals were prosecuted.333 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
January 1981 he became a hero of the Socialist Labor. However, his misdemeanors 
and his "noble" [aristocratic] lifestyle were revealed." Prot 64/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 
157, d. 2022, l. 15. 
330 An letter published on 11 May 1988 in PV exemplified these. It declared a need to 
“exclude careerists, people engaging in fraud, liars, pimps, and hypocrites [...and all] 
those figures for whom the party card had become a passport to personal gain.” PV, 
21674, 108, 11 May 1988, p. 1. 
331 At the same time, many scandalous stories emerged that aimed to discredit 
Rashidov even more. The former FS CPUz was portrayed as a sort of ‘godfather’ (or 
even a ‘Khan’), a historical figure with well-known negative connotations in the Soviet 
narrative. Indeed, on 19 June 1988, an article titled “The Khan’s house” appeared in 
PV. It outlined how Rashidov had acquired many homes around Uzbekistan. According 
to the article, in 1982 one of these estates was donated by the former FS Jizzakh and 
was served by a “personal railway station” (connected with a well-paved road up to 
his residence) so that he could get directly to his home by train. The house had red 
granite stairs and glass doors, with decorations on the walls, a mosaic parquetry floor 
made of different types of wood, empire-style furniture, a projector room, a billiard 
room, and a sauna. The article noted the curiosity of the public in finding out exactly 
how it looked. In the few months following Rashidov’s death it was abandoned, and 
then became a sanatorium. PV, 21708, 142, 19 June 1988, p. 1. 
332 Prot 66/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2024, l. 3. 
333 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-90-024. 8 May 1990. Soviet Union. Political Affairs,” 1990, 64. 
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Economic Crimes Reported (number of cases)334 
Union Republic Total 
Percentage variation 
compared to 1987 
  1987 1988 1989 1988 1989 
RSFSR 160,361 151,825 146,215 -5.3 -8.8 
Ukrainian SSR 34,739 33,555 33,144 -3.4 -4.6 
Belorussian SSR 9,847 9,727 9,810 -1.6 -0.8 
Uzbek SSR 18,684 16,898 17,295 -9.6 -7.4 
Kazakh SSR 21,021 20,344 20,360 -3.2 -3.1 
Georgian SSR 6,017 6,061 5,825 +0.7 -3.2 
Azerbaijan SSR 5,427 4,686 4,632 -13.7 -14.6 
Lithuanian SSR 3,095 2,820 2,688 -8.9 -13.2 
Moldavian SSR 2,776 2,550 2,453 -8.1 -11.6 
Latvian SSR 2,165 2,145 1,765 -0.9 -18.5 
Kirghiz SSR 3,060 3,070 3,198 +0.3 +4.5 
Tajik SSR 3,178 2,882 2,947 -9.3 -7.3 
Armenian SSR 2,856 1,836 2,039 -35.7 -28.6 
Turkmen SSR 2,616 2,260 2,345 -13.6 -10.4 
Estonian SSR 1,049 698 757 -33.5 -27.8 
USSR 276,891 261,357 255,473 -5.61 -7.74 
However, comparing the data on economic crime, we can see how the 
number of cases in Uzbekistan was actually lower than in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan and, after reaching a peak in 1987, the number of registered 
crimes was even decreasing.335 Nevertheless, the system was suffering much 
more from other alarming and more serious phenomena that would threaten 
stability and that would lead to its collapse within a few months. 
                                                                
334 Ibid., 65. 
335 Despite the easy conclusions on the effectiveness of the moralizing campaign, we 
can skeptically comment positive results evidencing how this ‘decrease’ could be due 
to a general reduction of complaints. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia 
dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
421 
 
5.3.2 Hopes of recovery and reform disillusions 
Between 28 June and 1 July 1988, the XIX All-Union Conference of the 
CPSU was held in Moscow. The convocation of such a conference was an 
extraordinary event: the first from 1941. On that occasion, corruption was a 
major theme and Yeltsin gave a very sharp speech where he was particularly 
critical of Mikhail Solomentsev – the chairman of the PCC CPSU – “for being 
too slack and too tolerant in this regard.”336 We will consider the event in 
greater detail also in the next chapter, particularly in relation to its 
implication in the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’. For now, it is enough to state that 
the conference was also central for affirming Nishanov’s political discourse. 
On 1 July, the FS CPUz confirmed the commitments of the republic for cotton 
production and to improve discipline in the party work. Nishanov then 
delivered a sharp message that laid out Uzbekistan’s wretched situation – 
from which the necessary reconstruction would need to begin – and 
attempted to justify the ongoing problems in the republic. In his words:  
[A]fter decades of fraud and falsification of agricultural production, and 
especially in cotton, very serious consequences have emerged. Today those 
responsible have gotten what they deserved. The atmosphere in the republic 
is purified and the lost faith of the people in truth and justice has been rebuilt. 
Of course, we have critically [and better] understood the time of stagnation 
and rashidovshchina, but already now it is clear that the biggest and most 
tragic mistake was agricultural policy [...] It formed a tangle of problems that 
has to be resolved, in which there are also ecological issues, concerns about 
the use of water resources, and problems with the education of cadres. Other 
agricultural and industrial problems also remain.337 
Nishanov was at pains to point the finger for all this squarely at Rashidov. 
In his lust for power during a quarter century of rule he had pursued 
disastrous policies in order to please Moscow and, in particular, Brezhnev. 
However, Nishanov’s speech thus indirectly brought Moscow into the frame 
of criticism, and suggested that the Uzbek leadership was no longer prepared 
to indulge staraya ploshad at any cost. In many ways during the XIX 
conference, history was invoked to build up the notion of Uzbekistan as long-
standing victim of Soviet excesses.  References to the cult of personality of 
Shchelokov and Rashidov as negative examples of recent CPSU history were 
                                                                
336 Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis, 227–28. 
337 PV, 21719, 153, 2 July 1988, p. 3. 
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common during the proceedings.338 Nishanov went even further back in time, 
commenting that: 
The people of Uzbekistan have directly experienced the results of cruel diktat 
and unbridled lawlessness during the reign of Stalin’s repressions. A deep 
moral wound was inflicted on them during the years of the triumphant march 
backward, when servility, perfidy, and deception allowed a leader and medal 
grabber like Rashidov to acquire ten Orders of Lenin and two Gold Stars and, 
on top of that, to pick up a Lenin Prize. Who gave these orders to Rashidov? 
Brezhnev, of course, and his closest associates. Why did they award them? 
Simply because they themselves were money grabbers.339 
Thus, many obscure aspects of history were presented by the FS as a kind 
of Soviet ‘original sin,’ inherited by recent generations as well as by the 
leadership called to make order in the republic. This kind of narrative, pushed 
from a figure who appeared determined – and somehow authoritarian – 
seemed to strengthen Nishanov’s role. However, the image of a corrupt 
republic - that was an object of mockery - was greater than that of a republic 
on the mend. Sadder still, there were manifestations of intolerance even at 
the popular level. For example, during this difficult season even the 
prestigious Tashkent state university became an object of derision while 
during the XIX conference, some of the 45 delegates from the UzSSR were 
attacked for their alleged involvement in the mafiya.340 Evidently, the 
statements of Nishanov341 had a boomerang effect that was thrilling the 
Russian nationalist about the malfeasance in a parasite peripheric republic of 
                                                                
338 Similarly, other criticism emerged against the fact that Chernenko could be elected 
despite being so unpopular among communists and that he became Gensek while 
gravely ill was an indication of a corrupt system, of which Uzbekistan was an unwilling 
victim. PV, 21719, 153, 2 July 1988, p. 4. 
339 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 190; Barukh Ḥazan, Gorbachev’s Gamble : The 19th All-Union 
Party Conference (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 279. 
340 D’Encausse, La Gloire Des Nations Ou La Fin de l’Empire Soviet́ique, 46. 
341 On 29 June 1988, in the middle of the conference, TASS reported Nishanov’s 
statement where he declared that, from late 1983, 100 officials in Uzbekistan had 
been indicted for corruption, 3000 had been demoted and 18,000 party members had 
been expelled. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account 
of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 163; Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet 
Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 
1990), 303. 
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USSR. This excess of self-criticism would inevitably irritate the nationalist, 
turning a part of the Uzbek establishment against the ‘stranger’ Nishanov. 
The more substantive results of the conference were its reformist plan. In 
fact, Gorbachev wanted to relaunch a 'healthy' image of a country that was 
too much limited in its development by bureaucracy. He figured that the 
solution was a gradual shift of power from party to state organs and he 
proposed, during the May 1988 CPSU plenum and during the XIX CPSU 
conference in July, a constitutional reform on four pillars.342 This reformist 
plan had the ambition to democratize the Soviet Union, given that it was still 
bureaucratized, centralized and, to a significant extent, authoritarian. 
This call for democratization of the Soviet system also heard at the 
republic level. The CPUz buro meeting of 13 July 1988 was devoted to the 
implementation of the “urgent executive measures from the decisions of the 
XIX All-Union CPSU conference.” On that occasion, Nishanov recalled how the 
UzSSR had been criticized for stagnation in agriculture and how the levels of 
consumption per capita in Uzbekistan were the lowest in the USSR. He noted, 
also, that central and local organs still received many complaints about 
disruptions in the supply chain of meat products, milk, fruit and vegetables 
and on the high prices in the markets.343 According to the FS, a radical change 
in productivity, diversification, and improvement in the quality of goods had 
failed to occur, because many organs of the party, soviets, and agricultural 
organizations showed sluggishness and political myopia.344  
Also during the CPUz buro meeting of 23 June 1988 the latest data on the 
ethnic composition of the republic were discussed. It was noted that the 
Tajiks – one of the largest nationality groups – amounted to some 700,000 
people while in Tajikistan more than a million Uzbeks were living. This group 
was represented by 12 deputies in the SS UzSSR while 3.1% of party members 
were Tajik: 44 Tajik members of the CC CPUz (1.3%), 438 in the obkoms (3%) 
and 1686 in gorkoms and raikoms (3%). Additionally, it was noted that an 
official CC CPUz Tajik-language newspaper titled “Khakikati Uzbekiston” was 
                                                                
342 The first was to create a presidential system, followed by the creation of a new 
parliament based on the CPDSU. Thirdly, the power of local soviets at expense of the 
communist party would be increased so that the party would be distanced from state 
economic management in order to discourage corruption. Finally, on 1 July the end of 
the CPSU monopoly on economic and other non-political sectors was also approved.  
343 Prot 68/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2027, l. 18. 
344 Prot 68/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2027, l. 19. 
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in circulation. The paper came out three times per week, in the Tajik 
language.345 All of this pointed to the fact that the largest ethnic minority – in 
1989 about 4.7% of the UzSSR population346 – was politically 
underrepresented in the republic. 
However, these apparent openings were not met with changes in the old 
methods with which the UzSSR had been ruled for decades. In this sense, 
democratization in many ways was something that existed more in theory 
than in practice. In the immediate aftermath of the XIX conference, Nishanov 
proceeded with a new wave of reshuffles.347 Then, in summer 1988, the FS 
CPUz proceeded with a wave of far more unpopular reforms that deeply 
irritated local elites. To begin, he promoted the adoption of decrees that on 
28 July abolished 13 ministries, leading “the office holders in the defunct 
ministries to be “transferred to production”, in effect losing the privileges 
they had held in the party nomenklatura.”348 Then, in August, the boundaries 
of several oblasts and raions were redrawn,349 abolishing many rural 
districts.350 Of even greater relevance was a fresh hit by Nishanov’s against 
Rashidov’s network, eliminating the oblasts – and the related obkoms – of 
Jizzakh and Navoi,351 and transferring a part of the Samarkand oblast to the 
Bukharan one.352 The FS CPUz’s motivation was probably to reduce the 
                                                                
345 Prot 67/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2025, ll. 15-17. 
346 Nancy Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 43. 
347 On 28 July, M.A. Zaidov became the new minister of education (PV, 21739, 173, 29 
July 1988, p. 2), and on 30 July, I.S. Umarov and V.A. Antonov became the first deputy 
directors of the Uzbek gosagropom (state agricultural industry). T.A. Alimov was 
appointed chairman of the UzSSR state committee for the safety of nature, and S.N. 
Ismailov the chairman of labor and social security committee of the UzSSR (PV, 176, 
21742, 2 August 1988, p. 2). 
348 Norling, “Myth and Reality: Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan,” 255. 
349 In 1988, the UzSSR changed its administrative structure, introducing also territorial 
changings in kishlaks and raions. GARF, f. R-7523, op. 145, d. 2857, ll. 1-54. 
350 Norling comments: “This far-reaching measure affected thousands of Uzbek 
officials in prominent positions. For example, on August 18, 1988, 20000 specialists 
were “released to production” following the elimination of rayons.” Ibid. 
351 With the decree of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR of 6 September 1988, the Navoi 
oblast is merged with that of Samarkand and Jizzakh in to Syrdarya. PV, 21771, 205, 7 
September 1988, p. 1. 
352 A decree of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR of 16 May 1989 transferred a part of the 
Samarkand oblast territory to Bukhara. In this move, the cities of Zarafshan, Navoi, 
425 
 
influence of the patronage networks that Rashidov had overseen – or at least 
tolerated – during his long reign.353 Attacks on other prominent figures within 
the party followed in short order. On 10 September, the FS Tashkent obkom 
Alimov was replaced by the former FS Khorezm Mirakhmat Mirhadzhievich 
Mirkasymov. In Khorezm, on 12 September 1988, Rimadzhan Matnazarovna 
Khudaibergenova became the FS Khorezm obkom, the chairwoman of 
Khorezm oblispolkom, and the first woman to cover such a high post in the 
republic. 
These unpopular measures shaped a view of Nishanov as a sort of 
‘viceroy’ of Moscow in Uzbekistan. However, the FS CPUz tried to explain his 
policy in several interviews he gave in autumn 1988. For example, on 17 
September 1988, PV republished an interview that Nishanov gave to 
Argumenti I Fakty where the Uzbek leader commented his political program - 
based on “purification with the truth” – and presented his version of the 
facts. The process of restoring order among the UzSSR cadres, he asserted, 
had already started in January 1984, when the obkom FSs Karimov and 
Gaipov were accused of corruption and forgery and expelled from their posts. 
The group of CC CPSU “specialists” (he was probably referring to the krasnyi 
desant) that came to Uzbekistan to assist the republican party and to restore 
the Leninist norms of party life was an additional milestone in the 
rejuvenation narrative he was outlining. This group had uncovered serious 
violations of law and order, theft, forgery, and corruption. According to 
Nishanov, this catastrophic situation was the legacy of the previous distorted 
practice of cadre selection, which had been based not on political and 
managerial characteristics but on kinship and zemlyachestvo. In his words, he 
defined a sort of feudal system where,  
many secretaries of raikoms felt they were Knyaz [princes] who arbitrarily 
stole and forgave malfeasance according to their own prerogative. For them it 
was not hard to force the law enforcement bodies to decline to prosecute 
somebody.354 
Then, following Nishanov’s narrative, the CC CPSU significantly 
contributed in defining the XVI plenum directives, where it was admitted that 
                                                                                                                                            
Uchkuduk shifted, as did the raions of Kanimekh, Kyziltep, Navoi, Tamdyn, and 
Uchkuduk. PV, 21980, 114, 17 May 1989, p. 1. 
353 However, despite the symbolic attack against Rashidov, Nishanov was anyway 
responding to a broader campaign promoted by Moscow to redefine oblasts in the 
Union. 
354 PV, 21780, 214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
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annually the republican accountants had falsified data for at least 400,000 
tons of non-existent cotton. However, also in that occasion 
many details had not been revealed because among the participants there 
were still many perpetrators of these crimes […] and the old cadres did not 
have the energy to settle those tasks. [This is why], the main problem was 
restoring effective cadre policy. […] In the first phase, it was necessary to oust 
unconditionally all those persons who had been compromised [with the 
negative phenomena], and then to change all those officials who appeared as 
weak workers – even if they were honest – recommending [new cadres] who 
deserved those posts for their political and managerial characteristics. This 
process was far more than a day’s work and it is still in progress. […] In the last 
four years, 58,000 workers have been removed.355 
Nishanov – who had already served in the CC CPUz in 1963-1970 – 
recalled how these phenomena were already well known then. However, 
‘rashidovshchina’ had seen the whole thing tolerated. Thus, Nishanov directly 
recalled that the honest people who had tried to complain to the center 
against the local abuses were prosecuted356 and considered the rising 
nationalism and ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan and in Nagorno Karabakh, 
stating that also in Uzbekistan there was a similar risk. Thus, he affirmed that 
such an explosive situation would be again imputable to a depraved cadres’ 
policy that has “hindered the strengthening of intra-national relations.” Once 
more, the responsibility was laid at the feet of Rashidov: 
[I]t is now clear to all what kind of writer and manager Rashidov was. As far as 
international education and cotton cultivation are concerned, there were 
many falsifications, treating lead as if it were gold, and much ado about 
                                                                
355 PV, 21780, 214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
356 In his words: “Because of Rashidov’s intrigue, the FS Tashkent obkom, R. Gulamov 
was removed. His letters to the CC CPSU on the situation in the republic were blocked 
by Rashidov who was, as you know, in good relations with Brezhnev. Now Gulamov is 
the chairman of the SS UzSSR and the director of the republican council of war 
veterans and labor.” [Similarly he also recalled] M. Mukhamedzhanov and Kh. 
Abdullaev, the former second secretary of the CC CPUz, R.E. Melnikov, the former 
director of the SM UzSSR, A. Alimov, and all others who have experienced the anger 
and revenge of the “noble patron.” Anyone who tried to protest and to argue with 
Rashidov or stick to his own position was immediately removed from the place under 
one pretext or another. In the late '60s and early '70s, this fate also befell the FSs of 
the Bukharan (K. Murtazayev) and Namangan obkoms (M. Ibrakhimov).” PV, 21780, 
214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
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nothing […] hiding the negative moments [also in other sectors such as] law 
enforcement, science, culture, party cadres, and awards.357 
According to Nishanov, not just in Uzbekistan but also in Kazakhstan and 
in the other Central Asian republics it was necessary to define the real 
situation and the real possibilities of each republic. The goal was to fix the 
economic priorities along the social development, also balancing the cultural 
demands of the ethnic minorities - Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Turkmen and 
Crimean Tatars - and other nationalities living in Uzbekistan. This call for 
‘objective criticism’ claimed to be a recipe for the whole Soviet problems. 
Then, he recalled again the importance of the CC CPSU support by  
sending to Uzbekistan hundreds of experienced and reliable Communists. 
These methods of large-scale assistance have been carried out in Uzbekistan 
for the first time in thirty years. The arrival of new people has helped to 
accumulate experience of organizational and political work within the party 
[…] and building an atmosphere of glasnost and democratization […] In the last 
year alone, in the plenums, in the aktivs, and in the buros of party committees 
the role of 2449 party managers was redefined and in the primary 
organizations of the party 28,872 and about 40,000 managers were elected 
democratically. [However,] masked supporters of the past [are still active and] 
are using various kinds of demagogic tricks to fight against perestroika, trying 
to gamble on the national feelings and mestnichestvo. But is undoubtable that 
Communists and the workers will see who really fights for perestroika and 
who, under the guise of glasnost and support for democracy, seeks to reverse 
this trend.358 
Finally, Nishanov denied any interpretation that would identify cotton as a 
problem for the republic – because of the risks of monoculture and pripiski – 
and confirmed the republican commitments to ‘white gold’. He affirmed that:  
cotton was and remains an important and internationalist contribution by the 
UzSSR to the social division of labor as the backbone of the economy. As we 
recently revealed in the plenum, the food program in any way does not 
contradict the cultivation of cotton. [However, it is correct to say that] the 
agricultural mechanism that has existed oriented the farmer not to the focus 
on quality but on quantity. The work of the cotton grower was focused on the 
final production of fibers but in terms of raw material harvested. In 1985, the 
CC CPSU and the SM USSR accepted the offer of the Republic to consider [the 
final production] in terms of fiber. The MCC - in which departments 
“clandestine millionaires” held this moonlighting shamelessly plundering the 
                                                                
357 PV, 21780, 214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
358 PV, 21780, 214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
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state – was abolished. These examples gave [effective] results. In 1983 the 
production of cotton fiber was 26.6% [of the raw cotton harvested] while in 
1987 it rose to 32.2%. Compared to 1983, from cotton processed in 1987 the 
production of fibers increased by more than 270,000 tons and of oil for 26,000 
tons, with a total value of more than 500 million rubles.359 
After affirming these improvements in the economy, and in the cotton 
sector in particular, Nishanov then remarked that unfortunately 
the health situation in the republic has been criticized more than once in the 
pages of newspapers and magazines and in television, but the situation is 
improving. In the short term, 400 administrative buildings and structures – of 
which 162 have been put to use as prevention centers –have been delivered to 
the medical institutions of the republic. The buildings that were built for 
Rashidov’s family and his entourage were also converted into prevention 
centers for workers of the Tashkent municipality. […]. A building with 60 
apartments in Tashkent has been set aside for the veterans of WW2 and 
handicapped people.360 
Then, the FS CPUz was asked to evaluate the activities of the USSR 
prokuratura in Uzbekistan and he stated that: 
With positive results, we work closely with the workers of the USSR 
prokuratura and law enforcement agencies of the republic. They have done 
much and are doing even more to restore order in the republic in identifying 
and prosecuting corrupt officials in the entourage of Rashidov and all those 
who have been stained by the ills of forgery, abuse and fraud. The fight is 
acute and the main weapon in the fight are not words but the facts. But I 
would like to stress that the organs of the prokuratura could not do an 
effective job without the strong support and help from a part of the party 
organs. This support helps to expose the negative phenomena and to correct 
the errors. The effectiveness of results – and first of all in the improvement of 
the conditions of people's lives – is a major criterion on which the workers are 
able to evaluate every one of us.361 
Nishanov effectively appeared as a firm Soviet leader who had been 
formed in the Moscow establishment and probably a devoted communist 
who apparently remained far from the ‘clan’ logics. However, as we have 
seen, those dynamics were – and are still – crucial in the Central Asian 
scenario. Probably, in making his own crossing of the ‘Uzbek Rubicon’ his aim 
was not to establish a Caesarean dictatorship. Rather he assumed he could 
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360 PV, 21780, 214, 17 September 1988, p. 2. 
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enlist the support of the local ‘generals’ in order to establish Uzbekistan as a 
Moscow trust territory. Apparently this happened, but only for a short period. 
The conjuncture of events and the enmities within the party would result in a 
conspiracy against Moscow’s viceroy. In fact, Nishanov was probably too 
honest (and perhaps inexperienced) to see how failing to enlist the support of 
the local elite was a crucial aspect of the internal legitimation that he was 
progressively losing. However, he kept his promises and supported the Soviet 
cause while the state was changing its shape.362 
Then, in the middle of the cotton harvest season, new scandals emerged 
and inflamed the public opinion. On 30 September inefficiencies and 
falsifications in the Jizzakh area received new publicity. More than 22,000 
tons of its produced cotton (11,61%) had apparently been lost, compared to 
the general wastage rate of 4,76%.363 This indicated that, also after its 
dismemberment, the Jizzakh area was condemned to a perpetual moral 
                                                                
362 In fact, the Soviet system was under a new wave of reform that touched also its 
constitutional structure. From September 1988, a debate on constitutional reforms 
expanded rapidly, particularly after Gorbachev’s appointment to the post of Chairman 
of the Presidium SS USSR on 1 October 1988. Replacing Gromyko in this position, 
Gorbachev became the effective head of the Soviet state. Later, on 1 December 1988 
a wide constitutional reform was adopted, creating the institution of the “President of 
the USSR” to which Gorbachev was fully appointed on 15 March 1990. Other 
important reforms were implemented in spring 1990. Among them, we can recall the 
"Law on languages of USSR peoples" that in early May established Russian as a 
"common language" and created a sort of bilingualism in schools, names, and official 
documents in every republic. This law substantially formalized a situation that was 
already effective. On 4 June the 'Enterprise Act' was then approved and on 12 June the 
law on press freedom, in which it was basically stated that the media could have been 
founded and managed not only by the state, public organizations, political parties and 
other associations of various kinds, but also by "any citizen above 18 years of age." 
Moreover, despite censorship in mass media was formally prohibited, a responsibility 
for officials who communicated information covered by state secret persisted. After 
70 years of official atheism and a single party system, on September the "Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" was finally approved as well as 
the law on political parties that recognized formally those parties with at least 5000 
registered members (10 October). Paolo Biscaretti di Ruffia, 1988-1990. Un Triennio Di 
Profonde Trasformazioni Costituzionali. In Occidente, nell’URSS, Negli Stati Socialisti 
dell’Est Europeo (Milano: Giuffrè editore, 1991), 27–95; Matlock, Autopsy on an 
Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 748. 
363 PV, 21791, 225, 30 September 1988, p. 3. 
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trial.364 In the Andijan oblast – specifically in the sovkhoz Kuibyshev – the 
massive and illegal use of child labor for the cotton harvest continued,365 as 
well as in the Yangiyulsky rayon where students were harvesting cotton 
instead of preparing for their exams.366 Besides these scandals, in mid-
October 1988 there was an incredibly dark week of arrests of many of those 
former CC CPUz officials that had been dismissed from their posts due to poor 
performance.367 
                                                                
364 In the late ‘80s, Jizzakh was regarded as a sort of ‘Uzbek Corleone’, a capital of the 
local mafia. In reality, it was just a small city that seemed to be destined to decline 
after Rashidov’s death. 
365 PV, 21796, 230, 6 October 1988, p. 1. 
366 PV, 21803, 237, 15 October 1988, p. 4. 
367 This was probably responding to a strategy where the party – and Nishanov 
primarily – was ousting many of its members in accordance with the investigative 
organs of the central prokuratura. We have already seen that Nishanov had a direct 
role in ousting, with the complicity of the prosecutorial organs, some of his rivals. At 
the same time, as Anishchev recalled in his memoirs, it is probable that the party 
leaders were to some extent committed – to do not say forced – to execute the 
requirements of the prosecutors. All this would lead to one of the most dramatic 
events of our story. O 19 October 1988, during the ‘black Wednesday’ of the ‘Uzbek 
cotton affair’ the former chairman of the presidium of the SS UzSSR Akil Salimov was 
arrested. At that moment, he was also rector of the Tashkent institute for irrigation 
engineers and agricultural mechanization. In the same wave, the former FS CPUz 
Inamzhon Usmankhodzhaev and the former CC CPUz secretary Abdullaev were also 
detained. The next day the former FS Tashkent obkom Musakhanov was arrested and 
a part of the Post-Rashidovian cadres ousted: On 19 October, after one year in the 
post, the FS Samarkand obkom Nazir Radzhabov was arrested and finished in the 
investigations of the Gdlyan’s groups. According to Ilyukhin, Razhabov was a honest 
person and a victim of Gdlyan’s ‘terror’. He was replaced by Anvar Salikhovich 
Ikramov, while the FS Bukhara obkom Ismail Dzhabbarov was arrested and replaced 
on 22 October by Damir Salikhovich Yadgarov. In fact, also Ismail Dzhabbarov was 
implicated in the cotton affairs. On 19 October 1988 he was dismissed form the Uzbek 
buro, arrested and presented to Moscow authorities who confined him in the prison 
n° 4 of the MVD USSR. His innocence was revealed on 6 march 1990 when the court 
released Dzhabbarov. Simultaneously with the verdict Court issued a special ruling 
addressed the Prosecutor General of the USSR and noted that all the charges, and 
obtain all of the facts of bribery during the investigation were fabricated, allowed a 
clear outrage against an innocent person. The court demanded that the Prosecutor 
General of the mandatory investigation of violations committed Gdlyan and Ivanov 
and some other investigators. Then, on 22 October, , Khamdam Umarov, one of the 
survivors of the purges and who has been in the post of FS Ferghana obkom since 
1978, was also finally replaced by the former second secretary of Syrdarya obkom, 
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This is probably the moment when we could say the chickens had come 
home to roost. The party was officially reporting in the press about the 
dismissal of officials. However, arrests were confined to a certain level of 
‘secret zone’, and rumors about what was happening in the republic started 
to circulate, creating a sense of popular disaffection towards the leadership. 
Amidst all this drama, Moscow’s viceroy was probably powerless to do 
anything but to follow the course of events and to keep describing the 
situation with the usual ‘emergency situation’ narrative, while the press was 
attempting to justify a situation that probably was out of control.368  
                                                                                                                                            
Shavkat Mukhitdinovich Yuldashev. Ilyukhin, Vozhdi I Oborotni. Prervannoye 
Rassledovaniye; Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo. 
368 Indeed, following the spirit of glasnost, PV published an article entitled “there are 
no zones of silence,” about those facts that under the leadership of Rashidov and its 
affiliates spread: nepotism, corruption and zemlyachestvo were typical element that 
endorsed disorder in the republic and ‘serious ideological deviations’. This article – 
which emphasized the role of Rashidov and Salimov in creating the conditions for the 
dramatic events – was a perfect example of how the CPUz leadership was attempting 
to justify a situation that probably was out of control. It had to show how, “in the 
years of Brezhnev and Rashidov, in the conditions of distorted consciousness a 
generation of executives, scientists and cultural workers was formed and [now] 
competes with perestroika.” According to the article, “The personal talent, managerial 
quality, honesty, decency, and respect for the principles [did not characterized] the 
“master” who, at first, selected cadres by their servility and dishonesty in order to 
remain at their posts. In the CC CPUz some posts remained vacant until there were 
relatives and trustworthy people [to place there]. In the republican AN, elections for 
leadership posts were reserved for some candidates who did not grow in the scientific 
[framework…] The apparatus workers who were unwelcome and that dared to criticize 
the actions of Rashidov and his environment, were treated with the most severe 
conditions. [Rashidov and friends] blackmailed, slandered, and even physically clashed 
with [their rivals]. Rashidov and other leaders in the apparatus of the CC planted the 
seeds of suspicion and discord, and controlled the workers through the apparatus and 
the administrative bodies. For example, a manager of a department of the CC CPUz 
was sent to the sanatorium Uzbekistan in Yalta where R. Gulamov spoke about 
Rashidov and his circle. Gulamov then fell into disgrace because he spoke against 
Rashidov. Another case is that of an executive who was sent to Moscow to sabotage 
the dissertation defense of the wife of another opponent, S. Aribov. […] R. Nazarov 
was a secretary of the party and the director of the laboratory at the institute of 
experimental biology. When he was chosen as secretary of the party organizations he 
was opposed strongly but [survived].” Then the article reported that in 1981, during a 
council of the institute, all board members were against his reelection, but thanks to 
Rashidov’s intervention he was reelected and his main critic – A. Kuchkarov, the 
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The massive wave of purges and arrests of senior officials seemed to be a 
successful step in Nishanov’s agenda. Similarly, on 12 November the 
fulfillment of the cotton plan with a final crop of 5.25 million tons was 
announced.369 Even Gorbachev - who stopped in Tashkent during a tour to 
India – met with the CC CPUz buro and congratulated the Uzbek leadership 
for the positive – or at least tangible – results.370 Evidently, Nishanov was still 
well appreciated by the center and Gorbachev who considered him as a 
strong ally in the region. However, the Uzbek leader’s popularity within the 
republic dramatically dropped and the discontent for the moralization policies 
rose. 
Then, during the CPUz buro discussion of 6 December 1988, a new list of 
‘villains’ - reported in accordance with the OrgOtdel and the PCC of the CPUz 
– was added. In the list, other prominent figures were purged, such as Ismail 
Dzhabbarov (point 45), Radzhabov Nazir Radzhabovich (point 46),371 and Akil 
Salimov Umurzakovich (point 47). They were all expelled from the CPSU for 
violations of the party rules, abuse of power and corruption. Then, at point 
48, further information of the CC CPSU and prokuratura USSR was added, 
arguing the name of the former FS CPUz. These documents informed that 
Usmankhodzhaev was already under arrest and on trial for violations of the 
party rules, abuse of power and corruption. Thus, he was excluded from the 
CPSU. Therefore, the buro discussed about the opportunity to report this 
situation in the XII plenum (to be held the day after).372 The decision was 
positive. Indeed, the shocking news about the former leaders was presented 
in the incredible plenum held on 7 December 1988. On that occasion, the FS 
CPUz proved a series of examples of negative phenomena, railing against a 
part of the nomenklatura that had been dismissed in accordance with the 
prokuratura. Indeed, on that occasion Nishanov noted how: 
I. Dzhabbarov, when he was secretary of the Navoi obkom, took bribes, 
abused his power and with the decision of the buro CC CPUz was relieved from 
                                                                                                                                            
author of the article – was ousted and slandered as an alcoholic. He lays a lot of the 
responsibility also to Salimov, who had just been arrested. PV, 21813, 247, 27 October 
1988, p. 3. 
369 PV, 21828, 262, 13 November 1988, p. 1. For the first time in recent years the plan 
was even exceeded for 100,000 tons, reaching a harvest of 5.35 million tons. PV, 
21844, 278, 1 December 1988, p. 2. 
370 PV, 21832, 266, 18 November 1988, p. 1. 
371 Prot 75/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2033, l. 20. 
372 Prot 75/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2033, l. 21. 
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the post of FS Bukhara obkom because he was compromised and according to 
the CC CPSU plenum of November is expelled by the candidates of the CC 
CPSU. Currently he is in detention and has been convicted. [As well,] Nazir 
Radzhabovich Radzhabov, when he was secretary of the Bukhara obkom, then 
chairman of the constructions and housing ministry in the agriculture 
department, took bribes from several officials. By the decision of the CC CPUz 
buro, Radzhabov was relieved from his post of FS Samarkand obkom because 
he is compromised for abuse of power. Currently is detained and has been 
convicted.373 Akil Umurzakovich Salimov, when he was secretary of the CC 
CPUz and chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR, received large bribes 
from officials. During the CC CPSU plenum of November he was expelled by 
the candidates of the CC CPSU because he is compromised and now he has 
been arrested and sentenced. [...] In the CC CPSU the materials of the 
prokuratura USSR were presented  and a copy sent to the CC CPUz. [In this 
documentation] it was evidenced how Usmankhodzhaev Inamzhon 
Buzrukovich has been arrested and condemned on corruption charges . The 
documents indicate that Usmankhodzhaev’s guilt for corruption has been 
confirmed by many testimonies. Usmankhodzhaev, admitting his guilt, gave 
testimony against himself regarding the true extent of his criminal activity.374 
Substantially, the party was following the evolutions of the ‘Uzbek trial of 
the century’ - that we will examine in the next chapter – and maybe even the 
policy (or diktats) of the prokuratura USSR. In the context of glasnost, despite 
the importance of the news, PV reported in minor fanfare that the plenum of 
the CC CPUz expelled from the CPSU Dzhabbarov, Radzhabov, Salimov and 
Usmankhodzhaev “because they were compromised.”375 Considering these 
filtered labels, we can hardly believe in the effective transparence and 
modest democratic scope376 of glasnost in Uzbekistan where the most serious 
purge of the perestroika times was still claiming victims. The final tally arrived 
in late 1988. A memorandum from the prokuratura of Uzbekistan to the 
central committee outlined the full extent of complicity in the ‘Uzbek cotton 
affair’. It reported that a total of 18,000 thousand people had been involved. 
Of these, 4,500 people had already been brought to justice. Among the guilty 
                                                                
373 Prot 12/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2011, l. 14. 
374 Prot 12/1988, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 157, d. 2011, l. 15. 
375 PV, 21849, 283, 8 December 1988, p. 1. 
376 “Only 12 gorkom and raikom secretaries (including five first secretaries) were 
elected on a competitive basis in 1988, and only two-thirds of PPO [primary party 
organizations] secretaries and members of gorkom and raikom bureaux in Tashkent 
city were elected from two or more candidates.” Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. The 
Organization of Power and Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU, 78. 
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were 69 party and soviet high officials, 84 cotton-cleaning factory directors, 
1,640 experts and specialists, and 430 heads of kolkhozes and sovkhozes. The 
remaining 13,000 foremen and accountants, heads of offices and 
departments were exempt from criminal liability and punished with measures 
of social and party action.377 
Even amidst all this crisis and drama Nishanov was content. On the eve of 
his first anniversary as FS CPUz he could reflect on the fact that, during his 
time in office, he had ousted his main rivals, satisfied the requests of the CC 
CPSU in terms of cotton, and managed to see through a criminal prosecution 
of the Uzbek cotton affairs. He no doubt credited himself as an honest, 
credible, and dutiful communist leader. Nevertheless, whether he was able to 
see it clearly or not, he had broken the compromise between the clans and 
sowed discontent among the elite. These people were ready to turn on him at 
a moment’s notice, when the time was ripe. 
Thus, Nishanov’s political discourse narrated a new version of moderate 
triumphalism that linked the commitments in ‘cleaning’ the republic with the 
production of effective and higher qualitative cotton shares. The publicized 
result was: in 1989, Uzbekistan would produce and sell to the Soviet state 1.5 
million tons of cotton fibers.378 However, it was important to keep production 
effective. Considering the depletion of the land and the fear of not realizing 
the plan, there was an increase of 40,000 hectares in the land area sown with 
cotton379 and a parallel increase in ‘illegal lands’ under cultivation.380 
Moreover, even more shortcomings were revealed in the cotton industrial 
complex.381  
                                                                
377 Kinokompaniya Pigmalion, Zoloto Dlya Parii. Khlopkovoe Delo. 
378 PV, 21868, 2, 3 January 1989, p. 1. 
379 PV, 21877, 11, 13 January 1989, p. 2. 
380 In 1988, had been revealed 2,700 hectares of abusive cotton fields. PV, 21865, 299, 
30 December 1988, p. 3. 
381 In January 1989 were reported losses in the industry of the UzSSR. The fault was 
given to the inefficiency of the Soviet productive system in Uzbekistan, with many 
obsolete and defective productions. Only in the first semester of 1988, Uzbekistan lost 
12 million rubles for failing to comply with the standards required. Therefore, the 
arbitral court requested 3.2 million rubles from vendors who have been provided with 
faulty products. Also in 1987, the arbitral court of the Moscow oblast asked a 
compensation amounting nearly to a million rubles from the cotton factories, and 
imposed fines for more than 721,000 rubles for the delivery of poor quality fibers. PV, 
11, 21877, 13 January 1989, p. 2. 
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Then, as tradition dictated, the new year saw mass purges in the top posts 
of the UzSSR,382 while signs of popular impatience leaked out. Above all, 
nationalism and ethnic claims were challenging the Soviet power with greater 
momentum. In fact, as in the other republics of USSR, also in Uzbekistan the 
use of the national language started to be much more discussed even at 
academic level.383 Therefore, the CPUz debated on the use of the national 
(Uzbek) language that, as we have seen in the previous chapters, was the 
most diffused among the population. The core issue was in compromising the 
role of a common administrative language - that since the colonial epoch was 
Russian – and the nationalist claims. The party admitted that in the years of 
stagnation the Uzbek national language was not effectively taught in the 
schools, contradicting the spirit of art. 36 of the Soviet Constitution.384 As in 
the rest of USSR, in Uzbekistan there was a debate on implementing 
bilingualism and this course was promoted as part and parcel of 
perestroika,385 consituting a very remarkable movement in the direction of 
nationalism. 
These debates on the national dimension of the UzSSR proceeded parallel 
to the main results on the ‘Uzbek affair’. On the long wave of the ‘Uzbek trial 
of the century’, on 9 January the SC USSR condemned the former chairman of 
                                                                
382 On 3 January, A.R. Atadzhanov became the first deputy chairman of the SM UzSSR 
and director of the republican Gosplan, and P.M. Abdurakhmanov deputy chairman of 
the SM UzSSR (PV, 21869, 3, 4 January 1989, p. 1). Then, on 6 January, R.A. 
Giniyatullina and A.Kh. Tadzhieva became first deputy directors of the agroindustrial 
committee of the republic (PV, 21872, 6, 7 January 1989, p. 1). 
383 In December 1988, the Tashkent state university held several conferences on the 
use of the Uzbek national language. Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural 
History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and 
Iran, 135. 
384 “Article 36. Citizens of the USSR of different races and nationalities have equal 
rights. Exercise of these rights is ensured by a policy of all-round development and 
drawing together of all the nations and nationalities of the USSR, by educating citizens 
in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, and by the possibility to 
use their native language and the languages of other peoples in the USSR. Any direct 
or indirect limitation of the rights of citizens or establishment of direct or indirect 
privileges on grounds of race or nationality, and any advocacy of racial or national 
exclusiveness, hostility, or contempt, are punishable by law.” SS USSR, Constitution 
(Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics : Adopted at the Seventh 
(Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 
1977. (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1977). 
385 PV, 13, 21879, 15 January 1989, p. 3 
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SM Karakalpak ASSR Erezhep Aytmuratov.386 Nishanov presented these 
results as a first step of a greater and longer campaign against corruption. 
However, he was probably ignoring the restlessness of the national elite 
groups that would not bear another wave of purges. The tension between 
Nishanov and the nomenklatura was much more evident. Then, on 18 
January, the prokuror UzSSR D.A. Usatov and the Vice President of the AN 
UzSSR E. Yu. Yusupov announced in the press that despite the many efforts,  
the struggle against the negative phenomena of the past is still not complete. 
People who have come here to the republic from other regions of the country 
are providing a great deal of help in this work. They have not only helped us, 
but have also themselves needed our help and support […] The negative 
phenomena of the past has manifested on a wide scale in Uzbekistan and has 
been uncovered with the help of a large circle of specialists from all regions of 
the country. For a number of years. Uzbekistan has been the principal – 
practically the only – laboratory where all the types of negative phenomena 
from the period of stagnation have been studied. Well-substantiated 
conclusions have been drawn. The lessons of such “laboratory analysis” have 
helped to accelerate a clean-up, not only within the republic, but also the 
country. However, another extreme [consequence] has also appeared. The 
newspapers intoxicate [the readers] with the terms “the Uzbek affair” and 
“the Uzbek Mafia.” This is, naturally, demeaning to the feelings, the honor and 
the dignity of people who have honestly created material and spiritual riches 
which are necessary to the country. As a result of their own lack of 
farsightedness, certain people have wanted to ascribe to this process a narrow 
regional and national coloration. I have spoken about this earlier. It is a good 
thing that PV was the first to rebuff those who have wanted to clothe the 
crimes in Uzbekistan in national dress.387 
                                                                
386 Aytmuratov was accused of bribes totaling some 80,500 rubles. In the Abdullaeva's 
testimony of 27 November 1987 emerged that in 1980 he gave her a 5,000 rubles’ 
bribe for Rashidov because he wanted to take the place of the Secretary of the Central 
Committee instead of Zh. Kurbanov, the seriously ill secretary for agriculture of the 
CPUz. Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo. 
387 In parallel, the interview reported alarming data on violent and organized crime, 
stating: “Last year there was an increase in all registered crimes and particularly of 
such serious types as premeditated murder, premeditated serious bodily injury, 
robberies, thefts, and rapes. Almost every third registered crime is theft of state 
property and the personal property of citizens. During recent years alone, more than 
20 bandit groups have been uncovered. One of them, the Yakubov and Boloshin gang 
(a total of 33 criminals belonged to it), committed 76 crimes within the republic from 
1981 to 1985. Altogether, bandit groups committed 49 murders, nine attempted 
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These great statements and attitudes did not take account of the fact that 
the whole republican nomenklatura was exhausted after continuous purges, 
cadre reshuffles, and unremitting criticism even against the Uzbek intellectual 
society. Finally, also Pulat Khabibullaev – scientist and chairman of the 
presidium SS UzSSR – was accused388 with political pretexts and his 
unavoidable demise was generally regarded as an unacceptable interference 
against an honest figure. Then, on 6 March 1989, he was finally ousted “for 
serious defects in his work” and the new ‘head of state’ of the UzSSR became 
Mirzaolim Ibragimovich Ibragimov.389 Nishanov seemed then to abandon also 
his closest allies, inflaming protests in the Uzbek intellectual community and 
leaving just scorched earth around him. 
At the eve of 1989, the FS CPUz presented in the press the results of his 
rigorous economic recipe. Basically, he admitted that Uzbekistan was not able 
to produce more than 5 million tons of raw cotton. Thus, he demanded a 
further reduction of the productive figures for about 250-300 thousand tons 
less.390 This request – disclaiming the Moscow’s demands - seemed to be 
                                                                                                                                            
murders, 337 robberies, and about 2000 thefts of personal and state property.” FBIS, 
“JPRS-UPA-89-031. 19 May 1989 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs,” 1989, 31–32. 
388 On 20 January 1989, during the buro meeting, M. Zakhidov – deputy party 
secretary of the Tashkent State University – denounced Khabibullaev, scientist and 
chairman of the presidium SS UzSSR. According to the first, the latter used his personal 
connections with former compromised executives and violated the financial discipline 
when he headed AN UzSSR. Allegedly, he also supported Rashidov's son in law to 
become the first deputy director of the academy. Then, he also reported that 
Usmankhodzhaev’s wife was employed in the institute of nuclear physics with a salary 
of 165 rubles (Prot. 78/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1513, ll. 2-3). Then, Pulat 
Khabibullaev, chairman of the presidium of the SS UzSSR was ousted from his post 
because of his involvement in relationships with persons compromised in the 'Uzbek 
cotton affairs'. According to PV, he also violated financial discipline when he was 
president of the AN UzSSR. Moreover, it reported that he had helped into the 
academy the son of Khudayberdyev and the former right-hand of Rashidov. He had 
also helped the career of A.I. Muminov, the husband of Rashidov's daughter, who in 
1983 became the first deputy director of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the AN 
UzSSR. The wife of Usmankhodzhaev had also been placed in the Academy of Sciences 
as a research scientist, but she never showed for work, produced nothing, and still 
took the salary. PV, 21885, 19, 22 January 1989, p. 1. 
389 PV, 21922, 56, 7 March 1989, p. 1. 
390 The FS CPUz declared that in 1988 the volume of industrial production had 
increased by 3.3% over the previous year as well as the national income by 5.1%. In 
1987 it had risen only by 0.8% over the previous year. Then, Nishanov recalled how 
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necessary. In fact, the party finally acknowledged the impossibility of 
producing more than that share, evidencing how the republican kolkhozes 
and sovkhozes in 1988 used any source, energy and piece of land to fulfill the 
plan.391  
In parallel, the press published with greater emphasis the calls of the AN 
UzSSR discussing the disaster of monoculture, and denouncing the ecologic 
tragedy in the republic where lands were impoverished, while rivers, lakes, 
land and air became much more polluted. An article concluded that “white 
gold is both the pride and the pain of the Uzbek people,”392 detailing a 
situation that everybody wanted to renegotiate with the Muscovite planners. 
Similarly, other articles pointed to the economic disadvantages of producing 
cotton compared to more remunerative yields.393 This kind of problems was 
even discussed within the politburo –  and directly by Gorbachev – with a 
certain economic sensitivity. Probably still committed to the ideal of a 
planned and specialized economy, Moscow seemed nevertheless chastened 
by issues within the periphery and wanted to find a compromise. For 
example, during a meeting with workers on 14 February 1989, Gorbachev, 
discussed both central planning and hyper specialization in the Soviet 
economy, stating:  
Uzbekistan provides cotton for our industry. In return it is supplied with meat 
from Ukraine and from the RSFSR. But the Uzbeks may say, why do we need 
meat from other republics? We produce “three harvests” in a year, and we can 
                                                                                                                                            
twice (in 1985 and in 1987) the CC CPUz had asked the CC CPSU and SM USSR to 
decrease the demand for Uzbek cotton while the twelfth FYP (1986-1990) had planned 
to reach an annual productive share of raw cotton of 6.25 million tons. However, after 
the persistent scandals related to falsifications, pripiski, and corruption in the cotton 
sector, in 1985 the productive goals were reduced to 5.75 million tons. Then, in 1987, 
the CPUz asked that these commitments be reduced by another 750,000 tons but the 
CC CPSU agreed to a decrease of only half a million. 
391 While the plan had set aside an area of 1.97 million hectares for the purposes of 
reaching the plan target, in the end the collective and state farms had to sow about 
2.016 million hectares in order to reach this objective. PV, 21886, 20, 24 January 1989, 
p. 1. 
392 PV, 21888, 22, 26 January 1989, p. 2. 
393 For example, an article announced that despite the selling price of meat and cotton 
being practically equivalent (1200-1223 rubles per ton), producing a ton of cotton was 
much more expensive in terms of cost than producing a ton of meat. PV, 21889, 23, 28 
January 1989, p. 2. 
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produce our own meat! And we would not have to steer so much cotton for 
export!394  
These doubts, uncertainties and anxieties were questioning the very 
essence of the Soviet system and stoking further distrust. This theme 
reemerged also during the Politburo session of 16 February 1989 when, after 
mooting the ‘Lithuanian knot’, the Gensek discussed the redefinitions of 
national economies and their relation with the center. On that occasion, 
Gorbachev gave the example of Uzbekistan that  
remains a “cotton republic”. Such has its history, and our national complex, 
been defined. But there is a debate […] on how to irrigate fertile lands, which 
are now under cotton, in order to grow food, fruits and vegetables, and to get 
more with less effort. But Uzbekistan will eventually lose a lot if it elects to go 
down the road of self-sufficiency. Each republic has its own strength. We are 
detecting issue  after issue - large and small ones. So to combine the general 
and the particular in our great federation, to serve one another. And vice 
versa.395 
Apparently, the Gensek understood the problem and pushed for reforms 
in Uzbekistan. However, he was not figuring a solution far from cotton 
monoculture. Then, Kadyrov, the chairman of the SM UzSSR, replied:  
our cotton gives the country 70 billion rubles, but we get from the center [just] 
1 billion. Previously, 1 million children were used in the harvest, now only 53 
thousand. Nevertheless, the press attacks persist against us.396  
Kadyrov was essentially arguing that the CPUz had fulfilled its duties while 
remaining under constant negative assessment by the CPSU and public 
opinion. Glasnost was exacerbating this, with its focus on relentless criticism. 
The Uzbek leadership could just reaffirm its commitments to do everything 
possible to heal the atrocious situation, pointing out that Uzbekistan was 
slowly recovering its healthy condition. Thus, Nishanov also emphasized the 
UzSSR’s perestroika credentials in the press, representing a republic that was 
upholding the demands of the XXVII congress CPSU for “improvement of 
relations between the nations of Uzbekistan with the conditions of 
democracy and economic and social perestroika.” The FS recalled how 
Uzbekistan was integrated into the Soviet system early, providing the 
homeland with two thirds of its cotton needs. The tense situation among 
                                                                
394 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 457. 
395 Ibid., 463. 
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national Uzbeks and the ethnic minorities came up, and Nishanov laid the 
blame for this on previous leadership too. In his words: 
The stagnation of recent decades had a general impact across the country, but 
in the republic of Uzbekistan it was stronger and in a worse shape. […] The 
officials with the assignments were amoral and did great harm to the republic. 
[…] Rashidov and rashidovzy [Rashidovians] proclaimed the tenets of 
internationalism and equality, but in fact cultivated mestnichestvo, 
protectionism, and the customs and traditions of the lords of the Middle Ages 
[…] They did not count the needs of the ethnic groups who lived in Uzbekistan, 
including Tajiks, Koreans, Uighurs, Crimean Tatars and others.397 
On 30 March, Pravda published an interview with Nishanov where the FS 
CPUz congratulated the republic for over-fulfilling the cotton plan - the first 
time it had even been met in five years.398 On the question about “cotton or 
food”, he replied that it was not an opt-out choice:  
Both cotton and food [are necessary]. Let us not forget that the UzSSR is an 
integral part of a huge country. We must run our economy in a way that will be 
good for both ourselves and others.399 
Apparently, Nishanov confirmed the cotton commitments - in line with his 
immediate predecessors - binding the republic to 2.5 million tons of cotton 
fiber annually, of which 700-800 thousand tons would be available for 
                                                                
397 PV, 21912, 46, 24 February 1989, p. 1. 
398 It is not only the weather [that has brought these results]. It is greater organization 
and discipline. We have moved to contract forms of labor, are introducing intensive 
technologies and are regulating the harvesting conveyor. This has enabled us to grow 
a good harvest, to procure over 5.36 million tons of raw materials, primarily of first 
and second class quality. As calculations show, now it is possible to produce no less 
than 1.72 million tons of fiber, whereas previously, during the very heat of the fake 
record-setting mania, no more than 1.6 million tons were produced. Nevertheless, the 
volume was some 750,000 tons less than the 1983 plan had envisaged. On this, 
Nishanov explained: “The problem has not been conclusively solved. Of course, the 
plan amount has been adjusted to take into account that part of previous harvests 
that were merely falsified in reality. A plan decrease was needed in order to restore 
reality to the plan. According to calculations we should decrease the sowing area by 
200,000 hectares and decrease the production volume of raw materials by another 
300,000-350,000 tons in order to bring annual gross yield to 5 million tons. On this 
question, we find understanding and support in the party central committee and the 
country’s government.” FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-031. 19 May 1989 - Soviet Union. Political 
Affairs,” 89–91. 
399 Ibid. 
441 
 
export.400 In parallel, the CPUz started to state a reformist plan for the 
economy and other social services.401 Then, the Uzbek leader affirmed that 
cotton was anyway destined to remain a protagonist of the republican 
economy. These commitments were also confirmed during the plenum of the 
SC UzSSR (13-14 April) where the need to better assess agriculture, 
investigations and the evaluation criteria on the selection of managing cadres 
was discussed as a priority of the judiciary agenda.402 Despite the ‘moralizing 
measures’ of the ‘cotton affair’ seemed to be almost over,403 Nishanov 
recalled that the work of the prosecutors was not finished.404 An ambiguous 
avowal that would bother the impatient nomenklatura.  
The enthusiasm and optimism for perestroika seemed to contradict the 
uncertainty of a turbulent period. Despite the hopes, many dramatic events 
puzzled the legitimacy of the reforms and were symptoms of an irreversible 
crisis of a system entered in a terminal stage. The episodes of interethnic 
intolerance – and their repression - spread all around USSR disproved the 
narrative of ‘wind of change,’ recalling the hard methods of the past. On 9 
April in Tbilisi the Soviet army fired on protesters, killing twenty people,405 the 
humanitarian crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh was exploding and Gorbachev was 
ousting a part of the ruling establishment. This schizophrenia was so evident 
on 25 April, when the CC CPSU changed 74 members and in parallel the Red 
Army began leaving Hungary.406 These facts show that Gorbachev’s 
                                                                
400 PV, 21995, 129, 2 June 1989, p. 2. 
401 Nominal growth of industrial production of 7.2% and national growth of 5.4% (PV, 
21958, 92, 19 April 1989, p. 2) however, could not hide the ongoing crisis in the 
republic. In 1989 Uzbek industry was in a difficult phase, could only promise to supply 
of goods with a value of 100 million rubles. This commitment fell 235 million rubles 
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402 PV, 21957, 91, 18 April 1989, p. 2. 
403 PV recalled that the peak of the ‘cotton affairs’ (1984-1987) had now thankfully 
passed (PV, 110 21976, 12 May 1989, p. 2) and also Nishanov admitted that the 
moralization season was almost over, thanking the prokuratura USSR for helping to 
find the end of the “cotton affair knot.” (PV, 21963, 97, 25 April 1989, p. 2). 
404 For example, PV reported how just in the Shakhrisab gorkom were involved over a 
hundred communists that were also sanctioned by the party. From those, 64 workers 
and 19 executives were expelled. However, not all went to trial and some were even 
reinstated in the party. PV, 110 21976, 12 May 1989, p. 2. 
405 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 750. 
406 Ibid. 
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‘universalism’407 was much more towards foreign countries of the communist 
bloc. However, Moscow wanted to keep the integrity of the country at any 
cost.408 Nevertheless, Uzbekistan was also a potential powder keg and the 
CPUz tried to calm down ethnic protests and any manifestation of intolerance 
that might threaten public security. In parallel, through 1989 Nishanov 
continued his reformist efforts. In the party, a series of measures were 
proposed to revitalize Uzbek national sentiments and use of the Uzbek 
language409 – in particular by promoting bilingualism410 – and to discourage 
any manifestation of racism and ethnic intolerance. On the respect of 
minorities in Uzbekistan, the party stressed the importance of improving 
teaching in the native languages of the local communities. 259 schools taught 
or had courses in the Tajik language, 491 in Kazakh, 52 in Turkmen, 40 in 
Kyrgyz, and 12 in Greek, also arranging courses in Korean. The use of other 
languages was also encouraged in universities, in the press, in literature, and 
in the mass media.411 On these issues, the CPUz acknowledged the rising 
intolerance and proposed to modify the criminal law to punish more harshly 
violations of equality of different ethnic groups.412 Thus, during the 19 May 
1989 plenum, Nishanov acknowledged the problems and the difficulties in the 
socio-political situation in the republic, stating: “while the political and 
economic reforms achieved the democratization process, the dissatisfaction 
of the people - for the resolution of the problems related to the social, 
ecologic and ethnic relations spheres – increases.”413 Again, the FS CPUz 
referred to the need to fight against the negative phenomena in order to 
restore the republican social order.414 However, the situation degenerated in 
a matter of weeks, destabilizing the republic and delegitimizing its leadership. 
                                                                
407 Silvio Pons, The Global Revolution. A History of International Communism 1917–
1991 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Silvio Pons, “Western Communists, 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1989 Revolutions,” Contemporary European History 18, no. 
3 (2009): 349; Silvio Pons and Federico Romero, Reinterpreting the End of the Cold 
War : Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations (London & New York: Frank Cass, 2005). 
408 This contrast between the domestic instability and cooperation abroad was then 
characterizing the leadership of one of the most controversial figures of the 20th 
century. 
409 PV, 83, 21949, 7 April 1989, p. 3. 
410 PV, 21954, 88, 14 April 1989, p. 3. 
411 PV, 21963, 97, 25 April 1989, p. 1. 
412 PV, 21956, 90, 16 April 1989, p. 2. 
413 Prot. 13/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1507, l. 5. 
414 . Then, the Nishanov informed the CC CPUz about the latest documentation 
received from the prokuratura USSR, revealing that Khamdam Umarov, member of the 
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Concluding, we can interpret Nishanov – the anti-Rashidovian ‘revenant’ 
and ‘Moscow’s viceroy’ – as the principal figure in Uzbekistan’s de-
Rashidovization course. He was able to exercise his undoubted political skills 
to take advantage of a very complex situation, to climb the highest rungs of 
his political career, and to affirm his own power. According to Anishchev, 
Nishanov was able to pursue his own authority415 and marginalize any source 
of counter-power such as the second secretary. During his short reign, the FS 
CPUz had the consent of Gorbachev, while the CC CPSU did not went into 
details of the political relations within the Uzbek party.416 For some extend, 
the FS had also the support of some prokuratura groups that, with their 
almost unlimited mandate, could intervene in the political life of the republic. 
In turn, they ensured a sort of immunity to Nishanov who remained one of 
the few figures that could remain completely untainted by the ‘cotton affairs’ 
investigations. 
Basically, Nishanov acted as a authoritative leader who intentionally used 
the card of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ to oust his political rivals. The practice of 
ad hoc investigations and the donos wars are a clear example of that. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, the Gensek and the CPSU did not go into the 
details of the ‘Uzbek cotton affairs’ and the related internal investigations., 
remaining focused on the cotton supplies. This was the first rule of Moscow-
Tashkent relations and the legitimizing condition for any FS CPUz from Stalin 
times. Such a legitimation issue was then enforced during Rashidov’s reign 
and was renewed, with a different narrative, even under Nishanov’s 
leadership. However, the current FS CPUz had been recognized as the leading 
promulgator of purges and seemed to have violated the informal rule of 
representation and redistribution of power/sources among the local elites, or 
clans if you prefer. As would be evident during the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 
Kirghizstan fifteen years later, this type of dynamic would lead to the 
insurrection of an organized part of the population.417 The wise Soviet 
                                                                                                                                            
CC CPUz and former FS Ferghana obkom, was accused of bribery. For this he was 
expelled from the party and arrested. Prot. 13/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1507, l. 
71. More openly, the day after the press reported that Umarov had been expelled 
from the party because he was corrupt and abused power. PV, 21983, 117, 20 May 
1989, p. 1. 
415 Anishchev, Vostochnyi Ornament, 811. 
416 Ibid., 799. 
417 Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in 
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statesman seemed to be in such violation of the cardinal rule of power in 
Central Asia that the consequences would be catastrophic in a few weeks.  
Therefore, the Moscow oriented Caesar passed the Uzbek Rubicon with 
his desantniki troops hoping to find acclamation to his illuminated 
dictatorship. After a first and apparent consent, he became victim of a 
conspiracy elaborated by the rival factions within the CC ‘Senate.’ With his 
latest maneuvers Nishanov endorsed many internal discontents within the 
party and fueled several protests – perhaps organized by his opponents – that 
in short order would explode into high-scale violence. Thus, May 1989 was 
the last moment of apparent calm in the UzSSR and was also the moment 
when the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ reached such a peak that it could not be 
ignored in Moscow any longer. For this reason, we will split the story in two 
parts, following the different conclusions of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ in the 
center and in the periphery. 
 PART III 
 
 
 
 
THE LEGACIES OF  
THE UZBEK COTTON AFFAIR  
IN MOSCOW  
AND IN TASHKENT 
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6 THE GDLYAN-IVANOV SAGA 
От ленинской партии остался только 
портрет Ленина, и то лицом к стенке1 
Yeltsin, Georgia, Gdlyan… who’s next?2 
Gdlyan and Ivanov were the noisy illegitimate 
children of glasnost in Andropovian sauce - Pikhoia3 
Гдлян и Иванов? Я помню. Хорошие люди!4 
Нет ничего легче, как изображать 
несимпатичное начальство, читатель любит 
это, но это самый неприятный, самый 
бездарный читатель – Chekhov5 
 
Gdlyan and Ivanov are two names inexorably associated with the last 
phase of perestroika. The most famed investigators of the Uzbek cotton affair 
became well-known for chasing ‘big fish’ within the criminal system. They 
                                                          
1 During his six years in Uzbekistan (1983-1989), the investigator Albert Kartashyan 
worked in the Gdlyan’s group. In his memoirs he recalled the episode of an Uzbek 
colleague who commented to him, “of the Lenin's party there was only the portrait of 
Lenin, and the face was [oriented] to-wall.” Albert Isaki Kʻartashyan, Daṛe 
Chakatagrer: Detektiv, Kʻnnichʻi Oȑ ragritsʻ (Yerevan: Iravunkʻ, 2010). 
2 From a poster appearing in Arbat in spring 1989. Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Diary of 
Anatoly S. Chernyaev. 1989. Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security 
Archive” (Washington D.C., 2009), 19. 
3 Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle 
Biceṕhale (Longueuil: EǶditions Kéruss, 2007), 63. 
4 When I requested the opis 24 of fond 89 in RGANI, the archivist Lyudmila exclaimed 
“Gdlyan and Ivanov? I remember! Nice people!”  
5 In 1899, a wise Chekhov replied to an aspiring writer named Maxim Gorky: “There is 
nothing easier than to portray unsympathetic bosses – the reader likes this – however 
he's the most embarrassing, the most incompetent reader.” Anton Pavlovich Chekhov, 
Pisඁma. Tom 26 (Moskva: Nauka, 1983), 3. 
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followed the idea that the real culprits of the scandals were mostly in 
Moscow rather than in Uzbekistan. In 1989 they claimed to have opened a 
wider case that connected the ‘Uzbek mafiya’ with the Moscow ‘bosses’ and 
politburo members in the so called “Kremlin affair.” However, Gdlyan and 
Ivanov were relieved from their duties and subsequently protested in the 
media, inflaming a media circus that thrilled Soviet citizens in the late ‘80s 
and alarmed the Soviet higher echelons. Basically, in 1989 the ‘Uzbek cotton 
affairs’ shifted from Tashkent – where investigations had more or less 
concluded by spring 1989 – to Moscow where Gdlyan and Ivanov achieved 
incredible notoriety because of the accusations against the CC CPSU 
leadership. The dynamic was simple: the more the two prosecutors claimed 
‘big fish’ indictments, the more they were thwarted in the institutions. We 
might ask, therefore, how it was that the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair achieved such 
great publicity? Why were they accusing politburo members of collusion with 
‘mafiya’ and what was their final objective? Their story radically polarized 
public opinion between supporters of the ‘heroes of perestroika’ and 
opponents who identified them as two populist6 ‘inquisitors’ engaged in rank 
self-promotion. This squabble thus assumed a highly political dimension and 
we will analyze the implications of this event in the very delicate period 1989-
1991, reconstructing the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ within the historical 
framework of a USSR in fundamental political transition. 
The ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ can be divided in three phases. In the first phase 
(1983-1986), the investigators were actively working in Uzbekistan on 
corruption cases. At that time, they were mostly unknown to the public. In 
the second phase (1987-1988), characterized by the first great debates on the 
Uzbek affair in the press and media, the two prosecutors were unanimously 
presented as two heroes of perestroika. Then, in 1988, the ‘Uzbek trial of the 
                                                          
6 For the concept of political populism, see John Abromeit et al., Transformations of 
Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Carlos de la Torre, The Promise and Perils of Populism: 
Global Perspectives (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2014); Adrian Kuzminski, 
Fixing the System: A History of Populism, Ancient and Modern (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2008); Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Susan C. Stokes et al., Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism. The Puzzle of 
Distributive Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Richard Wortman, 
The Crisis of Russian Populism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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century’ was symbolically concluding the ‘Uzbek affair’ while Gdlyan and 
Ivanov publicly claimed more ‘villains’ in the upper Moscow echelons and, in 
parallel, the limits of their investigations and methods emerged. As Feofanov 
and Barry have remarked, “In the field of law during this period no individuals 
aroused more controversy – dividing the public into ardent supporters and 
equally strong critics – than did Gdlyan and Ivanov.”7 The third phase (1989-
1991) was characterized by the expulsion of Gdlyan and Ivanov from the 
institutions while the related scandals emerged in the press and the 
demonstrations pro and against the two prosecutors created an embarrassing 
problem for those in the upper reaches of Soviet power, who had to manage 
what turned out to be a highly damaging and delegitimizing issue. 
6.1 The enlarged investigation (1983-1986) 
Both Telman Kh. Gdlyan and Nikolai V. Ivanov were professional 
investigators within the prokuratura.8 As mentioned in the third chapter, in 
                                                          
7 Yuri Vasilevich Feofanov and Donald D. Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major 
Trials of the Post-Stalin Era (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 102. 
8 To contextualize the story of the two prosecutors we can offer a few words on their 
lives. Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan is probably the most famous character of the 'Uzbek 
cotton affair'. An ethnic Armenian, he was born on 20 December 1940 in the Georgian 
village of Bolshoi Samsar. From 1949 to 1956 he lived with his grandfather and 
grandmother in the Rubtsovsk district of the Altai Territory. Then he returned to 
Georgia – to the Sukhumi district – where he worked on a farm. In 1959-1962 he 
served in the Soviet army where he joined the CPSU and in 1963 he worked in an 
educational complex in Saratov. In 1964-1968, Gdlyan studied at the Saratov Law 
Institute 'D.I. Kurskii' where he was famous for his political commitment within the 
local party and Komsomol sections and was known widely as ‘Tov. Telman.’ In 1968 
Gdlyan graduated and started to work as an investigator of the Prokuratura of the 
Barishski district (Ulyanovsk oblast) until 1972 when he was appointed investigator in 
the Zavolzhsky district. In 1974, he worked as senior of the Ulyanovsk oblast and in 
1977-1980 he took an important case investigating clandestine textile shops in the 
Chechen-Ingush Republic. In 1981 he became investigator for particularly important 
cases of the Prokuratura of the Ulyanovsk oblast. Then, in 1983, the Gdlyan’s career 
rose further when he was appointed senior investigator for particularly important 
cases of the General Prokuratura of the USSR. In June, he left Estonia – where he 
worked on the dairy product scandal and on the Hint case – and went to Bukhara to 
work on the ‘Muzaffarov case’. His main collaborator was the young investigator 
Nikolai Veniaminovich Ivanov with whom he had already worked on the scandals in 
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September 1983 the Bukhara affair was transferred from the KGB to the 
prokuratura and assigned to the investigator for particularly important case 
T.Kh. Gdlyan. The case had such great implications that the prokuratura sent 
several officials to Uzbekistan to widen the investigations. 
6.1.1 An investigative team in Uzbekistan 
In Uzbekistan, Gdlyan’s group became the most famous investigative team 
dealing with corruption cases related to the cotton affairs. However, his was 
not the only one. As mentioned, the investigations on the Uzbek cotton 
affairs had involved party organs, the KGB, the MVD and prokuratura at local 
and central levels. Nevertheless, given the scale and sensitivity of the 
corruption issues, the investigations on the judicial front were managed by 
the central Prokuratura of the USSR which organized 30 investigative groups9 
headed by the investigators for particularly important cases. The most well-
known of these were K.K. Maydanyuk,10 B.E. Svidersky, V.I. Kalinichenko, T.Kh. 
Gdlyan, N.V. Ivanov, Yu.D. Lyubimov, K.I. Mavrin, V.Yu. Laptev. Moreover, 
certain ‘veteran’ prosecutors, such as G.P. Karakozov,11 were involved. As 
                                                                                                                               
the Caucasus. Ivanov was born in 10 December 1952 in Troitsk (Chelyabinsk region). 
After graduating at the Sverdlovsk Law Institute in 1974, he worked in the Prokuratura 
of the Chelyabinsk region as an investigator and in 1976 he became assistant 
prosecutor of Kartaly until 1977 when he was transferred to the prokuratura of 
Murmansk. Finally, in 1984 Ivanov joined Gdlyan on the most important case of his life 
– the Uzbek affair – and in November became an investigator for particularly 
important cases of the Prokuratura USSR. Cf. GARF, f. 9654, op. 3, d. 121, l. 11; GARF, 
f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 32. Nikolay Ivanov, Sledovatel’ Iz Provintsii (Sankt Peterburg: 
Shans, 1995); Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Nikolai Veniaminovich Ivanov, 
Kremlevskoe Delo (Moskva: Gramota, 1996); Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Yevgeniy 
Yuriyevich Dodolyev, Piramida-1 (Moskva: MTA, 1990); Ezio Mauro, “Così Combatto La 
Piovra Sovietica,” La Repubblica, July 22, 1989; Sergey Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. 
Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” Klub «Olimpas», 1991. 
9 Ibid., 41. 
10 Konstantin Maydanyuk was a famous investigator active in the Sochi-Krasnodar 
scandal and in the Uzbek affairs. However, in 1988 he resigned from the prokuratura 
and disappeared from public view, because he felt dishonest for having served the 
'Soviet mafioso system.' Lev Timofeev, Russia’s Secret Rulers (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992), 71–75. 
11 German Petrovich Karakozov, investigator for particularly important cases of the 
General Prokuratura USSR, was considered a veteran of investigations in the 'caviar 
affair', in the 'Sochi-Krasnodar Affair', in the 'Zhdanov murder' and in the bribery and 
abuse of senior officials in the MVD. 
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Laptev commented “there was an investigator in every square meter of the 
Republic.”12 The investigations led to incredible arrests and seizures of 
treasures – mentioned in previous chapters – and incredible trials and 
sentences. In 1985-1987 alone, more than 800 criminal cases were opened, 
condemning thousands of culprits, including 433 chairmen of kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes, 85 directors of cotton cleaning factories and all the chiefs of the 
regional zagotkhlopkoprom.13 Then, the purges within the party and state 
claimed other victims among the nomenklatura of the UzSSR as well. 
Apparently, Gdlyan’s group was an important cog in a greater machine.  
However, the story of the ‘cotton affairs’ has been generally associated 
with Gdlyan who was wryly defined as the ‘real ruler of Uzbekistan’, who 
seemingly single-handedly imposed ‘gdlyanovschina’,14 and whose name has 
come to personify the whole ‘Uzbek affairs.’ In more than five years of 
investigations in Uzbekistan, the originally three members group led by 
Telman Gdlyan – and his deputy Ivanov who had a devotional admiration for 
the elder official15 – grew to 35 after the Bukharan affair and by the end 
counted some 209 investigators.16 This enlarged size was a product of the 
incredible results of Gdlyan’s investigations. In fact, his team had investigated 
the bigger fish in Uzbekistan – 11 members of the CPUz buro, 8 FSs obkom, 9 
high ranks MVD – including party ‘millionaires’17 such as the aforementioned 
Karimov, Gaipov, Usmankhodzhaev, Khudayberdyev, Abdullaeva, Davydov, 
Ergashev, Osetrov, Kamalov, Churbanov, etc. These lofty and important 
                                                          
12 Interview with the former investigator Vitaly Yuryevich Laptev who worked on the 
Uzbek Affairs. Nina Selina, “Ob ‘Uzbekskom Dele’, Razvale Strany I Sovremennoy 
Bor’be S Korruptsiyey,” Krasnoyarskii Rabochnii, October 12, 2013. 
13 Interview with the former investigator Vitaly Yuryevich Laptev who worked on the 
Uzbek Affairs. Ibid. 
14 For some of his ‘victims’ Gdlyan became a sort of grand inquisitor. As Abdullaeva 
put it: "I would not be mistaken if I said that in the years 1985-1988, Uzbekistan lost 
more party, Soviet and economic leaders than it had in the thirties and forties." Rano 
Abdullaeva, Preodolenie Ada (Moskva: Monolit, 2009), 24, 114, 151. 
15 Giulietto Chiesa, “La Mafia Uzbeka Alla Conquista Di Mosca. Due Giudici Sovietici La 
Sbarrano E Raccontano,” L’Unità, August 13, 1989. 
16 The second biggest group – led by Lyubimov-Mavrin – had around one hundred 
members. 
17 From K. Kamalov cash and goods with a value of 6.8 million rubles were seized, 5.6 
million from Khudaybergenov, from A.K. Nurumbetov 1.84 million, from 
Usmanhodzhaev 1.3 million, and from A. Primov 1.3 million rubles. GARF, f. 9654, op. 
6, d. 18, l. 46. 
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names made Gdlyan’s name. However significant his results, they did not lead 
to massive numbers of prosecutions. During the investigations in Uzbekistan 
(1983-1989) Gdlyan’s group brought criminal charges against 69 people, led 
to trial 19 separate cases, and resulted in the conviction of 40 people. 
Gdlyan’s ‘spectacular’ seizures were worth 22.3 million rubles in cash, and a 
value of 15 million rubles in jewelry.18 
6.1.2 Looking for the big fish 
By luck, or by coincidence, Gdlyan and his deputy Ivanov managed to land 
the bigger fish of the Uzbek affairs. As we have seen in the previous chapters, 
in the aftermath of the Bukharan affair – which was originally supposed to 
last for two or three months – the case was refocused on the republican 
MVD, then on the MCC UzSSR and finally on the top party and state leaders in 
Uzbekistan. Therefore, the investigative group had evidence to proceed 
further and followed a pyramidal scheme19 from raions to oblast and then to 
the central party, claiming to find a connection between the Uzbek crimes 
and the ‘mafiya protectors’ in Moscow that was supposedly managing 
millionaire businesses. In their scheme, Gdlyan and Ivanov wanted to turn the 
investigations on to Brezhnev’s son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov (for his connection 
to the local MVD), on to Usmankhodzhaev (for his role in managing the 
malfeasance within the CPUz), and Ligachev (for his role in supporting the 
post-Rashidovian FS CPUz). They also sought to target influential CC CPSU 
officials, such as Viktor Ilich Smirnov – second secretary of the Moldovan 
Communist Party and head of the party-organizational department of the CC 
CPSU responsible for cadre selection in Uzbekistan – and the adjunct officials 
Mogilnichenko, Ishkov, Bessarabov, Istomin, and Ponomarev.20  
                                                          
18 “However, this amount includes cash and valuables worth 12.9 million rubles seized 
by the KGB of the USSR when the investigation began. Several other, smaller 
investigative teams in Uzbekistan seized about 100 million rubles worth of cash and 
valuables.” GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 45; Pravda, 20 May 1989, p. 3; William A. 
Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 192; Feofanov and Barry, 
Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 102. 
19 Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, “Piramida,” Strana I Mir 3 (1989); Gdlyan and 
Dodolyev, Piramida-1; Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo. 
20 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 60–61; 
Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 44. 
451 
 
The pyramidal scheme basically followed the party hierarchic organization 
from the lowest local units and ended with the Gensek at the top.21 Thus, 
Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigation focused on the ‘organizers’ of the scam 
rather than punishing lower-level corruption, a phenomenon that, as 
mentioned in the third chapter, implicated wide swathes of Soviet society. 
Following the law strictly, they could have jailed millions of people across the 
country under corruption charges. However, their search for ‘organizers’ led 
them to extend the case to the upper echelons of the party in Moscow, 
originating the so called ‘Kremlin affair.’ In a country where justice, 
prosecutions and even security were directly dependent on the party, Gdlyan 
and Ivanov had to face the difficulties of going against a part of the system 
they were essentially working for. 
As mentioned, the Andropovian demonstrative actions had a specific and 
non-systemic focus, and in the immediate aftermath of the Bukharan affair, 
there was pressure from the prokuratura to limit the case and to not extend 
its terms.22 In their reconstructions, Gdlyan and Ivanov from the end of 1985, 
denounced the heads of prokuratura USSR – the Genprokuror Rekunkov and 
his deputy Soroka – for intervening to slow down the investigations and to 
end the cases as soon as possible. According to Pikhoia, the prokuratura was 
under the clear influence of the CC CPSU and the case evidently became a 
political affair that "was developing in full conformity with the tradition of 
Soviet law whereby the party would bend or apply the law in the interests of 
political opportunism.”23 Evidently, where they were allowed to go further 
with the investigations, impeaching the higher cadres of the MVD UzSSR, this 
was only possible if welcomed by the CC CPSU, which endorsed the 
investigations as a continuation of the Andropovian wars against corruption 
and malfeasance within the MVD. So authorized, investigations continued 
and Gdlyan’s team grew in size and even in importance. Nevertheless, the 
investigators’ ambitions were greater still. 
In 1986, the two prosecutors started to send letters to the CC CPSU – and 
directly to Gorbachev – informing them of concerns about obstacles to the 
                                                          
21 Gorbachev was also a potential suspect, having been CC CPSU head of the 
agriculture department in late 70s, during the intensive falsification period of cotton 
figures. Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo. 
22 Ibid.; Selina, “Ob ‘Uzbekskom Dele’, Razvale Strany I Sovremennoy Bor’be S 
Korruptsiyey”; Fedor Razzakov, Korruptsiya v Politbyuro: Delo “Krasnogo Uzbeka” 
(Moskva: Eksmo, 2009). 
23 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 61. 
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investigation. In March 1986, they wrote to the Gensek insisting on the need 
to keep the investigations alive and to unblock obstacles from the 
prokuratura.24 Again on 11 April 1986, Gdlyan and Ivanov informed 
Gorbachev of the serious situation in the republic and demanded the Gensek 
support proceedings against Usmankhodzhaev, Osetrov and Salimov and to 
take additional measures in the Uzbek affair.25 Once more, on 11 November 
1986, they directly wrote a long report to the Gensek, to the head of the 
Soviet government Ryzhkov, and to the FS Moscow gorkom Yeltsin26 
denouncing the prokuratura USSR for hindering their investigations. In this 
incredible document – fully reproduced in the appendix – Gdlyan and Ivanov 
declared that the deputy Genprokuror Soroka ordered them not to extend 
the scope of the Bukhara case that had initially involved eight people arrested 
by KGB in April-June 1983. According to their reconstruction, in 1984 they 
were anyway able to extend the case because of the apparent involvement of 
the Uzbek MVD in covering shortages in the republic. Their version of events 
reports that at that time Soroka was irritated and again ordered them to not 
proceed further. Gdlyan and Ivanov persevered with their investigations and 
were even encouraged by a part of the local party to proceed against the 
worst elements in the republic. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
investigations were also welcomed by influential elements within the CC CPUz 
– such as Nishanov – that wanted to oust rival elements. Then, following their 
reconstruction, at the end of 1985 Gdlyan and Ivanov tried to report 
Usmankhodzhaev’s role in the malfeasance in the republic to the Genprokur, 
but they were again stopped from the prokuratura from going further. Thus, 
they demanded Gorbachev's and the party support in their task to prosecute 
important figures, such as: 
I.B. Usmankhodzhaev; second secretary of the CPUz, T.N. Osetrov; Chairman of 
the presidium of the supreme soviet of the UzSSR, A.U. Salimov; first 
secretaries of the Tashkent and Khorezm obkom party, M.M. Musakhanov and 
M.Kh. Khudaibergenov; second secretary of the CC of the CP Moldavia V.I. 
Smirnov, who before had been working as manager of the organizational-party 
department of the CC CPSU; first deputy minister of MVD USSR, Yu. M. 
Churbanov, and many other managers. During the investigations, the 
corruption charges were confirmed against the following: K.N. Mogilnichenko, 
deputy director of the organizational-party department of CC CPSU; the 
manager for the agriculture sector in the CC CPSU, B.M. Istomin; the deputy 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 18, ll. 18-23. The document is fully reported in the annexes. 
26 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 18, ll. 3-17. 
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director of the organizational-party department of CC CPSU, I.E. Ponomarev; 
the instructor of the same department, M.L. Ishkova, the secretaries of the CC 
CPUz, R.Kh. Abdullaeva and E. Aitmuratov; the chairman of the SM UzSSR, N.D. 
Khudaiberdiev; the first secretaries of the obkom, N.T. Turapov (Kashkadarya), 
I.D. Dzhabbarov (Bukhara), V.P. Esin (Navoi), N. Radzhabov (Namangan) and 
K.K. Kamalov (Karakalpak); the minister of the MVD UzSSR, N.I. Ibragimov and 
his deputy M.N. Sultanov; deputy director of the HQ of the MVD USSR, V.N. 
Kriventsov; the manager of cadres of the MVD USSR, I.F. Mel'nik, and others.27 
Gdlyan and Ivanov stated in this document that they had collected a great 
deal of evidence against these figures – especially against Usmankhodzhaev 
who was also distrusted by Yeltsin.28 They also wanted to proceed against the 
FS CPUz and other ‘criminals’ who were allegedly protected by the CC CPSU 
and the prokuratura. Basically, Gdlyan and Ivanov wrote these reports 
because they needed the party’s authorization to proceed and to circumvent 
the obstacles laid by the heads of the prokuratura. To justify this approach, 
they directly attacked the Genprokuror USSR, Aleksandr Mikhailovich 
Rekunkov, and his deputy, Oleg Vasilyevich Soroka, for muddling the 
investigations in Uzbekistan, delaying the operations and arrests, and 
blackmailing the investigators who were following important targets.29 Then, 
                                                          
27 RGASPI, f. 653, op. 1, d. 113, l. 2. 
28 After his appointment in 1985, Yeltsin took many trips around USSR. During a tour in 
Tashkent he was advised by the KGB that things had changed little after Rashidov in 
terms of bribery and “Usmankhodzhaev, the new secretary, was taking as many bribes 
as his predecessor”. The KGB gave him evidence about the FS CPUz’s bribery and 
Yeltsin informed Gorbachev about the event. The Gensek was irritated and replied 
that Usmankhodzhaev was a devoted communist appreciated by Ligachev. Gorbachev 
argued that these charges were probably coming from the old mafia to discredit an 
honest person. Boris Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography (London: Summit 
Books, 1990), 100–101. 
29 RGASPI, f. 653, op. 1, d. 113, l. 7. Furthermore “Soroka has declared that in an open 
and categoric way that Usmankhodzhaev I.B., Osetrov T.N., Churbanov Yu.M. and 
Smirnov V.I. will be never trialed for the penal responsibility.” RGASPI, f. 653, op. 1, d. 
113, l. 8. An example of obstacles laid by the prokuratura was the much-delayed 
permission to arrest some important figures. Permission to proceed against Ergashev 
– the former chairman of the MVD UzSSR – arrived too late, as the suspect had already 
taken his life. Thus, Gdlyan reports that from that moment he stopped sending all the 
information to the prokuratura, believing that they could advise the suspects in 
advance whereby they might escape, be killed, or commit suicide. Another absurdity 
was the condition that Gaipov could only be arrested within the confines of the 
prokuratura office. When Gdlyan and Abdurakhimov went to his house to convince 
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again in the same document, the two prosecutors marked a very interesting 
point, stressing the importance of focusing on the organizers of the scam (the 
big fish) and pardoning minor suspects. Thus, they criticize the line assumed 
by the heads of the prokuratura and commented: 
We do not agree with their decision to bring to criminal responsibility several 
hundred people on our case [These people] who had been forced under 
severe duress to give bribes to their managers [...] Substantially, these people 
were simply victims and they had no other choice to survive and stand in those 
unbearable circumstances [. However, all of this] began with Rashidov and 
ended with the management of the rayon department, extorting bribes from 
their subordinates. [Hence,] we are convinced that the arrests of so many 
people without considering the level of their guilt and the circumstances under 
which they were engaging in these crimes, is erroneous and politically 
harmful.30 
Thus, in 1986 still, Gdlyan and Ivanov were advising Gorbachev of the risks 
of massive investigations that could destabilize the country and delegitimize 
Soviet power. However, after the clashes with Rekunkov in 1986, the 
Genprokuror gave the coordination of the investigation to German 
Karakozov. Nevertheless, Gdlyan and Ivanov kept a certain grade of operative 
autonomy within the republic.31  
Apparently, this investigators’ appeal was understood in Moscow and 
influenced the Gensek. During the politburo session of 4 December 1986, the 
party had evaluated the affirmations made by Gdlyan and Ivanov in the 
letters sent on 11 November and instructed Solomentsev and Razumovsky to 
check their claims and to report back to the CC CPSU. Indeed, the Politburo – 
under the influence of Yeltsin who issued a formal memorandum after the 
investigators’ review32 – authorized the continuation of the investigation and 
consented to the arrest of Churbanov, Osetrov, and others. Thus, 1986 ended 
                                                                                                                               
him to sign some papers in the prokuratura – a trap to proceed with the arrest – 
Gaipov understood their trick and committed suicide. This is why, according to Gdlyan, 
they had to proceed ‘less formally’ and arrested Yakhyayev in the middle of the night 
when he was in pajamas and slippers. Mauro, “Così Combatto La Piovra Sovietica.” 
30 RGASPI, f. 653, op. 1, d. 113, l. 9. 
31 EG, “Nikolay Ivanov: Skazat’ O Churbanove Chto-to Khorosheye Ya Ne Mogu,” 
Ekspress Gazeta - EG.RU, June 8, 2016. 
32 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 88. Mauro, “Così Combatto La Piovra Sovietica”; Selina, 
“Ob ‘Uzbekskom Dele’, Razvale Strany I Sovremennoy Bor’be S Korruptsiyey.” 
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with further positive results in the Uzbek saga.33 However, at that time 
Usmankhodzhaev – while under suspicion – was safe34 and investigators had 
to wait to put the leader of the CPUz in handcuffs. This move had seemed to 
be impossible until his apparent patron in the CC CPSU – Ligachev – lost most 
of his influence in the party. 
6.2 The ‘heroes of perestroika’ (1987-1988) 
After the first clashes with the Genprokuror in 1986, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
wanted to strengthen their position against any potential obstacles and to 
cultivate support among the public (as a substitute for widespread 
institutional support). Indeed, they had the occasion to get publicity for their 
activities in the press and media from 1987, when their stories started to 
appear widely in the Soviet press, thrilling the Soviet public and publicizing 
the phrase ‘Uzbek affair’ such that it became common knowledge.35 This 
evolution was possible only because of certain transformations within the 
Soviet system. 
6.2.1 Gdlyan-Ivanov case reaches the press 
The glasnost revolution was manifest in the many scandals, investigative 
reports, critical articles, and even tabloid articles that from 1987 started to 
appear in the Soviet press. Desire for information, conspiracy theories or 
simple curiosity fueled the readers' demand after decades of strong 
                                                          
33 In May, Muzaffarov and his accomplices were finally sentenced. In August 
Churbanov was excluded from the ranks of the CPSU, and on 27 October Orlov, the 
former deputy chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR, was arrested as well as the 
former second secretary of the CPUz Osetrov on 13 December. Plekhanov, “Delo 
Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 23. 
34 Aleksandr Melenberg, “Na Dmitrovke, 15 — Bez Peremen. Posledneye Delo 
Prokuratury SSSR,” Novaya Gazeta, November 3, 2003. 
35 As a result, in 1987-1989, the Soviet press published more than four hundred 
articles which exposed the “Uzbek mafia” especially in the magazines Ogonek, 
Sovetskiy Ekran, Iskusstvo kino, Smena, Pravda, Izvestiya, Argumenty i fakty, 
Moskovskiye novosti, Komsomol'skaya pravda, Sobesednik, Sovetskaya kul'tura, 
Literaturnaya gazeta, Sotsialisticheskaya industriya, Krasnaya zvezda, Moskovskiy 
komsomolets and other local issues. Fedor Razzakov, Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR (Moskva: 
Algoritm, 2012). 
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censorship. At this moment, magazines such as Ogonek36– despite being 
under the Pravda publishing house – had a certain amount of autonomy to 
publish thrilling stories. Other ‘independent’ weeklies – such as Literaturnaya 
Gazeta and Moskovskiye Novosti37 – created the basis for a new cultural 
canon in Russia. This process was a product of perestroika and glasnost, 
which were gradually acknowledging freedom of speech, of the press, of 
expression and information. Indeed, more than 70 years of almost total 
control and censorship in mass communication was being broken.38 This 
journalistic avant-gardism was thus offering a different perspective from the 
official press – mainly represented by the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya – 
and had very high demand among Soviet readers.39 In fact, these magazines 
                                                          
36 Ogonek is the oldest weekly illustrated magazine in Russia. It was founded in 1899 
and re-established in 1923 under the Soviet government. Despite being part of the 
Pravda publishing house, during perestroika, under the editor-in-chief Vitaly Korotich, 
it assumed a more liberal approach and reached the peak of its popularity when 
thousands of letters received by the editorial board. Christopher Cerf et al., Small 
Fires: Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987-1990 (New York: 
Summit Books, 1990). 
37 Literaturnaya Gazeta was a weekly newspaper founded in 1830. In 1947, its format 
was changed from a purely literary publication into a newspaper that was also dealing 
with political and social contents and had a certain grade of autonomy. In 1990, 
Literaturnaya Gazeta became an independent collective. As well, during perestroika, 
Yegor Yakovlev transformed Moskovskiye Novosti, the Russian language version of 
Moscow News, from a propaganda tool into the leader of the liberal press. During his 
time as chief-editor (1986 to 1991), thousands of people would wait in long lines at 
Moscow newsstands on Wednesday mornings, hoping to get a copy of the latest issue 
of Moskovskiye Novosti. Nora Buhks, Le Journalisme de La Peŕestroık̈a : Les Techniques 
Du Renouveau (Paris: Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1988); Thomas C. Wolfe, 
Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
38 Azhgikhina recalls how at the MGU - in the faculty of journalism where ‘propaganda’ 
was taught– most of the students were liberals and journalism was considered as a 
vocation. During perestroika, these magazines became the front lines of freedom of 
expression and these journalists were devoted to glasnost and freedom of 
information. Personal interview with Nadezda Azhgikhina, Executive Secretary of the 
Russian Union of Journalists and Vice-President of the European Federation of 
Journalists, Venice, 18 June 2016. 
39 As Dejevsky comments, “the only newspaper that regularly sold out at news kiosks 
was Literaturnaia gazeta, the paper of the Writers' Union. In the summer of 1987, 
people would queue from early morning to buy the weekly Moscow News – in 
whatever language it happened to be available – and the magazine Ogonek.” Mary 
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were the first in breaking taboos, such as the debates on the politics of the 
‘30s and Stalinism generally, the war in Afghanistan, ecological disasters, drug 
addiction, prostitution, child abandonment, and other social problems.40 At 
that time, a new generation of investigative journalists were reporting ‘mafiya 
stories’ about organized crime in Russia and in the peripheral republics of the 
USSR, thrilling Soviet readers and narrating the investigations – with a high 
proportion of fiction – against organized crime in the country. The ‘Uzbek 
cotton affair’ was a huge source of inspiration for many of these articles and 
novels. However, the republic was – often and sometimes unfairly – 
described as a ‘black hole’ where the mafiya and malfeasance dominated 
every aspect of the sociopolitical life, exacerbating in the readers a sense of 
anger and sometimes a prejudice against other cultures, which were thus 
perceived as doomed to servility and corruption. 
In this phase, interviews of the investigators involved in the Uzbek affairs 
appeared in the press, plumping myths and something of a media circus 
around the names of Gdlyan and Ivanov who were presented to the public as 
people’s heroes against the mafiya. For example, in June 1987, PV published a 
full-page article entitled Anatomiya Vzyatochnichestva – "The anatomy of 
bribery" –where "the leading investigation team headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan and 
N.V. Ivanov that is currently working in the republic" was presented. In this 
first press appearance, the two investigators explained the origins of bribery 
and its roots in republican society, recalling its origins in the general lack of 
control and diffuse mercantilist approach where money became a key 
ideological issue and the source of common criminal interest. Then, they 
described the difficulties in dealing with the ‘Bukharan affair’ and described 
the typical situation of ‘bribery in advance' – the so-called periodical ‘bribe-
tax’ – when money was given not to a purpose but to obtain an 
affiliation/protection at some unspecified future date. Nevertheless, to be 
considered as bribes – and not as ‘gifts’ – it was necessary for investigators to 
define a condition of intentionality. Thus, Gdlyan and Ivanov explained the 
hard work of the investigators to join the dots in this task. They stated that 
they were ready to open a new front against “big corruption” in Moscow and 
                                                                                                                               
Dejevsky, “Glasnost’ and the Soviet Press,” in Culture and the Media in the USSR 
Today, ed. Julian Graffy and Geoffrey A Hosking (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 
26. 
40 Ibid., 27–30. 
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called for a civic revolution against the rotten system.41 The investigators 
were thus presented as ‘heroes for socialist legality’ in the official press of the 
CPUz, endorsing a narrative that was functional to legitimize the moralizing 
Gorbachevian course42 characterized by anticorruption policies.43 However, 
the exposure of the degeneration44 presented the contradictions within the 
Soviet system and, in a context of open debate, to present such phenomena 
                                                          
41 Basically, they wanted to focus on the big corruption protectors in Moscow. In this 
regard, Ivanov interestingly defined Karimov, the former FS Bukhara obkom who had 
been sentenced to death, as a “victim of his leadership.” PV, 21426, 158, 20 June 
1987, p. 3. 
42 Endorsing the anticorruption campaign, in 1986 Gorbachev hoped to gain legitimacy 
both inside the Soviet system and abroad, pointing out “the contrast between its [his 
campaigns] own implied moral superiority and an earlier regime, [to] enhance its own 
legitimacy.” Leslie Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns 
and Legitimation Crisis (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 211. 
Therefore, it’s evident that at the beginning of his mandate, Gorbachev’s moral 
campaigns were functional to his legitimation and punitive justice was a useful 
instrument to maximize Moscow’s control over the entire Soviet state. However, his 
aggressive campaign both ignored the intentions of perestroika and glasnost and in 
turn its contradictions were exposed by them. Chernyaev notes that “more and more 
articles came out that subtly, or even openly, pointed out the contradictions in 
Gorbachev’s ideas and policies.” Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 110. 
43 Personal interview with Lev Dmitrievich Gudkov, Moscow, 24 November 2015. 
44 Gorbachev sought to stir the indignation of the masses at the behavior of corrupt, 
self-referential and self-centered state officials, singling out a list of regions, 
administrations and ministries “where the degeneration of cadres and violation of 
socialist legality had been particularly acute.” In this list, Uzbekistan was just the first 
region in a long list that also figured several areas of Moldavia, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and many districts in the RSFSR, such as Krasnodar Territory, Rostov 
Province, the city of Moscow and the Soviet ministries of foreign trade and internal 
affairs. Thus, the first stories emerged in the press on a criminal system that falsified 
cotton in Uzbekistan and in other ‘republics’ while the CPSU also admitted the 
presence of organized crime operating in the country. Holmes, The End of Communist 
Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis, 227. Craumer notes: “Not 
all of this padding was in Uzbekistan; in nearby Chimkent Oblast of Kazakhstan, for 
example, in 1979–84, 138,000 tons of raw cotton were falsely reported […], and during 
the last five-year plan in Tadzhikistan raw cotton production was padded by more than 
700,000 tons” Peter R. Craumer, “Agricultural Change, Labor Supply, and Rural Out- 
Migration in Soviet Central Asia,” in Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, 
ed. Robert A.Lewis (London: Routledge, 1992), 143. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 15 
March 1987, pp. 1-3. 
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as systemic45 could prove dysfunctional from a legitimation perspective. In 
this context, the Uzbek cotton affair became an explosive issue. 
Through 1987, Gdlyan and Ivanov became much more famous in the 
Soviet press and media. This circumstance was not an accident. In fact, public 
interest in the investigators developed out of the incredible details about 
corruption in the higher echelons of USSR that appeared on the front pages of 
newspapers. Indeed, one of their best results in the Uzbek affair was to snare 
Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, Brezhnev’s son-in-law and a prominent 
candidate member of the Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the 
MVD USSR in 1980-1983. Churbanov was arrested on January 14, 198746 
                                                          
45 The difference with the previous year’s narrative was clear. Despite narrating 
singular and isolated cases, since 1987 the press presented stories and made 
connections to describe a systemic phenomenon. This was an effective revolution in 
Soviet journalism that awakened a slumbering knowledge of facts. Personal interview 
with Lev Dmitrievich Gudkov, Moscow, 24 November 2015. 
46 Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov was born on 11 November 1936 in Moscow. “At the 
time of the trial he was just past fifty. He had been in the army, and worked as a 
mechanic, and since 1959 had served in Komsomol work, as an instructor in the 
Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol. In 1961 he began working for the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, first as an instructor at prisons and later as aide to the director of 
the political section at prisons run by the ministry's division in Moscow oblast. He left 
the MVD in August 1964 at the rank of “Senior Lieutenant of the Internal Services” to 
return to the Komsomol, this time taking a position in its Central Committee. He 
graduated by correspondence from the Philosophy Faculty of Moscow State 
University. In 1964 he divorced his former wife, leaving her with one son. In April 1971 
Churbanov married Galina Brezhnev. He was immediately named deputy director of 
the political section of the USSR MVD administration for Moscow with the rank of 
lieutenant colonel. A year later, jumping several rungs on the promotion ladder, he 
became deputy director of the political administration for all internal troops in the 
USSR MVD. His progression in rank was no less swift-to colonel, major-general, 
lieutenant-general and colonel-general. He became Deputy Minister and then First 
Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. He was chosen candidate member of the CPSU 
Central Committee and a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. He received military 
orders in peacetime and was awarded a state prize. He had begun to write his 
memoirs, entitled “My Career.” Before fortune smiled on this attractive young man, 
he was a Komsomol functionary, and then a junior officer working his way gradually 
up the ranks of Ministry of Internal Affairs. Suddenly this junior had earned the trouser 
stripes of a general. It didn't take much to figure out what had happened. And when 
he said in court that he had done nothing, that people brought him money “for no 
reason at all,” I, for one, believed him. It is unlikely that he had what it takes to have 
organized a criminal gang or become the head of a mafia clan. But he could become a 
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while other ‘villains’ were also charged as part of the ‘Uzbek mafiya’ and 
exposed in the press. Hence, the popularity for Gdlyan and Ivanov, the 
paladins of the struggle against organized crime, rose. The harsh tones used 
by figures that were supposed to operate behind the scenes and who now 
appeared in newspapers as heroes using new labels – such as “mafiya”47 – 
were evident symptoms of this transformation.  
A very famous interview of Gdlyan and Ivanov was published in Pravda on 
23 January 1988 and became a real milestone of the whole Uzbek affair. The 
article was entitled Kobry nad zolotom (Cobras standing watch over gold) and 
inflamed public opinion, offering revelations by the star investigators that the 
falsification of statistics in Uzbekistan had caused losses of more than 4 billion 
rubles. After recounting the stages of the Bukhara affair, Gdlyan finally 
described the systematic aspect of a scam that involved hopeless managers 
who had no other choice than to obey – “leave your post or live according to 
the criminals' laws.” This was justified by the idea that:  
Mafiya has no limits, up to and including tacit assent to stepped-up activity by 
Islam, [a religion that] preaches, as is known, submission [obedience] and 
nonresistance to senior in rank and age.48 
Then, Gdlyan and Ivanov stated that the real target of the investigations 
were the scam organizers described as “contemporary emirs” or affiliates of 
criminal organizations. In this scheme, “every stolen ruble is earmarked for 
some future use. A large part of this money goes to bribe officials, while 
another part is used to expand the criminal enterprise.”49 Hence, the 
investigators severely stated: 
                                                                                                                               
son-in-law. And this was sufficient for him to receive sums of 10,000. 30.000 or even 
50,000 rubles.” Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the 
Post-Stalin Era, 111–12; Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, Ya Rasskazhu Vse, Kak Bylo 
(Moskva: Izdatel഻skiı ̆t︠s︡ entr “Liana” sovmestno s izd-vom “Nezavisimaia︠︡  gazeta,” 1993); 
Yuri Mikhailovich Churbanov, Moı ̆Testඁ Leonid Brezhnev (Moskva: Algoritm, 2013). 
47 An important article on ‘mafiya’ appeared on 20 July 1988 in Literaturnaya Gazeta. 
It was an interview by Yuri Shchekochikhin of the MVD official Aleksander Gurov, who 
was heading a team of specialists on organized crime. Virginie Coulloudon, “Russia 
Adrift. Twenty Years of Anticorruption Campaigns,” in Corrupt Histories, ed. Emmanuel 
Kreike and William Chester Jordan (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004), 
254, 286. 
48 G. Ovcharenko, “Kobry Nad Zolotom,” Pravda, January 23, 1988. 
49 Ibid. 
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In Uzbekistan, crimes such as bribetaking, report-padding and embezzlement 
have become the norm. There was no real attempt to fight against them. 
Moreover, all of this was excused and camouflaged by traditional hospitality 
and the need to fulfill the plan. It involved not only the oblast management, 
but also the leaders of the republic as well. [...] Corruption, lawlessness, the 
organized ranks of professional criminals caused by these phenomena – they 
are looking at us with the merciless eyes of a cobra, rearing its poisonous head 
over the gold buried away from the state. Take one step, and... But to take this 
step and to crush the cobra – this is a necessity.50 
The harsh words used by Gdlyan and Ivanov were inexorably irritating a 
section of Uzbek society that saw the republic described as a black hole of 
malfeasance. Also the publicity of the harsh sentence for Usmanov was 
emblematic – and at least ‘demonstrative’ – of the fight against the mafiya 
creating a further frustration in a republic that saw a part of its leadership 
described as mafiya bosses.51 
6.2.2 Showing the mafiya in the XIX CPSU conference 
In 1988, the television began presenting stories about the heroic work of 
the investigators in Uzbekistan52 while the press revealed incredible details of 
the ‘Uzbek mafiya’ related to Rashidov53 and Odilov.54 Journalists like 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 On 24 March 1988, the former MCC UzSSR Usmanov was sentenced to death while 
other members of the “cotton case” sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. 
Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 24. 
52 Anatolii Aleksandrovich Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O Rozhdenii 
Parlamenta (Moskva: Novosti, 1991). 
53 In April 1988, an article appeared in Moskovskye Novosti stating that 
“rashidovshchina [...] became a common noun. Under him corruption, much bribery, 
oppression of millions of people with the sound of crackling and speeches occurred.” 
Viktor Loshak, “My Stolknulis’ S Mafiyey — Utverzhdayet Geroy Etogo Ocherka,” 
Moskovskiye Novosti, April 3, 1988. 
54 Even though the cases are often associated, Odilov’s story was not part of the 
Gdlyan-Ivanov affair. In fact, despite Gdlyan’s desire to get his hands on Odilov, he was 
arrested by the Uzbek KGB and prokuratura instead, and directly sent to Moscow. 
Gdlyan met him in prison and asked for his collaboration, offering in turn protection to 
his family. Mauro, “Così Combatto La Piovra Sovietica.” As mentioned, Odilov accused 
of brutal murders and other atrocities. Arkadii Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 134–36. 
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Likhanov (Ogonek) and Dodolev55 (Smena) started to follow Gdlyan’s and 
Ivanov’s deeds, contributing to building the mythology surrounding them.56 
As mentioned, this narrative seemed to be welcomed by Gorbachev, while – 
at least until mid-1988 – the party was still able to control, censor and 
prevent direct attacks.57 In parallel, Gdlyan’s media circus was endorsed by 
spectacular shows. To sensitize Soviet public opinion against the ‘mafiya’ 
problem and “to bring home to everyone the extent of corruption in 
Uzbekistan,” on 1 April 1988, Gdlyan organized a press conference that 
broadcast spectacular images of the seized treasures into the homes of Soviet 
citizens.58 A ‘theatrical staging’, it was ‘explosive’ in terms of propaganda 
                                                          
55 Gdlyan mentions that originally the project was to publish three books (Pyramida 1, 
2 and 3): "In 1988 the journalist Evgeniy Dodolev came to the Prokuratura USSR with 
Dmitry Likhachev, and then we considered the opportunity to write the book 
"Pyramida", and just immediately to continue the story with "Pyramida 2." We had a 
conversation where I said that they will not let us to write everything and that I will 
have a bad ending. At that moment, I had the opportunity to stop and to not take 
further risk, to avoid this mortal combat, and I knew against what kind of beast I was 
fighting. I could go back, give up everything, to stop my activity and to get prizes, 
promotion and so on... but that would have been a betrayal. I could not do this, so I 
accepted the proposal to write a book, and to leave a mark before violence could 
reach me. In other words, I want to say that this was all done consciously, with inner 
conviction that we were doing it for the people, for the good of the country. [...] The 
case was fully revealed in the last book, 'Kremlevskoe Delo'. Then I wanted to continue 
to write, but I decided that it was enough. I saw that Russia under Yeltsin had set off 
down the road of corruption and property seizure endorsed by very unreliable, 
dishonest, egotistical people. [...] So I lost interest in writing, and I have not continued 
anymore." Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 
2014. Gdlyan and Dodolyev, Piramida-1; Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan and Yevgeniy 
Yuriyevich Dodolyev, Mafiya Vremën Bezzakoniya (Erevan: Izd-vo AN, 1991). 
56 Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 32. 
57 According to Vaksberg, in 1988 the press was still publishing articles that kept to the 
party’s line, and that Ligachev had ordered the press to censor publicity of the 
allegations against him –the strong machine of censorship remained in place. In his 
version of events, Vaksberg claims that already in September 1988 there were rumors 
that Ligachev had been offered a 500-year-old carpet as a bribe from Uzbekistan. In 
other words, before the arrest and the confessions of Usmankhodzhaev in October. 
Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 128–31. 
58 Gdlyan “arranged for a special flight from Tashkent to Moscow. On board were eight 
suitcases of valuables. There was a lot of money; piles of 3 per cent government 
bonds; valuable jewellery; pendants with 70 diamonds; bracelets; tsarist gold coins 
and so on. There was 4.7 million rubles in cash; the gold jewellery and artefacts 
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effect,59 revealing the grounds on which the investigations had been based. 
Apparently, Gdlyan was further credited by the CC CPSU to proceed in his 
investigations and to display his results in the media while the key 
obstructionist figures within the prokuratura were replaced.60 Thus, the two 
investigators felt vindicated both within the party and public opinion, and 
believed they had finally defeated the obstacles within the prokuratura. 
However, this victory would prove Pyrrhic for them. 
Following these results, also the newly established FS CPUz Nishanov 
benefited from Gdlyan’s narrative and he probably had a role in endorsing 
their campaign.61 Then, also the official press of Uzbekistan presented the 
two heroes of perestroika. On April 1988, PV published a large article entitled 
Korni zastoya (“the roots of stagnation”) presenting the results of a 
roundtable organized on the ‘Uzbek affairs’ and involving some of its main 
investigators. The meeting was aimed at defining the ‘Uzbek affairs’ out of its 
Uzbek contextualization, reframing it as a broader Soviet problem. Basically, 
the CPUz also wanted to avoid attacks from the local nationalists that – as we 
will see in the next chapter – were showing signs of impatience towards 
Moscow and attacking the republican party for collaborating with the 
‘colonizers.’ Hence, Gdlyan explained that the label 'Uzbek affair' was a 
journalistic mistake and a way to marginalize as a 'local' issue a bigger 
problem of the whole country – the mafiya in the Soviet upper echelons. 
Then, the deputy head of the investigative department of Prokuratura USSR 
                                                                                                                               
weighed 43.2 kg and were worth at least 4 million rubles.” Martin McCauley, The Rise 
and Fall of the Soviet Union (New York: Routledge, 2013), 374.  
59 Sobchak recalled his amazement in reading a report that appeared in the magazine 
Sobesednik. Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O Rozhdenii Parlamenta. 
60 On 26 May 1988, the Genprokuror USSR Rekunkov was relieved from his post for 
reasons of health. He was replaced by Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev. His deputy 
Soroka was also replaced, by Aleksandr Filipovich Katusev. Nevertheless, Rekunkov 
continued to work in the USSR Prosecutor's Office, and then became an adviser to the 
Attorney General of the Russian Federation. Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya 
Politicheskogo Skandala,” 24. 
61 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s investigative 
ambitions had been exploited by a part of the Tashkent ruling elite (especially 
Nishanov) to oust opponents of other factions. This internal game was far from 
Moscow’s interests and was, apparently, supported by Gorbachev who wanted to 
enforce Nishanov’s role in the republic. 
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Viktor Ilyukhin62 also confirmed that the case was at the All-Union level and 
had already involved 12 directors of cotton factories in the RSFSR63 – three 
were sentenced to death – and officials of the Ministry of Light Industry of the 
USSR. He underlined that similar cases had been opened in Azerbaijan, 
Krasnodar, Rostov, Moscow, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and southern Ukraine.64 
Consequently, Ivanov endorsed the narrative of the common cause and 
explained that the investigative group also involved the best and most skilled 
investigators from Uzbekistan because they were the most able to move 
within the republican context. One of them – Sakidzhan Bakidzhanovich 
Dadadzhanov, from the prokuratura UzSSR – stated that most of the bigger 
investigations in Uzbekistan were over and Ivanov added that the 
investigations initiated in the republic were leading to Moscow. Gdlyan 
concluded by announcing that "without public support, without [the people’s] 
help we would not have any affair to send to the court." This call to support 
the investigations and spread in the media had effectively a political impact 
for the two formerly ‘backstage operators’ who subsequently emerged as 
very visible Soviet paladins of antimafia.65 
Hence, by the spring of 1988 Gdlyan and Ivanov could complete most of 
their missions in Uzbekistan, having garnered the consent of the CC CPSU and 
of the new prokuratura establishment to proceed with further investigations. 
As mentioned, they were ready to open a new front against the Muscovite 
mafiya with the ‘Kremlin affair’ and believed that they could again get the 
consent of the party. However, the Gensek probably perceived the risks of 
endorsing these potential ‘loose cannons’ and was simply not ready to 
                                                          
62 Ilyukhin was to be, a few months hence, one of the greatest rivals of Gdlyan and 
Ivanov and one the responsible for opening the criminal case against them.  
63 The Uzbek affair involved even “a number of influential ‘local’ Russians […] in the 
cotton scandal of that time.” William Fierman, “Glasnost’ in Practice: The Uzbek 
Experience,” Central Asian Survey 8, no. 2 (1989): 138; Edward A. Allworth, “The New 
Central Asians,” in Central Asia: One Hundred Thirty Years of Russian Dominance, A 
Historical Overview (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 551–52, 556. 
64 Therefore, Ilyukhin admitted that from the end of 1983 until 1987 – not only in 
Uzbekistan but at the All-Union level – 780 criminal cases on cotton pripiski had been 
opened, prosecuting more than 4,500 people. However, Ilyukhin recalled that these 
criminal investigations almost always involved the peak organizers of corruption and 
excluded the other 13,000 figures that were eligible to be prosecuted but who were 
too minor to count. These admissions are interesting if we consider the role that 
Ilyukhin assumed lately in the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair. PV, 21658, 92, 21 April 1988, p. 2. 
65 PV, 21658, 92, 21 April 1988, p. 2. 
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endorse a campaign of two investigators with too much support among the 
masses against a party that appeared to the public to be obscure and corrupt 
machine. At that moment, the party urged a halt – or at least a slowing – of 
their activities within the prokuratura before it was too late. Again, the 
judiciary organs were responding to the political need of the effective ruling 
force of USSR. Sukharev, the new head of the prokuratura, refused to 
sanction the arrest of two obkom secretaries and two managers of the CC 
CPSU – Mogilnichenko and Smirnov – and in so doing he continued his 
predecessor’s diffidence as head of the supreme prosecutorial organ against 
the ambitious investigations of Gdlyan and Ivanov. At this point, Gdlyan and 
Ivanov had just two options: obey the party and drop the charges against top 
leaders or go against the party and take the consequences. The two 
investigators seemed to honestly believe in their strategy and embarked on 
the second, risky solution, turning to the Fourth Estate and public opinion for 
support. Thus, the Uzbek/Kremlin affair – which would touch even higher 
figures such as Aliyev, Grishin, Romanov, Solomentsev, Kapitonov, Ligachev 
and others – became a case that staked a public outcry against most of the 
important institutions of the party and the state.  
Boris Yeltsin was one of the first66 and greatest supporter of Gdlyan’s 
investigations inside the CC CPSU and used similar ‘cleaning’ arguments 
against a part of the Moscow apparatus in order to consolidate his power.67 
Nevertheless, in 1988 he  was marginalized within the CC CPSU and dismissed 
from the politburo.68 However, the future president of Russia understood 
that he could use the Gdlyan’s ambitions and deploy the same arguments 
against his main rivals within the party.69 Basically, both Gdlyan and Yeltsin 
                                                          
66 The early sympathetic relations between Gdlyan-Ivanov and Yeltsin had also been 
confirmed by Pikhoya who saw their correspondence at the APRF. Personal interview 
with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
67 Gdlyan admitted that Yeltsin probably had a role in sponsoring the Uzbek affair 
within the CC CPSU. In 1987, the future president of Russia was a key figure in getting 
consent for Gdlyan’s cause and corralling a majority of votes in support of the arrests 
of prominent figures under investigation. 
68 “The growing Yeltsin-Ligachev conflict exploded into the open at the October 1987 
CC Plenum, disturbing the party protocol of unanimity, discipline, and comity.” Gordon 
M. Hahn, Russia’s Revolution from Above, 1985-2000: Reform, Transition, and 
Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2002), 60. 
69 From 1988 Gdlyan’s attacks against Ligachev, one of the main rivals of Yeltsin, and 
the ‘conservative’ faction of the party were harsher. 
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could exploit each other and fight on a common front of anticorruption 
against the upper echelons of the party, forging a political alliance that would 
last until the early ‘90s. The main occasion to relaunch their position was then 
during the signal event of the year, the XIX All-Union conference of the CPSU 
(28 June - 1 July, 1988), where the Gdlyan-Ivanov story became a political 
affair and contributed to polarization of the party scene. 
At the “highly exceptional conference, replete with criticism of the 
leadership and sensational speeches,”70 the divisions within the party were 
exacerbated. Evidently, the party was no more a unite monolith and the 
Soviet regime appeared to be split between ‘conservatives’ and ‘soft-liners’ 
while the divisions within the clashing factions would further radicalize the 
debate.71 On that occasion, corruption was recalled by many of the 
participants who criticized the slowness in implementing reforms and 
denounced the persistence of zastoya practices. In this arena, Boris Yeltsin 
reappeared from his political ‘exile’ and made a long speech72 criticizing the 
Gorbachevian line of slow reforms and effectively pushed the line of Gdlyan 
and Ivanov. Indeed, Yeltsin attacked the control organs – which were 
reluctant to bring charges of bribery against senior leaders – and directly the 
head of the PCC CPSU Solomentsev for being too slack and too tolerant in this 
regard.73 In parallel, at the conference Gdlyan’s stories became widespread 
and were exploited as popular – and even populist – arguments to criticize 
Gorbachev’s leadership. Indeed, during the first day of conference, the chief 
editor of Ogonek, Vitaly Korotych, made a harsh statement announcing that 
among the conference delegates were four criminals74 and presented to 
Gorbachev a dossier that had been prepared by Ivanov.75 Basically, Korotych 
rehashed a series of idea exposed in a scandalous Gdlyan-Ivanov article – 
                                                          
70 Valery Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by 
His Chief of Staff (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 230. 
71 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 564–65. 
72 Yeltsin, Against the Grain: An Autobiography, 224–35. 
73 Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation 
Crisis, 227–28. 
74 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 63. 
75 According to Sobchak, there were many rumors on the four names “Three were 
easily guessed: Solomentsev, Gromyko, Ligachev. There was no convergence in the 
definition of the fourth candidate.” Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O 
Rozhdenii Parlamenta; EG, “Nikolay Ivanov: Skazat’ O Churbanove Chto-to Khorosheye 
Ya Ne Mogu.” 
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entitled Protivostoyanie (Confrontation) – that was published in Ogonek just 
three days before the conference opened.76  
This was a moment when stories related to the Uzbek affair appeared 
frequently in the press.77 This threw into sharp relief the widespread 
discussion within the conference arguing that there were bribe-givers among 
the delegates and that this was just the ‘tip of the iceberg.’ The Gdlyan-Ivanov 
article denounced systematic corruption in the highest echelons of the Soviet 
elite and claimed the existence of a ‘Soviet mafiya’ where Brezhnev and 
Rashidov were bosses and where also four bribers among the delegates had 
been involved. 
This scandal caused a great embarrassment for the whole party which 
already felt itself under attack. This was just a further reason for concern. 
Hence, Yakovlev announced that Gdlyan had committed big error in writing 
the Ogonek article. He also claimed that the CPC was already handling this 
case78 and even Boldin mentioned that after the conference Gorbachev "was 
deeply upset by the torrent of accusations, some of which were aimed at 
him."79 Then, the Gensek “ordered the procurator general and the KGB to 
stop the slander and report to him on all details of the case. The Uzbek affair 
was discussed at closed meetings of the Politburo; instructions were issued 
and, to some extent with Gorbachev’s consent, several Central Committee 
members were arrested and tried.”80 
Evidently the party had to formulate a strategy to contain the blowback 
from the anticorruption campaign. Ivanov recalls that after the conference 
the head of the general department of the CC CPSU – Anatoly Lukyanov – 
proposed to Gdlyan that he be posted to Armenia as a prosecutor, promising 
that he could keep the investigations of the Uzbek affair. However, during the 
                                                          
76 T. Gdlyan, N. Ivanov, Protivostoyanie, Ogonek, 26, 25 June – 2 July 1988, pp. 27-29. 
77 In July 1988, Ogonek published stories that criticized the defunct FS CPUz Rashidov 
as a sort of godfather. Ogonek, 29, 3 July 1988, pp. 20-23. 
78 Yakovlev stated: “Does an examining magistrate have the right to determine 
whether a person is a criminal or not? No. Only the courts can declare a person to be a 
criminal. This was a most serious error by Gdlyan, who simply declared that they were 
bribetakers.” Sovetskaya Latviya, 20 August 1988, p. 3, FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-88-050- Soviet 
Union. Political Affairs, 10 NOVEMBER 1988,” 1988, 139; Chiesa, “La Mafia Uzbeka Alla 
Conquista Di Mosca. Due Giudici Sovietici La Sbarrano E Raccontano.” 
79 Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His 
Chief of Staff, 231. 
80 Ibid. 
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negotiations, Lukyanov retracted the second part of the proposal and there 
was no deal.81 Ivanov adds that, at that point, the case risked being passed in 
full to the KGB but there was no objective basis for their removal and they 
were too famous to be touched. Gdlyan argues that by then they had reached 
a point of no return: 
We wanted to liberate the country from that sore, to clean the cadres, the 
structures of power from the negativity that has been accumulated. Time has 
shown that it was the first priority for the country. […] We did a great job 
[…but] Gorbachev wanted to "buy" me, he praised me with members of the 
Politburo and then he proposed that I become the prosecutor of Armenia. I 
agreed with one condition: ‘I will take the job if I will stay at the head of the 
investigative group.’ And when the Genprokuror, the little wretch Sukharev, 
organized the meeting of the college, he told me words that I had never heard 
before, that I was a genius, an investigator of God, that people like are one in a 
million, that I have a great future. After that praise, my candidacy as 
prosecutor of Armenia was approved. Thus, [Sukharev] gave me compliments, 
congratulations and he promised that within a year and a half I would become 
the deputy Genprokuror of the USSR. However, he began to say “you know, 
there's a lot of things to do in Armenia, and this case should be entrusted to 
the someone else.” I replied: “I cannot close this case because I gave my word 
that I will finish it.” Then, I told the board members that I was not on going to 
“sell myself” and I would not barter the case for the post of prosecutor. Then 
[Sukharev] tried to convince me, we talked for more than two hours. I said 
“now please understand, I will go to the end [of this case], I chose this road, I 
cannot change, people are counting on me, we have to put to an end this 
damn corruption. I understand that you are following the instructions of the 
Politburo, but why you want to ruin this case? Future generations will not 
remember Sukharev with a good word.” Then I added "let me offer another 
way, you should write a letter of resignation from your post so that your name 
gets no dirt.”82 
Even though this recounting of the story undoubtedly presents some 
elements of fiction, in summer 1988 there was in fact no deal between 
Gdlyan-Ivanov, the prokuratura, and the party. Basically, from that moment, 
the investigative group was much more marginalized as a potential 
antisystem threat while the debate converged on the biggest and most 
famous trial of the entire Uzbek affair. 
                                                          
81 EG, “Nikolay Ivanov: Skazat’ O Churbanove Chto-to Khorosheye Ya Ne Mogu.” 
82 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
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6.3 The Uzbek ‘trial of the century’ 
At the end of summer 1988, another showdown was about to inflame 
Soviet public opinion and to further credit Gdlyan’s crusade against the 
‘mafiya’. The trial against ‘Churbanov and the others’ was a judicial case that 
incriminated Brezhnev’s son in law and exposed systemic malfeasance in the 
upper echelons of Uzbekistan. 
6.3.1 A judgement written in the press 
Initially, Churbanov collaborated with investigators while during his many 
interrogations, he retracted many of his confessions.83 Nevertheless, the 
prosecutors were able to charge him and the trial was set by the prokuratura 
on 30 May 1988.84 This event was announced with great fanfare in the press 
attracting journalists who had started to speculate on the Uzbek mafiya, the 
                                                          
83 After his arrest, Churbanov collaborated with the investigations and admitted to 
have taken bribes for 400,000 rubles. Thus, he admitted that a part of money was 
used to buy stones that were kept by his sister, furnishing the dacha and restoring an 
apartment. However, he was not able to explain the disappearance of 300,000 rubles 
at the preliminary investigation. During his deposition on January 24, 1987 he 
demanded more time to remember, on 25 January he wrote to the Genprokuror that 
valuables were hidden in his “dacha at Zhukovka, and a sketch of the hiding-places 
was included. The authorities went there, dug and tapped on walls, both according to 
the diagram and at random, and they found nothing.” The day after, he said that he 
gave false testimony and did not know where the money was. On June, he demanded 
more time because the disappearance of money was linked to other major problems. 
On 16 July, he declared to have given 300,000 rubles to his wife Galina Brezhneva who 
spent it on gems but the day after he retreated this admission saying “My previous 
testimony was given impulsively. I didn't give my wife any money except for my 
salary.” On July 23, he admitted “The question about the money is very complex. The 
fact of the matter is that I don't have the right to compromise the family of my late 
father-in-law and even more so his memory.” On 4 December, he admitted “I passed 
the money on to Vashkov—300,000 rubles in two leather cases. He told me that he 
was going to 'do a deal with someone from the world of trade.' And that the money 
would be returned soon. However, within two months Vashkov unexpectedly died and 
did not return the money.” The Vashkov in question then held the position of head of 
the trade section of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Feofanov and Barry, Politics 
and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 113–14. 
84 Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 24. 
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Brezhnevian millionaires, and the 'pyramidal' scheme.85 On 30 August 1988, 
Pravda published a long article entitled "the son in-law and his godfathers"86 
where Churbanov was described as a mediocre figure who had a 'business' 
relation with Rashidov and who was protected by a 'constellation' of quasi-
criminal figures. According to this reconstruction, about 110 volumes of 
evidence were collected against Churbanov who “was the portrait of a fully 
formed careerist and power seeker” at any cost. However, the real news was 
about the engagement of a member of the former ‘first family.’87 The defunct 
Rashidov was also accused of protecting the “criminal clan" and 
“rashidovshchina remained a monolith of the bureaucratic-criminal” system. 
Rashidov and Churbanov were clearly different people. The first claimed to be 
a writer, an intellectual, a major political and economic leader […who] spread 
his cult and enjoyed enormous power. Simple honest workers were his 
political enemies and were supplanted in the country […] The second – a 
relatively young and brash [official] – just started to taste power, privilege and 
the sweetness of "entering in the sphere." […] The first was the master of 
intrigue. The second was an aspiring apprentice.88 
 Churbanov was thus demonized as a godfather (kumov'ya) who was 
covering for the scammers and Aitmuratov as a ‘boss’ of the mafiya system, 
while the former top management of the Uzbek MVD was put in the dock 
together with the former deputy chairman of the MVD USSR.89 This 
                                                          
85 Evgeny Dodolev, ...I Odna Noch, Smena, 15, 1988, pp. 4-7, 18-19 and PV, 197, 28 
August 1988, p. 3. 
86 G. Ovcharenko and A. Chernenko, “Zyat’ I Yego Kumov’ya. Khronika Odnoy 
«blistatel’noy» Kar’yery,” Pravda, August 30, 1988, 6. 
87 According to Vaksberg – who defined Brezhnev’s son in law as a member of the 
“Rashidov mafia” – Churbanov wanted to publicize himself in the press and it was 
common for him to buy journalist as a key of success. Churbanov took a 10,000-ruble 
bribe from Karimov in Bukhara during his inspection trip at Gazli plant in October 
1979. After that episode, Churbanov was in a writers conference in Tashkent where he 
met with Vaksberg proposing him to write a good article and promising any gift, 
dacha, car, house or whatever he wanted. Churbanov was substantially commissioning 
good press to accredit his office. Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 107–11, 132. 
88 Ovcharenko and Chernenko, “Zyat’ I Yego Kumov’ya. Khronika Odnoy 
«blistatel’noy» Kar’yery,” 6. 
89 Then, the article announced that close to Churbanov were also incriminated the 
former head of the Uzbek MVD, Kh. Yakhyayev, his deputies P. Begelman and T. 
Kahramanov, and the heads of the UVD S. Sabirov, Kh. Norbutaev, D. Dzhamalov, M. 
Norov, and I. Makhamadzhanov. Ibid. 
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spectacular publicity of trials and the scapegotism – typical of many 
communist regimes – was intended to discredit a living symbol of 
Brezhnevian nepotism,90 corruption and stagnation in the Soviet system. 
From this case, the defunct Brezhnev was also symbolically put on trial, 
representing a sort of “godfather”91 of the decadent past. Again, to establish 
distance from a previous regime was a typical narrative trend in Russian 
history and in this case was functional to legitimize Gorbachev and his 
reformist agenda, becoming a perfect target. 
Responding to these hyper-biased articles, the jurist and journalist Yuri 
Feofanov wrote in Izvestiya an impressive article entitled Prigovor do suda 
(“the sentence before the trial”) where he complained of excessive negative 
biases against the defendants and argued that “some people have already 
been publicly declared to be criminals and are named in articles, and 
television programs with thick bundles of stolen money, talking about what is 
still under investigation as if it has been proven [. Thus, he urged letting] the 
court decide who's who and what's what. The court and no one else."92 For 
the first time, the media pillory was criticized, and the need to reaffirm the 
principles of the rule of law in Russia was supported in the press. In fact, the 
trial against Churbanov was supposed to be in the typical Soviet style where 
the verdict had been determined before. However, it was probably the first 
important case in the USSR where the judge acted according to the law rather 
than to political orders. Nevertheless, a part of the Soviet public seemed to 
sympathize with the popular accusers – Gdlyan and Ivanov, who prepared the 
charges – and their moral mission and "the whole country was awaiting this 
trial with impatience."93 Finally, on 5 September 1988 the trial against 
‘Churbanov and the others’ started and was followed with rapt attention by 
media, which were reporting news about the newly dismissed leaders of 
Uzbekistan and their involvement in the case.94 
                                                          
90 Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation 
Crisis, 211. 
91 The Time, 12 September 1988, p. 22. 
92 Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 
104; Yuri Vasilevich Feofanov, “Prigovor Do Suda,” Izvestiya, September 3, 1988, 6. 
93 Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 127. 
94 The trial was even recorded by cinema operators and broadcast in some parts by 
Gosteleradio USSR. PV, 21868, 2, 3 January 1989, p. 4. 
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6.3.2 The arrest of Usmankhodzhaev 
Apparently, Gdlyan and Ivanov touched the zenith of their notoriety while 
another important element was added to endorse their cause. In fact, after 
three years of investigations, the group finally got the permission to proceed 
against Usmankhodzhaev and arrested the former FS CPUz on 19 October 
1988. The former leader of Uzbekistan was transferred to Matrosskaya 
Tishina (‘Seaman's silence’), the famous MVD USSR isolation facility n. 4 in 
Moscow. During his first interrogations, Usmankhodzhaev admitted to having 
given bribes to Ligachev and to other CC CPSU officials. These were incredible 
words that reinforced the investigators’ assumptions. Indeed, following the 
Gdlyan’s accusatory scheme, Usmankhodzhaev’s confession was the evidence 
of a corrupted relations between Moscow and the periphery, demonstrating 
that this dynamic was not only at the MVD level – as it was evidenced with 
the Churbanov-Yakhyayev affair – but directly involved the higher echelons of 
the party. This hypothesis seemed to acknowledge a patronage relation 
between a fallen republican leader and a politburo member who had been 
gradually marginalized in the CC CPSU and lost his influence to avoid the 
arrest of his protected clients. Despite these thrilling suppositions, this is not 
the most relevant aspect of the story.  
In fact, within a couple of weeks of the first interrogation, 
Usmankhodzhaev retracted his confessions, denied he had bribed Ligachev 
and other CC CPSU members and progressively accused the investigators – 
and Gdlyan personally – of extorting his confessions.95 According to Gdlyan, 
                                                          
95 During his interrogation on 23 October – directed by Gdlyan and the assistant 
investigator Svetlana V. Moskovtseva –  the former FS CPUz admitted to having paid 
bribes to some managers of the CC CPSU as well as to the former Genprokuror USSR 
Rekunkov and his deputy Soroka. There was no registration of these statements and 
many doubts emerged on the methods of obtaining such confessions. On 25 October, 
Usmankhodzhaev confirmed to Gdlyan the previous evidence, admitting also a bribe 
of 60,000 rubles to Ligachev. The same testimony was offered on 26 October when 
Usmankhodzhaev – in the presence of Deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR A.D. 
Vasilyev – confirmed the bribes to Ligachev during the XVI plenum in Tashkent in June 
1984 and at the CC CPSU office in November 1984 when he was in Moscow preparing 
for the 60th anniversary of the Uzbek SSR. After 25 October, Usmankhodzhaev sent a 
petition to the Genprokuror where he asked the investigation of his case be conducted 
only by Gdlyan, Ivanov and Karakozov. Nevertheless, on 28 October, in a meeting with 
the Genprokuror Sukharev, Usmankhodzhaev rejected his testimony while just the day 
after – in front of Vasilyev, Moskovtseva and Karakozov - he confirmed the version 
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this reconsideration was due to the intervention of the Genprokuror Sukharev 
who was ordered by the CC CPSU to slow the investigation on the Uzbek affair 
and to limit its extent. Usmankhodzhaev’s words did not present irrefutable 
evidence against Ligachev, but it is evident that the party did not want a 
scandal that could directly touch a politburo member and probably wanted to 
defend the credibility of the whole system from the potentially slanderous 
words of the former Uzbek leader and his accusers.  
Unfortunately for him, Usmankhodzhaev had become the subject of a 
political game between the investigators – who pushed him to confess – and 
the party, which had every interest in dismissing this kind of accusation. Not 
least, Gdlyan’s leadership was challenged in late October 1988, when a dozen 
KGB members – led by Colonel A. Dukhanin – were brought in to Gdlyan’s 
investigation team and partially took the responsibility over interrogations. 
This move probably interrupted the ‘Gdlyan’s evidence machine’ and many 
suspects were transferred from the MVD detention centers to the KGB 
facilities in Lefortovo, which Gdlyan and Ivanov could not access.96 According 
to the investigator Laptev this was a clear attempt by Sukharev to include “all 
the King's men” in the investigations97 and Gdlyan directly recalled how in his 
team 70 members had been progressively substituted with shady elements 
that had contaminated the evidence.98 Undeniably, Gdlyan’s position was 
awkward and unwelcomed by those who wanted to obstruct his 
investigations. Nevertheless, Gdlyan and Ivanov were positively encouraged 
                                                                                                                               
given on 26 October. Finally, during the interrogation of 1 November 1988 – held by 
Vasilyev and Moskovtseva – the former FS CPUz reevaluated the ‘erroneous’ 
accusations against Ligachev but confirmed two bribes of 50,000 rubles to the former 
Genprokuror Rekunkov and to his deputy Soroka for 20,000 and 10,000 rubles. Then, 
on 3 January 1989, Usmankhodzhaev confessed a bribe gave to the former minister of 
the MJ USSR Terebilov (GARF, f. 10147, op. 1, d. 466, l. 3). Nevertheless, on 8 March 
1989, Usmankhodzhaev sent a petition to the Genprokuror where he retracted his first 
allegations and on 8 April, in front of Sukharev, he admitted that he gave false 
testimony at the demand of Gdlyan and Ivanov. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 12; Yegor 
Kuzmich Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 243; Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya 
Politicheskogo Skandala,” 24; Gdlyan and Ivanov, Kremlevskoe Delo; Melenberg, “Na 
Dmitrovke, 15 — Bez Peremen. Posledneye Delo Prokuratury SSSR.” 
96 Melenberg, “Na Dmitrovke, 15 — Bez Peremen. Posledneye Delo Prokuratury SSSR”; 
Selina, “Ob ‘Uzbekskom Dele’, Razvale Strany I Sovremennoy Bor’be S Korruptsiyey.” 
97 Ibid. 
98 Mauro, “Così Combatto La Piovra Sovietica.” 
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by their popularity and the positive results in the investigations. They were 
sure to find a way to embed the members of the supposed ‘Muscovite 
mafiya,’ and even during Churbanov’s trail they hoped to get a further 
endorsement of their cause. This line was confirmed by the tones of the 
‘Uzbek trial of the century’ that were further exacerbated in the press when 
people started to send letters demanding more details be published.  
6.3.3 Churbanov and the others 
In order to reply to the readers’ request, on 2 November 1988, Pravda 
published an interview with the deputy Genprokuror USSR, A.F. Katusev, in 
which he acknowledged the arrests of Churbanov, Usmankhodzhaev, former 
chairman of the presidium SS UzSSR Salimov, and the recently dismissed FS 
Bukhara obkom Dzhabbarov, FS Samarkand obkom Radzhabov and other 
heads of Uzbek MVD. Then, the article acknowledged that in the previous 
weeks the press has violated the presumption of innocence principle 
forewarning that the major perpetrators of corruption in Uzbekistan were 
under indictment.99 The Churbanov case was thus presented as part of a 
wider story related to the Uzbek affair. Hence, his judgement became the 
‘Uzbek trial of the century,’ an event organized within the SC USSR military 
collegium – presided over by General Major Mikhail A. Marov100 –  that had 
various phases. During the first hearings, some of the witnesses and 
defendants made harsh accusations against Churbanov that ended up as a 
scapegoat of the malfeasance within the republic. The former secretary of the 
CC CPUz, Yerezhep Aitmuratov, admitted: 
The leadership of the USSR MVD exercised strong influence on the 
development of corruption in the republic by selecting people that would be 
useful to it. The role of Churbanov, the son-in-law of Brezhnev? His word was 
law for the republic organs of internal affairs. This was because the leadership 
of the republic enjoyed the trust of Brezhnev, and his son-in-law was the first 
                                                          
99 G. Ovcharenko, “V Prokurature SSSR: Neumolima Logika Zakona,” Pravda, 
November 2, 1988. 
100 The tribunal was chaired by Marov, assisted by the General Majors V.Z. Zhevagin 
and V.S. Sizov as honorary judges . On the side of the public prosecutor was the 
assistant Genprokuror USSR A.V. Sboev and on the side of the defense lawyers was the 
college of lawyers of Moscow city. PV, 21868, 2, 3 January 1989, p. 4. According to 
Feofanov and Barry, Marov’s honesty and fairness cost him his post. After Churbanov’s 
trial he was forced into retirement. Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia 
Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 110. 
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deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. In turn, Rashidov and his team did anything 
necessary to protect the organs of internal affairs from criticism or from being 
checked up on. Many workers in the police organs, from the local inspector to 
the republic Minister, engaged in extortion.101 
Similarly, the defendant Yakhyaev102 also admitted: 
With Churbanov's arrival at the central apparatus of the MVD, corruption 
began to run wild. A kind of dual power was established in the ministry, but in 
fact Churbanov ran everything. Both Shchelokov [the Minister] and Churbanov 
took bribes, but the former was a trained professional while the latter had 
neither competence in any area of police work nor any desire to learn. It is not 
by chance that he carried parade drill to an extreme and became a kind of 
martinet. He began to push forward his favorites, and to treat the real 
professionals shabbily.103 
Hence, there was a first turning point during the session of 12-13 
December 1988 when Churbanov and his associates were finally charged with 
bribe taking on a particularly large scale (art. 173 RSFSR criminal code) and 
abuse of official position for personal gain (art. 170 RSFSR criminal code). The 
accusations were presented against him, former head of MVD UzSSR 
Yakhyayev (and his deputies Kakhramanov and Begel'man), and the chairman 
of the regional UVD departments of Khorezm (Sabirov), Tashkent 
(Dzhamalov), Kashkadarya (Norbutayev), Namangan (Makhamadzhanov), and 
Bukhara (Norov). Particularly, Churbanov was indicted for taking bribes totally 
680,000 rubles. However, on that occasion the prosecutor asked to exclude a 
part of them (275,000 rubles) for lack of evidence. Also Yakhyayev was 
accused of taking 89 bribes (for a total sum of 146,000 rubles) but only 68 
(114,000) could be verified. Therefore, the public prosecutor demanded for 
both Churbanov and Yakhyayev a punishment of 15 years in a strict-regime 
corrective labor colony (and the first five years in prison for Churbanov) while 
minor punishment was proposed for the other defendants.104 However, in the 
                                                          
101 Ibid., 120–21. 
102 According to Vaksberg, Churbanov had an insignificant role in the mafia and was 
just a symbolic culprit meanwhile, Yakhyaev was the real powerful mafia boss and for 
this reason he was replaced by Rashidov with a loyal element as Ergashev. Vaksberg, 
The Soviet Mafia, 132. 
103 Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 
121. 
104 Kakhramanov was given 13 years, Sabirov, Norbutayev, Makhamadzhanov, and 
Norov 10 years, Dzhamalov 7, and Begel'man 6. PV, 21855, 289, 16 December 1988, p. 
4. 
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last days of a trail that seemed so to follow a less political and more legal 
criteria, the charges were partially subverted by the lack of evidence. 
After bringing over 200 witnesses to the stand and scrupulously refuting 
the evidence, the court concluded on 30 December when the final verdict 
resized the charges. For accepting bribes in the verified amount of 90,960 
rubles and for abusing his official position for mercenary purposes, 
Brezhnev’s son-in-law “was sentenced immediately to twelve years 
deprivation of freedom in a strict-regime corrective labor colony, the 
confiscation by the state of his personal property, and a fine equal to the 
amount of bribes received.”105 Also the other crimes were assessed106 and the 
other defendants – with the exception of Kakhramanov, whose case was 
acquitted – received minor punishment.107 Churbanov, the greatest 
defendant in the Uzbek affair, was finally in jail. However, the verdict was not 
a real victory for Gdlyan and Ivanov. Considering the amount of evidence that 
had not been confirmed at judicial level, the myth of the two invincible 
investigators was definitively questioned. Furthermore, in that moment, 
accusations and information about their extortive methods of getting 
confessions were leaked to the press. 
6.3.4 Dismissing the ‘queen of evidence’ 
Feofanov and Barry’s analysis reveals how this trial was conducted under 
a more ‘fair’ and effective judicial framework that often criticized the validity 
and the means to obtain evidence in the prejudicial phase. Basically, this 
                                                          
105 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 187. 
106 The crimes related to abuse of power, intermediation and bribery. The verified 
bribes amounted to 90,960 rubles (Churbanov), 45,200 (Begelman), 49,008 
(Norbutayev), 21,000 (Dzhamalov), 16,458 (Makhamadzhanov), 26470 (Norov) and 
14000 (Sabirov). PV, 21868, 2, 3 January 1989, p. 4. 
107 Norbutaev was condemned to 10 years, Begelman and Norov to 9, Dzhamalov, 
Mahamadzhanov and Sabirov to 8 years imprisonment with confiscation of property. 
Kahramanov was acquitted and the Yakh'yaev case was separated and allocated to 
further investigation. In fact, the former head of MVD UzSSR was accused of the illegal 
arrest of people, groundless commitment to a psychiatric hospital, and other crimes, 
rather than bribetaking, the basic crime of which his co-defendants were accused. 
Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 24; Feofanov and 
Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 123. 
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episode exposed the limits of the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigations, even 
demonstrating serious flaws in the criminal procedural law, such as: 
the absence of real limits on pre-trial detention and the lack of prompt access 
to a defense attorney for a person brought in for questioning [and] improper 
pressures by investigators on suspects over the law. Coercion is normal for this 
job, but some pressures were over any legality.108 
Evidently, the problem was related to Soviet criminal procedure where 
confession was considered as ‘auxiliary’ evidence that might enforce and had 
to be supported by other ‘objective’ evidence. Nevertheless, providing 
evidence in corruption cases was – and it is still now – extremely complicated 
because such a verification is directly related to the nature of bribery itself. As 
mentioned in the third chapter, bribery usually involves just two participants 
– the giver and the taker – and produces no document or receipt. Therefore, 
the confession is the main, in fact the only, evidence that is possible to 
obtain. However, the excessive reliance by investigators (and courts) on 
confession as proof of guilt recalled the methods of the great purges of the 
‘30s when Vyshinsky based most of the trials on confession that was defined 
as the ‘queen of evidence.’109 However, with Churbanov’s trial, “for the first 
time the public demanded that the court act like an organ of justice and not a 
cog in the mechanism of repression.”110 
In the aftermath of the verdict, the public prosecutors Aleksandr 
Vasilievich Sboev,111 offered a version of the facts. He declared that initially 
the case seemed to be easily resolvable – more than 100 folders of evidence, 
videotapes and other recordings for more than a thousand episodes of crimes 
                                                          
108 Ibid., 104–5. 
109 Arkadii Vaksberg, Jan Butler, and Robert Conquest, Stalin’s Prosecutor: The Life of 
Andrei Vyshinsky (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991). 
110 Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 
110. 
111 On 29 October 2014, I was in Moscow and I read this story in PV. Thus, I searched 
for Sboev’s contact details and I was able to reach him on the telephone. I wanted to 
ask if it were possible to meet him for an interview or, at least, to have a short 
comment on the phone and he seemed happy enough to have a young Italian 
researcher interested in his story. However, when I mentioned Churbanov's trial and 
prosecutorial activity in Soviet times, he evidently became embarrassed by my 
requests and rejected my call stating that he was too old and too intelligent to argue 
certain facts. Probably, after so much outcry about these issues, he felt the pressure of 
his responsibility and he declined to recall any fact of his life during the Soviet period. 
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had been assembled. Additionally, pretty much every defendant had already 
confessed his guilt. However, when Yakhyayev and Kakhramanov 
reconsidered their affirmations during the trial – according to Sboev because 
of “a tactical ploy, a method of protection” – it became harder to define the 
truth between versions that had been completely distorted. Thus, Sboev 
recognized the principle such that “the recognition of bribes must necessarily 
be supported by the other, circumstantial evidence, small, seemingly, details, 
confirming the reality of our other acts” while the charges that were not 
objectively arguable were dropped.112 Furthermore, it was hard to make 
accusations against Churbanov, who admitted “they gave me money for no 
reason at all,” and bribes thus became a symbol of submission. Evidently, that 
kind of gift was not in itself a crime113 and it is difficult to label it as bribery, 
extortion or another form of corruption.114 As mentioned, a bribe has a do ut 
des nexus. When this mechanism is missed, it is very hard to define the 
nature of the bribe. Responding to the charges made against him, Churbanov 
revealed that in the late ‘70s he received many gifts from Rashidov and other 
figures who wanted to please Brezhnev115 or to “give a good impression”116 to 
his influential son-in-law. In this regard, Churbanov explained that:  
These hangers-on of Rashidov wanted to win me over, and through me to 
secure the favor of my father-in-law. "I felt uncomfortable." he said, "and 
wanted to send these sycophants packing and to throw the money in their 
faces […] I'd only have to do it once […] But I couldn't find the civic courage to 
stand up to the flattery and the bribes.117 
                                                          
112 PV, 21877, 11, 13 January 1989, p. 4. 
113 “The law (article 173 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) is reasonably clear, but as 
practice has shown, the crime of taking a bribe is somewhat narrowly defined: for 
performance or non-performance, in the interests of the giver, of any kind of act.” 
Ibid., 119. 
114 Ibid., 112–15. 
115 Ibid., 112. 
116 The former chairman of the SM UzSSR Khudayberdyev admitted that he gave 
50,000 rubles to Churbanov because it was a good way to make a good impression. 
However, he probably wanted to divert MVD investigations out of the republic. Esin 
(the FS Navoi obkom), Yakhyayev (the former chairman of MVD UzSSR) and other 
prominent figures of the UzSSR shared the same objectives. The Uzbek-Churbanov 
bribery “took place during an All-Union Conference of the MVD and the USSR Writer's 
Union on the subject of “Moral Problems in Fiction” in October 1979. Vaksberg, The 
Soviet Mafia; Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the 
Post-Stalin Era, 116. 
117 Ibid., 116–17. 
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Additionally, as we have previously seen, many of the defendants started 
to reconsider their confessions during the investigations and even during the 
trials.118 This kind of strategy was even possible because perjury – even at 
juridical level – was not really considered as a criminal offense in the USSR. 
Furthermore, they justified their reconsiderations, mentioning that they were 
forced by investigators to give such confessions, that those alleged bribes 
were a matter of gifts or even that they had admitted guilt by ‘mistake’. It is 
difficult to determine whether this approach was a strategy devised by their 
defense attorneys or if they were pushed to reconsider their confessions from 
above. Both cases are plausible, considering that after Yakhyayev’s and 
Kakhramanov’s reconsiderations, many other defendants started to disavow 
their previous confessions in order to contradict their charges. Furthermore, 
these reconsiderations were possibly encouraged by a part of the central 
Prokuratura and by KGB officials considering that after meeting with some of 
the defendants (such as Usmankhodzhaev or Abdullaeva) the confessions 
were mostly disavowed.119  
Thus, after his first confessions in 1987, Churbanov rejected the 
accusations of bribery during the trial and admitted to have taken money – 
specifically 50,000 rubles from Khudayberdyev and 30,000 from Esin – only as 
a ‘gift.’ Churbanov stated that he was pushed to give names and to admit up 
to a million rubles in bribes but he could not explain his contradictory 
confessions during preliminary investigations. In sum, 
the major part of the charge against Churbanov was not proven in court, and 
[…] Kakhramanov was completely acquitted, even though he confessed during 
the investigation. As I have indicated, I didn't find in the statements of the 
                                                          
118 “When the questioning of Churbanov in court commenced, he did not express this 
remorse. When the question that always follows the reading of the charge was asked 
(“Do you admit your guilt?”), five defendants (Begelman, Norbutaev, Dzhamalov, 
Makhamadzhanov and Norov) answered in the affirmative, Sabirov admitted partial 
guilt and Kakhramanov and Iakhiaev denied their guilt completely. Remember that the 
last-mentioned was the Minister of Internal Affairs, Kakhramanov was the deputy 
minister, and the others were oblast heads of the internal affairs administration. 
Churbanov said that he admitted guilt for abuse of his office, but he denied taking 
bribes since he considered the money he received to have been given as gifts.” Ibid., 
117. 
119 Also Ivanov referred how “our suspects began to be sent to the KGB detention 
centers, where they got the offer to give up their confession.” EG, “Nikolay Ivanov: 
Skazat’ O Churbanove Chto-to Khorosheye Ya Ne Mogu.” 
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defendants any persuasive evidence that illegal methods of interrogation were 
used.120 
This kind of dynamic did not happen just in the Churbanov trial but also in 
other cases related to the Uzbek affair. In fact, Khudayberdyev and 
Abdullaeva also retracted their confessions and further discredited Gdlyan 
and Ivanov’s ‘aggressive’ methods of obtaining evidence.121 However, these 
alleged threats, blackmails and moral pressure were substantially impossible 
to authenticate “as long as defense lawyers were not permitted to see their 
clients during preliminary investigation.”122 As Feofanov and Barry note: 
all the defendants complained about the methods of investigators – [with] 
some in particular – denouncing "psychological pressure" and "testimony 
being coerced in every way possible." No-one presented concrete evidence to 
support illegality in the methods of investigation. No-one said that he, for 
instance, had been beaten, starved, or deprived of sleep. [Thence] 
investigators from the procuracy did not employ physical torture. There was 
simply no need to since the distorted legality of the system put instruments of 
psychological pressure into the hands of the interrogator that a suspect rarely 
could withstand.123 
                                                          
120 Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 
123. 
121 Against Rano Abdullaeva, Umarov testified to having given a bribe of 30,000 rubles 
and she admitted of receiving bribes form 16 people and giving bribes to nine for a 
total value of 200,000 rubles. When she was arrested, valuables totaling 99,000 rubles 
were confiscated, including 30,000 in cash and bonds, and jewelry worth about the 
same amount. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when in May 1989 the 
investigations against her passed to another group led by the KGB, she refused to 
confess, stating that she gave bribes “because of the threats and moral pressure of the 
investigators.” During the trial, she reported having made confessions because she 
was blackmailed. The charges against her thus collapsed and she was acquitted for the 
last accusation of 5,000 rubles made by Khudaibergenov. Despite investigative 
methods, the truth or not of confessions and their reconsiderations, Abdullaeva's 
rights had been seriously violated because she was arrested bypassing the permission 
of the presidium SS UzSSR in violation of her immunity as an MP. Finally, she was 
judged innocent. Later, she accused Gdlyan and Ivanov of feeding her confessions, in 
terms of amounts and names of giver/taker. She also stated that the idea of being 
Rashidov's mistress was Ivanov's idea and that investigators threatened they would 
incriminate her son for narcotrafficking and her daughter for hiding diamonds. She 
was assured that they would find witnesses to testify to these ‘crimes’. Ibid., 130–35. 
122 Ibid., 131. 
123  Ibid., 118, 126. 
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Gdlyan and Ivanov’s methods were probably not the best in terms of 
respect for human dignity. They were investigators in the USSR and their job 
was to uncover evidence at any cost against the suspects. Barry and Feofanov 
have commented that both Gdlyan and Ivanov were experienced 
investigators "who had worked at their profession before the heightened 
attention to the rights of the accused became a matter of open public debate. 
It would not be surprising, therefore, that their investigative techniques 
included practices of questionable legality."124 Also Vaksberg defined them as 
“the products of that system of 'socialist legality' (to be more exact, illegality), 
under which people were none too fussy about exact observation of the 
procedures which they disparagingly referred to as 'legal formalism'.”"125 
After Churbanov’s trial, for the first time cases of bribery were also not 
confirmed by mere confessions. Instead, it was held that “the accusation 
should demonstrate that the confession was not coerced.”126 Thus, when the 
complaints against the investigators arrived in court, Gdlyan’s credibility was 
inevitably compromised and the evidence produced during their preliminary 
investigations began to collapse as did their scheme of charges. However, 
Gdlyan was able to counterattack the court's decision commenting that: "Out 
of 500 witnesses, 180 were barely questioned; out of an enormous amount of 
video recordings, where the most important investigative action had been 
recorded, they played only a portion, mere fragments.”127 Basically, 
Churbanov’s trial marked the entry into politics of the two investigators, 
radicalizing public opinion, journalists, citizens – divided in gdlyanists and 
antigdlyanists, friends and enemies, heroes and villains, black and white etc. – 
and defining a narrative legacy for Gdlyan-Ivanov that would remain also in 
contemporary Russia. Gdlyan explains this as follows: 
When the guilt of many corrupt individuals had been confirmed, to extend the 
case in its complexity became impossible [within the prokuratura]. We had no 
choice, and it was the last chance to reveal all. With the support of public 
opinion we could move forward and continue the investigation of this case. As 
evident, any normal investigator makes noise, shouting in the media and so 
on. We had no other choice, because in our case we were connecting all the 
                                                          
124 Ibid., 102. 
125 Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 116. 
126 Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 
124. 
127 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-052 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 22 AUGUST 1989,” 1989, 
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elements, not only the office of the Prokuratura, but also the MVD, the KGB, 
the SC USSR and, worse, the leadership of the CPSU, headed by the 
Westerners’ poster-child Gorbachev.128 
6.4 The people’s lonely heroes (1989-1990) 
Despite the criticism against Gdlyan and Ivanov for their methods of 
managing investigations, at the beginning of 1989, the group was still active 
and ready to launch a further attack against the upper echelons of the Soviet 
regime. On 11 January 1989, Gdlyan and Ivanov succeeded in impeaching the 
first member of the CC CPSU Central Committee Viktor Smirnov, the second 
secretary of the Moldovan communist party and the secretary of the CC CPSU 
responsible for the Central Asian nomenklatura.129 This act signaled the final 
success of the two investigators whose careers ended with them marginalized 
by state institutions while their popularity grew considerably, inflaming a 
political battle that would thrill the Soviet citizens in the first half of 1989. On 
19 January, Gdlyan and Ivanov gave a long press conference in which they 
denounced the obstacles in the way of their investigative activity and 
launched their open crusade against the party leadership. From that moment, 
the struggle against ‘mafiya’ inexorably turned to the political level.  
6.4.1 The protracted election campaign 
At the beginning of 1989, many more stories on the illegal investigative 
methods of Gdlyan and Ivanov emerged, discrediting the two investigators 
and exposing them to possible sanctions. In this regard, the prokuratura 
started to evaluate the case in February130 while the party was much more 
                                                          
128 “I understand that he is still praised and loved by you [Westerners], but he is the 
scoundrel who not only ruined the [Uzbek] case, but who also ruined the country. He 
is a short-sighted man, who went to Western leaders and betrayed all of our national 
interests.” Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 
2014. 
129 Against Smirnov "there were nineteen proven episodes of bribe-taking." He was 
dismissed from the CC for health reasons three months before his arrest was 
authorized by the prokuratura. Such a high impeachment was probably not possible 
without the consent of the politburo. EG, “Nikolay Ivanov: Skazat’ O Churbanove Chto-
to Khorosheye Ya Ne Mogu”; Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 226. 
130 The prosecutor E. Martinson revealed that “until 20 February 1989, there was not 
any prokuratura supervision for activity in criminal case N° 18/58115-83 but 
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concerned about other events related to the two loose cannons of the 
prokuratura. Nevertheless, in 1989 Gdlyan and Ivanov’s popularity was so 
high that they ran for the elections of the CPDSU. This meant the Uzbek affair 
could return actively to the political level, as the two men would gain further 
warranties in terms of parliamentary immunity. In the first free elections of 
USSR,131 Gdlyan and Ivanov were the perfect populist candidates able to 
rouse voters and to catalyze the support of electors. Consensus on them 
gathered large constituencies made up of former Communists schooled in the 
myth of socialist legality and disappointed by recent Soviet history marked by 
degradation and hopeless transition.  
Therefore, both investigators run for the elections, inflaming a political 
battle based on their allegations about the ‘Kremlin affair’ and taking place in 
the two biggest cities of the USSR. Gdlyan was a candidate in the 25th 
electoral district of Moscow (Tushino-Zelenograd) while Ivanov was candidate 
in the 19th electoral district in Leningrad where he was presented as ‘our 
[Leningrad’s] Yeltsin.’132 
At meetings, rallies and stands organized for the campaign they inflamed 
the masses, informing citizens about the high-profile corruption scandals and 
casting a dark shadow over the Soviet leadership, which was accused of 
protecting (or at least tolerating) the mafia within the Soviet state. Hence, by 
accusing – directly or indirectly – the members of the CC CPSU, Gdlyan and 
Ivanov could offer what the people wanted. This was a fully politicized issue – 
like the Uzbek affair – that was now challenging the credibility of the CPSU. 
Nonetheless, their program was simple and easily understandable for voters. 
Indeed, on 21 February 1989 during the presentation of the ‘letter to the 
voters of Tushino’, Gdlyan recalled his commitments to fight “against mafia in 
the higher organs of the state” and denounced that “power had been 
usurped by criminal elements and is used in antisocial ways that deform the 
                                                                                                                               
complaints about the leadership of Gdlyan to prokuratura USSR, party and soviet 
organs, public organizations arrived from 1983.” GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 6. 
131 The election of the CPDSU served to politicize the Soviet people, who were finally 
free to express their personal perspectives, even promoting the formation of national 
"popular fronts." And for the first time non-communist and even dissidents, such as 
Andrei Sakharov – who co-led the democratic opposition, the Inter-Regional Deputies 
Group – were candidates. Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de 
L’aigle Biceṕhale, 176; Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione 
Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
132 Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O Rozhdenii Parlamenta. 
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politics of the party and social aims of our social-political system.”133 Gdlyan’s 
promises to fight against the self-styled slugi naroda (people’s servants) were 
a simple recipe to restore legal institutions within the country: 
In this catastrophic situation, behind each of us there are two main tasks. The 
first is the consolidation of all healthy forces of society, to begin to stop the 
further collapse of the state and then to move dynamically along the way of 
the progressive development of the country. The second is to use the levers of 
democracy and glasnost to dispatch a staff of high quality deputies to the 
highest organs of power, willing and able to complete the renewal of society in 
the framework of perestroika.134 
Also in his electoral poster for the Tushino district, Gdlyan’s candidature 
president him as a brave figure who had fought for 20 years “against bribers, 
plunders of socialist properties, and crimes against persons. He is 
distinguished by high efficiency, principled behavior, belief in the rightness of 
his cause and the ability to fight for social justice.”135 Interestingly, this new 
political proposal had many tones in common with the previous Andropovian 
narrative and was esteemed by the electors who appreciated his radical, 
moralist, populist – but clear, fair and simple – recipe. Thus, in the elections 
held on 26 March 1989, Gdlyan won in a landslide against the other four 
candidates, taking 86.8% of the votes. Less fortunate was Ivanov who had to 
move in to a run-off, to be held on 14 May. Nevertheless, despite Gdlyan’s 
triumph, the election campaign did not end and kept assuming harsh tones 
against the Soviet state and party organs for the whole of spring 1989, when 
the two investigators joined the rallies organized by the ‘democratic’ 
opposition groups and moved even closer to Yeltsin politically. 
Their radical and highly public accusations against the CPSU were 
inexorably irritating the Soviet regime, which began to take countermeasures. 
On 3 March, the SC USSR demanded Gorbachev and the politburo take 
measures against Gdlyan who slandered the court after the Churbanov trial136 
while on 21 March, even Sukharev wrote to the Gensek about a 
memorandum that was received from Nikolai Ivanov containing criticism on 
the work of the SC and the prokuratura USSR and demanding to reopen the 
Churbanov case.137 Obviously, this kind of accusation embarrassed the party 
                                                          
133 GARF, f. 9654, op. 3, d. 121, l. 5. 
134 GARF, f. 9654, op. 3, d. 121, ll. 5-6. 
135 GARF, f. 9654, op. 3, d. 121, l. 14. 
136 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 1, ll. 1-2; GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 16. 
137 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 2, ll. 1-2. 
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no end, leaving it appearing increasingly weak. Part of the CC CPSU wanted to 
react by opening an internal case against Gdlyan and Ivanov and focusing 
attention on sensitive issues – such as their illegal investigative methods – 
which could discredit the investigators as dangerous charlatans.  
Thus, on 24 March 1989, the politburo instructed the party commission of 
the CC CPSU headed by Boris Pugo – chairman of the CPC138 – “to verify the 
legal violations in the investigation of cases of corruption in the UzSSR and to 
report the results to the Central Committee.”139 The commission was held on 
6 April  and involved the Genprokuror Sukharev, the investigators Karakozov 
and Gdlyan, as well as the supreme judges R.G. Tikhomirnov and V.I. 
Zamyatin. On that occasion Gdlyan gave a harsh statement where he referred 
to the unconstitutionality of the party commission as an attempt to break the 
case and he defined the chairman of the SC USSR Terebilov as a ‘suspect’ 
involved in the case. Nevertheless, Gdlyan did not give evidence and stated 
that he would give it and other big names personally to Gorbachev,140 thus 
rejecting the commission’s authority. Thus, on 7 April 1989, Pugo proposed to 
Sukharev to investigate the alleged bribes by Terebilov and stated: 
Given that com. Gdlyan T.Kh. – with the aim of undermining the resolutions of 
the CC CPSU on the ongoing verification – may apply to the media with 
irresponsible statements, it would be appropriate to entrust the ideological 
department of the CC CPSU to take the necessary preventive action.141 
This was something of a sinister formulation that sought to discredit 
Gdlyan and his team, defining a line that was confirmed during the politburo 
session of 10 April142 and that was also followed in the official press. Then, on 
13 April the CC CPSU was informed by the members of the party 
                                                          
138 On the aftermath of the Churbanov affair, the CC CPSU secretary Razumovsky 
affirmed that the facts published by the magazine "Ogonek" needed to be checked. 
Hence, he requested the CPC and the Prokuratura USSR to shed light on these facts. 
GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 15. 
139 The commission was headed by Pugo B.K. (CPC CPSU), Pavlov A.S. (State-legal 
department of the CC CPSU), Menteshashvili T.N. (Presidium of the SS USSR), Bobkov 
F.D. (KGB USSR), Pobezhimov AS (Prokuratura USSR), Gusev S.I. (SC USSR), Shilov I.F. 
(MVD USSR), Gubarev V.T. (MJ USSR). RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 20, l. 1 
140 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 19, l. 2 
141 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 19, l. 3. 
142 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 19, l. 1. 
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commission143 that, after evaluating many letters, the charges made against 
Gdlyan and Ivanov were founded and their methods of investigation illegal.  
The commission thus confirmed cases of many illegalities such as pretrial 
detentions extended to 4-5 years, people arrested for months without any 
questioning, psychological pressure to extract confessions requested by 
investigators, seizure of personal money and valuables of suspects and their 
family, creating a situation “reportedly leads to self-incrimination.”144 The 
report stated that according to the KGB USSR, these practices were not only 
applied to the suspects but also to the convicted, such as "Kamalov, Iliadi and 
Radzhabov to testify under the threat of execution and repression against 
[their] families."145 Finally, the commission acknowledged that “the actions of 
Gdlyan and Ivanov and some of their supporters actually lead to prejudice 
against the CPSU, the party leadership and the country through the shaping 
of public opinion. The Commission considers it appropriate to propose [the 
case] to the Genprokuror of the USSR.”146 The day after, Gorbachev replied 
and revealed his concern for the facts, ordering the resolution of the situation 
within a couple of weeks.147  
Nevertheless, Gdlyan’s and Ivanov’s popularity kept rising and the party 
had to find a solution that could be accepted by the people as well. Thus, the 
CC CPSU commission was transferred at state level where a similar 
commission was set up in the Presidium of the SS USSR.148 In parallel, also the 
plenum of the SC USSR issued a resolution that acknowledged “violations of 
the law committed by the investigative team of the Prokuratura USSR led by 
T. Kh. Gdlyan”.149 This opened a further front on the – non-independent - 
judicial level against the two ‘people’s heroes’ with a fact that appeared to be 
highly discrediting: the posthumously rehabilitation of the Estonian scientist 
Johannes Hint150 on 25 April 1989 emerged as a perfectly-timed attack on 
                                                          
143 The memorandum was sent by the party commission members: B. Pugo, A.S. 
Pavlov, T. Menteshashvili, F. Bobkov, A. Pobezhimov, S. Gusev, V. Trushin and 
V.Gubarev. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 3, ll. 3-6. 
144 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 3, l. 4. 
145 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 3, l. 5. 
146 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 3, l. 6. 
147 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 3, l. 1. 
148 Ibid., 111. 
149 Izvestiya, 27 April 1989, p. 1. 
150 Johannes A. Hint was an Estonian scientist with an international reputation. PhD in 
technical sciences and winner of a Lenin Prize, he directed a special technological 
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Gdlyan’s integrity and created a very powerful argument against his methods. 
In fact, the court recalled how Gdlyan charged Hint in 1981 as an example of 
official injustice and prosecution in the KGB style. In the SC USSR resolution 
emerged that: 
Innocent people have been brought to trial without legal basis and have been 
convicted, which is a gross violation of socialist legality. This was possible 
because the investigatory group headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan, the investigator for 
especially important cases under the USSR Procurator General, ignored the 
legal status of SKTB "Dezintegrator" [...] From beginning to end the 
investigators conducted their inquiry into the case of Hint and others with an 
accusatory bias. [...] The Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court believes that the 
facts regarding the violation of socialist legality committed by investigators 
headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan in investigating this case and the absence of 
appropriate prosecutorial supervision over the investigation and court review 
deserve special significant response on the part of the Collegium of the USSR 
Procuracy. The elimination from investigatory practice of activities of this kind, 
and the discussion of the question of the further use of T.Kh. Gdlyan in such 
important aspects of investigatory work as an investigator for particularly 
important cases in the office of the USSR Procurator General are also called 
for.151 
                                                                                                                               
bureau named “Disintegrator.” Hint and other employees of the bureau were arrested 
on 13 November 1981 and accused of theft, abuse of office, smuggling, and forgery of 
official documents. After numerous interrogations he and the others confessed, but all 
later retracted their confessions. On December 19, 1983 he was sentenced by the 
Estonian Supreme Court to 15 years in prison, and his property was confiscated. On 
March 28 1985 the USSR Supreme Court reduced the punishment, lowering the level 
of property confiscation assessed against Hint and his fellow-defendants but 
confirmed their criminal liability. Nevertheless, he died on 5 September 1985. Hint was 
effectively experimenting a proto-capitalistic cooperative but he did not steal a 
singular ruble from the state budget. However, as marked by Feofanov and Barry, 
“what was really feared was ideological heresy, which Hint represented, even though 
he never uttered a word against the communist ideology. But he did threaten it with 
his reasonable entrepreneurial acts, with real economic profit generated on the basis 
of common sense. This they could not forgive.” On 25 April 1989, the USSR Supreme 
Court reviewed the ‘Hint case’ in plenary session and fully rehabilitated him 
posthumously. As well, his academic degrees, titles and awards were restored and the 
confiscated property returned. Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major 
Trials of the Post-Stalin Era, 52, 77–78. 
151 The special ruling N. 340-89 of the Plenum of the SC USSR of 25 April 1989 is 
reported in Ibid., 81–84. 
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This sentence expressed by the SC USSR was a fatal hit to Gdlyan's 
professional honor and a political arm against the investigator who was 
openly attacked by the Estonian deputies and press. Sobchak recalled this 
episode and stated that Gdlyan became the scapegoat that took the sins of 
the whole totalitarian system, evidencing that Hint was effectively 
condemned by a court in three instances and not personally by Gdlyan.152 
Then, also the two investigators personally contested a rehabilitation that 
appeared as a political event rather than a juridical one, opposing this 
episode as a Gorbachev’s attempt to collude with the Estonian nationalists.153  
In the 1989 spring, the official newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya154 also 
started to publish many more articles that were critical of the working 
methods of Gdlyan and Ivanov during the Uzbek affair investigations, accusing 
them of artificially enlarging the number of the people involved in corruption, 
violating law in getting information from those under investigation, illegally 
detaining or arresting innocents without reasons and over the statutory limits 
of nine months, fabricating evidence against suspects, using threats and 
actual violence to secure confessions, manipulating and rewording 
testimonies, illegally intervening in court proceedings, using the investigations 
to acquire popularity and personal power, and undermining the credibility of 
the CC CPSU and its members with groundless accusations.155 Basically, the 
press – which had contributed in the edification of the myth of the ‘people’s 
heroes’ – was now playing the role of judging Gdlyan and Ivanov as 
charlatans. 
Nevertheless, they both rejected the accusations and denounced them as 
an interference of power in their investigations. This political strategy seemed 
to work. Apparently, the conflict with the institutions radicalized further and 
the people turned even more favorably to them, triggering a populist 
mechanism through which the ‘people’s heroes’ were saying and offering to 
                                                          
152 Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O Rozhdenii Parlamenta. 
153 Chiesa, “La Mafia Uzbeka Alla Conquista Di Mosca. Due Giudici Sovietici La 
Sbarrano E Raccontano.” 
154 Critical articles against Gdlyan and Ivanov appeared in the press. See, Pravda, 13 
May 1989, p. 2; Pravda, 20 May 1989, p. 3; Izvestiya, 21 May 89, p. 4; Pravda, 21 May 
1989, p. 3; Pravda, 22 September 1989, pp. 6-7; Izvestiya, 28 September 1989, p. 6; 
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155 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 192. 
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the people what they wanted to hear, presenting a thrilling story that was 
delegitimizing the power of an already weak CPSU.  
6.4.2 The war of May 
May 1989 was to a great extent the climax of the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair.’ 
The failed negotiation with the prokuratura156 and with the party created a 
‘perfect storm’ in which Gdlyan and Ivanov seemed to benefit from their 
failures, appearing as the final martyrs of Gorbachev’s system. At that time, 
Chernyaev defined the two investigators as “scum” that apparently charmed 
the hearth of some citizens. Thus, he revealed that Gdlyan, the new people’s 
martyr¸ became a powerful political weapon to attack the Gensek. Chernyaev 
recalled how in early May a poster had appeared in Arbat bearing the slogan: 
“Yeltsin, Georgia, Gdlyan… who’s next?”157  
On 3 May, Gdlyan joined a meeting of the Mossovet deputies with the 
politburo members where, according to Sakharov, he “began by crying out 
dramatically: ‘I've been accused of state crimes. Look! Before you stands a 
state criminal!” It’s quite possible! Boris Pugo shouted back from the 
audience.”158 Thus, after denouncing the sabotaging of his case, he replied to 
the accusation against him159 and demanded to speak with Gorbachev 
personally. The meeting took place and Gdlyan told the Gensek directly that 
in April, Khudayberdyev had retracted his confessions after a night visit from 
Sukharev, his deputy Vasiliev, and Dukhanin. “Gorbachev listened without 
interrupting. Then he said with a grim expression, ‘This is an extremely 
serious matter. I'll see you, but if you can't prove your charges, I don't envy 
you.’”160 Probably, Gorbachev was concerned enough to give some 
consideration to Gdlyan's allegations. In a moment when both party and 
Gorbachev felt that power was slipping away, the Gensek probably had sense 
                                                          
156 The deputy Genprokuror Katusev reported that on 27 April 1989, Gdlyan came to 
the Prokuratura USSR and did not bring any evidence but that he had harsh words to 
say to the Genprokuror Sukharev and his deputy Vasil'ev. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 
4. 
157 Savranskaya, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev. 1989. Donated by A.S. Chernyaev 
to The National Security Archive,” 19. 
158 Andrei Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 1986-1989 (New York: Knopf, 1991), 111. 
159 Gdlyan admitted: “They say that I kept children in jail. But those children were forty 
years old, and it was the only way to get back the millions of the people’s money that 
they stole.” Ibid., 122. 
160 Ibid., 112. 
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that indulging the ‘people’s heroes’ or at least to treat them with ‘velvet 
gloves’ 161 in order to keep negotiations open. 
Nevertheless, the day after, the Gensek received a long ‘report of 
information’ from the CC CPSU that summarized the content of the letters 
and complaint that arrived from Uzbekistan to denounce the violations of 
prosecution and justice made by Gdlyan and Ivanov.162 This denunciation of 
‘terror’ was probably organized in accordance with the prokuratura – which 
had access to the prosecutorial materials of Gdlyan and Ivanov – and allowed 
a further step in the discrediting of the investigators to be taken. However, 
the two people’s heroes were more or less finished when they were removed 
from the investigations on the Uzbek affair "for unsatisfactory work of 
misconduct, an obvious accusatory and public misinformation" on 4 May.163 
The case was then transferred to Vladimir Semenovich Galkin164 in 
coordination with the investigative KGB group led by the colonel Dukhanin. 
This latter – according to Gldyan’s version – had pushed the witnesses to 
                                                          
161 Excerpts from the Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev (2 May 1989): “Inside me depression 
and alarm are growing, the sense of crisis of the Gorbachevian Idea. He is prepared to 
go far. But what does it mean? His favorite catch-word is “unpredictability.” And most 
likely we will come to a collapse of the state and something like chaos. He feels that he 
is losing the levers of power irreversibly, and this realization prevents him from “going 
far.” For that reason, he holds to conventional methods but acts with “velvet gloves.” 
He has no concept of where we are going. His declarations about socialist values, 
ideals of October, as he begins to tick them off, sound as irony for the cognoscenti. 
Behind them - emptiness.” From Anatoly Chernyaev translated by Vladislav Zubok. 
NSA, Box 28, file 2909. 
162 In 1978-1983 an average of 776 letters of this kind arrived annually from 
Uzbekistan. The number increased to 1212 in 1984, 1404 in 1985, 2414 in 1986, 2147 
in 1987, 2180 in 1988, and 420 in the first quarter of 1989. Most of the authors of 
these letters were the convicted ‘victims’ of the two investigators, suspects under 
investigation (or their relatives). These letters denounced the long pre-trial-detention, 
violations of the principle of presumption of innocence and abuses of the investigators 
that were accused of threatening suspects and their family, doing pressure on courts, 
violence and even instigation to suicide. This 'report for information' just refers to 
cases related to the abuse of Gdlyan and Ivanov. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 21, ll. 1-24. 
163 Aleksandr Anatol഻evich Volkov, Viktor Ilyukhin: Okhotnik Za Prezidentami (Moskva: 
Algoritm, 2012). 
164 Speaking with Sakharov, Gdlyan commented “Galkin is my old friend. His fault—or 
misfortune—is that he doesn’t know how to stand up to the authorities. I never give in 
to pressure.” Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 1986-1989, 122. 
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retreat their accusations against CC CPSU members.165 Certainly there is some 
truth in these assumptions, considering that, after the transfer of 
interrogations to the KGB in late October 1988, most of the defendants began 
to deny their confessions.  
Final negotiations were organized on May 10 when Gdlyan met with 
Gorbachev in the presence of Chebrikov, Ryzhkov, Lukyanov and Sukharev.166 
Again, Gdlyan failed to bring overwhelming evidence of his allegations and 
blamed Gorbachev and the party for failing to be active enough. 
Nevertheless, he found an agreeable setting in the public square – where he 
could shout his anger at the regime for having removed him from the case for 
attempting to muzzle him – offering more conspiracy and imaginative 
narratives that demanded little evidence. Indeed, a great part of the  public 
was supportive. In spring 1989, the press and the presidium of the SS USSR 
received many letters and appeals from Soviet citizens, labor collectives and 
organizations defending their heroes and revealing the general tenor of public 
opinion. A collective based in Almaty referred to the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair as a 
“broad and deliberate campaign to discredit comrades T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. 
Ivanov in the eyes of public opinion” in order to cover up criminality.167 
Another appeal from the group 'friendship and dialogue' pointed to the 
‘convenient’ timing in the announcement about Hint's case and the dismissal 
of the charges against many suspects arguing this was clearly about 
discrediting Gdlyan and Ivanov. The group demanded they be given the 
chance to appear in the media to defend their position.168 Others, like the 
collective ‘Impuls’ demanded they be reinstated to lead the investigations 
into the Uzbek affair and conclude the cases.169  
Evidently, the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair attracted the sympathy of many 
citizens who generally rallied around the idea that ‘defending’ this cause was 
a matter of defending democracy and glasnost.’170 Local committees within 
factories also spontaneously organized to support Gdlyan and to endorse the 
                                                          
165 This version is indirectly confirmed by the Gdlyan’s ‘victim’ Abdullaeva. Abdullaeva, 
Preodolenie Ada. 
166 Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 39; Mauro, “Così 
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campaign for their rehabilitation in the media, threatening strikes and riots.171 
Interestingly, many appeals came not from supporters but from simple 
people who, without taking a partisan position, wanted an appropriate and 
uncensored resolution of the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’, demanding that an 
impartial body be formed to assess the case. A committee of Tushino voters 
organized a demonstration on 10 May and wrote to the presidium to 
denounce the campaign against Gdlyan (their elected representative within 
the CPDSU) as an attempt to violate democratic outcomes and after 
organizing a protest with about 8,000 participants demanded the creation of 
an impartial commission within the CPDSU.172  
It was clear that the Gdlyan-Ivanov campaign was incredibly appealing to 
the people and to some extent was also attracting skeptical citizens who were 
simply hungry for truth. In any case, this mobilization of the masses that 
produced some of the biggest rallies seen in late Soviet times was an 
exceptional democratic test for the Soviet regime. The extraordinary 
popularity of the two "heroic investigators" acted to a significant extent to 
‘inoculate’ them such that they became effectively ‘untouchable’173 and free 
to say anything they wanted. Gdlyan and Ivanov’s campaign of publicity in the 
war against the mafiya also followed the course of Ivanov’s election 
campaign. Politicization was heightened on 12 May 1989, when Ivanov 
appeared on Leningrad television and presented a sharp attack against the 
former and present establishment of the CC CPSU. In his words: 
Many voters are asking why the mafia in Leningrad isn’t being routed and who 
at the top in Moscow is being investigated for felony violations. There's no 
attempt to fight the mafia because it is state policy to curtail the battle against 
organized crime. But it could be fought everywhere. For the information of 
Leningraders, I can say that among those whose names have come up in our 
felony case is the former leader of Leningrad, Comrade Romanov. Other 
names that have come up are members of the Politburo, such as Comrade 
Solomentsev and Comrade Ligachev, and Terebilov, the former chairman of 
the Supreme Court. Today the situation concerning Ligachev is very 
worrisome. We are very concerned to see the consolidation of his position in 
light of the move to the right that we are observing in today’s politics. That 
naturally raises serious concern. I'm not speaking about the innocence or guilt 
of these people. Today all I can say is that the case will be investigated in the 
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future. I am speaking very deliberately. And I'm prepared to take full 
responsibility for my words. Thank you.174 
Ivanov’s statement directly attacked the ‘conservative’ Ligachev even 
though he was well regarded for his moral integrity and for his anticorruption 
stance.175 Thus, the inspirer of the famous XVI plenum of the CC CPUz in 
summer 1984 was alleged to be a bribe-taker and in collusion with the ‘Uzbek 
Mafiya.’ In his memoirs, Ligachev recalls that despite hearing such 
accusations he never wavered in his sense of moral integrity and claims to 
have never accepted bribes and gifts.176 His memoirs also express his lack of 
surprise that such slanderous attacks would come from the ‘gdlyanovists.’ 
Nevertheless, his mood changed when he realized that such allegations 
undermined his credibility and were the butt of jokes among higher figures of 
the party who mocked him thus: “Yegor Kuzmich, so how much does Gdlyan 
say Usmankhodzhaev slipped to you? He says thirty thousand?.. . Well, you’re 
a strange one, Yegor Kuzmich. You sold yourself too cheap, way too 
cheap.”177 
The day after, the Presidium of the SS USSR strongly condemned such 
charges in a statement published in all the most important Soviet 
newspapers. Ivanov’s statements were presented here as “an attempt to 
appeal to the public, to disorient people and hinder the work of a special 
commission, which the Presidium of the SS USSR instructed to review the 
numerous complaints of citizens on the serious abuses committed by Gdlyan 
T.Kh. and Ivanov N.V. during their investigative activities."178 Nevertheless, an 
immediate political reply by the party was slow in coming. In this regard, 
Boldin reveals a conversation with the Gensek who stated: "I don't believe 
that Yegor took bribes. It's somehow not in his character. He might have done 
all sorts of things, but not that.”179 However, the Gensek assumed a strange 
                                                          
174 The statement of Ivanov in Leningrad TV on 12 May 1989 has been fully transcribed 
and translated in Ligachev’s memoirs. Ibid., 226. 
175 Chernyaev recalls that “Ligachev was a figure coming from Andropov’s personnel 
change and early fight against rampant corruption in the party.” Chernyaev, My Six 
Years with Gorbachev, 11. 
176 “It was my firm rule, an ironclad, unwavering position” Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s 
Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 205. 
177 Ibid., 220. 
178 Pravda, May 13, 1989, p. 2. 
179 Boldin, Ten Years That Shook the World: The Gorbachev Era As Witnessed by His 
Chief of Staff, 173. 
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attitude towards Ligachev’s accusations and did not publicly condemn those 
allegations as slander. It is not clear whether Gorbachev believed the Gdlyan-
Ivanov allegations or if he simply wanted to exploit the opportunity to 
marginalize an internal rival. Indeed, at that time Ligachev was a very critical 
element in the politburo and his relations with Gorbachev remained tense 
after his role had been progressively degraded in the deflated secretariat. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that Gorbachev would have endorsed an 
attack discrediting the very system he represented. Instead, it is more likely 
he was playing the role of Pontius Pilate, seeking to avoid antagonizing the 
people by condemning their heroes and preferring to take some more time to 
consider the situation.  
However, on 13 May, the politburo CC CPSU demanded that the special 
commission headed by Sukharev produce the results of the investigations 
before the beginning of the first CPDSU and remove Gdlyan and Ivanov from 
any investigation related to the Uzbek affair.180 This move simply turned into 
further grist for the mill for the two investigators who were by now adept at 
using these kind of attacks to sway the public against the regime. Needless to 
say, on 14 May, two days after the statements on TV, Ivanov was confirmed in 
a second ballot with 67% of votes in Leningrad, and on 16 May a committee 
to defend Gdlyan was formed in Zelenograd.181 
Ligachev was furious and was convinced that he had to react as soon as 
possible. Thus, on 15 May he directly addressed an appeal to the 
Genprokuror Sukharev – who was also heading the commission of the 
presidium of the SS USSR – that stated: 
On 12 May 1989 on Leningrad television, the investigator N.V. Ivanov said that 
"the new members of the Politburo came up" in a criminal case, and my name 
was mentioned. In this regard, I consider it necessary to report as follows. This 
statement is a provocation, a malicious fiction. It basically infers that I am a 
suspect in a crime. And he made this statement to advance his career as well 
as to disavow [his] responsibility for the charges that the letters from citizens 
bring against him about the abuses committed during the investigations of the 
criminal cases. I wanted to draw your attention to this. False reports are in 
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violation of the established order of investigation of criminal cases. Please 
consider the results to be published in the press.182 
Ligachev urged that a public reply be made and also wanted to publish his 
statements in TASS. However, as suggested by Vadim Medvedev – the head 
of the ideological commission of the CPSU – he preferred to discuss it with 
Gorbachev after his return from China. Ligachev was anxious and perceived 
that a delay in that task could be fatal, considering that not all the other 
higher members of the CC CPSU were so openly supportive of him. 
Nevertheless, on 18 May Ligachev called Gorbachev on his personal ‘hotline’ 
and the Gensek agreed to proceed..183 Thus, on 19 May 1989, Ligachev’s 
“categorical protest” was published in Pravda and Izvestiya while in parallel 
also Solomentsev and Romanov wrote appeals to the politburo and 
secretaries of the CC CPSU.184 
Another counterattack arrived from the presidium of the SS USSR where 
the special commission "to examine the many statements and complaints 
regarding serious violations of legality by investigators of the USSR Procuracy 
T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov in performing investigative activity" presented a 
conclusive report (19 May 1989) that was sent to the CC CPSU185 and was 
even published in the press.186 It stated: 
                                                          
182 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 22, ll. 1-2. Ligachev even offered a lightly modified 
translation in his memoirs. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of 
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In the materials, letters and complaints of citizens, including statements of 
investigatory and prosecutorial personnel, it is confirmed that in attempting to 
artificially broaden the circle of those accused of corruption, comrade Gdlyan 
and the investigators who were under his influence embarked on a path of 
gross violations of the norms of legality. They widely employed smear tactics in 
making unfounded accusations of bribery, forcing suspects and witnesses into 
giving so-called "inculpatory" evidence on the basis of groundless arrests, 
blackmail, and intimidation, without properly specifying the circumstances of 
their acts [...] Gdlyan, Ivanov and the investigators associated with them 
frequently insulted those being held, assaulted their dignity, threatened them 
with execution by shooting, and constantly sought to introduce the idea that 
to avoid the supreme punishment and receive a minimal term of 
imprisonment they needed only confess to the accusations made and testify 
against the "higherups," that is, certain leaders in the republic and the country. 
Regarding the latter point, they were presented with an already-prepared 
program of testimony, including sums of bribes and a list of officials to whom 
bribes were supposedly given.187 
Therefore, the commission considered the sensitive cases of Orlov, 
Usmankhodzhaev, Musakhanov, Kamalov and other cases that were dropped 
for lack of evidence, inviting the Genprokuror to proceed with further 
investigations and to bring to justice those responsible for violations of the 
law. Gdlyan and Ivanov protested because they were not invited to defend 
themselves in the commission. Sobchak also highlighted this episode as an 
example of neo-Stalinism, charging that the KGB was interfering with 
prokuratura investigations.188 In parallel, another attack against Gdlyan’s 
credibility occurred when the cases of other prominent figures involved in the 
Uzbek affair – such as Abdullaeva, Osetrov and finally Smirnov – were rapidly 
dismissed. Smirnov’s case was transferred to another investigative group led 
by the KGB colonel Dukhanin who was supposed to check the validity of 
prosecution evidence (19 May). The 19 alleged bribes were accredited as 
‘gifts’ and so the former second secretary of Moldova was finally liberated on 
22 May. Vaksberg suggests that this episode was one of the dirtiest cases of 
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political interference in justice undertaken by the KGB in the later years of 
Soviet history.189 
After this interference of the KGB in the investigations and the rapid 
dismissals of the case, Gdlyan and Ivanov had a strong case and were 
successful in publicizing the scandal, mobilizing the masses and their political 
allies. Interestingly, their crusade against the ‘bribetaker’ Ligachev was also 
endorsed by another radical leader of the masses, and historical rival of 
Ligachev, Boris Yeltsin who on 18 May stated: “I personally believe them 
[Gdlyan and Ivanov] They've got some evidence, and without it they wouldn't 
have made such suggestions. It would have been suicide for them to put 
forward suggestions without evidence.”190 Similar ‘tactical’ narrative emerged 
on 20 May during a huge rally organized in Zelenograd to protect Gdlyan and 
Ivanov. Also on that occasion Yeltsin gave a long speech supporting the two 
investigators and demanding the establishment of a fair and impartial 
commission. In turn, Gdlyan joined the cause of his allies and participated at 
the big rally to protest against the latest repressions in Tbilisi held at Luzhniki 
on 21 May. On that occasion, Gdlyan – close to Yeltsin and Popov – met 
Sakharov seeking his support. However, when the scientist announced his 
skepticism about the case, "Gdlyan's face darkened and he walked away."191 
Evidently, there were divergences within the ‘opposition front’ with a part of 
its intelligentsia seeking to distance itself from Gdlyan. Conversely, the 
consent of the working class for the two investigators consistently remained 
very high.192 
Thus, in May 1989, the party was too weak to firmly contest the 
accusations made by the masses, creating a situation that seriously 
concerned the Gensek and his advisors.193 Further, Gorbachev did not seem 
                                                          
189 Vaksberg recalls that on 12 May Aleksander Pavlov, the head of the administrative 
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But at the same time a meeting is scheduled in Moscow, organized by a “strike 
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to be able to elaborate a strategy and his enigmatic silence in front of such 
demonstrations spoke volumes. Indeed, on 22 May, during the politburo 
session Ligachev read out a statement about “slanderous accusations to his 
address, emanating from a group of Gdlyan-Ivanov supporters.”194 Then, at 
the concomitant plenum – devoted to the organization of the first session of 
the CPDSU – Ligachev sent a petition to the CC CPSU where he condemned a 
tense atmosphere comparable to that of 1937. The petition was read by 
Gorbachev but there was “scarcely any reaction to it at all”, not even so much 
as a comment by the Gensek.195 Once again, it was not clear if Gorbachev had 
no strategy to face the challenging crowd. Perhaps he was not overly worried 
and thought that he could easily control the situation by leveraging the 
influence of the party to marginalize the two mavericks.  
Apparently, this second solution was effective and on the day of the 
plenum (22 May), Gdlyan and Ivanov were finally dismissed from any activity 
related to the prosecution of the Uzbek affairs.196 This line seemed to follow 
the ‘restrained authoritarian’ approach that Gorbachev had endorsed after 
the plenum of 25 April 1989 when 74 full members and 24 candidate 
members of the CC CPSU were dismissed and replaced with ‘loyalists to 
perestroika.’197 According to Sakharov, on that occasion the party even 
endorsed a change in the press narrative. This manifested in the discrediting 
campaign endorsed in the newspapers and magazines against the two 
investigators who had not been able to prove their accusations.198 On 24 May 
1989, a very famous article entitled Mif (The Myth)199 appeared in 
Literaturnaya Gazeta, discrediting Gdlyan and Ivanov for their ‘illegal 
investigative methods’ of extorting confessions, humiliations and strange 
suicides, criticizing also the mythmaking by the press in the previous months 
to support them. Again, gdlyanists seemed to be galvanized by the attacks 
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and, in response to Chaikovskaya’s article, organized a two-hour strike in 
Zelenograd to defend the pair.  
However, the next day, following a request from Ligachev,200 the head of 
the department for supervision over the implementation of laws on national 
security of the Prokuratura USSR, Viktor Ilyukhin201 opened criminal case N° 
18/67812-89 against Gdlyan and Ivanov for violations of the law during 
investigations in Uzbekistan.202 Nevertheless, the two investigators were 
protected by parliamentary immunity since they had been elected people’s 
deputies of the USSR and so the Genprokuror USSR requested to the newly 
formed Congress of People’s Deputies of Soviet Union (CPDSU) to remove 
their immunity and to hand them over to justice. 
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6.5 The CPDSU media circus 
The opening of the first session of the CPDSU on 25 May 1989 elected 
Gorbachev as chairman of the SS USSR and head of state.203 However, the real 
extraordinary event was related to the media circus of parliamentary sessions 
that for the first time in USSR were broadcast on TV, thrilling the Soviet 
public. 
6.5.1 Gdlyan-Ivanov in the CPDSU 
As mentioned, both Gdlyan and Ivanov were elected to the CPDSU and 
joined the Inter-regional Deputies Group (MDG), an heterogenous formation 
that brought together all the elements of the non-communist opposition. 
There was a lot of curiosity about these two neophytes of politics who 
polarized the assembly between gdlyanists and antigdlyanists. During the first 
session of the CPDSU, Gdlyan and Ivanov actively participated. They wrote to 
the first deputy chairman of the SS USSR, Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov, 
complaining of the criminal situation within the country and again declared 
that their investigations – even on the gold mining industry – had been 
hampered by the Genprokuror Rekunkov while a defamatory campaign was 
organized against them. Gdlyan and Ivanov demanded to be reinstated to the 
case.204 
In parallel, several deputies sympathized with Gdlyan and Ivanov, 
speaking strongly against Ligachev and discrediting the party. Ligachev was 
furious because on the first day of the congress, he was not afforded the 
opportunity to reply to the accusations.205 Gorbachev also elected not to 
engage in the melee, probably because he did not want to further give 
importance to the discrediting ‘Ligachev affair’. It’s likely he felt the charges 
should drop by themselves under the weight of their inconsistencies. 
However, in this kind of provocative environment the risk was things would 
turn out the opposite and thus Ligachev even argued with Gorbachev over his 
unwillingness to speak up. In this regard, Chernyaev accused Gorbachev of 
having “underestimated the possible repercussions of Karabakh, Tbilisi and 
the Gdlyan affair. Once again, he [Gorbachev] had relied on old methods and 
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decided that nobody would dare to blame him.”206 Probably the Gensek did 
not want to get into an open war with gdlyanists and preferred to bear the 
brunt of Ligachev’s impatience instead. However, this situation was a good 
occasion to further marginalize one of his greater adversaries within the 
politburo. As well, Gorbachev probably had to mediate with some of his allies, 
such as Yakovlev, another politburo member who had “behaved with 
exaggerated indifference” and who demonstrably sympathized with Gdlyan 
and probably supported his cause.207  
Thus, the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ was also polarizing the first days of the 
CPDSU dividing the deputies and even a part of the CC CPSU. In this context, 
the new parliamentary body was called to settle the case by creating an 
impartial commission. Among the new figures entering the supreme 
legislative body of USSR, the famous physician and dissident Sakharov was an 
influential star. He seemed to be an impartial figure and was courted by many 
deputies to take a part in the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ debates and to join the 
commission that was going to be formed.208 However, Sakharov rejected the 
invitation replying: “I can’t. It would take months for a newcomer to unravel 
the facts in the matter. And unless he does so, he risks compromising his own 
authority.”209 Also Gdlyan himself was courting Sakharov at the congress as a 
'fair' protagonist and during one meeting he recounted his version of the 
facts: “The ones who are recanting were kept in Tashkent in deluxe 
conditions. They’re being held in much worse circumstances right now in 
Moscow. The prolonged detentions were necessary, but I didn’t make the 
final decision. Permission always came from Moscow.”210 Then, a few hours 
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after that conversation, Sakharov was involved in the provocations of some 
deputies who wanted to involve him in the quarrel, informing him about the 
alleged bribes received by Gorbachev.211 This event apparently shocked the 
scientist who was probably fascinated by Gdlyan and Yeltsin, and started to 
doubt the Gensek’s honesty.212 
Finally, on 27 May a special commission of the CPDSU was established 213 
while the issues related to its composition were discussed in the following 
days. in this regard, Sakharov intervened in the congress, stating: 
The Gdlyan case has two aspects. It’s an inquiry into the work of Gdlyan’s team 
of investigators, but it’s also an examination of the charges made against the 
highest levels of the bureaucracy and our society. There is a crisis of trust in 
the Party and the leadership [that sentence was omitted in the transcript, but I 
said it]. Both sides of the question must be studied objectively […] The 
chairman of the commission should enjoy the confidence of the people, of the 
working class [this sentence was left out too], A man with Kudrin’s214 
biography would make a fitting chairman, in my opinion. 
                                                          
211 In fact, after that meeting, Sakharov received an anonymous letter that was 
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Then, Sakharov mentions that the majority of the congress were insistent 
that the historian and famous dissident Roy Medvedev be chosen to head the 
commission215 because he could be an impartial figure and be agreeable to 
public opinion. Apparently, also the CPSU majority was seriously concerned 
on any further criticism in trying to settle the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair, a case that 
was sensibly undermining the party credibility and endorsed a soft-line.216 On 
this regard, at the end of the congress session of June 1, Sakharov had a 
discussion with Gorbachev and Lukyanov, stating that the whole Gdlyan-
Ivanov affair was a real matter of credibility for the Soviet system and argued: 
Sakharov: “The Gdlyan affair isn’t only a question of violations of the law, 
although that is very important, but for the people it’s a question of 
confidence in the system, of faith in the leadership. It’s too bad that Kudrin 
wasn’t appointed chairman of the commission: he’s a worker, a former judge, 
a former Party member. The people would have trusted him.” Lukyanov broke 
at this point: "Kudrin's whole election campaign revolved around the Gdlyan 
affair. He can’t be impartial.” (In fact, the Gdlyan affair was not the central 
issue in Kudrin’s campaign.) Sakharov: “I’m very concerned that the only 
political result of the Congress will be your achievement of unlimited personal 
power—the ‘18th Brumaire’ in contemporary dress. You got this power 
without elections; you weren’t even on the slate of candidates for the 
Supreme Soviet, and you became its chairman without being a member.” 
Gorbachev: “What’s the matter, didn’t you want me to be elected?” Sakharov: 
“You know that’s not the case, that in my opinion no alternative to you exists. 
But I’m talking about principles, not personalities. And besides, you’re 
vulnerable to pressure, to blackmail by people who control the channels of 
information. Even now they’re saying that you took bribes in Stavropol, 
160,000 rubles has been mentioned. A provocation? Then they’ll find 
something else. Only election by the people can protect you from attack.” 
Gorbachev: “I’m absolutely clean. And I’ll never submit to blackmail—not from 
the right, not from the left!” Gorbachev spoke these last words firmly, without 
any visible sign of irritation. And on that note our meeting ended.217 
                                                                                                                               
working as a truck driver and won his seat to the Congress after a fierce battle." 
Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 1986-1989, 124. 
215 Ibid. 
216 On 30 May, Chebrikov sent to the CC CPSU the memorandum 693 to resolve the 
situation around the “Uzbek Affair” and to find “an objective approach to the public” 
about the investigations of Gdlyan and Ivanov. In this document, the politburo 
member warned the CC about the diffused campaign in the media against the two 
investigators and communicated the creation of the CPDSU special commission. 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 5, ll. 1-2. 
217 Ibid., 132–33. 
504 
 
6.5.2 The impartial judgement 
On 1 June 1989, after a long debate within supporters and contesters of 
Gdlyan and Ivanov, the commission “to examine the materials related to the 
activities of the investigative group of the Prokuratura USSR headed by T.Kh. 
Gdlyan” was finally realized. The commission was headed by Roy 
Medvedev218 and comprised another 16 members to examine the charges laid 
against the two investigators.219 This new organ was created to be impartial, 
representing experts of the legal and non-legal society and members from all 
                                                          
218 On that occasion, E. Yu. Yusupov, vice president of the An UzSSR stated that he was 
against Roy Medvedev’s candidature inasmuch he was accused of being close to those 
journalists who propagated the myth of Gdlyan and Ivanov. SNDSS, Pervyy S"yezd 
Narodnykh Deputatov SSSR. 25 Maya — 9 Iyunya 1989 G. Stenograficheskiy Otchet. 
Tom II (Moskva: Izdaniye Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989), 256. 
219 The commission was chaired by “Medvedev, Roy Aleksandrovich and included as 
members: Adylov, Vladimir Tuychiyevich — foreman of turners Tashkent Aviation 
Production Association named after V. P. Chkalova; Aleksandrin, Valeriy Grigor'yevich 
— Chairman of the Yoshkar-Olinski city people's court, Mari Autonomous Republic; 
Baranov, Aleksandr Ivanovich — Chairman of the Union of the production association 
“Izhora Works”, Leningrad, Kolpino; Bisher, Ilmar Ol'gertovich — Professor of the 
Latvian state university named after P. Stuchki; Bichkauskas, Egidiyus Vitautovich — 
investigator for particularly important cases of the Prosecutor's Office of the 
Lithuanian SSR; Golik, Yuriy Vladimirovich — Dean of the Law Faculty of the Kemerovo 
State University; Ignatovich, Nikolay Ivanovich — investigator for particularly 
important cases of the Prosecutor at the Byelorussian SSR; Lubenchenko, Konstantin 
Dmitriyevich — Associate Professor of the Law Faculty of the Moscow State University 
named after MV Lomonosov; Pokhla, Vello Paulovich — member of the editorial board 
of the main edition “Estonian TV movie” Radio and Television of the Estonian SSR, 
Tallinn; Semenov Vitaliy Aleksandrovich — Senior Researcher at the Institute Technical 
Mechanics of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Dnepropetrovsk; Sorokin Igor' 
Viktorovich — senior officer of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Kuibyshev 
MVD station; Strukov Nikolay Alekseyevich — senior investigator of the Kursk region; 
Suleymenov Olzhas Omarovich — writer, the first secretary of the Union of Writers of 
Kazakhstan, Alma-Ata; Fedorov Svyatoslav Nikolayevich — Director General of 
scientific and technical interbranch complex “Mikrokhirurgiya glaza”, chairman of the 
Soviet Charity and Health Foundation, Moscow; Shorokhov Viktor Nikolayevich — 
adjuster Tula Machine-Building Plant named after VM Ryabikov and Yarin Veniamin 
Aleksandrovich — operator Nizhny Tagil Metallurgical Plant named after VI Lenin, 
Sverdlovsk region.” Ibid., 250–68. 
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around USSR, even including three members recommended by Gdlyan and 
Ivanov.220  
Its creation was an interesting event that involved the participation of 
numerous institutional actors and many from civil society.221 Indeed, a large 
number of deputies sent appeals to the commission. These included requests 
for a review of the charges against Gdlyan and Ivanov as well as of those that 
they made against the senior CPSU officials. Members also demanded the 
results of the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigations in Uzbekistan.222 As well, the 
CPDSU received many letters and appeals requesting the possibility for 
Gdlyan and Ivanov to defend their position.223 For example, a ‘workers’ 
initiative’ demanded the suspension of the Genprokuror Sukharev in his post 
at the CPDSU until the Gdlyan-Ivanov case was discussed. Permission was also 
sought for Ivanov – one of the most popular and influential deputies of the 
CPDSU – to speak to the press. The appeal was presented with 3,629 
signatures and claimed to could easily have gathered thousands more.224  
Other letters from local committees – drawn from across the whole USSR– 
arrived,  accusing the Soviet power of focusing attention on the two ‘martyrs’ 
in order to mask high levels of corruption.225 Furthermore, collectives inside 
factories and institutes, spontaneous committees of citizens and voters, 
groups inside hospitals226 and investigators who worked on the case also 
expressed solidarity with Gdlyan and Ivanov who became symbols of 
justice.227 Other local groups requested that the CDPSU include in the 
                                                          
220 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 2. 
221 Despite the commission demanded the silence of the media on the Gdlyan-Ivanov 
affair in June and July 1989, the spontaneous organization of rallies and 
demonstrations and even the activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov was followed by the press 
and broke this rule. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll. 28-29. 
222 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 1-4. 
223 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 22. 
224 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 23 
225 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 34-35. 
226 A letter supporting Gdlyan-Ivanov was sent from the hospital ‘19’ in Leningrad and 
signed by 135 medics and patients. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 36. 
227 A telegram sent on 31 May 1989 stated that “corruption is common in the life of 
Uzbekistan,” in trading, in militsya, in the road police, in education, in health facilities. 
There, “everything has a price” and “organized crime leads the places of 
management.” The author, Galina Anatolievna Vieshkinia, defends Gdlyan and Ivanov 
because they managed the hard task of fighting against those major criminals. She 
said that a friend of her was an investigator in Uzbekistan and when he started to 
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commission members of Tushino-Zelenograd or Leningrad228 or international 
jurists229 in order to have a fair final judgement. As well, many letters from 
individual citizens were addressed to the CPDSU or even to the Gensek 
requesting justice for Gdlyan and Ivanov and linking this issue to the new 
course of democracy in USSR. One of these letters appealed directly to the 
Gensek and emblematically stated: 
Dear Mikhail Sergeevich […] if you are honest, let them [Gdlyan and Ivanov] 
work because they are now struggling alone against mafiya [… otherwise] all 
the beautiful words about the triumph of the ideal of justice and the honest 
idea of perestroika, which you so passionately speak about, become pure 
fiction and very inflammatory in the eyes of Soviet people and peoples of all 
the world.230 
Indeed, these letters not only demanded the rehabilitation of both Gdlyan 
and Ivanov on their investigations but also challenged the credibility of 
perestroika, showing the contradictions between the pre-1989 narrative 
(discourse about ‘heroes’) and the current campaign against the two 
investigators.231 Other appeals even protested the forming of the commission 
and asked that the material of the investigations be published in full to ‘let 
the people judge it themselves.’232 Nonetheless, many were simply convinced 
of the myth of the two investigators and demanded that the leadership give 
an account of why they were being discredited.233 
However, after the establishment of the commission, the CPDSU received 
quite a volume of letters from the ‘victims’ of Gdlyan and Ivanov or from their 
families. Figures such as the former FS Bukhara obkom Ismail Dzhabbarov,234 
                                                                                                                               
follow some cases, somebody tried to beat and kill him. Then he was ostracized and 
couldn't find support for his investigations in Uzbekistan as well in Moscow, and 
became a taxi driver. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 72. 
228 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 63-64. 
229 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 68. 
230 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 45. 
231 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 46-48. 
232 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 52-53. 
233 GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 56. 
234 For example, on 19 May 1989, the presidium SS USSR received a letter from Maria 
Federovna Maksimova the wife of Dzhabbarov, Ismail Dzhabbarovich – the former FS 
Bukhara obkom in 1984-1988 – attacking the two investigators who elevated 
“themselves as glorified pioneers in the fight against corruption in Uzbekistan awaking 
the public’s passions. [...However, they] lost all sense of proportion and responsibility 
to the soviet laws.” Thus, she defended her husband as a honest person who was 
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the former FS Tashkent obkom Mirzamakhmud Musakhanov,235 the former FS 
Samarkand obkom Bektash Rakhimov,236 the former second secretary of the 
CPUz Timofey N. Osetrov,237 the former first deputy chairman of the Bukhara 
                                                                                                                               
unjustifiably put in jail and threatened by Gdlyan and Ivanov who had prosecuted the 
case in error. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 73-75. 
235 Yusup Talipov wrote on 2 June 1989 a letter to the president of the commission for 
Gdlyan and Ivanov and to the deputy chairman of SS UzSSR. He was a former FS 
Tashkent raikom (1975-1986), in Galabinski raikom and the main agronomist in the 
kolkhoz ‘Leninism.’ In April 1988, he accused the investigator Safronov – a member of 
Gdlyan’s group – of having leaned on him to get evidence on bribes to the FS Tashkent 
obkom Musakhanov. Thus, the investigator pushed Talipov to have his collaboration. 
Finally, he also confessed a 6,000 ruble bribe to Musakhanov. However, that amount 
of money was directly suggested from the investigators who, in turn, let him free. 
Basically, Talipov was shocked at giving an extorted and slanderous confession against 
an innocent. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 78-80. On 31 May, also the son of the 
former FS Tashkent obkom Musakhanov wrote to the Genprokuror Sukharev to 
defend his 77-year-old father who was spending his 21st month in prison and was very 
unwell. According to his reconstruction, he also was pressured to accuse his father 
who in turn was forced by Gdlyan and Ivanov to slander himself, several other people 
and his children in a game that pit family members against each other. So, he and his 
sister spent five months in prison and were threatened by investigators to gather 
confessions. He demanded justice for his father who had been due for release on 30 
May but was still in jail. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 84. On 22 May 1989, 
Musakhanov’s daughter also sent a telegram to the CPDSU to demand the release of 
her father, brothers and sisters who had been ‘illegally detained’. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 
2, d. 20, l. 93. 
236 On 18 May 1989, the SS USSR received a letter from a group of communists, 
deputies, heroes and veterans of socialist labor from Uzbekistan to defend the honour 
of the former FS Samarkand obkom Rakhimov, Bektash Rakhimovich, “an hero of war, 
an honorable man and a good communist,” defining Gdlyan and Ivanov as “the 
enemies of perestroika.” GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 86. 
237 On 28 May 1989, the wife of T.N. Osetrov, former second secretary of the CPUz, 
sent a letter to the SS USSR and Gorbachev denouncing the Gdlyan's group methods. 
According to her reconstruction, the investigator O.M. Litvak, a member of Gdlyan's 
group, came to their house and threatened them, saying that if they did not confess it 
could be worse for their children and grandchildren. She revealed that they had been 
victims of humiliations perpetrated by other interrogators within the group, such as 
I.M. Dovgan' and E.I. Chernyshev. These two were even badgered the friends, relatives 
and neighbors of Osetrov. Then, she reported that in the night of 14 December 1986, 
during an inspection she woke up and she asked where her husband was. The 
investigators replied “your husband is a criminal and he is in jail.” According to her 
version, Gdlyan was too convinced of his work and had once told her “we never make 
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UVD Shamsi Rakhimov,238 the former deputy chairman of the Namangan UVD 
Shumkov,239 the former chairman of the Navoi UVD Tura Khaitov,240 and the 
former deputy chairman of the MVD UzSSR Kakhramanov wrote to the 
authorities.241All these letters were substantially accusing Gdlyan and Ivanov 
of imposing in the republic a system of terror where, to be liberated, a 
suspect had to give other and bigger names. All these letters were demanding 
for the restoration of their job post or even just of their good name and put a 
further shadow on the name of Gdlyan and Ivanov. To some extends, these 
letters seemed to recall the need to revive patrimonialism. 
                                                                                                                               
mistakes and we take people when all [their guilt] is proved.” However, “witness 
statements were distorted in a negative way, getting the opposite meaning of guilt” 
while they were overestimating the suspicious elements and ignoring the positive 
ones. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 87-91. 
238 On 20 May 1989, Shamsi Abdullaevich Rakhimov wrote a telegram to the presidium 
of SS USSR declaring herself a victim of Gdlyan. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison 
and he was still declaring his innocence and disavowing his involvement in mafia. 
Thus, he denounced the behaviour of Gdlyan that on 14 April 1987 sent a 41 page 
document to the CC CPSU about some alleged suspects and culprits. According to 
Rakhimov, thanks to this complaint, some people were sent to Siberia and publicly 
defamed in press. Thus, Rakhimov demanded the opportunity to speak and to 
consider the 250 complaints he had sent in the past six years. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 
20, l. 94. 
239 A phototelegram sent to the SS USSR invited the control organs to evaluate the 
activity of the MVD, the KGB and the Prokuratura to prevent a new 1937, defending 
Shumkov, the former deputy head of UVD of Namangan as an innocent “victim of the 
arbitrariness of the group” and demanding his release. GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, l. 
95. 
240 On 25 May 1989, Tura Khaitov, the former head of Navoi UVD, protested that he 
was illegally under arrest. According to his reconstruction, investigators committed 
several gross violations of law and he demanded for his release, defining Gdlyan and 
Ivanov as “unworthy to be among the people's representatives.” GARF, f. R-9654, op. 
2, d. 20, ll. 97-98. 
241 Kakhramanov, the former deputy chairman of the MVD UzSSR and the only 
acquitted defendant of the Churbanov trial, sent a letter to the CPDSU and to 
Gorbachev revealing that he spent four years in prison in vain where he was pushed 
by investigator to say something against his superiors in a system that recalled 'the 
methods of 1937'. After the trial, he was liberated. However, his life was destroyed, he 
lost his job and his wife got sick. He demanded the restoration of his good name and 
his job and accused Gdlyan and Ivanov of being “not worthy to take place of people’s 
deputies.” GARF, f. R-9654, op. 2, d. 20, ll. 81-83. 
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6.5.3 Enlarging the base of support 
Evidently, the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ was thrilling the public and was 
extending the scope of the debate on the democratic course of the USSR in a 
moment of dramatic crisis. Indeed, crisis was manifest in  serious signs of 
interethnic intolerance, the explosion of violence in the Fergana valley in June 
1989, the national demands of different ethnic groups, the economic crisis 
exasperated by excessive monetary issues, budget deficits, shortages of 
consumer goods and falling productivity, the protests in the cities and mining 
areas etc.242 Furthermore, in that moment the political activity supporting 
Gdlyan-Ivanov increased with dozens of rallies and marches, frightening the 
party upper echelons. It was clear their cause had tremendous support, 
drawing thousands of protesters in big cities – and especially in Moscow.243 
However, the situation seemed to be polarized on the Gdlyan-Ivanov front. In 
summer 1989, while the commission worked during the whole summer to 
define the case, the two investigators continued to publicly press their case 
and kept mobilizing a part of the public through rallies and demonstrations. 
For its part, the press kept a moderate attitude and avoided exposing further 
scandals related to the story. 
 Nevertheless, the prokuratura USSR – which was investigating a criminal 
case against Gdlyan and Ivanov – was still expressing to the party its concerns 
about the investigators’ declaration244 and kept dismissing the allegations 
that they had previously endorsed, discrediting their methods. On 29 August, 
during the trial against Khudayberdyev, the former chairman of the SM UzSSR 
admitted that the confessions against Churbanov had been ‘extorted’ by 
                                                          
242 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 
590. 
243 On 12 September 1989, the first deputy chairman of the MVD USSR, V.P. Trushin, 
sent a memorandum to the CC CPSU outlining the extent of mob support for Gdlyan 
and Ivanov and stating that since May 1989 51 mass demonstrations with a 
participation of 350,000 people had been recorded. Most of these rallies were in May–
June (41), concentrated in Moscow region (88%). However, there were 
demonstrations also in Vologda, Perm, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Yaroslavl. 23 of 
these adopted resolutions and appeals to the citizens of the country and to the 
CPDSU. Also, petitions and crowdfunding had been organized. During the latest rallies 
in September, the Popular Front had been involved and the removal of Sukharev had 
been demanded. Nevertheless, there was no violation of public order. RGANI, f. 89, 
op. 24, d. 7, ll. 1-2. 
244 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 6, l. 1. 
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Gdlyan.245 In parallel, the case against Ligachev was concluded on September 
4 for lack of evidence.246 Thus, during the plenum CC CPSU of 20 September 
1989, Sukharev rejected any accusation against Ligachev,247 stating that 
charges against him were without merit, and that Gdlyan and Ivanov had 
violated investigative ethics – such as the presumption of innocence – and 
were spreading "a dangerous lie that they themselves had fabricated."248 
                                                          
245 On 7 September, Khudayberdyev was sentenced to nine years’ prison and 
confiscation of property. Initially, he admitted bribery naming 36 persons from whom 
he had received bribes (for a total of 150,000 rubles) and nine to whom he had given 
bribes (for 70,000 rubles). Then, in court he completely retracted all confessions and 
accused his interrogators of coercing his testimony by blackmail and threats, stating: “I 
made these statements under pressure from the interrogators, under threats of 
reprisals against my family, and on the basis of feeling that I was in a hopeless 
situation” Feofanov and Barry, Politics and Justice in Russia Major Trials of the Post-
Stalin Era, 127–28; Churbanov, Moı ̆ Testඁ Leonid Brezhnev, 198; Plekhanov, “Delo 
Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 40. 
246 On 4 July 1989 Ligachev was questioned as a witness by the deputy Genprokuror 
USSR V.I. Kravtsev and the major assistant Yu.N. Shadrin. He categorically denied 
taking bribes from Usmankhodzhaev and confirmed the latest version given by the 
former FS CPUz, denying any bribe during the XVI plenum CC CPUz in June 1984. 
Basically, the charges against Ligachev were substantially dismissed for lack of 
evidence. Then with a resolution of 4 September 1989, the deputy head of the 
investigative department of Prokuratura USSR Galkin (the investigator who took 
Gdlyan's post in the 'Uzbek affair') concluded that Usmankhodzhaev, in the first stage 
of the case, gave false testimony slandering Ligachev E.K. for bribery. 
Usmankhodzhaev explained that he made these allegations under pressure from 
Gdlyan. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 8, l. 5; GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 12. On 14 
September, Sukharev informed Gorbachev of the allegations against Ligachev and 
reconstructed the story of Usmankhodzhaev’s confessions in October 1988 and their 
disavowal from November. It confirmed the psychological influence of Gdlyan in the 
questioning that forced Usmankhodzhaev to admit bribes to Solomentsev, Kapitonov, 
Mogilnichenko, Bessarabov, Smirnov, Ishkov, Terebilov and some others. In 
subsequent questioning – on May 22 and 14 June, 1989 – Usmankhodzhaev totally 
refused the idea of bribes to Ligachev. As well, other witness refused the allegations 
against Ligachev: V.P. Malyshev - who constantly accompanied Ligachev during a trip 
to Uzbekistan in 1984 - and his assistant A. Mikhailov defined Ligachev as a resolute 
opponent to any kind of bribes, gifts and other forms of ‘suvenirschina’. Similar 
testimony was given Assistant Secretary of the CPSU Legostaev V.M. and the doctor 
Taranov A.M. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 8, ll. 1-5. 
247 NSA, box 28, file R. 6870, p. 1. 
248 Pravda 22 September 1989, pp. 6-7. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet 
Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990, 193. 
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Consequently, the politburo asked the Moscow gorkom to consider party 
sanctions against Gdlyan and Ivanov.249  
It is interesting to evaluate Ligachev’s reaction to his formal acquittal. In 
his memoirs, he recalled the general indifference of the CC CPSU plenum 
audience had shown when the politburo (and indirectly against the whole 
system) had come under attack. This, he felt, was symptomatic of the fact 
that the party was deeply divided over Gdlyan and Ivanov. For this reason, 
during the plenum he acknowledged the symptoms of a systemic breakdown 
and called for a statement of party unity. He made it clear that the risks posed 
by radicalization and polarization of the political scenario and the threat 
represented by slanders that were deceiving people and discrediting the 
party were huge.250 Nonetheless, Ligachev’s warning were branded 
‘conservative’ while the Soviet ‘Cassandra’ was much more marginalized by a 
new group of party officials that would represent the latest stage of agony of 
the Soviet system. 
In autumns 1989, the end of the ‘Ligachev affair,’ the further dismissal of 
criminal cases for lack of evidence and the refusal of Gdlyan and Ivanov to 
provide the expected evidence to the commission and to criminal trials 
further radicalized the positions of the public. A great part of citizens – 
especially the intelligentsia – had lost interest in the affair, concluding that 
the prosecutors' “stash of evidence” was not the hand they were purporting 
to hold, and they were essentially bluffing. Instead the prosecutors' ruse was 
just a populist251 campaign designed to further their careers.252 However, on 
the radical front the case assumed new interest, with more and more daring - 
if not fanciful - conspiracy theories that were formulated to defend or to 
discredit the two ‘people’s heroes’ at any cost, becoming a matter of faith. 
                                                          
249 RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 9, l. 1. KPSS, Materialy Plenuma Tsentral’nogo Komiteta 
KPSS, 19-20 Sentyabrya 1989 G. (Moskva: Politizdat, 1989). 
250 Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 237; KPSS, 
Materialy Plenuma Tsentral’nogo Komiteta KPSS, 19-20 Sentyabrya 1989 G. 
251 During the roundtable “Views Legal Status of 'Informal' Groups” held in September 
1989, V. Zolotarev, member of the organization ‘Civil Dignity’ stated: “We have 
examples of such populist leaders in Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, Gdlyan and Ivanov, 
who deliberately exploit the image of a "revolutionary" in the worst sense of the 
word...” Literaturnaya Gazeta, 13 September 1989, p. 12, reported in FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-
89-058 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 30 OCTOBER 1989,” 1989, 37. 
252 Pravda Vostoka, 22076, 210, 13 September 1989, p. 3. 
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On 26 September 1989, the ordinary work of the commission resumed in 
a session watched by crowds of journalists and simple citizens.253 In the 
aftermath, the cautious Medvedev released an interview to Izvestiya254 where 
he revealed that “We still have a kind of unwritten rule that people above a 
certain position must not be drawn into an investigation.”255 This statements 
was effectively recognizing the interference of politics in judicial matters and 
seemed to make understandable the zeal of the two investigators. 
Consequently, within a couple of weeks, Medvedev was replaced and the 
commission was chaired by a triumvirate that, anyway, was including himself 
and the people’s deputy Veniamin Yarin and the senior investigator in Kursk 
oblast prokuratura Nikolai Strukov. This change in the commission’s 
leadership was justified because “Medvedev sometimes indulges in wishful 
thinking when speaking on the commission’s behalf, [and] has not always 
been able to organize the purely technical process of our work.”256 
Again, this passage was interpreted by the supporters of Gdlyan-Ivanov as 
an attack to the supposed impartiality of the commission, while many 
committees in defense of the two investigators appeared all around the 
country.257 Once again, the more Gdlyan-Ivanov were attacked, the more 
popular consent they received. At that time, the high popularity of the two 
investigators was even confirmed in opinion surveys,258 causing concern 
within the higher echelons of the party. Indeed, Primakov, during the 
politburo session of 4 October reported his fear for these “lost figures” as 
Gdlyan and Afanasiev who had to be isolated.259 Nevertheless, the crowd 
defended its heroes and the popular defense committees seemed to proceed 
in a self-propelling way, forming a force that could stage spectacular events 
and to organize remarkable rallies. One example was the spectacular 40 km 
                                                          
253 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-062 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 1 DECEMBER 1989,” 1989, 
90. 
254 Izvestiya 28 September 1989, p 6. 
255 Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, 194. 
256 Moskovskiye Novosti, 15 October 1989, p. 15, cited in Ibid. 
257 Novyye Vremena, 42, 1989, p. 4. 
258 In autumn 1989, Argumenty i Fakty organized a survey indicating the popularity of 
the best and the worst deputies. “Gdlyan was considered among “the very best” 
deputies by 187 respondents, and among “the worst" by a mere 15. For Ivanov, the 
corresponding numbers were 156 and 11.” Argumenty i Fakti, 7-13 October 1989, p. 1 
cited in Ibid. 
259 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 540. 
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human chain – in the Baltic style – organized on 7 October during the Day of 
the Soviet Constitution involving thousands of people that connected the 
Moscow center to Zelenograd. These events attracted the sympathy of many 
readers, and the number of letters of support to the newspapers began to 
increase.260 In response, the party tried to curb the “spillovers and clashes of 
opinion” in the press.261 Furthermore, Gdlyan and Ivanov were extending 
their horizons. Indeed, from June 1989, the two investigators started to give 
interviews to foreign journalists investing in in a provocative and self-
martyrizing narrative262 of pure Bolsheviks combatting against the Soviet 
mafiya. Gdlyan especially defined a special relation with the Italian 
journalists, making appealing comparisons between the different mafia 
systems: 
The Sicilian Mafia is like a whore who does not hide her occupation, while the 
Soviet one is a prostitute who tries to save her respectability. Hence, all the 
world speaks about the first, that starts from the crime to involve politics, but 
little about the second, who uses politics as leverage and coverage for the 
crime.263 
Gdlyan also followed a self-victimizing narrative describing to the Italian 
audience the paradoxical situation of a prosecutor fighting against mafiya 
who had been ostracized. Thus, the news of a brave prosecutor fighting 
against organized crimes attracted a lot of international interest and support. 
On 26 October 1989 he joined a convention in Rome organized by the 
magazines l'Espresso and MicroMega about the rule of law and the future of 
perestroika in the USSR. On that occasion, he denounced political 
                                                          
260 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-062 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 1 DECEMBER 1989,” 22. 
261 In a memorandum, Chernyaev referred about the meeting of 20 October with 
Klimov, Adamovich and Gelman (Egor Yakovlev) discussing the candidature of Burlatsi 
instead Vorontsov to be chief redactor of Literaturnaya Gazeta. About the reaction of 
different Moscow people and their "spillovers and clashes of opinion" in connection 
with Yeltsin, Gdlyan etc."Chernyaev recalled how in Moscow “ideological environment 
is extremely tense." GF, f. 2, d. 8096. 
262 Gdlyan commented to Chiesa “Ok, we are the villains, accuse us, it is your right. But 
the bags filled with money, the stolen gold, how are you going to return it to the 
comrades? Immediately exiting from jail or by mail?” Chiesa, “La Mafia Uzbeka Alla 
Conquista Di Mosca. Due Giudici Sovietici La Sbarrano E Raccontano.” 
263 Mauro, “Così Combatto La Piovra Sovietica.” 
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interference in the Soviet judiciary, which was still reliant on the party.264 He 
recalled that experience as follows: 
I realized that in Italy everything was taken seriously. Not as in the USSR. […] 
Since our arrival from Moscow, I have seen people with machineguns in the 
airport. They told us that it was for the security controls etc. When I asked 
confirmation to the interpreter, she told me that it was normal for the Italians. 
In the USSR, everything was calm and for us it was strange to see that. Then 
we visited the parliament and again there were these strong boys with 
weapons [at the entrance]. For me and for all the [Soviet] delegation it was 
something odd. I jokily went to touch the hole at the top of the gun [of a 
guard] and they looked at me as Lenin looked at the bourgeoisie! The escort 
reprimanded me saying that it was not allowed. Evidently, I thought it all to be 
puppet theater. Those were very difficult years, because the whole country 
was stifled, and when the Italian Parliament passed a law against the mafia, it 
precisely instructed an antimafia pool. I looked at where and how this group 
was set, how it moved, what were their problems. They [Mafiosi] were chasing 
them. So, I met one of those Italian prosecutors and I asked him to make a 
deal. “We both walk on the “tightrope.” You are persecuted and for me it will 
be not easier [to do my job in USSR]. Certainly, one of us will die first, but the 
other who will survive will drink for the repose of the other soul.” It has passed 
more than six months after my arrival, and I heard on TV that he and his wife 
were blown up on the road.265 Mafia, of course, reached him. Well, I'm still 
alive. [For me] it was interesting that you [Italians] had that protection while I 
never had bodyguards. The only thing that Soviet Union gave me was a gun 
with three cartridges. What would happen if I had to use all these three 
rounds? Should I say to these bandits "comrade bandits, wait while they bring 
me other cartridges!"? […] however, the level of danger and of personal 
unsafety, was of course higher in USSR than in Italy. And when, after 1988 we 
went into politics, the country's political leadership found itself in a trap. Stalin 
could solve this problem in five minutes. But they could not do so because the 
Kremlin has received collective statements, complaints, requests and the 
                                                          
264 Marcello Villari, “Nei Giornali Glasnost È Lotta Quotidiana. Convegno a Roma Sulla 
Perestrojka,” L’Unità, October 27, 1989. 
265 In our conversation, I asked if the subject he recalled in his story was Giovanni 
Falcone, a famous Italian judge and prosecuting magistrate killed by mafia – with his 
wife and escort of three police officers – in May 1992, on the A29 motorway near the 
town of Capaci. However, the timings do not coincide and there is probably a bit of 
fiction in his memoirs. Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 
17 October 2014. 
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message was "if you touch Gdlyan and Ivanov, we will destroy the Kremlin." 
That was our security.266 
6.5.4 Showdown 
In autumn 1989, the commission was late in presenting the results, and 
this postponement was thrilling - not to say irritating - the millions of people 
who wanted to know the conclusions of the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair.’ Thus, the 
pressure to clarify the situation inflamed the political debate also in autumn 
1989 when many letters arrived to the CPDSU. Several appeals came from the 
others people’s deputies addressed to Gorbachev asking for an evaluation of 
the materials related to the two investigators,267 or to suspend the work of 
the Genprokuror Sukharev.268 Other deputies were complaining about the 
delays in ending the matter, asking what happened and why the ‘Gdlyan-
Ivanov affair’ was removed from the political agenda,269 as well as appeals to 
ascertain the competence of the Committee and of its chair Medvedev,270 or 
requesting to publish a first part of the materials.271 In this phase, the work of 
the commission was followed by many people’s deputies, media and press, 
groups of interest and committees defending Gdlyan-Ivanov and, not least, 
even by the two investigators who had the occasion to give their version of 
the facts.272  
However, their credibility was further compromised by the fall of their 
‘Kremlin cases.’ In fact, after Ligachev’s acquittal, on 26 October 1989, 
                                                          
266 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
Personally, I do not have intention to contest Gdlyan’s impressions on the levels of 
mafia danger in USSR and in Italy. Nevertheless, I can add that until the late 70s Italy 
was facing a moment of high violence related to the black, red, anarchic and 
Palestinian terrorism and I would not be surprised to find so many weapons in that 
certain historic moment. 
267 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 96, l. 3. 
268 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 96, l. 5. 
269 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 96, l. 8. 
270 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 96, l. 9. 
271 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 96, l. 13. 
272 As mentioned in a preliminary document of the commission: “in October-
November 1989, many people's deputies (not members of the commission), 
journalists from press and mass media, members of public supporting Gdlyan and 
Ivanov from Moscow and Leningrad participated at the commission sessions. Ivanov 
presented in two meetings of the commission, Gdlyan in four.” GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 
90, l. 2 
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Sukharev informed the CC CPSU that also the charges against the former 
Politburo member and chairman of the CPC M.S. Solomentsev had been 
dropped.273 Similarly, also Romanov274 on 11 November, Kapitonov275 on 12 
November and Grishin on 22 November276 were acquitted for lack of 
evidence. 
                                                          
273 Solomentsev was accused of having received two bribes of 50,000 rubles, which 
was confirmed – and afterwards negated - by Usmankhodzhaev. Other witnesses of 
the meeting between Usmankhodzhaev and Solomentsev were listened, including the 
former first deputy chairman of the CPC I.S. Gustov, the assistants of the chairman of 
the CPC A.D. Smirnov and S.D. Mogilatov, and the security officer N.K. Lebedev. Thus, 
the allegations against Solomentsev were “proved to be false, obtained illegally by the 
investigators, as is evident from the case materials in connection with which the 
criminal case against Usmankhodzhaev] is dismissed in this part for lack of criminal 
evidence.” RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 10, ll. 1-2; NSA, box 28, file R6871, pp. 1-2. 
274 The charges against Romanov were again based on Usmankhodzhaev confessions 
of giving a 25,000 rubles bribe. However, on November 1, the former FS CPUz changed 
his testimony and stated that the bribe amounted at 10,000 and it was aimed to get 
permission on the fabrication of micro air conditioners in Uzbekistan. Lately, 
Usmankhodzhaev rejected the accusations against Romanov stating that they had 
been extorted by Gdlyan and Ivanov. On these facts, the investigators had also 
listened the witnesses B.P. Gavrilov and T.I. Tsarev, who worked in 1983-1985 with 
Romanov. Even during the last questioning on 30 October 1989, Usmankhodzhaev 
confirmed that he never gave bribes to Romanov. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 11, ll. 1-2; 
NSA, box 28, file R6872, pp. 1-2. 
275 On 12 November 1989, Sukharev informed Gorbachev that also the charges made 
against the former CC CPSU secretary Ivan Vasilievich Kapitonov were inconsistent. 
The allegations were based on Usmankhodzhaev's confession in which he admitted 
giving Kapitonov a bribe of 50,000 rubles in November 1983 and a second of 50,000 in 
1984 in Moscow during the preparation for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of 
the Uzbek SSR. After the first admissions in October 1988, Usmankhodzhaev dropped 
these accusations and stated that such slanderous confession was “a result of the 
unlawful methods of investigation of T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov.” Kapitonov was 
questioned and explained that he just had a formal relation with Usmankhodzhaev 
and he had no role in appointing Usmankhodzhaev, as was even confirmed by 
Osetrov. The testimony of Kapitonov's assistants N. Sobolev and I.O. Malinkin as well 
as his security officer V.K. Ilyin confirmed that during meetings between Kapitonov 
and Usmankhodzhaev, attaché cases were left out of the room. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 
12, ll. 1-2. 
276 On 22 November 1989, Sukharev informed Gorbachev that the charges against the 
former politburo member and FS Moscow gorkom Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin were also 
dropped. As for the other 'big names', Grishin was accused by Usmankhodzhaev after 
his arrest in October 1988. Then, in November the former FS CPUz specified that the 
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Finally, on 10 December 1989, a “Preliminary report of the Commission of 
the Congress of national Deputies USSR to review materials on activities of 
the investigative group of Prokuratura USSR headed by T.Kh. Gdlyan” was 
ready.277 The document reconstructed the phases of the Gdlyan-Ivanov saga, 
their success and their ‘provocations.’ A first important point was that "the 
commission recognized nothing particularly unusual in its routine operations, 
noting that the Gdlyan-Ivanov group generally functioned in the typical way 
of the Prokuratura of the USSR.” It also  recognized the group’s efforts in 
struggling against corruption and with “Mafioso groups in Uzbekistan and 
individual crime groups in Moscow.”278 However, it stated that “it is totally 
unacceptable that investigators [...] used methods of investigation adopted 
under Stalin and Vyshinsky.”279 Effectively, the commission acknowledged 
serious violations in the group’s work admitting that this was due to a lack of 
control and supervision by prokuratura.280 Indeed, “Gdlyan’s group was 
totally out of control and avoided all attempts at oversight to its work.”281 The 
document revealed that even though initial complaints of violations arrived as 
early as late 1983, these were ignored and there was excessive tolerance 
towards this cavalier approach. The only review made by the Prokuratura was 
after the suicides connected to the investigations – Mirzobaev, Gaipov and 
                                                                                                                               
30,000 ruble bribe to Grishin was given in 1984 and was functional in obtaining a 
group of experts in Moscow for the construction of residential buildings in Tashkent. 
However, on 22 May 1989, Usmankhodzhaev disavowed his previous version and on 
26 July 1989 Grishin was questioned and confirmed to have had no relations with 
Usmankhodzhaev with whom he met just on formal occasions. As witness was also 
interrogated Yu. Artemyev, manager of the protection unit of Grishin who confirmed 
that cases were left in the visitor's storage room or at the reception. A.A. Vankov, 
worker at Glavmosstroy in Tashkent in 1984-1985 confirmed that Grishin had no 
influence on that process. Also Umarov, FS Tashkent gorkom confirmed no relations 
between the construction in Tashkent and the intervention of Grishin. Thus, the 
former politburo member was acquitted and excluded from further investigations on 
the Uzbek affair. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 13, ll. 1-2. 
277 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 1-16. 
278 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 3. 
279 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 4. 
280 In particular, the document mentions the responsibilities of the Genprokuror A. 
Rekunkov and his deputies A. Katusev and V. Soroka, the head of the investigation 
department of the prosecutor’s office G. Karakozov and the prosecutors N. Popov and 
G.K. Mazurkevich. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 4. 
281 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 4. 
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Khadzhimuratov.282 After these episodes Gdlyan was seriously 
reprimanded.283 The report even included information about complaints 
against Gdlyan’s methods that arrived from a former member of the group, 
B.I. Severtsev, who was removed from the case and sent back to work in 
Leningrad. Thus, the commission indicated that many complaints on the 
Gdlyan’s methods of getting confessions referred on the investigator’s 
"rudeness and insults, humiliation of national dignity," "food and water 
deprivation" and psychological violence such as "threats of execution" and 
"threats to prosecute relatives, wives and children, rough treatments, spitting 
in the face and so on."284 Not least there were complaints reporting the 
‘requests of money’ by Gdlyan and Ivanov. Nevertheless, the commission 
acknowledged that all these complaints had to be checked.  
Thus, the commission admitted also objective violations on defendants – 
such as T.Kh Kakhramanov,285 T. Khaitov and A.R. Gaipov – who had been 
detained in jail for more than three years without due process and even 
without a formal investigation against them.286 Furthermore, the commission 
accepted that just a fourth of the reveled evidence had been confirmed in 
courts. Strikingly, it was revealed that  even family members of the suspects 
were often arrested and detained for long periods287 and that similar 
treatment was meted out even to the innocent, sick and old people, mothers 
                                                          
282 Plekhanov resumes five suspect case of suicide: M. Mirzobaev was the brother of 
the head of the Bukhara consumers’ guild, after questioning on 6 July 1984 in the local 
KGB facility – where Gdlyan’s team was based - he jumped from the window. In his 
pocket a note “sorry, I lied you, suckers!” Then, on 15 August 1984 the suicide of the 
chairman of the MVD UzSSR K. Ergashev; the tragic end of the former FS Kashkadarya 
Gaipov in March 1985 and the suicide with three bullets in his head of the first deputy 
chairman of MVD UzSSR G. Davydov on 17 May 1985, and the suspect end of chief of 
Tashkent police department Khadzhimuradov on 23 December 1985. Plekhanov, “Delo 
Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 35–36. 
283 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 5. 
284 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 7. 
285 Kakhramanov reconstructed the story of his injustice in a famous book published in 
Uzbekistan. Tashtemir Kakhramanov, Vozvrashchenie Iz Ada : Dokumentalඁnyı ̆Roman 
(Tashkent: Izdatel഻stvo “EȌzuvchi,” 2000). 
286 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 8. 
287 The document makes the example of the case of A. Karimov in which were 
detained in prison 20 of his relatives for a period of 5-6 months. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, 
d. 90, l. 8. 
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of minor children etc.288 Cases of abuse – midnight arrests and rough 
interrogation of witnesses, or arrests of deputies violating their immunity – 
were confirmed. The commission even revealed cases of mismanagement of 
the seized values that amounted to 37 million rubles,289 or the ‘unfair’ 
liberation of guilty bribers who collaborated with the group and cases of 
pressure made by the investigators on the local courts in Uzbekistan, and 
even on the SC UzSSR and the SC USSR.290 On these charges, the Prokuratura 
opened case N°18/67812-89 against them. The commission also reviewed the 
charges that Gdlyan’s and Ivanov made against higher managers of party and 
state and confirmed that the investigators did not provide the claimed 
evidence, agreeing with the conclusion given by the independent reviewer of 
the Prokuratura, E. Martinson.291 Nevertheless, regarding the ‘Smirnov affair’ 
the commission admitted that the case needed further review, because it was 
dismissed too easily by the prokuratura, and the suspect was released on 22 
May 1989 while there was still evidence of ‘gifts’ in the sum of 20,000 rubles 
that Smirnov did not deny.292 However, the commission protested that it had 
no authority to evaluate some other cases that were more media-oriented  
than juridical – those of Aliyev, Medunov, Grishin, Kunaev, Shchelokov or 
Galina Brezhneva – and that were not directly related to Gdlyan-Ivanov’s 
investigation in any case. Thus, 
these facts and circumstances, combined with economic and political 
difficulties, provides the opportunity for Gdlyan and Ivanov who, in recent 
months, had been turned away from [their] work and investigation team in 
Uzbekistan, began to engage in direct political activity in Russia against the 
leadership of CPSU and Soviet state, with the charge of deliberately inciting 
ethnic hatred and intentional creation of economic plight of the country and 
even in the conscious sabotage of rail transport. Almost all the limitations of 
our reality and difficulties of economic reconstruction, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
                                                          
288 The document made the example of P. Alimova who had nine children, B. Dalieva 
11, A. Saidova 12 and P. Matganova with 10 children and was personally arrested by 
Ivanov and jailed for 9 months. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 8. 
289 The document also noted that this sum was collected over six years while the KGB, 
in less than one year between 1983-1984, collected 13 million. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 
90, l. 9. 
290 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 10. 
291 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 12. 
292 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 13. Nevertheless, on 16 May 1990, Sukharev finally put 
an end to the Smirnov case, informing the SS USSR that there was no evidence of 
bribery. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll.117-118.  
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started to present the result of purposeful deliberate action emanating from 
the Moscow-Kremlin mafiya. This is not merely harmless demagoguery and 
causes considerable damage to the credibility of the perestroika reforms, to 
the CPDSU and to the SS USSR. From all the points of view, it would be wrong 
to leave this kind of activity of the People's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov 
unanswered.293 
Basically, the commission admitted that there were violations in the work 
of the Gdlyan-Ivanov group but the most significant negative impact had been 
to the credibility of the entire Soviet system in a sensitive moment of 
transformation.  
Subsequently, the second session of the CPDSU started on 12 December 
and the commission’s report – as well with other details on the Uzbek affair294 
– was discussed in an already tense situation together with other sensitive 
issues such as the constitutional modifications,295 the Tbilisi events and the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Ligachev recalls the event for finally disparaging 
Gdlyan’s allegations. In fact, on that occasion, Gdlyan took the stage. It was 
the best opportunity to expose the alleged ‘Kremlin affair’ from the highest 
podium of the USSR in front of millions of soviet citizens who, in front of their 
TVs, were waiting to hear his version. However, he did not give any evidence 
on the case and was interrupted by E.A. Panfilova who argued 
Telman Khorenovich, as a lawyer, you must be completely responsible for the 
statements you make on television and at rallies. I personally saw on 
Leningrad TV your accusation of Ligachev, saying that you personally had 
                                                          
293 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 14-15. 
294 In his memoirs, Nishanov recalls that during the II CPDSU in December 1989, a 
deputy V.A. Yarin – the Co-Chair of the Commission to verify the work of the 
investigative group – voiced that in Uzbekistan, law enforcement officials investigated 
more than 800 criminal case of bribery. Convicted 5000 people - including six hundred 
executives and ten Hero of Socialist Labor – and seized cash amounting to one 
hundred million rubles. Despite his role in the investigations against his rivals, 
nowadays Nishanov disavow the work of Gdlyan and Ivanov stating that ‘at first they 
put people in jail, and later they proved their guilt’. Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov, 
Derevඁya Zeleneyut Do Metelei : Raﬁk Nishanov Rasskazyvaet Marine Zavade I Yurii 
Kulikovu (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2012), 232. 
295 On 12 December 1989, during the second session of the CPDSU, Gorbachev refused 
to discuss the elimination of art. 4 and hounded against Sakharov. Unfortunately, the 
scientist died on 14 December. Jack F Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American 
Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 
1995), 752. 
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materials that would prove his guilt. I ask you to bring them forward here, at 
the Congress. You knew that today we would listen to material on your case. 
You know that the entire country is waiting for it. If you have it—bring it out; if 
you don’t—stop your demagoguery! Stop stirring up the entire country!296 
Gdlyan listened but did not reply, disappointing the audience and the 
millions of other people awaiting his version. That was probably the end of 
the myth for many Gdlyan-Ivanov supporters who had listened to their 
alternative version and now looked at that story as pathetic conspiratorial 
demagogy. As Sobchak recalls, from that moment “drama passed into farce” 
with the investigators claiming to have very secret documents and 
overwhelming evidence hidden in some safe place.297 Basically, while their 
investigations on the Uzbek affair was producing some effect,298 the ‘Kremlin 
affair’ was starting to look much like a fairytale. 
6.6 The ‘democrats’ Gdlyan-Ivanov 
In 1990, the war between the Soviet system and the front of Gdlyan-
Ivanov became open. The case assumed a much more mediatic impact with 
the waited publication of the first Gdlyan’s book, Pyramida-1, that became a 
bestseller and source of inspiration for a documentary film produced by 
Lenfilm in 1990.299 At the same time, the two investigators joined the 
DemRossiya election bloc – a coalition created by the interregional group to 
run in the 26 March 1990 elections – and Gdlyan was elected to its 
Coordinating Council. Their radical political discourse, together with some 
elements of nationalism and anti-communism jelled very well with the 
                                                          
296 This passage has been reported and translated in Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s 
Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 244. 
297 Sobchak, Khozhdenie vo Vlastඁ : Rasskaz O Rozhdenii Parlamenta. 
298 At the beginning of December, the prokuratura USSR closed the criminal case 
against N. Radzhabov for lack of evidence, while on 14 December the SC Kazakh SSR 
condemned for bribery the former FS Navoi obkom V. Esin to six years of 
imprisonment with confiscation of property; and on 27 December the SC USSR 
sentenced for bribery the former FS CPUz I.B. Usmankhodzhaev to twelve years 
imprisonment with confiscation of property. On 15 January 1990, the charges against 
Abdullaeva were totally acquitted by the SC USSSR. On 14 February 1990, the SC USSR 
condemned the former chairman of the SM Karakalpak ASSR and secretary of the CC 
CPUz E. Aytmuratov to ten years imprisonment and confiscation of his property. 
Plekhanov, “Delo Gdlyana. Anatomiya Politicheskogo Skandala,” 40. 
299 Gdlyan and Dodolyev, Piramida-1. 
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heterogenous coalition of ‘democratic’ candidates that were challenging the 
predominant CPSU and its leader. Thus, in a context where the democrats 
were fighting against a party in shambles, the possibilities of action were 
endless.  
6.6.1 In the grip of the crowd 
During a rally held in Tushino on 9 January 1990,300 Gdlyan personally 
accused Gorbachev of bribery and collusion with criminal elements, and 
made a common front with ‘other dissidents of perestroika’ such as the 
former KGB officer Oleg Kalugin. Apparently, there was no more common 
ground for negotiations. Similar accusations appeared during the huge mass 
demonstrations of ‘reformers’ that invaded Moscow on 4 February. Gdlyan 
also participated on that occasion, claiming that half a million people were for 
him301 and calling for a resignation of the entire politburo based on its 
corruption and protection of mafia elements.302 In these delicate days, the CC 
CPSU approved the elimination of art. 6 from the constitution, abolishing the 
primacy of the CPSU in the political system,303 and bringing to reality a 
political transition that would involve the opposition forces. After decades of 
ideological monolithism, enthusiasm for democratization was opening a 
Pandora’s box from which emerged a plethora of shabby ideas. These 
included ultranationalism, anti-Semitism and even manifestations of crypto-
fascism – among which Gdlyan’s populism was not the most radical.  
In this scenario, the still numerous gdlyanists could easily organize rallies 
while the Prokuratura turned resolutely to the task of discrediting its 
employees Gdlyan and Ivanov. Nevertheless, the criminal case against them 
was still in train and the Prokuratura admitted it lacked control over the 
investigative group. In this context, it for the first time issued apologies "to 
the Uzbek people for the arbitrariness and lawlessness [and promised] to 
develop measures to prevent similar phenomena” in future. Finally, a report 
"about the gross violations of law committed by the investigators for the 
especially important cases at the Prokuratura USSR, Gdlyan T.Kh. and Ivanov 
N.V." was prepared by Ilyukhin on 6 February 1990, becoming a base for the 
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301 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, l. 24. 
302 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 87. 
303 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 753; Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia 
dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991. 
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Gdlyan and Ivanov prosecution.304 The document stated that the criminal case 
against Gdlyan and Ivanov was opened on 25 May 1989 because of the many 
letters and appeals from citizens revealing abuses in investigative methods of 
the investigators who "systematically allowed gross violations of socialist 
legality and arbitrary abuse of honor and dignity of Soviet citizens."305  
In Ilyukhin accusation, the Gdlyan’s investigations were often 
"unprofessional, without critical analysis and long term vision and were badly 
organized,"306 producing unreasonable periods of pre-trial detention,307 and 
giving relatively limited results,308 considering that just one fourth – and 
sometimes less – of the alleged evidence had been validated by the courts. 
Thus, many cases were considered inconsistent after the removal of Gdlyan 
and Ivanov from the investigations.309 The document even charged the two 
investigators for “forcing citizens to testify thought threats, blackmail [...] and 
other abuses" and detaining – mostly illegally – more than 100 people for 
questioning.310 Gdlyan and Ivanov were thus accused of extorting artificial 
confessions,311 extending the arrest to the members of the suspects’ 
families,312 arresting mothers of minor children,313 proceeding with illegal 
                                                          
304 The report was even sent from the deputy Genprokuror USSR Vasil’ev to the MJ 
USSR Yakovlev on 12 February 1990. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 10. 
305 GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 10. 
306 GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 10. 
307 The report cites the cases of Kakhramanov and Khaitov, who were detained for 
three years, A. Gaipov , three years and seven months, and G. Mirzabaev, five years. 
GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 10. 
308 Ilyukhin comments that in six years more than 200 investigators worked to 
condemn 34 people while 4 were acquitted by the court (Kakhramanov, Khaitov, 
Gaipov and Abdullaeva). GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 11. 
309 The former the second secretary Osetrov spent four years and five months in jail as 
well as the former FSs of Fergana and Samarkand Kh Umarov, B. Rakhimov, N. 
Radzhabov (9 months) or the deputy chairman of the MVD UzSSR, A. Mukhammadiev, 
who was under arrest for two years and three months. Mukhammadiev and Osetrov 
were arrested personally by Gdlyan. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 11. 
310 For this purpose, Gdlyan personally arrested 8 people in such way, and Ivanov 17. 
GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 11-12. 
311 The document reports that due to the former FS Bukhara obkom Karimov's 
confessions, 21 people were arrested at the request of Gdlyan and six of them were 
personally handcuffed by Ivanov. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 12. 
312 For example, Usmankhodzhaev was detained with 9 others (8 were relatives) for six 
months, including his wife, his son Gairat, two sisters Fazilatkhon and Kanalkhon. For 
all of them there was a lack of any evidence. As well, the FS Tashkent obkom 
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night arrests in the ‘1937 NKVD style’ etc. in order to “force suspects to 
confess.”314 They were also accused of violating the parliamentary immunity 
or arresting people without an arrest warrant,315 even exceeding unjustifiably 
the pre-trial detention over the three days limits. Ilyukhin also reported cases 
of people forced to push their relatives and friends to testify about bribes,316 
or the extreme indulgency towards ‘smaller bribers’ by Ivanov who in June 
1985, voluntarily dismissed a criminal case against 56 ‘collaborative’ workers 
of the Bukhara gorpromtorg who gave to their director Kudratov more than 2 
                                                                                                                               
Musakhanov was arrested with his son Mirzoiusuf and his daughters Sadzhida and 
Nafisa by order of Gdlyan. Also K. Nurumbetov was arrested in 1987 with eight other 
people directly by Gdlyan and the arrest of seven of them was considered illegal. In 
this way, eight relatives for each of Radzhabov, Kamalov, Dzhumaniyazov were 
detained, four of Primov and 15 of Khudajbergenov were illegally arrested as was 
confirmed by the SC USSR. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, ll. 12-13. 
313 The report stated that even the investigators Adburakhimov, Dadazhanov, Tuktarov 
illegally arrested Pasho Alimova, mother of 9 children, Bibizada Dalieva (11 children), 
Anora Saidova 12 children, Pasha Matchanova (10 children) under the instruction of 
Ivanov. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 13. 
314 The document reports many cases of people arrested during the night and 
detained for no reasons in jail and isolated from their relatives. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 
2738, l. 14. 
315 On 30 November 1987, Gdlyan arrested Shariboj Radzhapov an engineer of kolkhoz 
"Pravda", member of the CPSU, deputy of a village soviet, violating his immunity. Also, 
on January 1988, Ivanov arrested the deputy of Nukus city soviet Khudaibergenov 
Kh.M. but the arrest warrant came just on 9 February. When the suspect told that he 
was as deputy, Ivanov ironically invited him to enjoy the right of immunity. He was 
detained for 2 months but his guilt was not proved. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 15. 
316 For example, the document reports the case of Sh. Mukhimov, father of 6 children 
without guilt, spent in jail 5 months and 20 days. During the inquiries, Ivanov told him 
"you are a little man, we do not need you… however, you must instruct your children 
to give testimony against Kasymdzhanov, saying that near the UVD, or in the airport, 
or near the house or in different places was given any occulted parcel to 
Kasymdzhanov. Find somebody of your relatives or your friends who could confirm 
this fact." Similarly, the document reports cases of drivers who had to testify against 
their clients. Also Mirzoiusuf Musakhanov son of the former FS Tashkent obkom said 
that Gdlyan pushed him during the interrogation and shouted that if he would not 
confess and give the money back, the investigators would "totally terrorize the whole 
Musakhanov family". It was true and four of his relatives were arrested. GARF, f. 9492, 
op. 8, d. 2738, l. 16. 
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million rubles in bribes.317 As well, the document accused the investigators of 
violating rules of recording the inventories of the seized valuables, confusing 
the bribes with personal belongings or writing approximate figures in 
protocols.318 Then, Ilyukhin accused Gdlyan and Ivanov for substantially 
abandoning their work319 and accused the former Genprokuror of not 
supervising the situation and even German P. Karakozov, the head of the 
investigative unit and very close to Gdlyan and Ivanov, for collaborating with 
them, writing documents to the Genprokuror and to the presidium of the SS 
USSR and allowing them to put in jail the people that they wanted to 
prosecute.320 Finally, Ilyukhin requested the possibility to prosecute Gdlyan 
and Ivanov – who had systematically abused authority in the detention of 
citizens and forced by threats of violence to give testimony and slander321 – 
and to examine the material of the board of the Prokuratura of the USSR.  
The report had an immediate effect and on 8 February 1990 the collegium 
of the General Prokuratura USSR acknowledged their criminal responsibility 
and demanded that the SS USSR strip the parliamentary immunity of both 
Gdlyan and Ivanov in order to proceed.322 This petition to the prokuratura 
                                                          
317 According to this reconstruction, some of these bribes amounted from 70,000 to 
200,000 rubles. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 17. 
318 The document denounces the lack of professionalism of investigators who wrote 
labels like “a pack with 25-50 rubles”, “60 or more coins” etc. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 
2738, l. 18. 
319 Ilyukhin stated: “over the last eight months they had practically ceased to perform 
their professional duties” becoming famous politicians and refusing to accept three 
new cases. They spent their time in different cities, attending meetings and musical 
shows and performing in mass media where they “spread accusations and insults 
against the political leadership of the party and state” GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 
20. 
320 Karakozov was even accused of protecting Gdlyan and Ivanov, directly passing 
them, not to their superiors, letters of complaint and failing to take adequate 
measures during the period of investigations, when Gdlyan was brought to disciplinary 
responsibility three times and Ivanov twice. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 20. 
321 Ilyukhin implicates violations of the articles 149, 158, 159 and 160 of the code of 
criminal procedure of UzSSR and 130 of RSFSR. GARF, f. 9492, op. 8, d. 2738, l. 21. 
322 On 9 February 1990, Pavlov, the chief of the State and Legal Department of the 
CPSU, informed the CC that on 8 February the prokuratura board discussed the 
criminal case opened on 25 May 1989 on the gross violations of law of Gdlyan and 
Ivanov. The investigation of the case proceeded with more than 500 witnesses and a 
lot of material and the SC USSR dismissed many cases initiated by Gdlyan and Ivanov 
in January 1990, even in accordance with the commission of the CPDSU. The board 
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was not welcomed by a part of the commission members that even 
denounced this attempt as a violation of the people's will, undermining the 
CPDSU credibility and predetermining the work of the commission for 
acknowledging the guilt of Gdlyan and Ivanov.323 Then, on 14 February 50,000 
people rallied in Zelenograd to support their heroes324 and on 21 February, 
351 persons attended a general meeting of communists in the prokuratura to 
consider the issue "about violations of the law and the requirements of the 
CPSU statuses committed by communists T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov." In a 
tense climate, the meeting decided they would both be expelled from the 
CPSU "for committing gross violations of the law and the requirements of the 
Charter of the Party."325 In response, a mass meeting in Zelenograd expressed 
support for the investigators and warned of strike action, while other 
manifestations of support for Gdlyan and Ivanov were organized in other 
parts of the country.326  
Chernyaev warned Gorbachev about the risks as the anniversary of the 
February revolutions (on 25th) approached stating that “radical leaders 
including Gdlyan and Ivanov, will inflame and direct antiparty and anti-state 
actions.” Thus, he concluded his warnings on the risks of disorder, pogroms 
and the involvement of criminality that would risk to degenerate in a 
                                                                                                                               
was attended by prokuratura members, deputies and journalists but not by Gdlyan 
and Ivanov, who boycotted the meeting. The board was led by Ilyukhin and reported 
the affirmations of former participants of the Gdlyan's groups or of people who 
worked in the case, involving from the Prokuratura USSR A.S. Sboev and E.I. 
Chernyshov, from the prokuratura Ukrainian SSR S.A. Sukhobrus and N.A. Klokol, the 
famous investigator of the Jizzakh-Ivanovo affair N.I. Kalinichenko, the prosecutors 
N.A. Nagorny and V.A. Ivanov and the attorney for prokuratura supervision R.M. 
Ovcharova. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 14, ll. 1-4. 
323 In fact, on 26 March 1990, I. Sorokin, a CPDSU deputy and member of the 
commission addressed to Gorbachev and to the media a letter referring his doubts on 
the activity of the commission that “became more and more biased and is now fully 
coincides with the position of the USSR prokuratura.” According to Sorokin, the 
commission suffered from the influence of the KGB, prokuratura, presidium and the 
CC CPSU focusing the whole responsibility of the methods to Gdlyan and Ivanov and 
dropping the case on corruption in the higher echelons. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 15, l. 1-
3. 
324 GARF, f. 10147, op. 1, d. 466, l. 3. 
325 Argumenty i Fakty, 24 February - 2 March 1990, p. 8. Clark, Crime and Punishment 
in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990, 195. 
326 Radyanska Ukrayina reports manifestations of solidarity also in Ukraine in February 
1990.FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-90-039 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 7 JULY 1990,” 1990, 85. 
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“Romanian variant.”327 In parallel, Gdlyan’s approach was not entirely 
welcome by a moderate part of the democrats that identified him as a radical 
and an extremist328 disavowing his disruptive methods of protests. 
Nevertheless, the rallies of 25 February – 220 demonstrations in 140 cities in 
Russia alone – recorded another huge crowd for the two popular ‘martyrs.’ 
This incredible – and alarming – result was even discussed during the 
politburo session of 2 March 1990. On that occasion, Gorbachev was furious 
at Gdlyan's claim that "mafia represents the country" and pointed Sukharev 
who was "too timid to deal with people such as Gdlyan" and referred to the 
other participants "sitting in their seats and watching the discrediting of 
senior officials." Thus, the Gensek called for an effective legalization of the 
response where, evidently, even slanders would be punished by law. Hence, 
the furious Gensek mazily exclaimed: 
I don’t want to expose Gdlyan as a political prostitute. I support the idea to 
legally prosecute [them] for their discrediting of the supreme power in the 
state. And check Gorbachev, Ligachev and others like them – if they got into 
the pocket of the state, let them respond. With such a Prosecutor, the Kremlin 
will be easily destroyed!329 
Then, Biryukova mentioned that during the demonstrations slogans such 
as "CPSU – clique of thieves and murderers" appeared. But Sukharev replied 
that for those activities it was not possible to prosecute people.330 Basically, 
the politburo realized that no firm actions could be taken against this kind of 
demonstration because the backlash might be catastrophic.331 The inability to 
take certain actions was an inexorable symptom of a dying USSR and a party 
in disarray. The following indication of impatience expressed by Chernyaev is 
remarkable. He wrote in his diary (3 March 1990) about Gdlyan and Ivanov: 
                                                          
327 GF, f. 2, d. 8200. 
328 The journalist and human rights activist Len Karpinsky criticized Gdlyan's calls for 
people to take the streets, seeing the destructive potential in the extremism of the 
"power of the street" Igor V. Timofeev, “The Development of Russian Liberal Thought 
since 1985,” in The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, ed. Archie Brown (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75. 
329 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 601. 
330 On this regard, also Pavlov, the head of the legal department of the CC, confirmed 
that was possible to prosecute for specific accusations against individuals but not in 
that form. Ibid. 
331 Then, Ryzhkov seemed to assume an ironic tone when he commented that in 
London the police were allowed to attack protesters who merely threatened public 
morals. Ibid., 602. 
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Criminals who imprisoned mothers with many children, extortionists who 
recreated 1937 in Uzbekistan! [...] Are you afraid to find out that Gorbachev is 
a thief?! Is that what you are afraid of? If he is a thief, let them prove it. If 
need be, Gorbachev will do what the law requires. But if it is slander — 
Gorbachev added — Gdlyan and Ivan[ov] belong on the prisoners’ dock for 
contempt of supreme state leadership. It would be impossible to imagine 
anything like this taking place in any civilized country.332 
6.6.2 The spring countermeasures 
In mid-March 1990, as Gorbachev controversially assumed the presidency 
of the country, the USSR was in the midst of a rapid institutional 
transformation.333 Nevertheless, the Gdlyan-Ivanov issue remained a crucial 
theme for its capacity to mobilize the passions of the crowd regarding the 
higher echelons of the state and the party. Thus, during the politburo session 
of 22 March, the results of the Russian legislative elections were commented 
on. The anger of some politburo members against the rising opposition was 
palpable. ‘Chekists’ like Gdlyan-Ivanov remained popular in the country334 and 
in accusing Gorbachev of corruption and of covering the case up,335 they soon 
drew support from parts of the radicalized intelligentsia, infuriating the top 
leadership further.336 However, the atmosphere was about to shift. 
                                                          
332 Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev - 1990” (Washington 
D.C., 2010), 17. 
333 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, 753; Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia 
dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991; Paolo Biscaretti di Ruffia, 1988-1990. Un Triennio Di 
Profonde Trasformazioni Costituzionali. In Occidente, nell’URSS, Negli Stati Socialisti 
dell’Est Europeo (Milano: Giuffrè editore, 1991). 
334 On that occasion, Frolov commented that despite the CPSU obtaining a solid result 
(86% of the seats) many of these were however taken by radical leaders such as Popov 
and Afanasiev. Then, Kryuchkov commented “Chekist candidates were almost all 
selected [...] There are deputies who are not only unworthy to be members of the 
Communist Party, but also to be citizens of our country: Gdlyan Ivanov, etc." 
Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 609. 
335 Holmes, The End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and 
Legitimation Crisis, 230. 
336 In the March rallies, Gdlyan was often joined by the economist Tatyana Koryagina 
who campaigned against party mafia in association with the apparatchiks. Joe Klein, 
“Shrinking the Russians,” New York, March 1990. 
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In fact, on 2 April, the prokuratura counterattacked and finally asked the 
SS USSR for authorization to fire Gdlyan and Ivanov from their prosecutorial 
posts. With the memorandum № 1-5-33-90 of 2 April 1990, the prokuratura 
communicated to the SS USSR details of the criminal case opened against 
Gdlyan and Ivanov and their group.337 The document gave details of the 
abuses on the suspects who had been beaten and illegally detained, 
reiterating the cases – previously cited by Ilyukhin – involving a total of 70 
victims. Furthermore, they were accused of slandering the state, the party 
and the Gensek without giving any evidence, violating articles 149 (abuse of 
power or position), 150 (abuse of power or official authority), 158 (knowingly 
unlawful arrest or detention) and 159 (coercion to testify) of the UzSSR 
criminal code and part 3 of article 130 of the RSFSR criminal code (slander, 
coupled with the accusation of a state or other serious crime). With this harsh 
document, Sukharev demanded their removal from the prokuratura.338 
At the party level, on 9 April the politburo discussed Ivanov's latest serious 
statement on Leningrad TV (29 March 1990) and the seizure of a TV studio 
together with Gdlyan and other members of the Leningrad city council (6 
April) when the two mavericks attacked the Soviet president, his wife and the 
Communist party. Thus, the politburo endorsed a series of measures to limit 
the influence of these radicals in the media.339 Then, even Gorbachev – 
                                                          
337 In 1984-1988, Gdlyan and Ivanov led the investigators Borov, Abdurahimov 
Ibragimov, Kartashyan and some others to commit systematic abuse of power and 
official position, by means of threats, blackmail and humiliation of personal dignity of 
citizens forced to give false and self-incriminating statements. They illegally 
prosecuted, detained and handed down the decision to arrest innocent people, which 
led to grave consequences. GARF f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 1 
338 GARF f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll. 11-12. 
339 Specifically, the politburo instructed the head of the USSR State Committee for 
Television and Radio (M.F. Nenashev) to propose to the SM USSR the establishment of 
the main tele-radio channels of Moscow and Leningrad under the Gostelradio USSR; to 
instruct the Leningrad obkom (B.V. Gidaspov) to bring to party responsibility the 
people involved in these statements and seizure of the TV studio; to instruct the 
Prokuratura to proceed against the people involved in these illegal actions; to provide 
as soon as possible to the presidium SS USSR and to Lukyanov the conclusions of the 
commission, to develop and adopt legislation on liability for insulting the President in 
the press and other officials of the country, requests the Commission on 
Parliamentary Ethics (chaired by com. Denisov) to consider the responsibility of the 
People's Deputies N. Ivanov and T. Gdlyan for their insults, to take measures against 
the Leningrad council member taking part in the seizure of the TV studio, and to 
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probably believing that the case was going to end soon – started to publicly 
consider the issue when, on 12 April 1990, he 
gave candid answers to the thousands of questions flying at him during a 
meeting with the Komsomol before their Congress, including about the 
Gdlyan-Ivanov slander: “I, the President, am not going to go and try to prove 
that I am not a thief and I do not take bribes!” They applauded when he 
declared that Gdlyan and Ivanov will be dealt with in the open at the Supreme 
Soviet (who knows whose side they were applauding).340 
Chernyaev’s final remarks are indicative of the tense political climate, in 
which Gdlyan and Ivanov were challenging Gorbachev’s credibility. As well, 
the two investigators, probably warned of the impending decision of the 
commission and fearing a negative judgment, decided to do something about 
it. On 15 April, they wrote an open letter to the CPDSU deputies. In this 
document, the two investigators noted that the commission was only 
focusing on the "investigators affair" and did not deal with the corruption in 
the state and party, alleging that only a 5% of the material had been reviewed 
while thousands of volumes, videotapes and documents remained 
unexplored. Thus, Gdlyan and Ivanov emerged as scapegoats in a case that 
involved more than 500 investigators by the prokuratura, the MVD and the 
KGB. Thus, they highlighted that the commission’s members demonstrated 
biases in the press341 and that they had not been informed of the 
commission’s findings. Therefore, they demanded to postpone the conclusion 
of the commission, to include a pool of 40-50 experts of law and to remove 
the ban on them in the central press and mass media.342 In the meantime 
                                                                                                                               
instruct Nenashev to take measures against the executives Lenteleradiokomiteta 
(com. Senin, Kurkov and others) for the organization of TV programs conducive to the 
creation of a society in the political atmosphere of permissiveness, overtones and 
denigration of anyone who disagrees with their ideological position. NSA, box 29, file 
R10028, p. 1; NSA, box 29, file R6877, pp. 1-2. RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 16, ll. 1-3. In 
what seemed to be a 'Leningrad affair', the Lenobkom answered to the CC CPSU that 
measures to punish the responsible for these acts were going to be implemented. 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 24, d. 17, l. 1-2. 
340 Savranskaya, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev - 1990,” 21. 
341 Gdlyan and Ivanov thus denounced some of members of the commission (like V.A. 
Yarin, N.A. Strunov, V.G. Aleksandrin and V.G. Adylos) for bias. They also criticized 
those who had condemned them in articles appearing in the Uzbek newspaper 
Selskaya Pravda and Izvestiya, as well as Medvedev who even performed on central 
television on 7 April 1990 and showing clear bias towards the case. 
342 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 68-77. 
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other appeals to defend Gdlyan and Ivanov appeared in the Soviet press,343 
further politicizing an issue that seemed to explode. Also among the 
commission members, the climate remained very tense because they knew to 
make a political choice in judging the two popular ‘Robin Hoods’ that were 
protected by the people.344  
Nonetheless, the commission was able to release a final report on 16 April 
1990345 and reconstructed the case integrating, in many parts, the 
conclusions of its preliminary report of December 1989 and the information 
mentioned in Ilyukhin’s report. The tone of the report was conciliatory and 
conveyed submissions from both parties, declaring that due to its media-
oriented impact, Gdlyan and Ivanov had become the scapegoat of the 
prokuratura where many investigators acted unprofessionally.346 Their arrests 
were authorized from either the prokuratura USSR or UzSSR and the 
prolongation of pre-trial detention periods had been sanctioned by the 
Presidium of the SS USSR.347 The report stated that the violations for which 
they were charged were generally common in the prokuratura and they were 
not the only case in this regard. Therefore, defects of that kind were 
attributable to lack of supervision by the prokuratura.348 However, the 
commission acknowledged the specificity of the group, considering that “in 
the last 20 years in our country this was the only such large group of 
investigators with such great powers to ever have been created.” It was 
recognized that no one had reviewed complaints as they began to arrive from 
the public from 1983,349 or from other team members,350 admitting that 
                                                          
343 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-90-034. Political Affairs. 21 JUNE 1990,” 1990, 35. 
344 For example, before the judgement, the member of the commission Suleimanov 
warned Lukyanov and the other deputies about the dangerous game that was opened 
on the two "Robin Hoods." GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 65-67. 
345 The report was signed by the members Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev; Nikolai 
Alekseevich Strukov; Veniamin Aleksandrovich Yarin; Ilmar Olgertovich Bisher; Valery 
Grigorevich Alexandrin; Vladimir Tuychievich Adylov; Yuri Vladimirovich Golik; Olzhaz 
Omarovich Suleimanov; Konstantin Dmitrievich Lubenchenko. GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 
18, l. 64. 
346 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll. 31-32. 
347 However, the commission admitted that several cases were not checked. GARF, f. 
9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 33. 
348 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 34. 
349 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll. 35-36. 
532 
 
before February 1989, there was essentially no oversight over the Uzbek 
affair investigations.351 As well, the commission acknowledged that only 
incomplete, superficial or contradictory investigations were opened on the 
almost ten suicides connected with the methods of Gdlyan,352 and 
condemned the practice of ‘bargaining’ with defendants, acquitting 
collaborators,353 arresting whole families354 and mismanagement of 
investigative materials355 and seized money and other valuables.356 
Nevertheless, the commission admitted that it was unable to investigate the 
charges made by Gdlyan and Ivanov against the leaders of party and state 
because they did not give the promised materials and kept claiming to store 
these secret documents in some safe places.357 
Basically, this report laid out the evidence for serious defects in the 
prosecutorial activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov, but acknowledged that their 
methods were not so far from the Soviet tradition of prosecutorial practices, 
presenting them as but one cog in a greater repressive machine. Therefore, 
the commission demanded that “the methods of the prokuratura be 
strengthened and upgraded, increasing its authority and independence” was 
well as the buttressing of legal standards to build a democracy with 
effectively democratic standards.358 Evidently, the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov’ case 
served to put both the methods of prokuratura and, to some extent, Soviet 
totalitarianism itself on trial. 
Thus, on 18 April 1990 the SS USSR reviewed the commission’s report and 
approved resolution N°1438-1 "regarding the conclusion of the commission 
to review materials of the activities of the investigative group of prokuratura 
                                                                                                                               
350 Also, the complaints from the investigators R.M. Ovcharova and B.I. Severtsev that 
accused Gdlyan of abuse of power and official authority, violent and abusive actions of 
personal dignity. 
351 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 37. 
352 The charge was for violating the art. 87 of the UzSSR criminal code (incitement to 
suicide). GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, ll. 38-40. 
353 "N.V. Ivanov stopped criminal cases on 70 persons who, according to their 
testimony, have given bribes for 2,358,481 rubles." GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 46. 
354 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 49. 
355 The commission evidenced disappearance of investigative materials that Gdlyan 
admitted to storing in 'pits.' GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 50. 
356 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 52. 
357 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 55. 
358 GARF, f. 9654, op. 6, d. 18, l. 43. 
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USSR led by Gdlyan T.Kh." This conclusive resolution affirmed that Gdlyan and 
Ivanov did not provide the evidence that they claimed to have provided and 
continued to discredit the SS USSR, its deputies and its officials, destabilizing 
the situation in the country. The resolution warned that if they were to 
continue their slanderous conduct, the SS USSR would consider rescinding 
their immunity. Nevertheless, the SS USSR rejected the option of opening a 
criminal case against them. At the same time, considering they had made 
their positions within the prosecutorial office untenable, it determined that 
they would be expelled from the prokuratura and obliged them to collaborate 
with further investigations. The SS USSR also requested the dismissal from the 
prokuratura of those officials who had failed to ensure proper control over 
the activities of the investigation team led by Gdlyan and Ivanov.359  
The receipt of the commission report and the SS USSR resolution in the 
assembly provoked something of a ruckus.360 This seemed to turnin a positive 
direction for Gdlyan and Ivanov who, despite having been wrapped severely 
over the knuckles, were acquitted. Nevertheless, their censure meant 
their hands were tied and they would need to limit their ambitions 
somewhat and proceed with caution going forward. Some strategy 
was needed to allow the two to continue their anti-system crusade. 
Thus, shielded from any criminal charge, Gdlyan and Ivanov were 
nevertheless  unemployed, having been formally fired from Prokuratura on 19 
April.361 Moreover, it was clear that were they to continue their radical 
narrative, they would risk losing the immunity granted by their status within 
the CPDSU. The way to cut through this Gordian knot, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
decided, was to become full-time professional politicians and to find a 
political office to run for that would cement their parliamentary immunity 
and advance their success. The elections in Russia – as in many other 
republics - had already passed, so the two looked elsewhere to put their 
strategy into effect. 
                                                          
359 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 17-18. 
360 In his diary, Chernyaev reported on April 21: "There is a ruckus in the Supreme 
Soviet over Gdlyan, with demands to replace Sukharev. It has been declared that the 
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Chernyaev - 1990,” 31. 
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6.6.3 The Armenian front 
In the immediate aftermath of the SS USSR resolution, the two former 
investigators essentially engaged a tactical retreat. Many supporters who 
were “confident in the rightness of their idols, calmed down” and had looked 
at their allegations as a “tactical bluff”362 saw this cagey move as a 
capitulation. In any event, on 19 April Gdlyan and Ivanov flew to Armenia 
where they led a campaign for the parliamentary elections of 20 May and 
where their political discourse was forged on a specific ‘nationalist’ narrative. 
Hence, Gdlyan, an ethnic Armenian, was acclaimed as a national hero in 
Yerevan and, in front a cheering crowd, endorsed the candidacy of his Russian 
colleague Ivanov who aspired to be an exponent of the Russian/Ukrainian 
community of Kirovakan – an industrial city close to the earthquake disaster 
epicenter that is now known as Vanadzor. In this context, the former 
investigators inflamed the crowd, linking their story to the dramatic national 
issues of Armenia, referring to the drama of the reconstruction after the 
earthquake of 1988, the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh, the pogroms against 
Armenians in Azerbaijan and the debate on the Armenian genocide of 1915. 
In a strategically brilliant reformulation of their political discourse, all these 
issues were craftily linked to the Gdlyan-Ivanov war against party mafiya.  
In Yerevan, on 20 April Gdlyan openly attacked Gorbachev of doing 
nothing to protect people during the pogroms against Armenians in Baku and 
Sumgait, with the claim: "the mafiya seeks to destabilize through bloodshed." 
Then he recalled that "Armenian democracy has been infected with the illness 
of Moscow, Leningrad and other republics" and invited the crowd to boycott 
the official press. Lest he be accused of being a reckless ‘spreader of terror’, 
he pointed to recommendations he had sent to Gorbachev in 1986, advising 
him ‘stop the terror’ against ordinary people and to focus his efforts against 
the mafiya. In a crafty move, Gdlyan harshly accused figures as Brezhnev, 
Suslov, Chernenko, Gromyko and Rashidov of criminal and anti-state activity. 
Given all of them were dead he could extract the political benefit of 
slandering all of them with little risk to himself. At this point, Gdlyan’s clever 
move was still ‘in bounds’ according to the rules of the SS USSR political 
game. However, not satisfied with merely slandering the mentioned 
“godfathers of stagnation,” Gdlyan took on fallen figures who were very much 
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still alive, such as Grishin, Aliyev, Romanov, Kunaev, Solomentsev, Kapitonov 
and Medunov, and insisted that Gorbachev, Ligachev and others in the ruling 
environment be kept under the spotlight. Interestingly, he seemed to give to 
the crowd an indirect suspicion about these figures, without making any 
specific charge and without punishable slanders. However, probably 
encouraged by the Yerevan crowd, the tones became again harsh when he 
shouted the request to dismiss Gorbachev and his deputy Lukyanov for their 
“role of higher patrons of mafiya selected by antidemocratic means.” 
Evidently Gdlyan was again breaking the rules but he felt confident that the 
crowd was on his side to resume his slanderous approach.363 At the same 
event, Ivanov also intervened inciting the crowd to organize mass 
demonstrations against the “common enemy – boyards’ duma, which is how 
the Politburo CC CPSU should now be called" and insisted in following the 
example of Eastern Europeans.364 
The day after, in Kirovakan, Gdlyan mocked Gorbachev, saying he ‘does 
not rule anything’ and recalled his investigations, remarking the risks 
connected to the criminal ‘clans.’ Then, he called the ‘talented Armenian 
people’ to become the new intellectual vanguard of a new democratic 
society, offering more and veiled allusions to the Armenian nationalism.365 
Ivanov also pushed on local desires for the independence and the de-
sovietization of Armenia, “hoping that the XXVIII will be the last congress.” 
Then, he referred to the Karabakh issue and to the Armenian nationalist 
revival in the region, stating that “in 1988 the democracy process and 
‘liberation movement’ began.”366 On 22 April, during a meeting in Abovyan, 
the tones seemed to be more relaxed. Gdlyan hailed the public with 
“Greetings, citizen terrorists” explaining that this was the formulation given 
by the Soviet regime to anyone who supported democracy. Again, he recalled 
the Uzbek/Kremlin affair stories and railed against the rehabilitations of those 
                                                          
363 In his speech in Erevan, Gdlyan also followed a nationalist-democratic narrative 
proposing to elect the president and the deputy president in democratic way, giving all 
the powers to the state, excluding the party, the KGB and the MVD from governance. 
In his speech, Gdlyan also showed solidarity with Yeltsin, demanding a share of of 50% 
of the seats to be reserved to of the democratic platform within the CPSU 
membership and for the cause of a Russian communist party. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 
90, ll. 19-27. 
364 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 28-32. 
365 In his words, Armenia could become a “technological vanguard […] much like 
Japan, which also has no natural resources.” GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 33-36. 
366 GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 37-43. 
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people that until some months before had been considered as ‘mafiosi.’ Thus, 
he explained that his case was dismissed because the KGB had falsified 
documents to save Gorbachev from his implication in the Uzbek cotton affair 
and defined Sukharev as a "professional dystrophic" who was participating in 
this provocation. Despite the apparent calm, Gdlyan argued about the 
necessity to endorse a violent “Romanian solution” that would involve not 
only the army but also the KGB, the MVD, the prokuratura and the best part 
of the state.367 This was a message that was far from conciliatory or peaceful. 
On that occasion, also Ivanov inflamed the nationalist sensitivity of the crowd, 
alleging to have evidence of Gorbachev and his wife’s bribery, accusing Aliyev 
– who in the meantime reinvented himself as a moderate nationalist in 
Nakhchivan – of being part of the mafiya and linking the Uzbek affair to the 
events in the enemy neighbor Azerbaijan where “falsifications were 1.5 times 
higher than in Uzbekistan.” Thus, the former investigator commented on the 
dismissal of the Azerbaijani cotton affair (1986-1988) as an intervention of 
the ‘Aliyev clan.’ Then Ivanov alleged that impeaching Ligachev would prove 
to be impossible and that he was an instigator of the Fergana events.368 This 
was by all accounts a dangerous game these two were playing, adding Mafia 
and state massacres to allegations of corruption. The political discourse of 
Gdlyan and Ivanov was clearly taking a hyper-radical turn, with the latter 
apparently doing most of the dirty work. 
The harsh Armenian election campaign ended on 23 April in Yerevan with 
a four-hour press conference at the city chess house. On that occasion, 
Gdlyan and Ivanov confirmed to the public their version of the story, the 
difficulties in doing investigations, the episodes of suicides connected with 
mafiya, the treasures and the delays in investigations, recalling the strange 
temporal conjectures of the ‘Hint affair’ as a strategy of Terebilov and other 
‘mafiya allies’ to discredit them and to create an argument to thrill the Baltic 
nationalists. Then, they answered the public’s question, relating the Uzbek 
affair to the Armenian nationalist sensitive issues: indeed, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
discussed an alleged ‘Aliyev’s criminal triangle’ and the possible mafia 
revenges against Armenians in Uzbekistan as the next potential victims. In 
these rocambolesque reconstructions that involved any sort of emotional 
arguments, Gdlyan and Ivanov confirmed their populist attitude of simply 
giving people what they wanted to hear.369 
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The Gdlyan‘s Armenian campaign was a triumph in term of popular 
support – confirmed by their election on 20 May – and was partially 
supported by the local communists who believed in the ‘national hero’ who 
came from Moscow. Ivanov also seemed to endorse the narrative of 
Armenian nationalists even after their return to Russia. In fact, during a 
meeting organized on 29 April at the Azimut association in Leningrad, Ivanov 
explained the reasons of his approach to the Armenian cause, stating that he 
was sensitized by the effects of the 1988 earthquake and affirming that 
Armenia was more democratic than Russia and did not apply censorship in 
publishing. Then, he also defended the ‘armenity’ of Karabakh, blaming the 
Soviet system for the crisis, and supporting the independence of Lithuania as 
well as the opposition front organized by the ‘ally’ Yeltsin against “Gorbachev, 
Ligachev, Lukyanov and others who are relegated to the past.”370 
In fact, the Gdlyan-Ivanov front fully reemerged during the anti-
Gorbachev rallies organized during May Day in 1990371 when Gdlyan incited 
the mob to not surrender against the ‘institutional masquerade’ that was no 
longer representative and indicating the crowd as the evidence of dissent 
against the “73 years of slavery.”372 Undeterred and fearless, the former 
investigators persisted in accusing the party of protecting the Soviet mafiya 
and joined a group of radical democrats shouting offensive slogans against 
Gorbachev and the entire government “to leave the podium of the 
mausoleum until the end of the demonstration.”373  
After their acquittal, the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ was basically over. 
However, in these years of protests and media circus, the two mavericks of 
the crowd were affirmed as experienced politicians with an unnatural ability 
of attracting support and inflame the crowd. Basically, after their return from 
Armenia they joined the protests with a new vigorous approach, keeping their 
radical agenda and shouting in the streets for the next months while the 
country was ready to collapse. 
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6.6.4 Aftermath 
In mid-1990, Gdlyan-Ivanov and their supporters kept spreading stories of 
the Kremlin affair in the non-official press distributed at the rallies374 and 
maintained an unpunished and radical attitude, demanding the dismissal of 
the communist regime.375 At that point, despite the many warning signals 
from the state organs376 and the slanders that the two former investigators 
were spreading, the party seemed to be much too weak to open a second 
Gdlyan-Ivanov affair. It was, after all, facing much more serious threats, ones 
that challenged the very stability and the integrity of the country. 
Nevertheless, Gdlyan and Ivanov kept antagonizing the Soviet institutions 
and frustrating its leaders who seemed to be inept and unable to formulate a 
response. On 6 May 1990, Sukharev informed Lukyanov about the slanders 
made by Gdlyan-Ivanov and their colleagues Koryagina and Surkov in rallies 
and public speeches where they alleged Gorbachev’s involvement in the 
‘Northern Caucasian’ mafia. Sukharev defined these provocations as “a 
misuse of glasnost and parliamentary immunity [to] destabilize the 
country.”377 As well, Chernyaev noted: 
M.S. once again got worked up about Lithuania. He came down on mass 
media, which has “gotten out of hand” (this reeks of Gdlyan) and shows no 
respect to the country’s President. He was describing a meeting between Raisa 
Maksimovna and Pamela Harriman, who was struck by the Soviet people’s 
ingratitude to Gorbachev, and their failure to understand the importance of 
                                                          
374 The unofficial magazine “Golos Izbiratelya” – Informative bulletin of Moscow union 
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his work. He concluded his tirade by saying that it is time for everyone to 
choose right now, including the people sitting here.378 
The party felt the pinch while a strong response would have been 
counterproductive if not impossible to realize. Nevertheless, the issue of 
Gdlyan and Ivanov had sensitized, in many ways, internal debate within the 
Soviet society and the state regarding the restoration of a culture of 
legality,379 while it contributed to the affirmation of the opposition and the 
rise of Yeltsin as a real leader of the masses able to challenge Gorbachev.380 
Thus, it seems that after the resolution of the SS USSR, the resolved Gdlyan-
Ivanov affair was still presenting rowdy spillovers on politics. Gorbachev 
understood that ‘the dog that barks doesn't bite,’ and avoided any reaction to 
their offensive provocations. Moreover, from mid-1990, the party had bigger 
problems to deal with, and the former investigators remained a marginal 
argument relegated to a weaker minority that was still believing in the 
populist program of Gdlyan and that was ready to endorse his ‘Romanian 
solution’, albeit only on paper.  
After so much noise during the XIX CPSU conference and a full presence in 
the media and in the political agenda of USSR, the issues related to the Uzbek 
Affair, Gdlyan-Ivanov and the moral fight against corruption etc. became 
insignificant problems compared with the serious political, social and 
economic challenges that USSR was facing. These issues were neither 
mentioned381 during the XXVIII Congress of the CPSU (2-13 July 1990) where 
the party demonstrated its terminal state and the factions failed to reach an 
agreement on the Union treaty or to define the CPSU program, revealing a 
deep internal crisis exacerbated by the resignation of Yeltsin. Interestingly, 
after the failed Congress, the sweeping recomposition of the party and the 
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criticized approval of the so-called “500 days program”,  the ‘old guard’ of the 
party started to recall the mafiya issues against those figures that emerged to 
lead the gradual transition towards a market system.382 In parallel, some 
radical nationalists also used allegations that were similar the program that 
Gdlyan had presented in Armenia, distrusting the party and for some extent 
letting a sense of fatigue by empire. This feeling, in our case, was perceived in 
Moscow and in Tashkent and, as we will see in the next chapter, led to 
manifestations of xenophobia and interethnic intolerance.383 
Gdlyan and Ivanov – as well as other popular leaders like Kalugin and 
Koryagina – had even an impact in attracting the attention of the masses to 
the newly formed Democratic Russia Movement in October 1990, when 
Gdlyan endorsed its political line. Interestingly, after proclaiming himself as a 
Bolshevik old guard, Gdlyan assumed a new narrative that pushed for a 
transition from communism. On 7 November, during the celebrations 
commemorating the October revolution, Gdlyan, Kalugin, and Ivanov firmly 
denied that this was a national holiday and resolutely opposed any 
celebration.384 Thus, the famous phrase "the worse, the better" allegedly said 
by Chernyshevsky - the founder of the populist Russian movement 'Narodism' 
- fit perfectly with the perestroika populists who based their success on this 
mechanism. Nonetheless, this strategy failed at the end of 1990, when the 
party ceased to attack Gdlyan and Ivanov and their popularity has dropped 
considerably. Apparently, Gorbachev had silenced the barking dog by simply 
ignoring it. 
In this last year of uncertainty and major changes, Gdlyan, Ivanov and all 
the extended family of radical democrats kept attacking a party that seemed 
to be in agony. Then in January 1991 Gdlyan became a credible leader and 
member of the coordinating council of Democratic Russia.385 However, his 
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influence was minimal compared to Yeltsin who became the ultimate 
challenger of Gorbachev. Consequently, Gdlyan definitively joined the circle 
of Yeltsin’s supporters and played a prominent role in organizing rallies and 
public demonstrations. Then, during the great pro-Yeltsin rallies of 10 March 
1991, he proclaimed the People's Party of Russia (PPR), a formation with a 
liberal-democratic program that would be integrated into the democratic 
coalition supporting the rise of Yeltsin. The PPR 
was quite a late attempt by some of the most radical anti-Gorbachev 
‘democrats’ to unite the whole of the ‘democratic’ movement. Its formation 
was announced in March 1991 at a rally in support of Boris Yel'tsin by the 
former special investigator Tel'man Gdlyan and was joined by the RSFSR 
People’s Deputies Aleksey Surkov, Bella Denisenko, Oleg Kalugin, and Vladimir 
Rebrikov. Its real leader was Gdlyan and its main base was his support groups, 
which were formed in several cities during his sharp confrontation with CPSU 
Politburo members over alleged corruption. The strongest organization of this 
kind, the Committee in Defence of Gdlyan and Ivanov, was formed in Gdlyan’s 
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies constituency in the town of Zelenograd, 
which administratively is a part of Moscow. The parly failed to unite all 
‘democrats’ and, like its leader, who failed to prove most of his allegations, 
gradually lost popularity.386 
In this moment of political crisis for the USSR, there was a new final 
attempt to limit the influence of the former investigators. On 12 July 1991, 
the Genprokuror USSR Trubin mentioned to Gorbachev that there was 
sufficient evidence for an accusation to Gdlyan and Ivanov for abuse of 
power.387 Nevertheless, these charges had no effect. Soon enough, the 
situation in the country rapidly collapsed during the attempted coup of 
August 1991 and the subsequent witch hunt. Gdlyan recalls that moment: 
On 19 August 1991, the GKChP arrested me because I was an enemy for them, 
for me it was impossible to negotiate, I have principles, and if I am convinced 
that it is necessary to do it this way, no one can convince me to change my 
path. Hence, the chairman of the KGB gave the order to put Gdlyan in prison. 
[…] They wanted to send me to my 'clients' in Uzbekistan. Then, fortunately, 
they were defeated and on 22 August I was liberated.388  
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Gdlyan has a personal interpretation of the coup as a mafiya’s attempt to 
take power389 and he often recalled the story of his arrest to prove it. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of this event, Gdlyan was ‘rehabilitated’ while 
the Soviet Union was more or less finished. In fact, on 31 August the 
Genprokuror Trubin disavowed the charges against Gdlyan on the basis of 
“rehabilitating circumstances” and “absence of [incriminating] elements.”390 
This news was not welcomed universally, and 83 deputies of the CPDSU made 
a formal protest, qualifying the amnesty towards such a popular figure391 as 
an opportunistic move.392 On that occasion, also the historical rival of Gdlyan, 
Viktor Ilyukhin claimed that the decision was:  
Illegal and unfounded. I value his [Gdlyan’s] action as a treacherous and 
dishonorable move against the interests of legality and truth [...] dictated by 
personal and opportunistic considerations [...]. The Genprokuror's decision to 
rehabilitate Gdlyan and Ivanov was made without knowledge of all the 
materials of the case and without a personal evaluation of the facts.393 
Nonetheless, in these last days of Soviet Union, Gdlyan’s ‘rehabilitation’ 
was completed on 4 December 1991, by the decision of the newly established 
State Council of USSR that declared illegal Gdlyan and Ivanov’s dismissal from 
the prokuratura and obliged the Genprokuror to reinstate them. However, 
this measure would never be effective and the whole querelle became 
senseless, in a context of confusion and vacuum of power, declarations of 
independence and the USSR that was formally dissolved. 
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Also in post-Soviet Russia, Gdlyan and Ivanov continued their political 
activity. However, their popularity remained marginal and conflicted with the 
Gaidar and Chernomyrdin entourage. After so many battles together in 1988-
1991, they felt betrayed by Yeltsin394 when he dropped them. Thus, in the 
early 90’s Gdlyan tried to lead an opposition force395 but he found only 
marginal successes fell into oblivion.396 Thus, by the 2000s Gdlyan and Ivanov 
substantially disappeared from the public scene and the crowd rapidly forgot 
them.397 Gdlyan entered an angry condition of retirement marked by 
disenchantment and regret, while Ivanov became a lawyer and disavowed his 
uncomfortable past. Nowadays, their approach towards the past is totally 
different.398 A 72-year-old Telman Khorenovich gave me his own idealistic 
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candidate Telman Gdlyan (national party of Russia) as deputy prime minister for the 
fight against corruption." GARF, f. 10115, op. 1, d. 844, l. 2. 
396 In December 1991, Gdlyan launched the ‘All-Russian Fund of progress, human 
rights and charity’ and in 1992 the political initiative ‘New Russia’, proposing to run for 
the elections of the state duma in 1993 in a heterogenous coalition – headed by 
Bocharov, Gdlyan and Ivanov – with nine other groups. However, the coalition did not 
get enough signatures. In 1995, Gdlyan’s party joined the centrist bloc People's 
Conscience Party and Gdlyan was elected deputy of the state duma and became a 
member of the international affairs committee and member of the permanent 
delegation of the federal assembly of the Russian Federation for relations with the 
European Parliament. 
397 “In Russia, Gdlyan and Ivanov were forgotten and there is no mechanism to 
maintained the collective memory of them.” Personal interview with Lev Dmitrievich 
Gudkov, Moscow, 24 November 2015. 
398 In October 2014, I was able to reach them both. On the phone, Ivanov was annoyed 
by my curiosity and said he was very busy with work, postponing our interview 
indefinitely. I am still waiting for his reply. Gdlyan ran both hot and cold. He was very 
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interpretation of the facts. After so many years, he still appeared convinced 
of his moralizing mission to cleanse Soviet society of the yoke of a parasitic 
party mafiya. 
Our tragedy was that we supported the preservation of the country, the 
strengthening of the state, prompting the law and order in the country. This is 
what we fought for. […] Our work sought to bring normality and progress to 
the country, but then, under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, we fell into the chasm. I 
have often wondered why Gorbachev was so anxious and wanted to destroy 
the case. The answer was very simple: corruption in the Stavropol krai – where 
Gorbachev was at the head of the kraikom -  was in the same dimensions of 
what we have seen in Central Asia and in Uzbekistan. And here we can draw a 
conclusion. Without the participation of Rashidov [such a high level of 
corruption] would have been impossible. Well, some bribes, you know, are 
part of the natural dynamic in any country, in any society […] but corruption 
on a large scale can only occur when the main leaders are involved.399 
Fascinatingly, Gdlyan still defends his instincts for the ‘Kremlin affair’ and 
the honesty of the job he did. Besides his allegations regarding the ‘Stavropol 
affair,’ he is still very irritated in recalling Gorbachev’s “political 
shortsightedness” for implementing a non-gradual transition and probably for 
not believing in his campaign. Hence, Gdlyan has no words to describe 
Gorbachev’s attitude in the last years of USSR. Finally, he simply labelled him 
as a ‘jerk.’ Nevertheless, his frustration with Gorbachev is evidently much less 
painful than his disappointment with Yeltsin and the betrayed hopes of the 
‘90s: 
In the new country, there were yet the same potential social dangers of the 
Soviet Union in the '80s. […] After Gorbachev, Yeltsin wrecked the country, 
capturing the people's property and delivering it to all his stakeholders thus 
creating all these oligarchs from thin air. Everything could absolutely have 
been saved by purifying the country, not only from corruption but also by the 
many other deficiencies that were identified during the investigation. […] 
Yeltsin, together with the cannibals and oligarchs in the end turned a beautiful 
country into a desert. […] This new generation of corrupters in the new Russia 
plays in figures a hundred times, if not thousands, higher than in the Soviet 
                                                                                                                               
reluctant at first to speak with me and he angrily said that he had nothing to add to 
what he had already published in his books. He felt abandoned by the world. 
However, his interest was piqued by my curiosity and after three phone calls, he gave 
me a chance. As was his want, he spent the first 30 minutes of our interview 
peppering me with questions about myself. 
399 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
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Union. And they kept attacking us on television, in the media, to say that [our 
case] was unfair, that we broke the law and all manner of other nonsense.400 
Gdlyan appears as nostalgic for Soviet times and apparently still believes 
in the justice and indeed righteousness of his cause, declaring his sadness in 
knowing that too often his story was remembered as a ruinous episode in late 
Soviet history. Nevertheless, he again demonstrated his naïve idealistic 
Andropovian moralism stating: 
I think that when an effective consciousness of the country’s leadership arises, 
as Italy in the early 90's that rallied around the idea of ‘Clean Hands’, there will 
be a time when we will see a new investigation team of the younger 
generation who will go left and right to open the way for progress and to clean 
the country from corruption, which erodes not only public morals but also 
individual ones. […] When the new investigative team will clean the society 
from all these useless parasites, they will remember the investigation team of 
Gdlyan-Ivanov and under that flag, the mafia in Russia will be defeated, or at 
least weakened.401 
The Gdlyan-Ivanov saga was a colorful soap bubble. It was suddenly 
inflated, thrilled the Soviets in the late 80s, polarized the public opinion and 
finally burst and disappeared. Today it is still very difficult to give a judgement 
on this affair and for three years I have personally tried to answer the main 
question in my mind: who are they? 
6.7 Conclusions 
So many conflicting labels appeared on the Gdlyan-Ivanov story: Heroes or 
bandits? Inquisitors or paladins of justice? Professional investigators or 
charlatans? Mythomaniacs or idealists? Populists or avant-gardists? Careerists 
or idealists? Crusaders for freedom or fame-thirsty opportunists? etc. To 
some extent, all of these radical interpretations find some kind of 
argumentation verifiable in the facts and in the emotion of the Soviet public 
opinion. Nevertheless, hasty judgments on the case itself are not useful to 
our task. Rather, we can try to use the “heroes of perestroika” as a test to 
interpret the first glasnost emphasis402 and the final years of Soviet political 
history.  
                                                          
400 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
401 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
402 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 
494. 
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The first issue we should consider is the impact that Gdlyan-Ivanov’s 
questionable methods had on the public emotions. From 1989, many stories 
appeared in the media discussing the unfairness of the so called 
‘gdlyanovshchina’403 and the ‘spread of terror’ in Uzbekistan where Gdlyan 
and Ivanov were alleged to have repressed thousands of innocents.404 In this 
regard, two facts are clear: compared to the whole Uzbek affair – that 
effectively involved thousands of people – the number of ‘victims’ of the 
Gdlyan-Ivanov team was fairly small and they were just one group in a huge 
case. It is also true that the way they extorted confessions was clearly 
questionable and far from ideal in terms of human rights. However, the 
investigative methods of Gdlyan-Ivanov were part of a greater problem 
associated with the nature of prosecution in USSR where, as we have seen, 
the ‘queen of evidence’ has marked a long history of injustice. Thus, Vaksberg 
emblematically comments Gdlyan and Ivanov as the “products of that System 
of ‘socialist legality’ (to be more exact, illegality), under which people were 
none too fussy about exact observation of the procedures they disparagingly 
referred to as ‘legal formalism.’”405 These two “illegitimate sons of the 
Andropovian moralizing wave”406 are probably just a clear example of the 
brutal features that were still used in late ‘80s and they can be interpreted as 
a single cog within a greater repressive machine that was exposing culprits in 
advance and demonstrating guilt at any cost. However, Gdlyan and Ivanov 
were described as ‘grand inquisitors’ and became the scapegoat of the Soviet 
totalitarianism. 
In parallel, the mythmaking of Gdlyan-Ivanov can be understood in terms 
of the deep ideological crisis of the system. The liberalization of the 
information offered to the people a debate on the worst malfeasance in the 
country, presenting the failures of a system and blaming leaders that were 
presented as mafiya godfathers. In this context, Gdlyan and Ivanov endorsed 
a media circus and became the new idols of the crowd. Their media impact 
                                                          
403 This term was invented by the Gdlyan’s main rival Viktor Ilyukhin to intend the 
plethora of abuses that investigators used to extract evidence. Ilyukhin, Vozhdi I 
Oborotni. Prervannoye Rassledovaniye. 
404 Razzakov recalls that the Tashkent hotel "Schelkovichnaya" became the “main 
headquarters of the repression, the very mention of which would produce shudders 
for all inhabitants of the republic, from the ordinary to the very high.” Razzakov, 
Korruptsiya v Politbyuro: Delo “Krasnogo Uzbeka.” 
405 Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 116. 
406 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
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was based on showcasing the seized treasures in press conferences, 
presenting higher officials in handcuffs and publishing ‘pulp stories’ with a 
high degree of intriguing fiction, denigration, conspiracy and villains to fight in 
a ‘common battle’ that united people in an apparently just cause. This kind of 
public exposure inexorably followed the kinds of political aims that 
professional investigators are not supposed to follow. Nevertheless, their 
great success was inevitably connected with the demands of the people. In 
the context of glasnost, Gdlyan and Ivanov excited a disillusioned population 
that, after having lived a whole life under the pretensions of socialist fairness, 
felt cheated and sympathized with the two investigators for their supposed 
honesty, courage, integrity, resilience, devotion to duty etc. In the absence of 
ideological reference points, a part of the Soviet people uncritically believed 
and defended a myth that, in many respects, became a matter of faith. In the 
decadent climate of a country adrift, Gdlyan and Ivanov substantially became 
a symbol and a message of hope for a generation of Soviets that were 
shouting “By defending Gdlyan and Ivanov, we defend liberty and 
democracy!”407 
The ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ is also a useful case to read the fragmentation 
of a party that did not appear anymore as the monolith of the Stalinist times 
and that was exposed to the internal struggles of its factions. We have seen 
how Gorbachev probably had a marginal role in the whole story and, 
especially at the beginning, seemed to welcome Gdlyan’s mission, finding in it 
an element that was functional to legitimize his narrative and, probably, to 
discredit and marginalize his rivals. Nevertheless, it is possible that some 
cases had been acquitted in order to discredit Gdlyan's professionality and 
the Gensek’s approached408 inexorably changed in 1990 when he and his 
family became a target of the Gdlyan-Ivanov allegations. Furthermore, this 
story could be read as an attempt to discredit the ‘conservative’ faction 
represented by Ligachev. In fact, together with the ‘Kremlin affair’ publicity, 
in mid-1988 the press started to criticize the ‘conservative’ line endorsed by 
Ligachev, inflaming the tones of radical leaders, such as Yeltsin, Afanasiev, 
Popov and obviously Gdlyan. In many respects, the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair 
                                                          
407 John Thor Dahlburg, “2 Crusaders for Justice or 2 Grand Inquisitors? : Soviet Union: 
The Exploits-and Woes-of the Two Embattled Investigators Have Polarized the 
Nation.,” Los Angeles Times, April 19, 1990. 
408 In October 2015, I tried to approach Gorbachev again in order to have his 
comments on this story. The answer was negative and, apparently, he seemed to be 
still irritated to recall these episodes of the latest Soviet years. 
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recalls the history of divergences between Yeltsin and Ligachev, two leaders 
that in different ways had been marginalized from 1988. The former was one 
of the greatest supporters of Gdlyan-Ivanov within the politburo in 1986 and 
also during the XIX conference after which the front of radicals converged in 
alleging corruption in the politburo and pointed at Ligachev and figures 
connected to him. In fact figures such as Usmankhodzhaev,409 Osetrov, 
Smirnov, Mogilnichenko, Ishkov, Bessarabov, Istomin, Ponomarev, 
Solomentsev410 etc. were all connected to Ligachev – or worked under his 
guide at the party-organizational department – and were to some extent 
connected to the facts in Uzbekistan. In 1988-1991, Yeltsin exploited Gdlyan’s 
popularity and probably involved other members within the politburo411 for 
his political ambitions. In such way he could keep attacking his historical rival 
Ligachev. Nevertheless, we have not enough evidence to argue a possible 
alliance between Gdlyan and Yeltsin aimed at diverting the charges against 
the ‘conservatives.’ However, Yeltsin and Gdlyan had a common target 
identified in the weakest faction of the politburo, and their radical self-
martyrization narrative proceeded in parallel and was indirectly related to the 
low esteem of the Gensek. In this regard, Sakharov comments 
Yeltsin’s popularity is to some extent dependent on Gorbachev’s 
“unpopularity,” since Yeltsin is regarded as the opposition to, and victim of, 
the existing regime. This is the main explanation of his phenomenal success.412 
Hence, the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair can be read as a populist issue exploited 
by Yeltsin and his allies in a struggle against the ruling establishment. In this 
task, the former investigators also turned to be professional politicians and 
had a mere politically opportunistic approach on the corruption issues. In 
fact, their narrative was very craftily formulated in creating ‘indirect 
                                                          
409 On 27 June 1988, Usmankhodzhaev wrote an anxiously-worded letter to Ligachev 
requesting for help against non-specified people who wanted to destroy him. Ligachev 
rejects criticism about patronage and stated that in 1983, the Usmankhodzhaev 
appointment as FS CPUz was supported by Chernenko and Gorbachev and confirmed 
by the politburo. Nevertheless, his role in directing the organizational department in 
the CC CPSU endorsing the ‘moralization’ and the kraniy desant is hardly deniable. 
Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 242. 
410 According to Gdlyan, these were Ligachev's affiliates. GARF, f. 9656, op. 4, d. 90, ll. 
88. 
411 According to Ligachev, Yakovlev was the only politburo member who had a normal 
relation with the ‘traitor’ Yeltsin also after the 28th congress. Ibid., 235. 
412 Sakharov, Moscow and Beyond, 1986-1989, 115. 
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impressions,’413 inflaming the crowd, garnering support, and avoiding any 
legal implications. The clearest example was the ‘Ligachev affair’,414 which 
was legally inconsistent but politically powerful. In this regard, the former 
‘number two’ of the USSR underlines the quality and selection of words in 
Gdlyan-Ivanov speeches, recalling typical propaganda language.415 Also 
Pikhoya commented the Gdlyan-Ivanov provocative narrative as a form of 
                                                          
413 They slandered their ‘suspects’ in a very crafty and political way that had no legal 
implications and could be too difficult to sue: they say that people were implicated, 
but they never used direct accusations stating that some people were mafia members 
or bribetakers. Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 
246. 
414 There was no evidence of the Ligachev bribes. In this regard, Ryzhkov comments: 
"[In the USSR] there were also some bribes and corruption. They accused Ligachev 
who took bribes, money from Uzbeks, brought him a suitcase full of money and so on. 
I remember the time I was visiting some oblast, perhaps in Novgorod and of course 
the people gathered in the streets and everywhere they asked me the same question: 
did Ligachev take bribes? Because Ligachev was a famous person, a member of the 
Politburo, the whole country knew him and there were lots of pictures around on all 
sides. I clearly told everyone that it was a lie. I would not say that my relations with 
Ligachev were without clouds. We had friction on some issues, but I am convinced 
that he is an honest man, an honorable man, and would never take money or anything 
else. I told everyone that it was a lie, specially planted in order to cast a shadow on the 
leadership of our country's party. I am absolutely convinced that he had nothing to do 
with this case, with all his defects he was an honest man." Personal interview with 
Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 December 2014. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
think that he had covered, shielded or sheltered from exposure some corrupt 
members of the nomenklatura and even used his position to interfere in the 
prokuratura work or that he also put his clients in the higher posts of the 
nomenklatura. On this regard, Vaksberg recalls: "Ligachev had hardly taken up his key 
position in the Kremlin leadership and command of party appointment than he 
transferred his chums to Moscow with him. They amazed his colleagues in the capital 
by their complete incompetence. From Tomsk he brought to the capital Vladimir 
Karnaukhov and put him in charge of a trade organization; he appointed the former 
director of the Tomsk psychiatric hospital Anatoly Potapov – a totally illiterate petty 
bureaucrat – Minister of Health of the Russian Federation. It is clear that they would 
not have given Ligachev any bribes – he simply needed faithful servants around him. 
Thank God the reign of one of these ‘Vikings’ was not a long one. Potapov did not get 
into the new Russian government. But Karnaukhov managed to keep his grip and even 
got promotion: he became the deputy president of the executive committee of the 
Moscow city soviet.” Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, 225. 
415 Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev, 227. 
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political leverage that “offered imaginative/science fiction versions of the 
facts and that have nothing to do with justice.”416 In this regard, another 
witness of those times, Nikolai Ryzhkov, offers his conclusions: 
During glasnost' [...] information on thefts of very large amounts of money, 
jewelry etc. increasingly appeared and became available to people. Then, 
when democrats began to struggle with the official power they, of course,  
used this issue as a tremendous hit on the central government. They showed 
that everything was depraved and so on. So, at the end of the 80s, not only 
Uzbekistan, but everything has been made available to the public. [...] Gdlyan 
and Ivanov were the people who were used in the fight against the Communist 
Party and against the leadership of the country. Thus, they grew and claimed 
some more facts to hit [Soviet power] harder. [...] Gdlyan and Ivanov were 
used, and they wanted to be used. […Nevertheless], the law enforcement 
bodies needed glasnost as well and it was important to provide a [free] 
information. But is not possible to say everything. […] They had to do their 
duty as investigators, but they started throwing [mud] and to tell the facts. 
They became famous figures in the country and they loved it. [...] They were a 
catalyst of the internal contradictions of the country.417 
Thus, Gdlyan and Ivanov became just a political megaphone, a folklore 
arm and a populistic tool in the hands of the ‘democrats.’ Nevertheless, they 
just represented a smaller piece in the Yeltsin’s most ambitious plans and 
when the latter came to power, both Gdlyan and Ivanov were cannibalized 
and repudiated by the same forces they had supported.  
A conclusive point is whether the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ gave a fatal hit to 
the credibility and legitimacy of Soviet institutions and contributed to Soviet 
collapse. For sure, corruption is a crucial indicator to determine the health of 
a society. In this regard, Gdlyan comments: 
an Uzbek affair alone was enough to determine the fall of the state […] the 
Soviet leadership had underestimated the devastating consequences of the 
corruption that had been revealed. We had repeatedly warned that this could 
lead to very sad and devastating consequences for the state and the 
Communist Party. […] Corruption was a catalyzer of Soviet collapse 
[…because], at the end, it led to consequences that touched the deepest 
interests of the State, causing permanent damage. The Union collapsed and 
one of the reasons was that corruption has covered it from top to bottom.418 
                                                          
416 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
417 Personal interview with Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 December 2014. 
418 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
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Nevertheless, the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair in itself was not a factor that 
directly determined the crisis of the Soviet Union. The regime would have 
inevitably collapsed because its systemic inefficiencies and the revivals of the 
various nationalities. However, we can read this story as an emblematic 
symptom of a more general crisis of the Soviet Union, discrediting its system 
of governance represented by a party in agony, triggering the people and 
showing that something was going wrong with the potentiality of 
transforming the anger feelings in a real factor of revolution. In every 
republic, national elites realized that they could use these symptoms to 
realize their political goals, presenting them as the real reasons of crisis. To 
some extent national elites – such as Yeltsin and Karimov – had a similar 
strategy, presenting symptoms as effective factors and turning them into 
tools of destruction – or even distraction – in order to justify the split from 
USSR. 
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7 LEGITIMATION THROUGH SELF-VICTIMIZATION  
To restore the good name of the great 
person that I have served - Sharaf Rashidov - who 
contributed to our lovely Uzbekistan, exalting it to 
the highest levels in the world1 - Karimov 
 
We have concluded the fifth chapter, splitting the story between a Moscow 
and a Tashkent based perspective. In the sixth chapter, we have analyzed the 
results of the ‘muscovite’ Uzbek cotton affair and its pivotal ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov 
saga.’ In this final chapter,2 we want to evaluate the effects of the Uzbek cotton 
affair on the affirmation of Islom Karimov’s leadership; on the transition of the 
UzSSR towards independence; and the legacies of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ in 
the post-Soviet context. 
7.1 A critical period of transformations  
In the spring 1989, Uzbekistan was about to face one of the most turbulent 
moments in its history. At this stage, the cotton affairs season could already be 
considered to be over, and many judicial cases were acquitted and 
reconsidered – in parallel with the delegitimating of Gdlyan and Ivanov 
investigations and their methods. Nonetheless, the republic was entering a 
period of dangerous socio-economic crisis,3 exacerbated by the rising 
nationalism and the reappearance of alternative ideologies and traditional 
values. As mentioned in the first introductory chapter, the Iranian revolution 
and the war in Afghanistan inexorably implied a series of unintentional 
spillovers in the neighbor Soviet republics. From the 1970s, radical Islam was 
                                                          
1 Personal inscription of Karimov in the book of signs at the Monumental Museum Sh. 
Rashidov in Jizzakh. 
2 This chapter is largely based on an article that has been accepted for publication in 
Cahiers du Monde Russe for 2017. 
3 In May 1989, in the new economic framework of perestroika, Ligachev recalled that 
despite the scarcity of food, Uzbeks were bartering fruits for cements with Siberian 
enterprises. Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor 
Ligachev (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 204. 
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widely diffused in some parts of Uzbek society where, despite the fact that 
there was only a small number of formal religious institutions, there were 
several “underground religious circles” - in particular in the Ferghana Valley - 
protected by local communities. A relevant one was the circle of Hakimjon qori 
Vosiev Margilan, close to the disciple of the Salafi tradition4 that would further 
emerge in these years of liberalization of religion - since 1989 the pattern in 
promoting atheism changed and Islam was basically accepted5 - with new 
opportunities for association6 and self-financing.7 
Ahmed Rashid remarks that “ethnic nationalism, anti-Russian feeling and 
Islam [reemerged in Uzbekistan] as a cultural identifying factor against 
Russification”8 that, to extends large extent, was imposed with new vigor 
during the cotton affairs. New political formations became the evidence of the 
changing times where the CPUz was inexorably losing its influence on the 
Uzbek society. Among these new formations, the political movement Birlik9 - a 
                                                          
4 Martha Brill Olcott, “Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia,” Carnegie Papers - Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, no. 77 (2007): 10. 
5 Sarah Kendzior, “Redefining Religion: Uzbek Atheist Propaganda in Gorbachev-Era 
Uzbekistan,” Nationalities Papers 34, no. 5 (2006). 
6 Finally, on 31 July 1989 the prokuratura USSR approved the law project on rights of 
association of citizens of the UzSSR. GARF, f. 9654, op. 1, d. 121. 
7 “Both Andijan and Namangan developed a strong, politicized Islamic presence. In 
Andijan, politicized Islam centered on Abduhvali qori and the Wahhabis, but in 
Namangan both Wahhabi and radical (but doctrinally more traditional) Hanafi and Sufi 
clerics were also highly politicized and played the more critical role.” Olcott, “Roots of 
Radical Islam in Central Asia,” 18. 
8 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism? (London: Zed 
Books, 1995), 56. 
9 Birlik (unity) started as a small group of nationalist intellectuals from the Uzbekistan 
Academy of Sciences and Tashkent State University. It was founded on November 11, 
1988 by members of the intelligentsia - most prominently scientists Abdurahim Polatov 
and Shuhrat Ismatullaev, the former MP Pulat Akhun and poet Muhammad Solih, and 
claimed to have 15,000 members. Their first point was to make Uzbek the state 
language, even raising social, economic, health and ecological issues, criticizing the 
cotton monoculture and the exploitation policies from Moscow. Birlik was claiming 
democratization, human rights, freedom of speech and a wide autonomy for Uzbek SSR 
but it did not support the full independence of Uzbekistan. Even if Birlik was very 
popular in the late 80s, it was very fragmented and strongly opposed by the authorities 
of Tashkent, which accused the movement of fomenting ethnic unrest. Fragmentation 
and tensions among Birlik leader led to an official split on February 20, 1990 when 
Solih’s group founded the new party Erk. Muhammad Solih became the leader of Erk 
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zealous group of Uzbek nationalists that in September 1989 founded the 
homonymic party and that was later banned – emerged from civil society. It, 
formed a first democratic opposition and organized several mass 
demonstrations for establishing Uzbek as the only state language in the UzSSR. 
As in the rest of USSR, language became the primary issue in the nationalists’ 
agenda. 
7.1.1 A tense inter-ethnic coexistence 
The first signs of inter-ethnic intolerance were evidently manifested against 
Russians and generally against the Slavs. In Moscow, despite the cotton affair 
to some extent contributing towards a sort of ‘fatigue by empire’ in Russian 
nationalists10, there were fortunately no significant clashes between Russians 
and Uzbeks in the republic. In fact, the evidence of a strong inflow of migrants 
from Central Asia – as would happen a decade later with thousands of seasonal 
                                                          
and criticized his former group, Birlik, for getting carried away with public 
demonstrations which could lead to violence. Erk proposed itself as a systemic party 
that could drive the transition of Uzbekistan. Its agenda was calling for independence, 
a democratic multi-party system, a liberal market economy, privatizations of state 
enterprises and an improvement of human rights situation in Uzbekistan. Erk was a 
tolerated intellectual branch that run out of Birlik that renounced demonstrations and 
wanted to get results by parliamentary means. Erk was running, as everybody else, the 
wave of ecologism and the environmental causes of Uzbekistan demanding the end of 
cotton monoculture and a new inflow of water to the Aral sea, and calling for the UzSSR 
autonomy within USSR. Independence seemed to be a goal to be reached in the mid-
term. Just before his election at the presidency of Uzbekistan, Karimov revealed to 
Matlock that he did not want to register Birlik because “it did not deserve registration 
because it had been taken over by irresponsible elements who organized 
demonstrations that could result in rioting.” Daria Fane, “Ethnicity and Regionalism in 
Uzbekistan. Maintaining Stability through Authoritarian Control,” in Ethnic Conflict in 
Post-Soviet World. Case Studies and Analysis, ed. L Drobizheva et al. (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1996), 283; William Fierman, “Political Development in Uzbekistan. 
Democratization?,” in Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
ed. K Dawisha and B Parrot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 372; Idil 
Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (London & New York: Routledge, 2014); Jack F Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 394–95. 
10 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-
1991 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), 495. 
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workers (otkhodniks) crowding the main Russian cities11 - was not perceived 
yet, and Russian ultranationalists kept their focus on other victims of their 
racial hatred (as the Caucasian and Jews) in the late 80s. The national press 
started to report episodes and publish letters by the people referring to the 
rising environment for potential inter-ethnic violence,12 while the tension 
remained high and the situation seemed to explode at any moment. In 
Uzbekistan, since the aforementioned Pakhtakor events in 1969, there were no 
other significant episodes of violence towards the communities of Russian 
settlers that had been established in the WW2 period.13 However, the tensions 
between the two self-excluding communities of Uzbeks and Russians remained 
high, and were further exacerbated due to the differences of social framework. 
Despite the fact that Russians were clearly overrepresented in the higher 
apparatus of the Party, they were underrepresented in the governmental 
institutions14 - with the exception of the ‘strategic’ sectors that were directly 
managed by Moscow officials - and basically out of the rural areas. As 
mentioned, Russians were integrated in the sovietized urban framework15 and 
                                                          
11 Juri Plusnin et al., Wandering Workers: Mores, Behavior, Way of Life, and Political 
Status of Domestic Russian Labor Migrants (Stuttgard: ibidem, 2015). 
12 Ogonek received many letters of Soviet citizens scared for the violent interethnic 
environment and the spread of racism and antisemitism. Christopher Cerf et al., Small 
Fires: Letters from the Soviet People to Ogonyok Magazine, 1987-1990 (New York: 
Summit Books, 1990), 211, 215. 
13 Since the colonial period, “Russians arrived in Uzbekistan in five large migration flows. 
The first is tied in with the colonization of Turkestan in the 1870s. By 1912 there were 
210,306 Russians living in Uzbekistan. This migration had both political and economic 
causes: at the beginning of the century the importance of Turkestan as the principal 
cotton-growing region supplying raw material for the textile industry of Russia began to 
grow (in 1915 the percentage of Central Asia in the total import of cotton to Russia 
reached 77.7 percent). This necessitated the creation of local production facilities for 
the primary processing of raw materials. Since the indigenous population lacked the 
necessary skills, industrial workers from Russia were brought in. Four other migration 
flows of Russians occurred in the Soviet period, all connected with the creation in 
Uzbekistan of industries, transportation facilities, and the expansion of building and 
assembly operations.” Sergei Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” in The New Russian 
Diaspora: Russian Minorities in the Former Soviet Republics, ed. Vladimir Shlapentokh, 
Munir Sendich, and Emil Payin (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 108. 
14 In the SS UzSSR they were represented by 4% of the deputies. Ibid., 109. 
15 In a city with 2 million inhabitants as Tashkent was in 1989, more than a third of 
people were Russians. Marco Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi 
(Rome: Viella, 2015), 24. 
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basically excluded from the traditional and Uzbek rural areas. Hence, a balance 
between the coexistent societies would be responsive to new socio-political 
events and demographic trends.  
In fact, the demographic gaps between Russians and Uzbeks, and between 
cities and rural areas, would be further exacerbated in the period 1979-1989, 
during which period the population of UzSSR rose by 29%, reaching 19.906 
million inhabitants. In this period, the share of Uzbeks rose from 68.7% to 
71.4% of the republic population, while the share of Russians dropped from 
10.8% of 1979 to 8.3% of 1989 because of the lower natality rates and the first 
massive emigrations from the peripheral UzSSR to the central regions of the 
country. 
In an effective context of non-forced segregation, Russians had specific 
features16 and were basically not integrated into Uzbek society for cultural and 
especially for linguistic reasons. Not only Russians but also other minority 
communities were substantially marginalized in the Uzbek framework because 
of the poor knowledge of the national language, surviving in the very Sovietized 
(and Russified) part of the republic society. Hence, the share of Non-natives 
claiming fluency in Uzbek language was 12.4% in 1970 and 13.5% in 1979 
including Russians; and without Russians respectively 17.8 and 20.2.17 In 
parallel, also the number of Russian speakers dropped from 50 to 25% in less 
than 10 years, especially in the rural areas18 and Russian remained as a lingua 
franca between natives and the other minorities.19  
                                                          
16 “The immigrant and local Russian society showed different attitudes in work 
preferences, in family and reproductive strategies, in the housing choices, and in the 
consumption. The Russians in their formally dominant role were linked to Soviet official 
rules more than others. This it was due to their employment status and their relatively 
weak social roots, which made them lack strong external or transversal solidarity 
towards the state.” Ibid., 35. 
17 Robert J. Kaiser, “Nations and Homelands in Soviet Central Asia,” in Geographic 
Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, ed. Robert Lewis (London & New York: Routledge, 
1992), 292. 
18 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 603–
4. 
19 To evaluate the diffusion of languages, we can examine the print run of newspapers 
published in Tashkent: despite the share of newspapers in Uzbek were inexorably the 
majoritarian - Lenin Uchkuni had a print run of 1,008,380 copies; Sovet Uzbekistoni - 
880,462; Uzbekiston Adabiyeti Va Sanati - 579,245; Yesh Leninchi - 509,233; Ukituvchilar 
Gazetasi - 227,437; Toshkent Okshomi - 139,035; Kishlok Khakikati - 121,587; Uzbekiston 
Fizkulturachisi - 65,830 and Tashkent Khakikati - 55,964 – the publications in Russian 
557 
 
Ethnic composition of the UzSSR in 198920 
 Population (thousands)  Percent of total 
  1979 1989 Variation (%) 1979 1989 
Uzbeks 10,569 14,142 133.8 68.7 71.4 
Russians 1,666 1,653 99.3 10.8 8.3 
Tajiks 595 934 157 3.9 4.7 
Kazakhs 620 808 130.3 4.0 4.1 
Karakalpaks 298 412 138.3 1.9 2.1 
Tatars 531 468 88.1 3.5 2.4 
Crimean Tatars 118 189 160.6 0.8 1.0 
Kirgiz 142 175 123 0.9 0.9 
Koreans 163 183 112.3 1.1 0.9 
Ukrainians 114 153 134.6 0.7 0.8 
Turkmen 92 122 131.7 0.6 0.6 
Turks 49 106 -- 0.3 0.5 
Jews 74 65 88.6 0.5 0.3 
Armenians 42 51 119.3 0.3 0.3 
Uyghurs 29 36 122.9 0.2 0.2 
Germans 40 40 100.7 0.3 0.2 
Azerbaijanis 60 44 74.3 0.4 0.2 
Bashkir 26 35 134.6 0.2 0.2 
Other 161 194 120.5 1.1 1.0 
Total Population 15,389 19,810 128.7 100 100 
                                                          
were over-representing the mere share of Russian speakers - Pravda Vostoka - 270,463; 
Vechernyy Tashkent - 168,920; Tashkentskaya Pravda - 48,609; Komsomolets 
Uzbekistana - 37,789; Frunzevets - 27,783; Fizkulturnik Uzbekistana - 20,836; Selskaya 
Pravda - 16,099 – while other minority (but relevant) language groups were under-
represented: in Tajik Khakikati Uzbekistoni had a print run of only 29,861 copies; and in 
the Crimean Tatar language Lenin Bayrogy - 22,763. FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-90-015 - Soviet 
Union. Political Affairs - 22 MARCH 1990,” 1990, 63–64. 
20 Nancy Lubin, “Implications of Ethnic and Demographic Trends,” in Soviet Central Asia. 
The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 49–50. 
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Demographic trend 
per region of the 
UzSSR (1979-1989)21 
Population Censed  
(12 January 1989)  
in thousands % variation 
(1979-1989) 
1989 in % 1979 in % 
 Total Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Uzbek SSR  19,906 8,106 11,800 129 41 59 41 59 
Kara-Kalpak ASSR  1,214 584 630 135 48 52 42 58 
Andizhan Oblast  1,728 559 1,169 128 32 68 29 71 
Bukhara Oblast  1,141 397 744 129 35 65 33 67 
Kashka-Darya Oblast  1,594 415 1,179 142 26 74 25 75 
Namagan Oblast  1,475 550 925 134 37 63 34 66 
Samarkand Oblast  2,778 926 1,852 129 33 67 42 58 
Surkhan-Darya Oblast  1,255 245 1,010 140 19 81 19 81 
Syr-Darya Oblast  1,316 407 909 137 31 69 29 71 
Tashkent (city) 2,079 2,079 -  116 100 -  100 - 
Tashkent Oblast  2,157 958 1,199 120 44 56 43 57 
Fergana Oblast  2,153 703 1,450 127 33 67 33 67 
Khorezm Oblast  1,016 283 733 136 28 72 20 80 
                                                          
21 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-031 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 19 MAY 1989,” 1989, n.d., 18–20. 
559 
 
As mentioned, a key feature of Uzbek identity can be found in its ‘rurality.’ 
Conversely, the Russian population of Uzbekistan remained mainly urban22 and 
outside of rural society.23 This Slavic ‘urban dimension’ gave them a specific 
role within the industrial and administrative context, and consequently a 
different social status. According to Nikolaev,  
the Russians' predominantly urban environment gave them the advantages of 
better education and social services (health services, culture, housing, etc.) and 
also higher wages than average, since in Uzbekistan wages in cities and towns 
(especially in industry) were always higher than in the countryside. With 
occupational characteristics typical of the urban environment, Russians 
concentrated mostly around the middle stratum of the social structure: 
engineers, technicians, and managerial personnel in industrial enterprises; 
workers in industrial, power engineering, transportation, and construction 
establishments; skilled workers in the same establishments; workers of average 
skill levels without a specialized education; employees in educational, cultural, 
and other such facilities, and so forth. This means that the professional culture 
of Russians in Uzbekistan, by incorporating industrial labor skills absent among 
the Uzbeks, has promoted Russians to second place in the ethnic hierarchy after 
Uzbeks.24 
Nevertheless, since the mid-70s the communities of Slav settlers started to 
come back from Uzbekistan in search for better opportunities in the center of 
the Soviet state and also because of a general and diffused feeling of 
remoteness and isolation within a society that appeared in its exclusivity. Then, 
during the ‘cotton affairs’ – a season that to many extents seemed to have 
interrupted the korenization process – further tensions were exacerbated 
between Uzbeks – that in the rest of USSR were mocked of being part of 
‘mafiya’25 – and Russian settlers and the situation risked to degenerate into 
                                                          
22 The share (in %) of urban and rural dwellers comprising the total Russian population 
of Uzbekistan was respectively 89.1 and 10.9 in 1970; 93.4 and 6.6 in 1979; and 94.8 
and 5.2 in 1989. Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” 112. 
23 Roy comments: “Russian cadres and representatives of security bodies were to be 
found only in the district capitals; kolkhoz and village soviets were entirely in the hands 
of local apparatchiks, functioning on a logic of group solidarity and not state control.” 
Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), 106. 
24 Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” 112. 
25 Many Central Asian writers as Muhammed Salih, Otkir Hashimov and Timur Pulatov 
referred to the cotton affairs describing the discriminations perceived by the Uzbeks. 
The first two described corruption as a natural response of the population to survive 
560 
 
racial hatred among the two communities.26 Donald Carlisle commented that 
a “reactive national identity” was “stimulated and crystallized” as a result of 
the cotton scandals,27 while also the Russian communities often took further 
distance from Uzbeks, manifesting their prejudices towards Uzbeks28 - the third 
largest ethnic group in USSR after Russians and Ukrainians.29 As well, a larger 
parts of the Uzbek intellectual community joined the nationalist cause in 
denouncing the ‘cotton affairs’ as a national humiliation, accusing or perceiving 
Russians to be ‘slave-owners’ and ‘colonizers’30 usurping resources, 
                                                          
and to rebel against the negation of the korenization. The latter described the situation 
of some Uzbek children in the pioneer camps where they had been named “children of 
thieves and bribe-takers.” As well, the Russian writer Fyodor Razzakov recalls how 
Uzbeks were mocked in public events and in football matches for the cotton affairs. See 
also Boris Z. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” in Soviet Central 
Asia. The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 81; Fedor Razzakov, 
Delo, Vzorvavshee SSSR (Moskva: Algoritm, 2012). Some years ago, I was discussing this 
story with a Russian friend of mine, and he commented: “at that time, Churbanov was 
mocked as being part of the ‘Uzbek mafiya’ and some people even referred to him as 
‘Yuri Churkanov’ [laughs].” Although indicative, this racist joke was not funny. 
26 Due to the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair, Uzbekistan had been already exposed as a blackhole 
of the country. It is emblematic that just after establishing the commission to evaluate 
Gdlyan and Ivanov, on 1 June 1989, the deputy Evgeniy Evtushenko spoke in the CPDSU 
about the signs of intolerance recently emerged as well as the racist nicknames diffused 
to insult the other ethnic groups and the risks for destabilization. He referred the 
diffused use of words as khokhlyandya (for Ukranians), katsap (for Russians), zhid (for 
Jews), armyashka (for Armenians), chuchmek (for Caucasians), chukhonets (for Baltics) 
and katsoshka and then he proposing to insert in the constitution against a new article 
racist discrimination. GARF, f. 9654, op. 1, d. 40A, l. 6. 
27 Donald S. Carlisle, “Power and Politics in Soviet Uzbekistan: From Stalin to 
Gorbachev,” in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation, ed. William Fierman 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 117. 
28 In 1985, Wixman interviewed several Russian mothers who encouraged their children 
to not frequent the “dirty and wild” Uzbeks. These settlers were so presenting the 
natives as a population of liars who remained “violent, not honest, mistreat their wives, 
and do not learn Russian well” characterizing this fact as a sign of their backwardness 
and inferiority. Ronald Wixman, “Ethnic Attitudes and Relations in Modern Uzbek 
Cities,” in Soviet Central Asia. The Failed Transformation, ed. William Fierman (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), 161–63. 
29 Edward A. Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present : 
A Cultural History (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1990), VII. 
30 In a speech at CPDSU, the deputy Adil Yaqubov, head of the Uzbekistan Writer's 
Union, compared the Soviet regime with the 19th century slave-owners in the USA, 
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opportunities and better living standards: basically, 30% of Uzbeks perceived a 
monopoly of Russians within the party and state agencies.31 Thus, in late 80s, 
Uzbeks perceived Russians as the second hostile group in the republic (after 
the Armenians). Nikolaev commented: 
It should be pointed out that especially hostile toward Russians are residents of 
those regions where interethnic competition for jobs is greatest. This is borne 
out by the following data (percent of the Uzbeks who have negative attitudes 
toward Russians): Tashkent—14.3 percent; Samarkand—13.7 percent; Nukus— 
2.6 percent; Andijan—12.8 percent; Fergana—7.6 percent; Karshi—33.3 
percent; and Urgench—10.2 percent. This circumstance has led to the 
departure of Russians not only from the countryside but from towns and cities 
as well.32 
Nikolaev keeps arguing: 
The organizers of the survey “Russians in the USSR: Realities and Stereotypes” 
(1991) made an attempt to find out, among other things, how 1,008 
respondents felt about the threat of interethnic conflicts in Uzbekistan. Of this 
number 88.9 percent of the Russian respondents experienced interethnic 
tension at their place of residence. 55.6 percent at their place of work or study, 
and 27.8 percent with close friends. Among the causes of interethnic tension 
cited were infringement upon the rights of the non-Uzbek nationalities, the 
Uzbeks' dislike of the culture of other peoples, the aggressiveness of members 
of certain nationalities (50 percent), and the outcome of the struggle for 
power.33 
The perception of danger, discrimination and difficulties in social 
integration led to the mass emigration of Slavs in the 90s - in the period 1991-
2008, 900.000 ethnic Russian returnees left Uzbekistan34 - bringing the 
                                                          
suggesting that there, at least, the “slave-owners were savvy enough to make sure that 
their slaves were well fed and strong.” Even the Uzbek poet Muhammad Salih claimed 
than in pre-revolutionary Russia a peasant could receive for a kilogram of cotton enough 
payment to purchase a cow, but now he receives just for 15 boxes of matches. This 
figure was exaggerated and even contested by the Uzbekistan Environmental 
Protection Society that said that in prerevolutionary Russia it was possible to buy a kg 
of meat. Rumer, “Central Asia’s Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 83–86. 
31 Nikolaev, “Russians in Uzbekistan,” 116. 
32 Ibid., 114. 
33 Ibid., 113. 
34 Lyudmila Maksakova, “Uzbekistan v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Migratsiy,” in 
Postsovetskiye Transformatsii: Otrazheniye v Migratsiyakh, ed. Zh.A.; Vitkovskaya 
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Russians to currently represent less than 2% of the Uzbekistani population 
(about 600,000 individuals). Nevertheless, despite the classical tensions 
between the (self)perceived ‘colonizers’ and ‘colonized,’ the victims of 
interethnic violence in Uzbekistan would not be Russians but another Turkic, 
Muslim and non-native group that was living in the most agricultural intensive 
and most densely populated area of the entire Central Asia: the Ferghana 
valley. 
7.1.2 The Fergana pogroms 
The new climate of intolerance, the rise of nationalisms and the crisis of the 
CPSU that had to face the first clear signs of separatism created a warning 
scenario. In this turbulent context, the first mass inter-ethnic clashes appeared 
also in Uzbekistan: the most serious episodes happened in the Ferghana Valley 
in June 1989, when a market discussion for the price of strawberries among 
Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks35 degenerated into pogroms, ethnic tensions 
and a civil conflict that killed and injured hundreds of people: the massacres 
began on 3 June in the cities of Margilan, Ferghana and Kuvasai (where almost 
3,000 Meskhetian Turks lived) and the republican government toke measures 
to stem violence: a commission headed by the chairman of the SM UzSSR G. 
Kh. Kadyrov was established and the presidium of the SS UzSSR issued a decree 
that imposed curfew in the oblast beginning at 22,00 hours on 4 June. The 
situation remained tense but seemed to have stabilized. Nevertheless, on 7 
June, the pogroms again resumed and subsequently spread to the neighbor 
city of Kokand and to Rishtanskiy, Uzbekistanskiy, and Kirovskiy rayons, 
involving also Namangan on 11 June and the Osh oblast in Kirghizstan defining 
a situation of pogroms that involved actively and passively the communities of 
Uzbeks of the Ferghana Valley that even reached Tashkent and lasted for 
almost three weeks.36 
                                                          
Zayonchkovskaya G.S. (Moskva: Tsentr migratsionnykh issledovaniy, Institut 
narodnokhozyaystvennogo prognozirovaniya RAN, Adamant", 2009), 328. 
35 “The violence led to a massive investigation involving more than two hundred law 
enforcement officials resulting in 265 arrests and 120 cases brought to trial.” Lawrence 
P Markowitz, State Erosion. Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central Asia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 59. 
36 The attacks continued even against those Meskhetians who were evacuated to 
Tashkent in the districts of Buka and Parkent. Nevertheless, the drama of Meskhetians 
did not finish then. They were displaced in Russia and other regions but they had 
difficulties to return to Georgia where their settlements had been occupied by 
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Mass demonstrations were stopped by the security forces in order to avoid 
the exacerbation of violence against non-native minorities, schools, transports, 
government infrastructures and even local communities. The subsequent 
deployment of 12,000 MVD USSR troops37 to quell the riots and normalize the 
situation in Ferghana Valley ended in increasing the number of civilian losses 
while the Soviet government organized the escort, the evacuation and the 
displacement of Meskhetian refugees in the central regions of Russia.38 
On 13 June, Nishanov was in Moscow and arrived in Ferghana together with 
the head of the Soviet government Ryzhkov39 and the CC CPSU secretary 
                                                          
Georgians since 1943. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s 
Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 240. 
37 Prot. 15/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 1587, d. 1509, l. 67. 
38 In two months only, from the 117,600 Meskhetian Turks registered in the republic 
(1989 census), 52,875 people had been displaced out of Uzbekistan and settled in the 
Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, in the Moscow, Orel-Kursk, Voronezh, Belgorod, 
Smolensk oblast and even in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan e Kirghizstan. Prot. 90/1989, 
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1525, l. 20. Sakharov recalled his disappointment for this 
solution that sounded as a "second exile" and argues his conviction that such pogroms 
had been well organized by somebody who wanted that massacre to blame some other 
groups. Probably, the famous Soviet scientist was right. Andrei Sakharov, Moscow and 
Beyond, 1986-1989 (New York: Knopf, 1991), 137–40. 
39 Ryzhkov recalls that episode: " Me and Nishanov - who was in Moscow - went to 
Ferghana to somehow stop the violence that was there. When I arrived there, I had a 
very heavy and painful impression. The tragedy of Meskhetian Turks [in Central Asia] 
started in 1943, when they were deported from their historical homeland. It seems that 
the reasons for this policy are attributable to Mr. Beria who said that they were, 
evidently, a 'fifth column.' Thus, [Meskhetian] people have been deported. I honestly 
do not know what they were saying against the Soviet regime. For the other peoples, I 
do not want to say, but I know that many of those who have suffered [of the 
repressions] deserved it for some extent. They opposed the Soviet regime, they killed 
our prisoners, our wounded, and so on. In this case, I cannot say anything, I just do not 
know. Everything happened in an unclear way. They appeared in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks 
have accepted these [Meskhetian] Turks very well and, as they say, have 'shared the 
last bread.' They have helped to build houses, find a job and so on. Therefore, 
[Meskhetian] Turks said that Uzbeks were their brothers, very nice and good [people]. 
Then, the years have passed. Turks lived not bad, had good houses, they became 
professionals and specialized in vegetable cultivation. Well, someone did not like this, 
and the young people who appeared under the effects of narcotics did the massacre. 
Over a hundred people [were killed by a crowd that] stabbed and burned people, and 
so on. when I was there, I met with representatives of Meskhetian Turks. The meeting 
lasted for some 3-4 hours, I tried to convince them that they need to go to the central 
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Chebrikov in order to speak with the representatives of the local communities, 
calm the people’s tempers down and avoid any further degeneration of mass 
violence.40 At that time, it was interesting to see how the communist political 
class did not understand the scope of the events, considering the ethnic 
tension in the same way of violence due to hooligans, criminals and 
troublemakers.41 Nevertheless, the official count of the victims appeared to be 
a war report. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, Nishanov gave a speech at the meeting of the 
republic party-economic aktiv (15 June 1989) where he referred that during the 
tragic events in the Ferghana Valley, 93 people died (of them 64 were 
Meskhetian Turks and 17 Uzbeks), more than 1000 people were injured or 
maimed, including 173 military personnel of the USSR MVD and 57 policemen, 
one of whom died. More than 700 homes and other buildings and 168 
transportation vehicles were burned. 30 criminal proceedings had been 
instituted, about 200 people arrested of whom 20 were suspects in particularly 
serious crimes. A total of 600 people who took part to one degree or another 
in the commission of serious crimes had been identified.42 The FS CPUz gave a 
vague explanation of the event referring to  
scuffles that arose between groups of persons belonging to the indigenous and 
the Meskhetine Turk nationalities were intentionally distorted and skillfully 
utilized by corrupt and criminal elements in order to accomplish their own dirty 
political aims. An artificial inflammation of inter-ethnic differences, specially 
organized massive disorders and excesses by shameless young thugs, 
accompanied by pogroms, arson, murders, by violence and acts of vandalism, 
                                                          
regions of Russia, where we will give them housing and the possibility to sue [the violent 
facts]. At a first moment, they did not want [to accept this proposal], but then I 
convinced them by saying that they cannot stay here and that we [the Soviet 
government] were not able to put a soldier around each person to guard. Nobody could 
give the guarantee that things like that would not happen anymore [if they remained in 
Ferghana]. Hence, they finally decided to go away, we brought military transport 
aircraft, waiting at the airport [to embark the refugees]. Thus, they were taken away. 
[...] We cannot say that Turks or Uzbeks were guilty. I know that when they came in 
Uzbekistan, Uzbeks accepted and helped them. How can we blame all the people of 
Uzbekistan [for these facts]? These things happened at the end of the Soviet Union." 
Personal interview with Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 December 2014. 
40 PV, 22006, 140, 15 June 1989, p. 1. 
41 RGASPI, fond 17, op. 158, d. 1509, l. 65. 
42 FBIS, “JPRS-UPA-89-053 - Soviet Union. Political Affairs - 29 AUGUST 1989,” 1989, 21–
24. 
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have taken hold of large regions and cities in Fergana Oblast. At the end of the 
day on 3 June a large group of young people in an aggressive mood, having 
ignored the explanations and warnings of party, soviet and law enforcement 
organs, instigated pogroms and burnings in the village of Tashlak, and later at 
the "Komsomolskiy" construction and water-transport workers settlement in 
the city of Margilan, in places where dense Meskhetine Turk populations are 
found. The excesses were accompanied by particularly cruel murders, outrages, 
violence, and acts of vandalism. In subsequent days the geographical area of the 
disorders spread to the city of Fergana and the agricultural regions lying 
nearby.43 
Hence, Nishanov admitted miscalculations and lack of prevention 
measures, keeping the usual attitude of self-criticism and pointing to lack of 
control of party and institution, as well a lack of education, economic 
stagnation and crisis, the cotton monoculture, unemployment and ecologic 
disasters in the Ferghana region: 
Taking advantage of the situation that has developed in recent limes, a part of 
them are trying to negate the work done since the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek CP 
Central Committee to restore healthy conditions and to portray this work in the 
eyes of public opinion as being a limitation of the dignity and honor of the Uzbek 
people. But we, the Communists, must look truth in the eye. We cannot show 
even the slightest tolerance of these people, who have disgraced themselves 
through distortion, misappropriation, bribe-taking, and misuse of official 
position. We will firmly implement this principled party line toward self-
purification and self-improvement.44 
Thus, Nishanov pointed at Birlik for fomenting people’s frustration and 
indicated the facts as a planned event of violence organized by extremists: 
At the same time, it would be incorrect to regard what has happened only as a 
criminal manifestation. Such facts, for example, as the appearance of green 
banners within the columns of those committing excesses, the distribution of 
fliers containing religious symbolism and signed by a previously unknown 
organization called the "Holy Uzbeks [Svyashchennyye uzbeki], the defilement 
of Soviet laws, attempts at physical violence against party and soviet workers, 
the pronouncement of appeals to continue the traditions of the basmach 
leaders, etc. require deep consideration and evaluation. In a word, there are 
serious grounds to suppose that this is a previously and carefully planned and 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 21–22. 
44 Ibid., 23–24. 
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prepared provocative action, possibly even specially timed to coincide with the 
congress of USSR people’s deputies.45 
Nevertheless, the ethnic clashes in the Ferghana Valley inexorably 
undermined Nishanov’s legitimacy. The Uzbek leader did not seem to be 
warned of the real situation of the republic and appeared as a Moscow official 
careless of the national instances. The fact that he was in Moscow and did not 
come back immediately to take charge of the situation weighed much to his 
political credibility. Tunçer-Kılavuz comments: 
His attitude during the events (his explanation made light of the clashes) and his 
handling of the situation were widely criticized. He was accused of being unable 
to understand or handle the events and of underestimating them. Nishanov was 
also disliked for his role as Moscow's representative in implementing the purges 
[reaching] their climax in Uzbekistan.46 
Thus, the Uzbek ‘Caeser’ who in the previous months had imposed his 
enlightened dictatorship characterized by purges of the internal apparatus 
would surely have suffered internal conspiracy of the CPUz that opposed a 
figure considered as a man of Moscow who “carried out the orders of the 
center with respect to the purges of thousands of Uzbek elites,”47 hoping that 
his “removal coincided with the end of the purges in Uzbekistan.”48 At that 
moment, Gorbachev – who kept warning the Soviet population about the risks 
of ethnic clashes in the country49 - perceived the Ferghana events “as evidence 
of the isolation of the party from society and its inability to both eliminate 
corruption and stop the rise of new opponents like the Birlik movement.”50 
Thus, the Gensek tried to save his trusted ally Nishanov, calling him back to 
Moscow where he became the chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities at full 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 24. 
46Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 82. 
47 Ibid. 
48Ibid., 60. See Fierman, “Political Development in Uzbekistan. Democratization?,” 360–
408. 
49 Parallel to Fergana, in June 1989 there were clashes between Kazakhs and Chechens 
(and other Northern-Caucasus groups) in the oil-city Novy Uzen (now known as 
Zhanaozen) in the Caspian sea. Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American 
Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 240, 751. 
50 Graeme Gill and Roderic Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and 
Central-Republican Relations in the CPSU (Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
1997), 79. 
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time.51 Basically, the Uzbek leader was finally exiting from the Uzbek political 
scenario.52  
In the summer of 1989, Gorbachev had to accept to further open the 
system to the national claims in order to deal with the separatist instances of 
                                                          
51 Ryzhkov commented: “Nishanov is a good and tactful person, otherwise it would not 
be normal to be appointed at the head of one of the chambers.” Personal interview with 
Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Moscow, 22 December 2014. In his memoirs, Gorbachev 
reported: “On 6 June the delegates elected the Chairman (Speaker) of the Council of 
Nationalities. The candidacy of Rafik N. Nishanov, former first secretary of the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, who had been proposed by the Central Committee, 
was generally greeted favorably. However, he had to begin by giving an account of the 
conflict with the Meskhetian Turks in Fergana, which as it happened had taken place on 
the eve of the session. I liked Rafik Nishanovich. His unchanging composure, humor and 
a certain philosophical distance from the petty vagaries of life - in other words 
everything that was usually associated with the ‘wisdom of the East’ - appealed to me. 
His ability to get along well with people and to settle conflicts worked well for him in 
the position of Chairman of the Council of Nationalities. I would even say that Nishanov 
was a natural speaker, had it not been for one quality that he lacked. This was 
decisiveness, the ability to cut the Gordian knot at the proper time. The diplomat in him 
got the upper hand over the politician and sometimes sessions of our ‘nationalities 
chamber’ lasted for days, even discussions on procedural matters, while simultaneously 
ethnic conflicts flared up in several parts of the Union. The body of deputies could have 
(and should have!) actively assisted in calming them down. To be fair, some committees 
and individual deputies went to the ‘hot spots’ on their own initiative. However, the 
Council of Nationalities and its Chairman did not do justice to its position as the organ 
of supreme power responsible for this sphere. Of course, I direct this criticism first of all 
towards myself as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Nishanov had to ‘dance’ 
perhaps a little more than Primakov did before the delegates approved his nomination. 
He was cross-examined in order to discover his views on equal rights for all nationalities, 
the possibility of using indigenous languages, and ways of regulating conflicts between 
nationalities. However, most of the questions were asked not so much to get answers 
as to present the questioner’s own positions on the subject. Some deputies, who were 
ready for harsh polemics, were obviously not satisfied by the composed and balanced 
opinions of Rafik Nishanovich or his conciliatory tone. In the end, Nishanov was elected 
chairman of the chamber by a convincing majority.” Mikhail Sergevich Gorbachev, 
Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), 393–94. 
52 In 2016, Nishanov recalled the Ferghana events in a very revisionist interview, 
indicating that the problem of cotton affairs was that Moscow had endorsed some 
punitive groups to act in the republic and to create the disaffection of the people. Rafik 
Nishanovich Nishanov, “Nishanov: Obnovlennyy SSSR Provalilsya Iz-Za GKChP,” Vesti 
Ekonomika, August 2016. 
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the Baltic republics and their communist parties.53 As well he had to mediate 
with the nationalist instances and find for a compromise. Despite the fact that 
there is no apparent connection between the cotton affairs and the explosion 
of violence in Ferghana, the first episode constituted a “shifting balance of 
power” in the region54 and a solution could be found by appointing a figure 
who appeared (once again) as a mediator between Moscow and the Uzbek 
power networks. 
7.1.3 The rise of Islom Karimov 
In June 1989, the Meskhetian pogroms were the straw that broke the 
camel’s back and signified the political end of the poorly tolerated Rafik 
Nishanov. The designated successor for the FS CPUz was expected to be 
Ibragimov.55 Nevertheless, the XIV plenum CC CPUz of 23 June 1989 headed by 
the first deputy director of the OrgOtdel CC CPSU E.Z. Razumov led to 
unexpected results. After thanking Nishanov for his “politically mature and 
worthy work,” the plenum proposed the candidacy of Islom Abdugʻaniyevich 
Karimov, the FS Kashkadarya obkom since 1986 who was considered an 
“outsider” to the higher party nomenklatura and not a typical professional 
politician nor a career party apparatchik: in fact, he never had a role in the buro 
or in the secretariat, nor he was the chairman of SS UzSSR. 56 Karimov (1938-
2016) was an economic technocrat from Samarkand and educated at Central 
Asian polytechnic institute and member of CPSU since 1964.57 Karimov worked 
in the Ministry of Finance between 1966 and 1983 at which point he became 
                                                          
53 On 9 August 1989, Chernyaev informed Gorbachev about the need to rename the CCs 
in national committees in order to reflect the international tradition of USSR. He also 
advised the Gensek about the need for the CPSU to reflect the multiethnicity of the 
country, listening and legitimizing "the claims of the autonomous republics where party 
leaders have equated to the obkom committees." GF, f. 2, d. 8023. 
54 Neil J Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), 183. 
55 Mirzaulim Ibragimovich Ibragimov was the chairman of Presidium of the SS UzSSR 
since 6 March 1989, replacing Pulat Kirgizbayevich Khabibullayev (who substituted 
Nishanov when he became FS CPUz in 1988). 
56 This position seemed to be a sort of institutional prerequisite to become FS CC CPUz 
since the appointment of Amin Niyazov in 1953. 
57 Karimov worked in the Uzbek Gosplan since 1966 until 1983 when he became 
Minister of Finance and Deputy Chairman of Soviet Ministrov Uzbek SSR. He kept that 
position until 1986, when he was appointed as Chairman of the Uzbek Gosplan. PV, 
22014, 148, 24 June 1989, p. 1. 
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Minister of Finance of Uzbek SSR, remaining in this post until 1986 when he 
became the Chairman of Uzbekistan Gosplan. On 26 December 1986, he held 
his first important party post, becoming the FS Kashkadarya obkom.58 
On that plenum, Razumov seemed to be warned about the unclear past of 
the CPUz candidate and his relatives,59 disavowing the subsequent famous 
stories about him being an orphan.60 Nevertheless, despite his lower profile 
                                                          
58 About Karimov’s experience as the First Secretary of Kashkadarya Obkom cf. Poyon 
Ravshanov, Qashqadaryo: Istiqlol Arafasida 1986 - 1989 Yillar (Toshkent: Ma’naviyat, 
2003). 
59 The plenum recalled the story of Karimov’s father who had been charged for theft of 
socialist property in 1950 and his brother Khurshed - deputy director of the grocery 
complex Uzkooptbakaleya in Jizzakh – who was condemned in 1986 for ten years for 
the same reasons. Prot. 14/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1508, ll. 4-6. On this regard, 
Malikov commented: “Ligachev opposed the candidacy because Karimov's two brothers 
had criminal records.” Mukhammed-Babur Malikov, “Uzbekistan: A View from the 
Opposition,” Problems of Post-Communism 42, no. 2 (1995). 
60 An US diplomatic report of December 2004 confirms certain rumors about Karimov’s 
first marriage with a Russian woman called Natal'ya Petrovna Kuchma - and their son 
Pyotr - and the how the story of the ‘orphan’ leader was appositely crafted in order to 
avoid any scandals related to his name. The report collects the witness of Muslima, 
Karimov's brother wife, reporting that Karimov was not an orphan but he "had six 
brothers and one sister, and grew up in a "normal family" in Samarkand. Karimov began 
to distance himself from his family in late 1985 and early 1986, when his brother, 
Hurshid, a distributor of retail food products (mostly tea), became embroiled in a minor 
corruption scandal. At the time, [...] Karimov was Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, and was 
expecting a promotion. Karimov called his brother Arslan (Muslima's husband) and 
demanded that they disown Hurshid, arguing that their careers were in danger. Arslan, 
the Chair of the Jizzak City Court, refused. (Now Hurshid is a rich man, Muslima said with 
some resentment; he lives in a fancy house in Tashkent and is protected by Ismoil 
Jurabekov.) From that point on, there was almost no contact, Muslima stated. Karimov 
was soon named First Secretary of Kashkadarya and spent almost all of his time shuttling 
between Tashkent and Karshi. It was then, Muslima and Jamshid said, that Karimov 
began to claim that he had been orphaned. [...] The final break came in 1989, the year 
Karimov was named First Secretary of the Uzbek SSR. Arslan died that year in what 
Muslima described as a "suspicious" collision with a bus. A street in Jizzak was named 
after him, but Karimov ordered it changed back to the original name. Karimov's eldest 
brother died that year, as well. According to Muslima, Karimov made a brief appearance 
at the funeral, where he offered 350 Rubles to the family (not a small sum in those days). 
Since then, there has been no direct contact. Muslima occasionally calls the Presidential 
Apparat if she needs something specific, such as medical treatment. The one time she 
tried to get through to the President's residence, she said, his daughter Gulnora picked 
570 
 
and his unclear past, the appointment of Karimov was enthusiastically greeted 
by the party top echelon who hoped to finally have a representative of national 
instances: without directly referring to the newly-dismissed Nishanov, on that 
occasion the FS Surkhandarya obkom M. Mamarasulov demanded “one thing, 
I ask that Islom Abdug‘aniyevich would not be a puppet like 
Usmankhodzhaev.”61 Then, Karimov thanked and reminded that “a person at 
the post of FS must know the republic, its people and the people's life.”62 
The appointment of Karimov was not an easy task: in a moment of major 
autonomy and lack of predominant power inside the CPUz (as even the CPSU), 
Uzbek elite groups were searching for a strong new leader that could be able 
to protect their interests. The CC CPUz agreed on Karimov with the placet of 
Ismoil Jurabekov and Shukrulla Mirsaidov, two prominent members of the 
Uzbek political elite at that time, and Qudrat Ahmetov, then chairman of 
Gosplan that had good connections in Moscow with the prime minister of 
USSR, Valentin Pavlov. The selection of a candidate had to be a compromise 
that could balance the powers among national elite, the former ruling ones, 
and the Party needs: Karimov was the least common multiple among all these 
figures. Thus, this ‘consensus’63 on an outsider figure had a logic: since all of 
these competing groups had equal powers to promote their leadership of 
Uzbek SSR, none could enjoy the full consensus of the other ones. As Tunçer-
Kılavuz points, at that time “in Uzbekistan there was more than one powerful 
elite group, so no elite group had a clear perception of their own power being 
higher than that of others.”64 
                                                          
up the phone and hung up immediately. See: WikiLeaks, President Karimov not an 
orphan, and other family secrets, 04TASHKENT3519_a, classified by Amb. Jon R. Purnell 
for reasons 1.4 (B, D). The document is online at: 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04TASHKENT3519_a.html. 
61 Prot. 14/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1508, l. 7. 
62 Prot. 14/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1508, l. 25. 
63 “Only through support from Nishanov, and such figures as Solijan Mamarasulov, 
Shukurullo Mirsaidov, Erkin Yusupov, Ahmadjan Mukhtarov, and Muftì 
Mukhamedsadyk Mukhamadiusuf (a deputy of the last USSR Supreme Soviet), was 
Karimov's candidacy approved.” Ibid. 
64 Tunçer-Kılavuz, Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 48. However, Karimov was deeply supported by the (former 
ruling) Samarkand-Jizzak clan. In fact, according to Collins, “Karimov was both a local, 
networked into the Rashidov clan, [formally] a communist apparatchik, [and] a 
technocrat whom Moscow would be unlikely to oppose [… His] candidacy was the work 
of adroit political maneuvering by certain Uzbek clan elites – especially by Jurabekov, 
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The new FS CPUz was considered to be someone who could protect the 
interests of Uzbeks, even if he did not initially support nationalist movements 
or independence of the Uzbek SSR. At a popular level, he was presenting 
himself as a people’s leader, someone that could unite instead of disunite, and 
that could enforce peace and stability in a context that was threatening to 
overspill into instability. The first message of peace and normalization was 
referred to the situation in the Fergana Valley, with the continuation of MVD 
investigation and the lifting, since June 27, of the curfew in the region.65 During 
the plenum of 29 July 1989, the chairman of the presidium SS UzSSR and head 
of the CC CPUz commission on the Ferghana events Ibragimov gave the results 
of the events,66 stating that the origin of the problems there was the 
underrepresentation of Meskhetian Turks within the party apparatus in an 
oblast where the situation remained critical with more than 70,000 
unemployed and 64% of the agriculture absorbed by cotton monoculture.67 
Thus, the new establishment accused the former ruling leadership declaring 
that party organs and governmental agencies did not take all those appropriate 
measures to solve the problems of cadres and population at socio-economic, 
ideological, ethnic and organizational level.68 
Hence, the commitment to normalize the situation in Ferghana and to find 
the culprits would be an occasion to consolidate his power, marginalize 
                                                          
who wanted to restore the Rashidov network’s place in power and who saw Karimov as 
tied by birth to a powerful Samarkand group, but not to the clan of former first secretary 
Rashidov” Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 123. Thus, “Karimov was in the 
unfortunate position of having to balance the interests of numerous large regions (the 
most important of which were the Ferghana Valley [including three oblast’s], 
Samarkand and Jizzak, Kashkadarya, and Khorezm) and more regionally based clan 
elites, some of whom were traditional rivals of his own power base in Samarkand” Ibid., 
128. 
65 PV, 22023, 157, 6 July 1989, p. 4. 
66 During the pogroms in the Ferghana Valley 103 people died - of whom 52 Meskhetian 
Turks and 36 Uzbeks; 1011 wounded - of whom 137 MVD troops and 110 policemen of 
whom one died.; 757 houses, 27 public buildings and 275 had been burned. Prot. 
15/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 1587, d. 1509, l. 65. 
67 Prot. 15/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 1587, d. 1509, l. 71. 
68 PV, 22044, 178, 2 August 1989, p. 1. 
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opponents, approve purges and promote loyal figures.69 Then, on August 2 
Vyacheslav Mukhtarovich Kamalov became the chairman of MVD UzSSR and 
on August 3 Shukrulla Rakhmatovich Mirsaidov was appointed as deputy 
chairman of SM UzSSR and chairman of the republican Gosplan.70 At a political 
level, there was further condemnation for these facts against the previous 
political order. The people deputy E. Yusubov declared publicly that “the roots 
of the tragedy of Fergana” were at socio-economic and political-ideological 
levels in an oblast where, in the last 30 years, the timing of the industry's 
growth has lagged behind the republican average. He was also denouncing the 
serious “pedagogical problem” related to a lack of education and respect of the 
language, history, culture, and traditions that led to provocations and 
interethnic clashes even against Russians.71 In this first phase of Karimov’s 
mandate, the Uzbek leadership was still quite cautious in taking distances from 
USSR and in condemning those practices of krasnij desant - that were 
characterizing the previous Usmankhodzhaev and Nishanov mandates – 
starting to balance the equilibrium between Uzbek and Slav elites, maintaining 
some Russian figures72 while enforcing again a “nativization” policy.73 To some 
extent, this narrative seemed to align with the nationalists. 
Nevertheless, Karimov was also considered to be a loyal communist, 
faithfully implementing in Gorbachev’s reformism. At the XVI plenum of the CC 
CPUz (19 August 1989), he denounced the problems of Uzbekistan, as the 
negative economic trends – low production, shortage of consumer goods and 
rising inflation, the evident social and interethnic tensions and the difficult 
                                                          
69 The CPUz buro meeting of 20 July 1989 demanded hard sanctions against the local 
party leaders, the MVD and KGB officers responsible for the events in Ferghana. Prot. 
88/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1523, l. 18. 
70 PV, 22045, 179, 4 August 1989, p. 3. 
71 PV, 22047, 181, 6 August 1989, p. 2. 
72 In these weeks, other Russians were appointed at primary positions in the Uzbek SSR: 
on August 15, Dmitri Dmitrevich Berkov became the first deputy chairman of the SM 
UzSSR and Boris Fedorovich Satin was appointed as the chairman of the PCC UzSSR. PV, 
22054, 188, 16 August 1989, p. 1 and PV, 22057, 191, 20 August 1989, p. 1. 
73 Since the first months, the Uzbek leadership renewed korenization appointing on 
September 9 the natives Lerik Akhmetov as Minister of Road Haulage and Rustam 
Rasulevich Yunusov as Minister for Highways; and on September 17 S.A. Khodzhaeva as 
Minister of social security, I.N. Iskandarov as the Minister for the building materials 
industry and Kh.Kh. Gulyamovas the Chairman of the State Committee for Work and 
Social Issues. PV, 22074, 208, 10 September 1989, p. 1 and PV, 22081, 215, 19 
September 1989, p. 1. 
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demographic situation, considering the upsurge of 4.5 million people (30% of 
the total Uzbek population) in the past 10 years. This demographic growth rate 
was three times higher than in any other Soviet Republic, and Uzbek SSR was 
not able to absorb such a number of newly-arriving citizens and to provide 
adequate services. Even the security and social protection standards were 
criticized by the CPUz for being scarce, considering that just 5% of the rural 
population had access to running water, 50% to drinkable water and just 17% 
to gas, and there were no improvements in the availability of housing, schools, 
health, culture etc. On that occasion, Karimov was still acting as a loyal Soviet 
statesman, admitting that the biggest political problem was related to the 
difficulties of implementing perestroika in Uzbekistan. In his vision, the party 
needed to apply the “reconstruction” to itself.74 To some extent, we could say 
that in these first months Karimov was still playing the card of “self-criticism” 
while balancing a tenuous nationalist rhetoric. 
Again, during the CC CPSU plenum of 19-20 September 1989, the Uzbek 
leader referred to the Fergana events, declaring that the dangers of the tense 
socio-political situation had been underestimated. Thus, he was emphasizing 
in a veiled way the responsibilities of his predecessors and other anti-
perestroika agents. He was, substantially, declaring to Moscow that Uzbekistan 
would break with the past, exploiting the “perestroika spirit” to realize a major 
autonomy of the UzSSR.75 Nevertheless, this autonomy had to be realized 
within a reformed Soviet framework and any separatist attitude seemed to be 
undesirable. However, during the plenum CC CPUz of 30 September 1989, 
Karimov complained for the difficulties in getting essential goods such as sugar, 
soap and flour,76 remarking the problems of a republic that had some of the 
lowest levels of consumptions rates in the whole USSR,77 and that was entering 
in a deep crisis due to the interruption of the supply chain from the center after 
1989.78 Effectively, the hyperinflation and the crisis of real income – dropped 
                                                          
74 PV, 22059, 193, 23 August 1989, p. 1. 
75 PV, 22086-22087, 220-221, 23 September 1989, p. 1. 
76 Prot. 17/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1511, l. 53. 
77 The annual meat consumption in USSR was 64.1 kg and in Uzbekistan only 29; as well 
as dairy products that were 190 for Uzbekistan and 341 for USSR. Rumer, “Central Asia’s 
Cotton Economy and Its Costs,” 86–87. 
78 A memorandum sent on 12 February 1990 by 17 peoples’ deputies from Uzbekistan 
to Ryzhkov denouncing the dramatic situation of a republic that was not able to produce 
the essential goods to feed its population. They argued that in order to fulfill a demand 
of 3.320.000 tons of flour, Uzbekistan had to import from other republics 3.220.000 
(97%) of that. Similarly, there was a demand for 500.000 tons of rice and an importation 
574 
 
for 25% in Central Asia only – defined the first significant crisis of primary goods 
deficits.79 
A great result that seemed to pacify the nationalist opposition – and that to 
a large extent was moved under the pressure of Birlik - was the approval, on 
20 October 1989, of a law that declared Uzbek as the official language of the 
republic.80 Karimov’s nationalist attitude was much more strongly enforced 
due to the condemnation of the ‘cotton affairs’ in a moment of high popularity 
of the facts. Indeed, as we have seen in the previous chapter the Gdlyan-Ivanov 
saga was thrilling the Soviet readers, mobilizing masses and polarizing public 
opinion between supporters and opponents while the cases were rapidly 
dismissed. Also in Uzbekistan, the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ stories were resumed 
and exploded by the new leadership, which adopted a very critical attitude and 
to some extent followed the nationalist narrative against the ‘colonial center.’ 
During the plenum CC CPUz of 14 November 1989, Karimov even commented 
the ‘cotton affairs’ as an unreasonable event that caused tension in inter-ethnic 
relations and also the dissatisfaction of workers.81 Thus, the first semester of 
Karimov’s mandate was concluded with his efforts to consolidate his power 
and legitimacy, replacing those “Moscow appointees” – mainly Russians who 
were chosen by his predecessors during the krasnyi desant – with Uzbek ones 
satisfying the clan divisions and getting their acceptability. This major 
autonomy of CPUz and flexibility of CPSU could be read, ex post, as a sign of CC 
CPUS weakness. 
In 1990, Karimov made further steps towards the national autonomy of 
Uzbekistan at political, ideological and cultural levels, while in parallel he kept 
marginalizing the opposition and launched the plan for a progressive transition 
that excluded political adversaries from the political game. “Whilst Karimov 
                                                          
of 80.000 (15%); and grain forage 1.174.000 - 950.000 (81%). Nevertheless, for 1990 the 
republic was going to receive 600.000 ton of flour only (19,1 of the demand) and needed 
an importation between 75 and 100% of forage for livestock. They denouncing the fact 
that the distribution chain that once assured supplies form the center had stopped after 
1989. The situation was generating a chaotic scenario were neither the factories of the 
republic received raw materials from the center and were not able to fulfill the plans 
while the black market was flourishing and becoming an important supply point for the 
domestic consumption. GARF, f. 9654, op. 4, d. 52, ll. 1-4. 
79 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 635. 
80 William Fierman, Language Planning and National Development the Uzbek Experience 
(Berlin-New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991). 
81 Prot. 18/1989, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 158, d. 1512, l. 10 
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supported the elimination of Article 6 in early January 1990, he opposed 
factionalism and warned after the republican elections that oppositional 
activity would not be tolerated.”82 Due to the major freedoms of perestroika, 
the republic was also publicly rediscovering the traditional cultural and 
religious values: emblematically, in February 1990, there was the first 
translation of the Holy Koran in Uzbek language,83 in March the celebration of 
Nowruz was permitted for the first time in decades84 and in May Islam Nuri (ray 
of Islam) became the first recognized Muslim periodical in the whole of the 
USSR.85 In parallel, 1990 was the year of Karimov’s consolidation of power, 
bargaining, negotiating and making concessions to elites, enforcing a 
“tranformist”86 agenda, coopting many of  the opposition figures and 
increasing his legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.  
Indeed, at the beginning of his mandate, the new leader was too weak to 
immediately fight against his divided antagonists. Thus, he proceeded with a 
power balance of elites, distributing powers and benefits without giving the 
perception that some of them could be more powerful than others to challenge 
the power status quo led by himself. Carlisle commented that local politicians 
were so powerful and effective in assisting the Karimov nomination that they 
even “thought of him as their puppet”, thinking that he would remain 
dependent on those people who brought him to power.87 In fact, during these 
months, Karimov tried to build good relations with all oppositions and rival 
clans, granting them freedom to promote their ideas and recognizing them a 
positive role in the system and, gradually, proceeding with a Central Asian 
version of Rakosi’s “salami tactic” to progressively divide opposition, eliminate 
his rivals and consolidate his power. Malikov commented: 
                                                          
82 Gill and Pitty, Power in the Party. The Organization of Power and Central-Republican 
Relations in the CPSU, 79. 
83 PV, 22203, 37, 13 February 1990, p. 4. 
84 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse 
of the Soviet Union, 394. 
85 PV, 22284, 118, 24 May 1990, p. 4. 
86 Trasformismo (Transformism) is an Italian concept - typical of the post-Unitarian Italy 
- referred to the method of making wide and flexible coalitions of government dividing, 
coopting and isolating the opponents to remain in power. Quoting the character 
Tancredi of the novel The Leopard (by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa): “If we want 
things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” 
87 Donald S. Carlisle, “Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan. Back to the Future?,” in Patterns 
in Post-Soviet Leadership, ed. T J Tucker and R C Colton (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 
196. 
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Karimov eventually eliminated these early supporters. Nishanov was effectively 
exiled; he was not allowed to return to Uzbekistan, and his apartment in 
Tashkent was taken away. Mirsaidov was convicted and was physically beaten 
in the Street. The Muftì was forced to emigrate, and a criminal case was 
instituted against him. Mamarasulov, Yusupov, and Mukhtarov were 
prosecuted and removed from the political arena.88 
On 15 march 1990, after abolishing art. 6 of the Soviet constitution (the 
primacy of party in the state), the CPDSU elected Gorbachev as President of 
the USSR and approved Nazarbayev’s proposal to establish national presidents 
- elected on a popular basis – in each republic. This move effectively legitimized 
the sovereignty of those local presidents more than the Soviet one.89 Hence, 
on 24 March 1990, Karimov was the first leader to be appointed by the 
republican SS as President of the UzSSR, defeating the leading representative 
of the former elite, Shukurullo Mirsaidov who became the vice-president and 
lately entered in disagreement with the Uzbek leader.90 
In this phase, Karimov kept an ambiguous approach towards the USSR – on 
the one hand, laying out a discourse of ‘brotherhood’ among the USSR peoples 
and, on the other, advancing a self-victimizing nationalist narrative for 
Uzbekistan – seeking for a ‘double legitimation’ of local networks and Moscow 
that, at least formally, was still the center of the country. Also the vice 
president Mirsaidov kept criticizing Moscow’s manipulations on the Uzbek 
economy and demanded to recognize all the most valuable resources as 
property of the republic.91 Thus, Karimov and his affiliates maintained 
something of a schizophrenic position that both formally respected the Soviet 
                                                          
88 Malikov, “Uzbekistan: A View from the Opposition.” 
89 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 635. 
90 “Karimov and Mirsaidov were engaged in a power struggle. […In 1991, the latter] 
traveled to Moscow in September soon after the declaration of independence, in an 
attempt to gather supporters in opposition to Karimov. Karimov’s decision to 
marginalize and eventually oust his former supporter may have also been the result of 
a power struggle between competing clans in Uzbekistan […]. Mirsaidov and his allies 
represented the Tashkent region, while Karimov represented the Samarkand region. 
Notably, Rashidov and Ismail Dzhurabekov (whose position in the early government will 
be discussed below) also represented Samarkand.” Pamela Blackmon, In the Shadow of 
Russia: Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2011), 31; Melvin, Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road, 
184. 
91 Ben Fowkes, The Disintegration of the Soviet Union. A Study in the Rise and Triumph 
of Nationalism (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1997), 168. 
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role and laid a large amount of blame at its feet. In his first speech as President, 
Karimov recalled the need of unity within the country, launching a proposal for 
a federal project based on severing republics with a clear separation of powers 
between the republics and the central USSR. The final aim – and most delicate 
task - of this project was to strengthen the economic independence of the 
republic and the transition to self-government and self-financing of SSRs.92  
While the USSR was adopting a new legislation defining the terms of the 
separation of the republics,93 the SS Uzbek SSR elaborated the general 
concepts of the socio-economic and cultural development and ‘independence’ 
of Uzbekistan, setting prior issues such as housing, food and primary goods 
supply, ecological problems,94 national cultural heritage,95 and the 
implementation of democracy and stability while most of these debates were 
hiding a veiled criticism against the Soviet central power. Gorbachev’s appeals 
to preserve internationalism within Soviet Union and to deter the younger 
generations from indulging in the dangerous nationalistic temptations were in 
vain.96 During his speeches, the Soviet leader warned about the risks of ethnic 
                                                          
92 PV, 22237, 71, 25 March 1990, p. 1. 
93 The new law laid down the rules for the republic’s separation from the USSR which 
could be made with the decision of the people through a free and voluntary 
referendum. The decision to open the referendum had to be held by the SS of the 
republic that could act independently or with instance proposal by a tenth of Soviet 
citizens residing in the republic and with voting rights. The referendum had to be held 
by secret ballot not earlier than six days prior to or after nine months after the decision. 
PV, 22247, 81, 7 April 1990, p. 1. 
94 Already in 1984, the Uzbek government was informed about the mobilizations and 
petitions of intellectual civil society worried about the ecological situation in 
Uzbekistan. TsGARUz, f. 2742, op. 1, d. 258. Then, in 1990 also the people's deputies 
from Uzbekistan started to send many letters and petitions to the Soviet government 
denouncing ecological problems and their effect on the workers' health. GARF, f. 9654, 
op. 4, d. 52, ll. 8-69. 
95 PV, 22250, 84, 11 April 1990, p. 1. 
96 During the Gorbachev’s speech at the XXI Komsomol congress on April 10 1990, the 
Soviet leader reiterated the need to distinguish national from nationalist: the first is 
“legal and legitimate aspiration of every nation to preserve its originality, language, 
traditions, lifestyle and historical memory. Without this element, the individual loses 
the national sense. Even without evaluating the events that are happening in our 
international relations, I can say that our party and organs of the government and I, as 
President, have one those important tasks to meet the needs of all people on the radical 
transformation of the Soviet federation”. According to Gorbachev, nationalism that is 
“the aspiration of the superiority of the nation, satisfying the interests of the nation not 
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clashes and separatism in USSR, enforcing the idea of a Union where the health 
of peoples influences each other ones.97 Similar rhetoric discussing the sense 
of ‘brotherhood among the people’ was still implemented even by Uzbek 
leadership who was able to balance a constructive attitude towards the Soviet 
center and criticism. One of the issues used for this aim was the “Gdlyan-Ivanov 
affair” that was continuing to sensitize the Uzbek public opinion, presenting 
the two prosecutors as two enemies of the Uzbek people. 
7.2 Self-victimization and ideological myth-making  
There is an extensive literature on national identity and the process of 
national ‘myth making’ in post-Soviet Uzbekistan.98 These studies have 
                                                          
to mention the interests of others, thus corresponding to a humiliation of the others 
[…]. Nationalism is scary when it is based in the new generations […]. The principle of 
internationalism is the necessary condition for the conservation of the state”. PV, 
22251, 85, 12 April, p. 2. 
97 During his speech when Gorbachev met the workers of the Sverdlovsk oblast, the 
Soviet leader affirmed that “the process of national revival went very fast” leading to 
losses in international and interethnic relations creating difficulties: first of all 
nationalism and separatism. He affirmed: “the Russians have made a great contribution 
in the construction and real national state” and “we found ourselves in front of the 
exasperation of acute conflicts and ethnic relations […]. The Russian people and other 
peoples of the country have the consciousness of this huge world called USSR. Whether 
the health of Russian people will be good, also the health of other people will be good 
and vice versa”. PV, 22265, 99, 29 April 1990, p. 2. 
98 See Laura Adams, The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the 
Fourteenth Century to the Present : A Cultural History; Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, “Islam v 
Uzbekistan: Ot Repressii K Bor’be Identichnosteil,” in Rossiia-Sredniaia Azia Politika I 
Islam v XX - Nachale XXI v., ed. A Kokoshin (Moskva, 2011); Donald S. Carlisle, 
“Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks,” Problems of Communism, 1991; James Critchlow, 
Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Independence (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991); Peter Finke, Variations on Uzbek Identity: Strategic Choices, 
Cognitive Schemas and Political Constraints in Identification Processses (New York-
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014); Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and 
Politics in Central Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Maria Louw, 
Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London & New York: Routledge, 2007); Vitaly 
V. Naumki, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle (Bolder: Bowman and 
Littlefield, 2005); Johan Rasanayagam, Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan; The Morality of 
Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Grigol Ubiria, Soviet Nation-
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deepened our understanding of the anthropological, sociological and political 
aspects of Uzbekistan’s often painful transition from Soviet state to 
independent nation. Nevertheless, these literatures have not adequately 
addressed the role of ‘negative’ commemoration of the Soviet period within 
this process of crafting a new Uzbek national consciousness and significant 
historiographic lacunae therefore remain. The new field of ‘identity and 
memory’ research99 is essential to understand the role of historiography in the 
construction of a ‘colonial trauma’ narrative in the post-Soviet Central Asian 
republics, including Uzbekistan, and in particular its function in grounding and 
legitimizing the new ideology of national independence (Mustaqillik).  
The Russian scholar Sergey Abashin has observed how this new ideology 
was not built merely on the recovery of Uzbek tradition but was cast as a radical 
break with a pathological Soviet past, that blends “memory of the suffering 
caused by the colonial policies of the tsarist era with memory of Stalinist 
repressions and other hardships of the Soviet epoch to form one general sense 
of trauma.”100 These intuitions prompted me to undertake a comprehensive 
investigation of post-Soviet historical memory in Uzbekistan and its role in the 
construction of a ‘colonial trauma’ narrative through a particular case study: 
the ‘Uzbek cotton affair,’ a formative event in late-Soviet Uzbek history that 
drew extensive media coverage in the perestroika period and defined the 
official political narrative after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I was struck by 
how quickly this episode – as well as the Gdlyan-Ivanov affair - was forgotten 
in Russia, only to re-emerge as a definitive event in Uzbekistan, remembered 
as one of the most tragic events in Soviet history. Indeed, as we shall see, the 
Uzbek cotton affair has come to occupy a pivotal position in the official 
narrative of Uzbekistan’s political, cultural, ideological and identity break with 
Russia/USSR, and in the ideological structuring and legitimation of the 
Mustaqillik concept.  
Therefore, we want to move beyond the limits of the current literature to 
lay out in detail how the Uzbek cotton affair was narrated within the political 
                                                          
Building in Central Asia: The Making of the Kazakh and Uzbek Nations (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2015); Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi. 
99 A recent contribution comes from Timur Dadabaev, Identity and Memory in Post-
Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s Soviet Past (London & New York: Routledge, 2015). 
100 Sergey Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” 
in Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Migration, Democratisation and 
Inequality in the Post-Soviet Era, ed. Sophie Hohmann et al. (London & New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2014), 87. 
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arena to undergird the Mustaqillik ideology, most notably through the 
exploitation of national ‘emotional levers’ that legitimized the steps taken by 
Uzbek political elites in the post-Soviet transition. These key moves that led to 
the definition and propagation of the Mustaqillik dialectic will therefore be 
outlined, showing how the Uzbek cotton affair was skillfully deployed to 
censure the Soviet regime and lay out a narrative of ‘victimhood’ that both re-
interpreted historical facts and rehabilitated the local ‘victims’ and symbols of 
the affair. The political exploitation of memory in Uzbekistan – through history, 
museology and political discourse – offers the perfect case study of how a post-
Soviet nation could assert its independent identity much as a newly post-
colonial state might, drawing on simultaneously censorious and affirmative 
ideological narrative to strengthen – domestically and internationally – its 
political legitimacy. 
7.2.1 Mustaqillik and the Uzbek national myth making dialectic 
During the 1990s, the Soviet collapse was represented in discourse as a 
‘triumph’ of the nation state, national ideology and national identity. Out of 
this political earthquake emerged 15 newly-independent states in search of 
legitimation at both the domestic and international levels. Former Soviet 
Central Asian states thus began to forge (political) legitimizing national 
mythologies, rewriting the historical narrative – through a politically-directed 
historiography and new textbooks and museums – and reshaping collective 
memory to make a clear break with what was now being cast as an ‘awkward’ 
past.  
Unlike the struggles for national liberation and independence seen in 
decolonizing states elsewhere, the separation of the Central Asian republics 
from Russia was more or less unforeseen, an unavoidable consequence of a 
startling political collapse. Therefore, unlike the anti-colonial movements of 
Africa and Asia, no ‘post separation’ vision had yet been articulated in Central 
Asia and essentially needed to be developed from scratch, and in very short 
order. Thus, a new narrative and set of national identity markers were required 
that could both ‘rationalize’ this rather inauspicious break with the past and 
legitimize the newly-constituted national leadership. In Uzbekistan, as well, 
historiography101 became part of the same process of post-separation 
                                                          
101 In Uzbekistan, there was apparently no transition at a historiographical-
methodological level and many patterns of previous Soviet historiography are 
recovered. At a narrative level, Uzbek history does not recall a cultural ethnic 
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legitimation designed to strengthening the state at the domestic level. The 
politicization of both memory and the definition of ‘post-colonial’ and ‘post-
soviet’ thus became important elements of the Uzbek national narrative and 
political debate. At the scholarly level, the use of these definitions remains 
highly contentious,102 with a significant proportion of historians and social 
scientists stressing the idea of the Soviet Union as a continuation of the colonial 
system introduced during the Russian Empire,103 while other authors argue 
that the USSR was an atypical empire that fundamentally restructured 
traditional notions of motherland-province, oppressor-oppressed and 
                                                          
dimension, but rather the history of the peoples in that territorial area. Hence, it is not 
uncommon to read of istoriya narodov Uzbekistana rather than istoriya uzbekov. Thus, 
we could say that we deal more with state historiography rather than national 
historiography. 
102 Marco Buttino summarized the debate on the imperial/colonial nature of the USSR, 
citing Ronald Grigory Suny, “The Empire Strikes Out: Imperial Russia, ‘National’ Identity, 
and Theories of Empire,” in A State of Nations. Empire and Nation Making in the Age of 
Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigory Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Terry Martin, “An Affirmative Action Empire: The Soviet Union as the 
Highest Form of Imperialism,” in A State of Nations. Empire and Nation Making in the 
Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigory Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). The fundamental volume on the ‘national’ involvement in 
Soviet policy is Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire and Nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Abeed Khalid argues 
that use of the colonial category for the USSR is misleading, Adeeb Khalid, 
“Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative 
Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (2006): 231–51. Similarly, see Laura Adams, “Can 
We Apply a Post-Colonial Theory to Central Asia?,” Central Eurasia Studies Review 7, no. 
1 (2008): 2–8; Deniz Kandiyoti, “Post-Colonialism Compared: Potentials and Limitations 
in the Middle East and Central Asia,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 
2 (2002): 279–97; Anatoliy Remnev, “Kolonial’nost, Postkolonial’nost I Istoricheskaia 
Politika’ v Sovremennom Kazakhstane,” Ab Imperio 1 (2011): 169–205. The need to 
converge post-colonial and post-soviet studies in order to overcome the limits of the 
Cold-war approaches is argued by Sharad Chari and Katherine Verdery, “Thinking 
between the Posts: Postcolonialism, Postsocialism, and Ethnography after the Cold 
War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no. 1 (December 16, 2008); 
Morgan Y. Liu, “Central Asia in the Post–Cold War World,” Annual Review of 
Anthropology 40 (2011). Abashin analyzes the debate along the political use of the past. 
Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later”; Buttino, 
Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 12. 
103 See Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of 
the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
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colonizer-colonized.104 The leadership that took charge in Uzbekistan during 
perestroika faced its own challenge in addressing the nature of what post-
Soviet order might emerge in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet political, 
economic and cultural systems. 
During the initial period of crisis as the Soviet system began to breakdown 
after 1988, the approach of Karimov was a kind of ‘cautious ambiguity’ towards 
the collapsing order and the possibility of Uzbek independence, which the 
leadership was neither prepared for nor particularly keen to pursue. Over the 
ensuing two years, however, it became increasingly clear that a partition was 
inevitable and that a new path would need to be charted. The Uzbek leader 
therefore advanced a new nationalist narrative that set the ground for the 
ideological transition from communism to Mustaqillik and in 1991 Uzbekistan 
became an independent republic born of a mutually-agreed separation from 
the USSR. Nevertheless, many practical aspects of the old order – in politics, in 
the economy, and in the society more generally – were retained, and had to be 
incorporated within a nationalist agenda that would emphasize the pure 
‘Uzbekness’ of the new state and accelerate a policy of ‘Uzbekization’ to place 
local-born cadres into every level of the political and administrative 
structure.105 
As with other ex-Soviet republics, a national ‘myth making’ process was 
required to legitimize the new political order in the now independent 
Uzbekistan. The borders of the state had been laid down as early as the 1920s, 
                                                          
104 Cf. Adeeb Khalid, “The Soviet Union as an Imperial Formation: A View from Central 
Asia,” in Imperial Formations, ed. A. Stoler, C. McGranahan, and P. Perdue (Santa Fe: 
School of Advanced Research Press, 2007). 
105 Uzbek nationalism is effective and, to some extends, as moderate as it is radical. 
Buttino argues that Uzbek nationalism is effective in so far as it builds the nation on 
national myths, 'uzbekizites' the great heroes of the past, enhances the leader/father 
of the homeland and basically keeps a hostile attitude to neighboring countries. 
Nevertheless, it is a moderate nationalism as it does not indicate enemies - and neither 
the Russians - and it is aimed at preventing any popular violence. It is also a radical 
nationalism because it becomes the ideological reference by which, in the absence of 
other resources, has expropriated the non-Uzbeks - such as Russians and other minority 
groups - ousting them from managerial posts and basically pushing them to leave. This 
kind of moderate/radical nationalism is also in the other former Soviet republics where 
the costs of the socio-economic crisis had been often paid by the non-titular nations, 
creating consensus around the dominant (national) group. See: Marco Buttino, In a 
Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet 
Union (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1993). 
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designating an area to the Uzbek titular nation. In fact, in Uzbekistan 
“[references] to nationality became an official means of gaining access to 
power, privileges, and bonuses, while sometimes [being deployed as] a stigma, 
a tool for repression and discrimination”.106 Although sovietization had been 
effective at the political (and even cultural) level, Uzbeks were permitted to 
maintain part of their ‘traditional dimension’ (like the institution of 
makhalla107) and other aspects of ‘Uzbekness’ were deployed affirming 
privileges as the titular nation within the Soviet republican system. This is 
because an Uzbek national state had never existed before 1920s and despite 
their high grade of sovietization, they had been allowed to keep many 
traditional aspects of the pre-Bolshevik society. 
The creation of a (post-soviet) Uzbek national identity thus became a 
fascinating creature that at once charted a new discourse and built on existing 
myths of the Uzbek historical legacy. Continuity with the modernizing and 
multi-ethnic discursive aspects inherited from Soviet experience were 
manifest.108 In fact, every feature of the new national narrative lacked an 
orthodox interpretation but could be deployed in any given context as needed, 
depending on the particularities of the moment and the deep contradictions of 
a highly-fragmented society. Although a return to Islamic values seemed a 
natural dimension of this process in a country with a Muslim majority, Karimov 
took an ambiguous position regarding religion. In replacing the Soviet 
narrative, he initially embraced aspects of Islam as a pillar of Mustaqillik and 
the new Uzbek society. However, this trend would be reversed in short order, 
when it was determined that ‘Islamism’ would pose more of a threat to the 
                                                          
106 Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” 82. 
107 The makhalla is the name given to the typical Uzbek neighborhood, and the 
traditional institution that governs relations amongst its inhabitants. The makhalla is 
important because it has started to “represent what is construed as national, 
independent and sovereign in the new Uzbek life.” Ayşe Saktanber and Asli Özataş-
Baykal, “Women and the Formation of Uzbek National Identity,” in Gender and Identity 
Construction: Women of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey, ed. Feride Acar and 
Ayşe Gneş-Ayata (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 233. 
108 The Soviet rethoric of "brotherhood among nations" in a republic with "more than 
100 national and ethnic groups" was revived in post-Soviet Uzbekistan where "multi-
ethnic harmony" became a key pillar of official political discourse. Mustaqillik thus 
emerged as an ambigously inclusive ‘civic ideology’ that legitimized the national claim 
of the Uzbeks while not (formally) excluding non-Uzbeks from civic and political 
participation. Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the 
Twenty-First Century: Tradition and Survival (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997), 41–51. 
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new order than a solution to the question of legitimation. This reconsideration 
emerged as soon as Islam was adopted as mobilizing discourse for the political 
opposition in Uzbekistan – and for a minor section of Birlik. During subsequent 
periods of communal strife – such as in the Ferghana valley tensions, the civil 
war in Tajikistan (1992–1997), the war against terrorism and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) (especially after the 1999 Tashkent bombings, 
the IMU invasions of 2000-2001, and the Tashkent attacks of March and July 
2004) – the anti-Islamism of the Uzbek national leadership was reinforced. 
Thus, the initial ‘liberal’ posture towards Islam was gradually repudiated, 
closing off the freedoms (especially in terms of religious habits and practices) 
that perestroika had made possible and legitimizing a police regime against 
what was cast as a (potential) terrorist/fundamentalist threat. Islam, then, 
remained an attenuated ideological base of Mustaqillik, making a somewhat 
awkward contribution to a narrative that balances Muslim tradition, 
modernization, and secularization in an uneasy tension. 
Having been, at the end of the Soviet period, subject to a kind of 
‘trusteeship’ from Moscow (epitomized by the krasnyi desant during the 
‘cotton affair’), Karimov’s regime propagated this new ideology with the aim of 
simultaneously justifying Uzbek independence, grounding its pure ‘Uzbek’ 
nature and legitimizing the reconstituted Uzbek ruling elite, principally with a 
domestic audience in mind. The newly constituted Uzbek government was 
much more worried about the (fragmented) internal dynamics of Uzbek society 
than about projecting its influence abroad. Indeed, Uzbek nationalism hardly 
even touched the Uzbek diaspora,109 Uzbek minorities abroad and the 
transnational communities of Uzbek immigrants; it was far too concerned with 
addressing the tensions arising in domestic cleavages. As Abashin has argued, 
the increasing tendency of the nation to fragment further along various fault-
lines comes into view: rich regions and poor, the city (suburbs) and the village, 
Islamists, women, migrants, minorities etc. This does not mean that the nation 
has failed as a community or identity. It does, however, indicate that the process 
of national construction continues to-date and is in constant flux: reacting to 
                                                          
109 Out of the Republican of Uzbekistan, there are consistent communities of Uzbeks in 
Tajikistan (16% of population), Kyrgyzstan (20-25%), Turkmenistan (10%), Kazakhstan 
(5-8%) and Afghanistan (10%). Aleksandr Shaydatovich Kadyrbaev, “Natsional’naya 
Istoriya Kak Instrument Politicheskoy Legitimatsii v Tadzhikistane I Uzbekistane,” in 
Istoriya - Pole Srazheniy, ed. Apollon Davidson (Moskva: Sobraniye, 2015), 205. 
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new conditions, changing trajectory, and continually finding itself in 
competition with other identities.110 
In this framework, the Mustaqillik ideology underpinned an official 
narrative that evolved according to a Baconian dialectic between a pars 
construens – essentially, a celebration of the myth of a ‘glorious past’ and the 
unique wonders of Uzbekness to cultivate a strong sense of 
belonging/affiliation111 – and a pars destruens that cast the Soviet ‘infamous 
past’112 as the source of all the problems and pathologies of the present. The 
overall effect of this dialectic was a sense of emancipation and legitimation of 
the post-soviet Uzbek independence. 
7.2.2 The condemnation of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ 
A crucial dimension of the pars destruens was a posture and discourse of 
self-victimization that the Uzbek leadership carefully crafted to condemn the 
Soviet experience ex post.113 In this telling, Uzbekistan was the victim of a series 
                                                          
110 Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” 86. 
111 Such elements include national culture, traditions, religion, institutions, architecture, 
science, language, literature and its symbols, such as the poetry of Alisher Navoi, the 
science of Ulugh Beg and all those representatives of the ‘Central Asian renaissance’ 
etc. 
112 Nevertheless, despite many perplexities on the Soviet modernization, the memory 
of the Soviet past and its official narrative are not exclusively negative but, according to 
Dadabaev, there is a principle of ‘selectivity’ in recalling the recent past. Indeed, there 
are some ‘positive’ aspects related to the sacrifice of the Uzbek people in the common 
struggle against the German invaders. On this regard, a World War II memorial was 
constructed in Tashkent in 1999. Hence, despite rejecting the trauma of Stalinism and 
‘cotton affairs,’ also the great patriotic war, the race to space and ‘great power’ status 
associated with the cold war are very sensitive topics that still thrill the elder generation 
of Uzbeks. Dadabaev, Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s 
Soviet Past. 
113 As Kudaibergenova demonstrates, there are similar narratives in the Kazakh 
presidential, national-patriotic and opposition political discourses. In Uzbekistan as well 
opposition groups (and Birlik above all) shared significant aspects of post-colonial 
discourse with Karimov. However, while the 'official' narrative remains ambiguous in 
terms of defining the responsibilities, the opposition charges both the former rulers and 
the current leadership (that was formed within the Soviet power structure) with 
collaboration; namely, of being puppets of Moscow. See Diana T. Kudaibergenova, “The 
Use and Abuse of Postcolonial Discourses in Post-Independent Kazakhstan,” Europe-
Asia Studies 68, no. 5 (2016): 922. 
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of Soviet policies imposed on the country, particularly ethnic division (cast as 
the progenitor of interethnic clashes in Fergana valley in 1989 and during the 
‘90s), economic planning (which triggered the food and consumer goods 
shortages in the republic after 1989), the division of labor (establishing cotton 
monoculture and Uzbekistan’s total economic dependence upon it), water and 
agricultural policies (producing ecological disasters, such as salinization and 
pollution of the soil, as well as the drying up of the Aral sea), the imprudent 
overtures towards Islam during perestroika, and ‘repression of the Uzbek 
people’ during Stalinism and in the 1980s. The ‘cotton affair’ itself was cast as 
part and parcel of this last accusation. Indeed, it was described as ‘the final 
stage of 1937’ or even as an ‘Uzbek genocide’ conducted by the two 
perestroika ‘inquisitors’ Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov. In order to 
understand the vital role played by the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’114 (1983-1989) in 
the evolution of Mustaqillik we must first explore how it was told initially (it 
was covered extensively in the Uzbek press up until mid-1989) to see how later 
(mostly in post-1991) interpretations were so distorted and recast.  
The ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ was one of the most famous corruption scandals 
to emerge in the final decade of the Soviet era. Pikhoya defined it as “one of 
the greatest examples of Andropov’s ‘demonstrative terror’, aimed at 
tightening control over both republican and local politics.”115 This 
‘demonstrative’ policy was endorsed as well by Chernenko and then by 
Gorbachev who, especially in the aftermath of the XXVII CPSU Congress in 
1986, ordered stronger measures against moral and material corruption in the 
USSR. After Brezhnev’s tolerance, Moscow realized that every year the Soviet 
state was paying for 270–340 thousand tons of nonexistent Uzbek cotton116 (as 
well as widespread fraud in other sectors). Indeed, between 1976 and 1983 the 
cotton scam had defrauded the state of almost four billion rubles.117 The 
consequent season of massive investigations, purges and political trials, which 
                                                          
114 A range of terminology is used to describe the events, including ‘cotton scandal’, 
‘cotton scam’ or simply the ‘Uzbek affair’. 
115 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
116 Cf. Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 
493. 
117 William A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption 
in the Political Elite, 1965-1990 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 187; Leslie Holmes, The 
End of Communist Power. Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Legitimation Crisis (Oxford-
New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 101. 
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officially involved more than 20,000 people in the republic,118 progressed in 
three different phases. As mentioned, the first ‘hidden’ phase (1983–1984) was 
characterized by preliminary inquiries amidst a general ‘institutional silence’ 
and conducted by the USSR central prokuratura and KGB officials in the Uzbek 
SSR. Initially, the case was not thought to have systemic implications and the 
previous power structures were preserved in the party and the SSR 
administration. During the second phase (‘systemic-repressive’) between 1984 
and 1986, the leadership in Moscow demanded that the CPUz elite take the 
battle against ‘negative phenomena’ to the party and to the state apparatus. 
What followed was spiraling dynamic that took the form of a kind of paranoid 
witch-hunt, which was often exploited in internal political struggles. In fact, in 
that period a denunciation campaign began in which dozens of letters were 
written – often anonymously – to the CC.119 In seeking to implement the 
recommendations of the CPSU, the XVI plenum of the CPUz (June 1984)120 
endorsed a harsh campaign against corruption in every agricultural and 
industrial sector. The result was repression on a mass scale and purges of the 
CPUz and Uzbek SSR bureaucracies, eradicating the previous power structures 
at all levels of the hierarchy. In fact, as early as January 1985, 40 of the 65 oblast 
Party secretaries, 10 of the 13 obkom first secretaries, and 260 city and rayon 
secretaries were removed from their posts.121  
The final stage of the ‘cotton scandal’ was characterized by a highly visible 
and public - with, in the context of perestroika, an intense media campaign that 
attracted an eager mass audience - crusade against corruption and falsification, 
led by Gdlyan and Ivanov.122 Throughout, the narrative of this campaign was 
                                                          
118 However, Donald Carlisle argues that the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ would had to involve, 
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cast around the struggle against the ‘mafiya’ in the USSR. Indeed, during this 
period in which the Uzbek administrative and political order was essentially 
under the direct ‘trusteeship’ of Moscow (1986–1989), investigations targeted 
the entire political system, provoking an understandable sense of frustration 
and humiliation within the Uzbek elite - typically represented by the 
nomenklatura. This humiliation reached its apogee during the so called krasnyi 
desant campaign, when hundreds of predominantly Russian cadres were sent 
to Uzbekistan to replace Uzbeks natives in command and control posts. At this 
moment, the local sense of disaffection with the empire was at its height, as 
Uzbek elites felt their very self-determination was on the line and that Moscow 
had completely violated the unofficial (patrimonial) ‘social contract’ between 
the center and periphery within the Soviet system. It was at this moment that 
a new Uzbek narrative of the country’s Soviet experience – and a new official 
national ideology – emerged. 
The interethnic clashes and subsequent pogrom of Meskhetian Turks that 
took place in June 1989 proved to be the ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’. 
These developments signaled the end of Nishanov’s leadership and he was 
immediately dispatched to Moscow to take up the position of Chairman of 
Soviet of Nationalities. Karimov, his designated successor as CPUz First 
Secretary, was an ‘outsider’ within the upper echelons of the nomenklatura. 
He immediately cast himself in the role of ‘peacemaker’ – and to  a large extent 
a ‘restorer’ of the pre-cotton affair order - launching a new political identity for 
Uzbekistan, the central ideological theme of which was Mustaqillik 
(independence). Mustaqillik essentially combined a ‘soft’ (and non-orthodox) 
nationalist folklore with a set of pars destruens claims, undergirded by the 
rhetoric of Uzbek ‘victimhood’ at the hands of the Soviet colonizers. Since that 
time, the Uzbek leader has propagated a sort of transgenerational ‘post-
colonial trauma narrative’123 in a country that had hitherto never considered 
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itself as a colony within the Soviet system but rather as an example of highly 
successful integration of an ‘archaic’ Asian society within the schema of Soviet 
modernization.124 In this first phase of Karimov’s mandate, the Uzbek leader 
was still quite cautious in establishing distance from the USSR and in 
condemning the practices of krasnyi desant that had characterized the 
previous Usmankhodzhaev and Nishanov mandates. Instead, he began to 
gradually assert his autonomy and to consolidate his personal power and 
legitimacy, rebalancing the equilibrium between Uzbek and Slav elites and 
replacing ‘Moscow’s men’ – mainly ethnic Russians appointed during the 
krasnyi desant – with Uzbeks in order to salve divisions within the local power 
network.125 This assertion of autonomy by the CPUz leader can be read, ex post, 
as a sign of Moscow’s increasing weakness. 
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In 1989, with the emergence of nationalist resentment against the central 
power and greater criticism in the press because of glasnost, Uzbek public 
opinion started to consider even more critically the events of the so called 
‘cotton affairs’, and in Moscow the case even became something of a media 
event coinciding with the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’. In Uzbekistan, PV – which had 
previously followed these scandals by condemning the weakness of party 
discipline and the ‘negative phenomena’ – started publishing testimonies and 
interviews against the two prosecutors, who had been acclaimed as ‘heroes of 
glasnost’ in previous years. It published an interview of the Deputy General 
Prosecutor of USSR, V.I. Kravtsev, who for the first time was declaring the story 
of Usmankhodzhaev, his dismissal and his implication in the ‘cotton affair’ for 
an alleged bribe to Yegor Ligachev. At the end of the story, he denounced 
Gdlyan and Ivanov as ‘inquisitors’ who had been extorting confessions, 
including through torture.126 
From 1989, the ‘cotton scandal’ stories became media cases that the Uzbek 
press, media and official journals – such as Positsya, Dialog, Narod i demokratia 
– started to follow very closely, confronting the versions expressed in the 
Soviet central press with the alternative versions they provided. These 
reportages were also instrumental in revealing how, among the prokuratura 
and public opinion, there were many doubts and a general disagreement about 
the validity of these criminal cases. Although in the Republic there were still 
groups that were helping the ‘judicial reform’ process endorsed by the CPSU, 
the Uzbek press started to acknowledge that, from the central level, 
misinformation and imprecise facts had spread about the ‘cotton affairs’ and 
the trial of Yuri Churbanov and others. During these months, the Uzbek media 
closely followed and condemned the related case of Aleksandr Minkin, one of 
the first reporters to sensitize Soviet public opinion about the dramatic 
situation in Uzbekistan in terms of corruption, child labor and environmental 
issues related to the use of defoliants in the cotton fields. Meanwhile, across 
the whole of the USSR, Minkin’s name became symbol of ‘glasnost’. In the 
Uzbek press he was harshly accused of distorting the truth and defaming the 
positive improvements in the republic, fomenting political tensions and 
creating a false impression of the processes in the economy, ecology and 
cultural life of Uzbekistan.127 However, history has proved that Minkin’s 
denunciations were unfortunately well-founded. 
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7.2.3 Self-victimization and the ‘last repression’ narrative 
After mid-1989, the limits of the Soviet system and challenging issues such 
as the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov affair’ were highlighted, to sensitize Uzbek public opinion 
and present the two prosecutors as ‘enemies of the Uzbek people’. Even the 
SS USSR acknowledged the ‘risks of destabilization’ due to this case128 while the 
SS UzSSR established a special commission to investigate the moral and 
substantive damage inflicted during the ‘cotton affairs’ revealing that: 
every person needs glasnost as much as they need the air to breathe. Now 
people want to know everything that is going on - considering that previously 
they did not have the opportunity to objectively obtain the whole truth on all 
aspects of life - and the deputies have created a commission for glasnost […]. In 
recent times, the expectations of the workers of the republic have not being 
met by the officials of the law enforcement […] and now the commission is 
examining the work of prokuratura of the Oblast of Andijan and the results of 
the audit will be made known to the public. […] The commission plans to 
examine the glasnost in the broadcastings of the ‘State Committee of 
Uzbekistan on TV and Radio’ as well as the opinion of the public on critical 
articles and cartoons […] and the fate of the people had been unjustly blackened 
by the press of the republic regarding the ‘cotton affair’ will be controlled.129 
It became increasingly clear that in Moscow, as in Tashkent, the ‘Gdlyan-
Ivanov affair’ was assuming a political dimension, narrated as it was from the 
Uzbek point of view. One of the most loyal of Karimov’s original allies, the 
Uzbek Minister of the MVD, Kamalov, gave his version on the ‘mafiya’ 
accusations. Kamalov argued that the definition of ‘mafiya’ – in the sense of 
being related to organized crime – was used as a “play on words”. The term – 
which had become widespread at that time due to a popular Italian TV series 
entitled La Piovra – was simply an exaggeration, not to be taken seriously as a 
description of actual reality in Uzbekistan. Indeed, Kamalov affirmed: we can 
easily say that there is fortunately no ‘mafiya’ here […] this term implies a huge 
criminal unit monopolizing action in many spheres” of public life. Conversely, 
in Uzbekistan the term ‘mafiya’ referred to the “activities of corrupt officials 
who carried out theft, handed out bribes on a large scale and had powerful 
patrons behind them […Therefore] there is no link to define these phenomena 
as organized crime.”130 This stance, advanced by the main person in charge of 
republican internal affairs, was targeted thus to wholly disavow the political 
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campaign that Gdlyan and Ivanov were advancing from Moscow. Therefore, 
the case had repercussions for the entire political life of the republic. During 
the plenum of the CC CPUz of 23 March 1990, the member of the CC CPUz, Kh. 
Yakubzhanova said that the XXII Congress must be the "congress of the 
cleaning, justice and independence." In her words,  
those 2-3 people who made speeches in the Supreme Soviet will never spare 
Gdlyan and Ivanov; this is a terrible force, this is the mafia, mafia against our 
people, they are chains for our communists. [...] The fight against Gdlyan and 
Ivanov is a sacred duty of the party organization CPUz and of the SS UzSSR. We 
will win Gdlyan and Ivanov, absolving the Uzbek people, or we will be defeated 
and disgraced.131 
In summer of 1990, there was an ambiguous attitude within Uzbek politics 
towards the USSR that emerged also during the first stage of the XXII Congress 
CC CPUz (4–6 June 1990),132 Karimov recalled the difficulties in implementing 
perestroika in a republic that was on the point of exploding, and the 
contradictory effects of the fight against the negative phenomena.133 In his 
words: 
the difficulties in Uzbekistan ended up being a kind of guilt. An example of this 
is the so-called "Uzbek cotton affair" [literally Uzbekskoe Khlopkovoe Delo]. The 
republic and its workers did not have time to straighten the back from the yoke 
of cotton, distortions and violations of the party and state rules and the law, and 
then a wave of lawlessness and humiliation came in connection with the cotton 
itself. The unfounded insult to [our] people which was exacerbated in the 
media, moral terror against some honest workers, mass repressions that have 
been expanded not only against the organizers of forgeries but also to 
thousands of workers, becoming an heavy additional burden on shoulders of 
[our] people.134 
On this point, Karimov was even recalling his predecessor Rashidov, who 
lived and worked, and was the head of the republic for nearly a quarter century 
in the period that now we define as 'stagnation.' If there is the supreme justice 
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- and in our opinion it is in the opinion of the people - we cannot deny the great 
and important changes that are connected with the name of this person. Yes, in 
this period the report-mania and falsehood, fraud and magnificence, 
protectionism and intrigue flourished. However, was Rashidov himself the only 
father of these phenomena and what we judge now was inherent only to him 
[?] But in the other republics and regions of the country there were no facts like 
these ones? We must not forget the responsibility of people like Brezhnev and 
his clique. We judge all negative phenomena connected with the name of 
Rashidov. For us, this is unacceptable. We must cleanse us from the routine of 
the past and without this [passage] we cannot go on. In parallel, we cannot 
conclude that everything that happened in that period was around a lifeless 
personality. Above all, it is not acceptable to speculate on the name of one with 
which many of his accusers today have [previously] worked together when they 
had non-minor posts. The most important thing has been obscured; and it is the 
[Uzbek] people that was, is and will be a great worker.135 
At the congress, some party delegates expressed the need to rehabilitate 
the moral integrity of the Uzbek people and of the republic against the slanders 
moved by Gdlyan and Ivanov campaign;136 while others started to accuse the 
CC CPSU and its officials, blaming for the lack of unity or blaming the inefficient 
planning system.137 This excess of criticism towards Moscow suggests a simple 
consideration: evidently, party unity was over and the republican elite were 
searching for a new agreement with a center that had dramatically interrupted 
the supply chain.  
As evident, the cotton affair was narrated differently than it had been 
before. The story was considered as a distortion of reality, a season of terror 
and mass repression, a humiliation and was thus evidence of the exploitative 
regime that the soviets imposed in Uzbekistan. On that occasion, the party 
condemned the actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov and asked for protection for 
people from that injustice.138 In parallel, on 20 July 1990 the SC UzSSR adopted 
the decision n° 4, introducing criminal liability for those defendants who, for 
the cases related to the cotton scams, had been given no other choice but to 
obey the orders of their superiors.139 With an evident manifestation of petty 
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annoyance, during the second stage of the XXII congress of CPUz (7–8 
December 1990), the Uzbek president declared that the republic had honored 
its commitments with the USSR – even exceeding the economic cotton plan by 
more than 225 thousand tons – while the CPUz cadres were dissatisfied with 
the decisions of the CPSU on the resolution of the intra-national relations 
issues. On that occasion, Karimov reaffirmed the need to redefine the Union 
agreement – and the interaction among party, soviets and the social 
organizations – and a roadmap for the transition to a market economy, even 
considering the responsibilities for the ecological disaster in the Aral basin, in 
Karakalpakstan and in the pre-Aral rayons. In this phase, highlighting ecological 
problems became a crucial point, constituting a further topic for the 
subsequent narrative of self-victimization in relation to environmental 
disasters brought about by Soviet policies of agricultural exploitation and 
cotton monoculture. 
On the one hand, the rhetoric of ‘brotherhood’ and unity under the same 
communist party framework still survived. At the same time, a national leader 
pushed for Uzbek economic and political autonomy. In fact, during that second 
stage of the XXII CPUz congress, Karimov highlighted the self-determination of 
the party, declaring that: “now we are an independent party and we ourselves 
have a responsibility to our people”.140 On that occasion, S. Mamarasulov, FS 
Tashkent obkom, delivered a harsh speech blaming perestroika and 
Gorbachev, with the complicity of the old Uzbek leadership. In this emblematic 
intervention, he noted that: 
the just assessment of the past is important for the party authority. I am talking 
about the so-called ‘cotton affairs’ that were called illegally for all of us ‘Uzbek 
affairs’ by irresponsible political speculators with the tacit approval of the 
central authorities. But how did this happen? I think the main mistake was made 
at the XXVII CPSU congress in the speech of M.S. Gorbachev, when the party 
organization of the republic was accused of corruption and massive decadence. 
After this, Usmankhodzhaev and his group wanted to save their heads and left 
Uzbekistan to the mercy of events to CC CPSU, sending a letter with a request 
to send ‘severnij desant’ [northern reinforcements]. And we know well what 
they were doing with the help of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Thus, we have to say that 
this was a small genocide, a 1937 in the period of perestroika. And now that the 
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truth is revealed the center pretends that nothing special happened, just one of 
many errors that occurred.”141 
This unforgiving speech sounded like a symptom of ‘fatigue by empire’ by 
local elites, revealing the seriousness with which the ‘moralization campaigns’ 
of the ‘cotton scandal’ had been perceived in Uzbekistan and the need to 
rehabilitate the honor and the symbols of a people – guilty or innocent – who 
had felt humiliated during these massive investigative campaigns. 
7.2.4 The rehabilitation of Sharaf Rashidov 
After 1990, Karimov consolidated his power142 by bargaining, negotiating 
and making concessions to the elite, advancing an agenda of ‘transformism’,143 
coopting many opposition figures, and increasing his legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public. His remaining in power depended on how well he could satisfy elite 
expectations. In this perspective, some episodes became emblematic, such as 
the restoration of the Jizzak oblast,144 approved by decree on 16 February 
1990. This event was highly symbolic because Karimov was essentially restoring 
a power base for the Jizzak power network and cancelling one of those 
measures that had been made during the krasnyi desant to condemn the 
former FS CPUz, Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov (1959-1983), his memory, and his 
(imposing) power network. 
The rehabilitation of Rashidov, a leader who had marked a quarter century 
of Uzbek political history, was not only intended to legitimize the ruling power 
elite – itself formed during Rashidov’s period in power – but to restore the idea 
of an ‘era of splendor’ regarding a period that had been vilified during the 
‘cotton scandal.’ In fact, Rashidov was officially recognized as the chief person 
responsible for the criminal situation in Uzbekistan at the XXI Congress CC CPUz 
(30 January 1986), when the “derashidovization” campaign condemned – post-
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mortem – the defunct leader as guilty of a vicious work style in cadre 
management, intrigue, formalism, indifference, abuse of power, corruption, 
theft, and scamming.145 Gleason notes that, “by the mid-1980s Rashidov was 
being publicly ridiculed and denounced for having fostered 
'Sharafrashidovshchina'. Rashidov [wa]s accused of having built for himself a 
political machine quite unlike anything anticipated by the conventional 
interpretation of the latitude of local officials in the USSR”.146 As mentioned in 
the fifth chapter, in June 1986 the CC CPUz and SM UzSSR even decreed a sort 
of damnatio memoriae cancelling any commemoration of his name, restoring 
original place names and removing the financial and housing support to his 
family.147 While the Uzbek affair became a media issue throughout the USSR, 
Rashidov’s name was in fact associated with that of a ‘Mafia godfather’. 
Nevertheless, after 1990, a campaign for the rehabilitation of Sharaf Rashidov 
became a crucial part of Uzbek public debate, becoming something of a cause 
célèbre, even in the official Uzbek press.148 In an interview published in the 
Soviet newspaper Izvestiya in 1991, President Karimov responded to 
Rashidov’s rehabilitation, explaining how his name was a symbol of recent 
events in Uzbekistan and how he had become a scapegoat for the period of 
stagnation:  
The attitude towards Rashidov was defined during the XXII Congress of the CPUz 
and at the III session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. I agree with the 
assessment that has been made in these places. The meaning of these 
evaluations is that the personality of Rashidov cannot be decontextualized from 
the period in which he lived and worked. I have to say that the hardest crisis 
that hit us was not economic, but moral. The consequences of the destruction 
of the ancient moral traditions for the sake of ideological reasons will be much 
more difficult to overcome than economic problems. Not long ago, a communist 
who had an important position could not go to the cemetery to honor his 
deceased loved ones. Participation in the process of burial has been associated 
with mortal sin, and the person was expelled from the party and removed from 
his position. To reconcile with his conscience and to not lose what has been 
achieved over many years, people even preferred to ‘go to hospital’ or leave on 
‘urgent’ business trips when a relative died. Moreover, after this, we say to 
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people there is nothing left of the spiritual dimension and the double morality 
regarding religion took on its ugliest form. A million and a half of the inhabitants 
of the republic who had the opportunity to watch Afghan TV have seen that the 
Soviet army was building and restoring mosques there. Meanwhile, here the 
mosques were destroyed. This attitude lasted until 1988 [...] when those 24,000 
criminal cases connected with the cotton [affair] started such that villains and 
even their victims appeared behind bars. This has undermined the people’s faith 
in justice. Meanwhile, our managers regularly reported to Moscow about those 
thousands of people arrested or expelled from the party for the facts related to 
cotton. Not all of them were convicted in vain, but this is not a justification for 
the thousands of innocents who have been persecuted unjustly. Only lately, we 
have compensated 1.5 million rubles to those who had been unjustly sentenced, 
and now released and rehabilitated. [About the years of stagnation] why in the 
ranks of Brezhnev people, they recall just Rashidov, while his other companions 
live serenely out from the public or have returned to political activity? In this 
imbalance, we can see the injustice.149 
Then, since 1990, the legal and honorary rehabilitation of victims thus 
became one of the main points of Karimov’s political agenda which advanced 
an agenda of forgiveness towards those former ‘culprits’ who has seemingly 
overnight become ‘victims’ of the repressive Soviet system. According to the 
Uzbek leader, corruption and falsifications in Uzbekistan were just one 
example of a wider problem related to the stagnation period. However, the 
republic became the scapegoat for the whole Soviet system. During the same 
interview, the reporter asked him why his opponents were linking his 
moderation towards Rashidov with the fact that he also had concentrated in 
his hands so much power since becoming President of the UzSSR, head of the 
cabinet (the former SM) and FS CPUz. Thus, Karimov answered that his actual 
status was the “requirement for the time of the transition to face the explosive 
situation which was formed in the country and in the republic.”150 In this way, 
the self-victimization rhetoric, the need to rehabilitate the victims of 
repression and the continuous call to an ‘emergency’ situation would become 
elements that President Karimov continued to apply in order to legitimize his 
power even in the following decades, laying the blame on the Soviet past to 
justify the present. Substantially, according to the Uzbek president, the 
‘negative phenomena’ related to the ‘cotton scandal’ were the natural 
outcome of Soviet policies of cotton monoculture, imposed on Uzbekistan with 
the most severe means:  
                                                          
149 Izvestiya’s interview with Karimov reported in PV, 22487, 21, 30 January 1991, p. 2. 
150 Ibid. 
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and those who did not agree were removed or replaced. [Moscow] chose those 
who were obedient, declaring that they would reach the [five-year] plan in [just] 
two years. It remained only to seed cotton on the sills or on the roofs. We have 
provided the independence of cotton [to the USSR] but, in return, we have 
received economic dependence. Everything was just created for the final 
purpose of cotton. Now we need to import more than half of our consumer 
goods.151 
Subsequently, the narrative emerged that Rashidov, although the main 
culprit or an accomplice, had effectively had no choice and had done 
everything possible to protect his people from the exploitation of Moscow. On 
18 October 1991, during a commemoration of Alisher Navoi – considered one 
of the fathers of Uzbek literature – the controversial rehabilitation of the 
literary work of Sharaf Rashidov152 was finally revived.153 Meanwhile, his 
controversial name was still signifying absolutism, nepotism, patrimonialism, 
stagnation and corruption in the rest of Soviet Union. Conversely, in 
Uzbekistan, Rashidov, his literary works, his family and even his power network 
were rehabilitated by politics, literature154 and historiography.155 Indeed, 
Rashidov was recast as a ‘patriot’, a ‘national hero’ – who behaved in such a 
way to maximize the Uzbeks’ interests sharing power and wealth amongst the 
                                                          
151 PV, 22514, 48, 8 March 1991, p. 1. 
152 PV, 22671, 205, 19 October 1991, p. 1. 
153 Allworth comments: “many people perceived Rashidov's extraliterary motives [but] 
they could not express great respect for his writing. His endless panegyrics to Russia, 
then, succeeded temporarily as Sovietwide political devices but failed as indigenous art 
for the emerging Uzbek nationality. In that crucial regard, the leader's main aesthetic 
method, his literary animus, could not contribute to a distinctive new Uzbek profile in 
Central Asia.” Allworth, The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the 
Present : A Cultural History, 315–16. 
154 An example is Rizaev, who explains his wish to write a book about Rashidov which 
would run counter to the ‘rashidovshina’ narrative. According to him, “the center 
needed to find a scapegoat in order to expose the appalling corruption and the 
incoherence of its promises […] Despite the ‘Uzbek affairs’ the people of Uzbekistan 
kept a respectful attitude towards Rashidov.” In Rizaev’s opinion, falsifications were not 
a direct responsibility of Rashidov but of the Soviet system. Saidakbar Rizaevich Rizaev, 
Sharaf Rashidov. Shtrikhi K Portretu (Toshkent: Yozuvchi, 1992), 5. 
155 According to Buttino, in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, “the history was bent for this 
purpose, gave merits and honors returned to the party leaders. In reality, these leaders 
were not so forward-looking, but they sailed in a corrupt world and then ran the power 
left by the Soviet collapse which they had not wanted nor expected.” Buttino, 
Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 36. 
599 
 
Uzbek people – and a symbol of revenge and resistance against Soviet ‘colonial 
rule’. This, then was a curious paradox, considering the work of the longest-
serving Soviet leader who had himself been a key contributor to the 
Sovietization of Uzbekistan. Similarly, both Usmankhodzhaev and Nishanov 
were represented as ‘Moscow’s puppets’, responsible for the ‘repression 
against the Uzbek people.’ However, Rashidov and his successors responded 
to central policies in order to legitimate their power, endorsing and declaring 
what Moscow wanted to hear. The campaign for ‘six million tons’ and the ‘fight 
against the negative phenomena’ had both a confirmatory-legitimizing intent 
in order to demonstrate loyalty to the Soviet cause. In this power structure, the 
latest Soviet leaders of Uzbekistan were probably not so different in their role. 
Despite the opposition of Birlik – that opposed this rehabilitation course 
and, for many extents, used the same argumentation of the ‘Uzbek affairs’ 
against Karimov156 - since 1991, monuments and streets in Tashkent157 and in 
other cities of Uzbekistan158 have been dedicated to Rashidov’s memory. In 
Jizzak – his native city – the Uzbek government endorsed several initiatives in 
his name. For 75th anniversary Rashidov’s birth (6 November 1992) a jubilee 
commission organized celebrations all around the city and several places were 
renamed in his honor, a monumental complex with his bust was inaugurated, 
a madrasa, and the ‘Monumental Museum Sh. Rashidov’ dedicated to ‘the 
                                                          
156 In its program, Birlik was using the same argument of the ‘Uzbek affairs’ against 
Karimov, evidencing a corrupt trend from Rashidov within the party and the state 
apparat that lasted until the present day: “the bustle in changing republican leadership 
(Rashidov - Usmankhodzhaev - Nishanov - Larimov) and of the official management of 
the SS UzSSR and SM UzSSR led to the renaissance of rashidovshina, corruption and 
fortification of [a corrupt] administrative and the command system.” Hoover Institution 
Archives, Inventory of the Soviet and post-Soviet independent publications collection, 
box 465, Birlik - Gazeta narodnogo dvizheniia Uzbekistana, Spetsvypusk titled "Za nashu 
i vashu svobodu," pp. 5-6. 
157 After the removal of the Lenin statue from Tashkent center (7 June 1992), Lenin 
street was renamed after Sharaf Rashidov, and near his former grave, a memorial 
complex was built after destroying a church and removing a pelmeny place, a puppet 
theater and an ice cream café. Then, the memorial complex was enlarged in a labyrinth 
shape and in the center a monumental bust was put. See Clark, Crime and Punishment 
in Soviet Officialdom. Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 1965-1990, 191. 
158 At the beginning of 1992, a movie about Rashidov entitled “Triumf i drama Sharafa 
Rashidova” was shot and diffused; and in May 1992 the Uzbek parliament announced 
that Ilyichevsky raion in Syrdarya oblast was renamed after Sharaf Rashidov. However, 
in 2004, it was renamed again as Sardoba. Ibid. 
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important statist and public figure, poet and writer, twice hero of labor’ were 
founded in Jizzakh. The museum was officially established by a decree of 
President Karimov to celebrate a symbol of modernization and Uzbek 
independence. He left a message that is still exposed in the main hall: 
This [celebration] is for the 75th anniversary of Sharaf Rashidov but, first of all, 
needless to say, for his 30 years serving Uzbekistan and our people. This is to 
restore his name to our generation. Slanders such as the "Uzbek affair," the 
"cotton affair" made a blemish to our people, defamed our country, accusing 
[us] to be "thieves" and "bribers." He suffered all of this and restored the justice 
to its current level and for the future life; he saved history. Secondly, he 
condemned the people who sold the[ir] relatives, the people and the country. 
Thirdly, as having reached independence, we do not let our country to be in the 
hands of strangers, we are responsible for our people's lives - [This is] the truth 
that we should bear in mind. Finally, we should persuade our young generation 
that there is still justice in the world.159 
This narrative correlates both Rashidov’s rehabilitation and Mustaqillik, to 
imply a relationship of interdependence. As it is stated in the museum, “with 
the independence of our motherland, even the good name of the 
unforgettable Sh. Rashidov is returned,” celebrating “one of the best sons of 
the fatherland” who said once “if Uzbekistan ever become independent, I will 
put gold in front of every house.” The museum – that appears as a ‘meta-
museum’ where the visitors go to admire the concept rather than its collection 
- was located in a former school library (built during Rashidov’s period in office) 
to contain a collection of his personal belongings of donated by his daughter, 
Sayora Rashidova. Accordingly, Jizzakh became the center for the memory of 
Sharaf Rashidov and it is now planning to celebrate the 100th anniversary of his 
birth, in 2017, with an ambitious plan of urban embellishment and 
modernization in order to make the city “as beautiful as he dreamed”160 and a 
series of public events. 
Thus, Rashidov (and his works) became the main symbol to be rehabilitated 
against the humiliation of the ‘Uzbek affair’. According to the chairman of the 
                                                          
159 Message left by Islom Karimov and reported in the hall of Monumental Museum Sh. 
Rashidov in Jizzakh. 
160 The official statement expressed in the brochure of the “Monumental Museum Sh. 
Rashidov” in Jizzak, donated by museum’s curator. Interview in Jizzak, 13 June 2015. 
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Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan (FATi),161 Ravshan 
Abdullaev, there could be even an attempt to rehabilitate this Brezhnevian 
symbol as a sort of “jadid”, a “partisan with the pen” who peacefully struggled 
against the colonial power.162 This provocation can appear paradoxical when 
related to a Soviet leader, but it is based on the fact that Sharaf Rashidov 
represented a model of progress and development in a Muslim society, 
“defending the interests of Uzbek people.” However, contrary to the jadids, he 
was also the endorser of a deep sovietization process that erased national 
culture and tradition.163 Wooden and Stefes have commented the 
rehabilitation as a direct political maneuver: “Karimov’s decision to embrace 
past policies and to rehabilitate Rashidov, as well as other officials involved in 
the cotton affair, would also result in the return of members of the former First 
Party Secretary’s Soviet-era elite.”164 This political analysis is sharp, considering 
that the Rashidovian elite was mostly restored and ruled for more than three 
decades after Rashidov’s death. Nevertheless, it was functional to legitimize 
Karimov’s regime. On this matter, Buttino commented: 
The existence of an Uzbek resistance to Soviet colonialism led by Rashidov and 
Karimov is a central part of the official Uzbek rewriting of history after 1991 and 
entered into textbooks [...The 'cotton affair'] was interpreted as a colonial act 
such as the arrival of cadres from the centre to replace local leaders accused of 
corruption in the cotton scandal. For many Uzbek leaders newcomers were seen 
as people who commanded without knowing the country and were held 
responsible for an atmosphere of utter arbitrariness and chaos. According to 
this interpretation, when he was appointed first secretary of the Uzbek party, 
Islam Karimov has wisely brought the country to the previous order, liberating 
from prison hundreds of people unjustly convicted and putting every process 
down.165 
                                                          
161 The institute is the official institution responsible for defining the historiography. In 
Soviet times, the institute was a party organ under the Institute of Marxism Leninism of 
the CC CPSU.  
162 Interview with Prof. Ravshan M. Abdullaev, Tashkent, 19 June 2015. 
163 Interview with Prof. Ravshan M. Abdullaev, Tashkent, 23 May 2015. 
164 Amanda E. Wooden and Christoph H. Stefes, The Politics of Transition in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, Enduring Legacies and Emerging Challenges (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 150. 
165 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 36. 
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7.3 Uzbekistan towards Independence 
Despite Karimov playing the nationalist tones in front of the republican 
elite, he had a softer and more collaborative attitude in Moscow. In fact, during 
the XXVIII congress of CPSU (2-13 July 1990), the Uzbek president remarked the 
importance of a political union in the USSR while he how during the cotton 
affairs the republic became a test site for repression and mass lawlessness, 
degrading to people’s national dignity. On that occasion, the Uzbek president 
reiterated the importance of unity in the party - that at that time was seriously 
challenged by internal struggles – proposing the democratization of the 
organization and of the entire system of intra-party relations. The means to 
autonomy within a Union was, again the formula that Karimov proposed in 
Moscow, clenching on the inadmissibility of a new return to hard bureaucratic 
centralism, and a hierarchical structure “that castrates the Leninist ideas.”166 
Substantially, Karimov was advancing an autonomist agenda that would 
nonetheless be limited for as long as it existed within the Soviet constitutional 
framework. 
The declaration of sovereignty of the Republic of Uzbekistan (20 June 1990) 
– which affirmed Tashkent prerogative power over the Uzbek population and 
territory167 – started the constitutional negotiations, which would define the 
involvement of the republic within the Soviet economic system. The 
negotiations would even bring forth the ideas of breaking the dependence 
yoke and strengthening the local cotton production industry. In this phase, 
besides confirming the commitments to supply the USSR with Uzbek ‘white 
gold’ until the end of the Soviet system,168 since 1989 the Tashkent government 
also followed an autonomist path, including a number of different measures: it 
launched a plan to build new factories and to restore, modernize and to 
improve the economic efficiency of the existing complexes; to endorse 
programs and proposal to make the cotton sector autonomous from the Soviet 
                                                          
166 PV, 22330, 164, 19 July 1990, p. 1. 
167 PV, 22307, 141, 22 June 1990, p. 1. 
168 On 13 April 1991, the first deputy prime minister Dzhurabekov wrote to the SM USSR 
confirming an exportation from Uzbekistan to the rest of USSR of about 1.334 million 
tons of fibers. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 7990, l. 30. 
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planning system;169 and to exchange the share of agricultural productions and 
redefining the interexchange agreement of the planned system.170 
Cotton factories in 1989 in UzSSR171 
Region Total Renovated 
Karakalpak ASSR 9 6 
Andijan 13 13 
Bukhara 9 8 
Jizzak 8 2 
Kashkadarya 12 7 
Navoii / / 
Namangan 9 9 
Samarkand 10 7 
Surkhandarya 10 9 
Syrdarya 10 7 
Tashkent 11 7 
Fergana 8 8 
Khorezm 10 10 
Total 119 93 
Nevertheless, the negotiations to define the role of Uzbekistan within the 
Soviet system proceeded also at a constitutional level. In the meeting of the 
Federation Council on 12 June 1990, Karimov recalled the need for a new 
agreement to build a confederation among “free republics,”172 while the 
debate on the redefinition of the Soviet institutional framework continued in 
the whole country. Meanwhile, the ‘conservative’ faction of the CC CPSU 
                                                          
169 On 14 August 1990, the first deputy chairman SM UzSSR Dzhurabekov wrote to SM 
USSR to organize new selection of cotton types in Uzbekistan and not in Moscow in 
order to reach at least on cotton issues the same autonomy as Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine. TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 7824, ll. 59-60. 
170 On 28 December 1990, the Uzbek government was proposing to the SM USSR to 
exchange for 1991 about 50 thousand tons of cotton fibers for fodder for livestock. 
TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 7990, l. 96. 
171 These data are referred to the total of cotton factories in UzSSR and the number of 
complexes that had been repaired and renovated in capitals by 28 August 1989. 
TsGARUz, f. 837, op. 41, d. 7616, l. 46. 
172 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS... (Moskva: Gorbachev Fond, 2008), 628. 
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opposed any possibility of secession.173 In this phase, Karimov had an active 
role and on 19 September he proposed to Gorbachev a project to reform the 
country on the base of a “real Union’s agreement”174 – that would replace the 
1922 one - among sovereign republics that are “voluntarily inside and outside 
of the USSR.”175 Karimov’s project, that sounded like a sort of confederation, 
acknowledged the respect of all nations and recognizes sovereignty and 
culture, traditions, languages in every republic (art. 1); the full independence 
of the republics with the exception of those rights that they delegate to the 
Union (art. 3); the full property of the resources (art.4).176 In  this regard (art. 
5), Karimov’s project referred to Uzbek gold - defining that prices of resources 
would be fixed by world prices and payed in freely convertible currency177 - and 
cotton that Uzbekistan will give to the center for no more of 40% of its 
production in exchange of meat, milk, sugar and other products. In the current 
situation of economic crisis, Karimov affirmed that the republic needed 5-10 
years to recover, and requested an annual budget of 55-60 billion rubles from 
the center. In parallel, he requested that a part of Soviet budget would be 
dedicated to recover the ecological disaster in the Pre-Aral regions and to build 
infrastructures that could ensure the water demand.178 
Alongside, the project proposed for the republic to reach the free access on 
the global marked and an equitable status in international relations and foreign 
trade (art. 6) and the peaceful and common agreement to define the borders 
between republics (art. 7). This “voluntary transfer of sovereignty” – and also 
the definition of borders, economic and political regime - would be confirmed 
by referendums179 and set a convergence goal that required republics’ 
                                                          
173 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 635; 
Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle 
Biceṕhale (Longueuil: EǶditions Kéruss, 2007). 
174 In light of the transformation of the political, social and economic system, to make a 
real Union's treaty to reaffirm socialist order on the base of democracy, personal 
freedoms and social aims, welfare of people, mutual enrichment of national cultures, 
taking advantage of all-Union market, regional division of labor and the integration of 
national economy on the basis of the need to maintain the current balance of forces in 
peace, together with environmental and other global threats to mankind, expressing 
the interests and need of their people. GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 3. 
175 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 3. 
176 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 4. 
177 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 5. 
178 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 6. 
179 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 7. 
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standards gap to do not exceed 25%.180 Thus, the union’s prerogatives would 
be in specific issues such as the most important scientific research, defense, 
energy systems, railways, water infrastructure and atomic energy, 
cosmonautic, communications, information and informatics, and emergency 
management. The citizens of the USSR would be equal and free to live in any 
part of the union (art. 8).181  
The project also specified that law had to follow common standards in each 
republic on the matters of citizenship, production, soil, forests, water, 
mountains, crimes, forced labor, finance, labor legislation, social protection 
and pensions, public association of citizens, environmental protection, 
administrative offenses, judiciary proceeding, education and health (art. 9); it 
also confirms that republics are free but not in establishing Union law and not 
against other republics (art. 10).182 Both Union and republics protect human 
rights mutually (art. 11); the republics pays the budget to the Union and then 
it is redistributed (art. 12); the SS USSR would be the central organ of the Union, 
while the President of USSR would be the head of state elected by citizens (art. 
13);183 a Soviet of sovereign states would monitor the application of the treaty 
(art. 14) and the government of the state would be conferred to the presidium 
(art. 15). The USSR courts would address violations of the Union law and the SC 
USSR (and even military tribunals) would accept refers from republican courts 
(art. 16);184 every republic would join this treaty as a subject of international 
law and could take duties internationally, but not against the interests of the 
Union or of other republics (art. 17).  
The project also specified that every citizen of a republic is a citizen of the 
USSR with the same fundamental rights (art. 18)185 and the republican law 
cannot dispute the unions’ law (art. 19) while also the administrative issues 
(art. 20)186 and conflict of laws (art. 21) would be defined by the USSR 
constitution. The self determination of any republic can be defined by a 
referendum for independence that can pass with 2/3 of votes and proposed by 
10% of citizens who have the right to vote (art. 22)187 and the resolution of this 
                                                          
180 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 8. 
181 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 9. 
182 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 10. 
183 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 11. 
184 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 12. 
185 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 13. 
186 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 14. 
187 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 15. 
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referendum is taken by the SS USSR that give 5 years to resolve the problem 
after which the republic can separate. In these 5 transitional years, both soviet 
and republican laws are operative (art. 23) and at the end of the transitional 
period the republican will would be respected (art. 24) but the eventual 
secessionist republic would pay for its debts (art 25).188 Basically, Karimov was 
pushing to reform the Union’s agreement in the framework of international 
law and claiming for Uzbekistan major possibilities to manage its resources and 
even reaffirming the possibility of secession. Nevertheless, any possibility of 
the separation of Uzbekistan from the USSR seemed to be undesirable and 
these kinds of proposals were a typical bargaining strategy which entailed 
attracting as much resources as possible to the republic. Also in USSR, every 
miller draws water to his own mill. 
In the first months of 1991 - while Moscow was effectively facing 
separatism in Lithuania189 - in Uzbekistan Karimov stressed the responsibility of 
the Soviet government for the ‘cotton scandal’, as well as for the monoculture 
and the related ecological disaster - or ‘ecocide’ - in the Aral Basin, even as he 
was restoring the figure of Rashidov. However, Karimov continued to profess 
his loyalty towards the Soviet cause, excluding the possibility of secession. In 
fact, Karimov still seemed to be a proponent of maintaining the Union. He 
argued that the party needed a firm line attempts of systemic openings could 
be seen as signs of weakness and uncertainty, giving to the opposition an easy 
opportunity to take advantage and make demagogy.190 
Hence, during the IV plenum of the CC CPUz (12 March 1991), Karimov 
affirmed the importance of reforming the system and disavowed any 
separation hypothesis, explaining that this kind of maneuver might be a hazard 
because the country that was not ready for sudden independence. On that 
occasion, the Uzbek president invited the electorate to vote – in a referendum 
                                                          
188 GARF, f. 9654, op. 7, d. 1097, l. 16. 
189 On 29 January 1991, in the aftermath of the Lithuanian crisis, despite the opposition 
of republics Gorbachev with a decree legalize the displacement of joint police-military 
troops to avoid civil war. Nevertheless, on 9 February a referendum with more of 90% 
of consensus confirmed the people's will for the Lithuanian independence. Andreï S. 
Gratchev, L’histoire Vraie De La Fin De L’urss - Le Naufrage De Gorbatchev (Paris: 
Editions Du Rocher, 1992), 346–47. 
190 Pikhoya, URSS, Histoire Du Pouvoir. Tome 2, Le Retour de L’aigle Biceṕhale, 314–15, 
318. 
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on 17 March – to remain within in the USSR.191 He affirmed that the destruction 
of the Soviet Union “means the threat of legal chaos, the first manifestations 
of which we already feel as a result of separatist aspirations, violations of 
economic and productive relations […] only a renewed union of sovereign and 
independent republics will be the warranty and the condition for the free 
development of each republic.”192 In the end, during the ‘Soviet Union 
referendum’ of March 1991, 9,215,571 Uzbek voters (93.9%) voted in favor of 
remaining in the renewed Union,193 one of the highest rates in the whole Soviet 
Union. It seemed then that, despite perestroika being presented by Tashkent 
as a camouflaged repressive maneuver, Uzbek citizens still wanted to stay 
within the USSR. 
Despite the will to remain in the Soviet system, Karimov kept seeking for 
better opportunities for the republic. During a Federation Council meeting of 9 
April 1991, the Uzbek president argued with Orlov and affirmed: 
And what do we do if from the Union budget we do not receive 7 billion rubles? 
Not only the federal, but also the republican budget is on the verge of collapse.  
The division into positive and negative republics [is unacceptable]. 40% of 
Uzbekistan's budget is created by the union. The Republic itself can provide, and 
lives with his hand outstretched. Just for gold, it loses 2 billion rubles. One of 
the measures could be a solution for barter plan production.194 
When Gorbachev was on a state visit in Japan, on 18 April the 
representatives of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ("the 
five core republics") met in Kiev to propose the terms of the new union treaty 
that had to be formed by sovereign states, sounding like a sort of confederation 
pact, and excluding this dignity to ASSR (that was a Gorbachev's proposal in 
order to destabilize the Yeltsin position). The next step was taken on 23 April, 
when an agreement between the Soviet central government and the nine 
republics (the so-called “9+1” agreement) was finally signed in Novo-Ogaryovo 
on April 23.195 Thus, on June, Karimov together with Mahkamov was one of the 
                                                          
191 The popular referendum on the future of the Soviet Union was held on 17 March 
1991 in the nine republics (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) which participated in the drafting 
of the treaty. 
192 PV, 22516, 50, 13 March 1991, p. 2. 
193 PV, 22522, 56, 21 March 1991, p. 3. 
194 Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 684. 
195 The New Union Treaty would have converted the Soviet Union into a federation of 
independent republics with a common president, foreign policy, and military. Russian 
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first leaders to agree on the version of the Union’s treaty.196 Finally, on 12 July 
1991, the SS USSR approved in principle the union treaty draft and during the 
plenum CPSU of 29 the date of 20 August for signing the agreement was 
scheduled.197 On 2 August, Gorbachev announced that the treaty was open for 
validation while Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announced their 
willingness for signing on 20 August.198 Russian democrats were asking Yeltsin 
not to sign until Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia were all ready to join. 
Thus, excluding Uzbekistan from the priority199 and marking an idea of Union 
that would keep united those territories that were historically tied to Moscow. 
Nevertheless, on 10 August, Yeltsin wrote an open letter where he confirmed 
the participation of Uzbekistan – together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan 
and Belarus for a new Union's treaty.200 The project to relaunch a Union 
agreement seemed to take form and Uzbekistan was a part of it. 
7.3.1 Rewriting memory to advance Mustaqillik 
At the same time as the  Uzbek president refusing any separation attempt 
and was negotiating the role of the republic in the new union, the political 
narrative at domestic level remained nationalist – and to a large extent 
chauvinist and anti-colonialist – criticizing Moscow and its policy. Indeed, the 
Uzbek press kept pursuing accusations against the ‘perestroika democracy’, 
reminding the public of how the ‘cotton affair’ could be considered as but the 
latest dose of humiliation, violence and repression, akin to that Uzbekistan had 
experienced during the ‘30s and ‘50s.201 Karimov, again, took part in the media 
quarrel, and during his speech at the V session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme 
Soviet, he replied to those he called ‘slanderous inventions’ of Soviet 
newspapers, and joked in the following way about himself: “President Karimov, 
thus violating the law, frees people from prison who have been convicted for 
                                                          
would become a lingua franca, while the common budget would remain at central level. 
Basically, it was a plan to establish a sort of confederation of republics. Graziosi, L’Urss 
Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 637, 642; Matlock, 
Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union, 511–12. 
196 GF. F. 5, d. 18049. 
197 Graziosi, L’Urss Dal Trionfo Al Degrado. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1945-1991, 642. 
198 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse 
of the Soviet Union, 757. 
199 Ibid., 573–74. 
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the ‘cotton affairs’.”202 He was, substantially, taking the responsibility of this 
rehabilitation course and negating the policies that Moscow had imposed in 
the republic during the previous years. This narrative would effectively become 
operative once that – after the failed conservative putsch led by the GKChP - 
the latest attempts to save Soviet Union failed. 
At that time, Karimov’s attitude towards the putsch – which was openly 
supported by the other Central Asians leaders – was ambiguous, assuming a 
very careful position.203 Without condemning the coup, he filtered out a certain 
neutrality towards its leaders.204. On August 20, Karimov appealed to the 
people, declaring: “no matter what forces may have opposed us and called our 
activity a dictatorship, we have always been advocates of strong discipline and 
order, and no one can deny this.”205 Nevertheless, he “made his own personal 
contribution by arresting his rival, the chairman of the Uzbek Popular Front, 
Abdurrakhim Pulatov, on 19 August”206 then, when the coup failed, Karimov 
did not have other choice that an inevitable and undesirable independence.  
                                                          
202 PV, 22580, 114, 15 June 1991, p. 2. 
203 According to Matlock, Karimov was endorsing the coup. Ibid., 587, 611. 
204 During the August 1991 coup in Moscow, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov took an 
ambiguous and cautious stance towards the coup leaders until it was clear that the coup 
would fail. In fact, since 17 August, Karimov was on an official visit to India: according 
to Malikov, this is a strange political agenda, considering that some days before he met 
Pavlov in Tashkent and on 20 August he was supposed to be in Moscow to sign the new 
Union’s agreement. Anyway, he immediately returned to Tashkent. Uzbek authorities 
took emergency measures in Uzbekistan, issuing a “vaguely worded statement 
declaring certain emergency measures, but were careful to write in a way which could 
be interpreted as an expression either of neutrality or support for the coup” without 
mentioning the removal of Gorbachev and just calling for order and discipline. Until 
Karimov took charge, the Vice President Shukrullo Mirsaidov and his allies made 
statements supporting the coup. An intense debate between the two figures followed. 
After returning, Karimov made ambiguous statements that could be read in support of 
both coup leaders and Gorbachev. “He cautiously explained that he would only be able 
to give his opinion of the changes after becoming thoroughly acquainted with detained 
plans for implementing the promises made by government circles” Tunçer-Kılavuz, 
Power, Networks and Violent Conflict in Central Asia: A Comparison of Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, 91; Malikov, “Uzbekistan: A View from the Opposition.” 
205 American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, “The Current Digest of 
Soviet Press,” 1991, 14. translating an article of Izvestiya, September 13, 1991. 
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On 23 August, Karimov resigned from the Communist Party and on 26 
August, he nationalized the MVD and the KGB. In his speech at the CC CPUz 
plenum of 28 August 1991, the Uzbek president condemned the “criminal 
attempt of coup of 19–21 August” and protested against Gorbachev’s decision 
to resign as General Secretary of CPSU. However, he took note of the events 
specifying that the  
dissolution of the party and of the fate of its property should be decided by the 
plenum or by the party congress […] but today after the declaration of 
Gorbachev the harsh realities of life raise questions about our party. 
[…Nevertheless] these questions can be answered only by the congress of 
communists of the Republic.207  
At the end, the failed putsch had finally and irreversibly undermined the 
credibility and solidity of Soviet power. Finally, on 30 August the property of 
the CPUz was nationalized and the party cut its ties with the CPSU.208 On 31 
August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR officially sanctioned the 
renamed Republic of Uzbekistan as a sovereign and independent state, 
effective 1 September 1991. Although Karimov was cautious in his initial 
speeches – balancing national interests with support for the Soviet cause – he 
assumed a hard tone following the proclamation of independence of a republic 
that was, formally at least, still part of Soviet Union. In his speech at the VI 
extraordinary session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, the President declared: 
Everything that was done to us, our people, Uzbekistan, differed little from the 
policy of the [colonial] pre-revolutionary period, and the republic was not much 
more than a source of raw materials. It was in the mind of all the organs of the 
union, who knew only that this region had to provide cotton, raw materials, 
while the rest of our needs remained our problem to resolve. They promised 
much, but none of it was honored. For the state independence in terms of 
cotton, the republic had to make many sacrifices, putting the people of 
Uzbekistan in total dependence on the import of meat, milk and most essential 
goods for the subsistence of life. We must say that this policy led Uzbekistan to 
the brink of collapse, with the lowest per capita income and a budget that had 
the character of a grant. And we were supposed to be ‘grateful’ for any meagre 
ration we received from the center. By this moment, we had finally realized who 
                                                          
207 PV, 22633, 167, 29 August 1991, p. 1. 
208 At this point, the CPUz was formally renamed as the People's Democratic Party of 
Uzbekistan (PDPU) and effectively transformed on 1 November 1991. 
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our friends and who our enemies were, who wanted well-being and peace [for 
us] and who was hiding a stone behind his back.209 
This reformulation, which assumes properly anticolonial rhetorical tones, 
indicated the following fact: that the USSR was, effectively, over. On the same 
occasion, the Supreme Soviet promulgated a decree of ‘amnesty on the 
occasion of Independence Day of the Republic of Uzbekistan’ that pardoned 
many prisoners condemned during the ‘cotton affairs’210 and effectively 
becoming a key political issue in Karimov’s agenda. In the program of the 
renamed People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, the first item was entitled 
“lessons of history and the path forward” saying that “the story of many family 
stories have become the allegations related to persecution on so-called ‘cotton 
affairs’, but this past way showed the futility of the administrative system and 
totalitarian control with its anti-people policy.”211 In this political program, 
there were several references to the other mentioned traumas of cotton 
monoculture and its disastrous ecological consequences.212 Emblematically, 
Karimov used often the ‘cotton affairs’ issue to reformulate the ideology of 
Mustaqillik and independence appeared as a rebirth of the nation in the 
likeness of the Homa, the legendary phoenix-like bird that, in 1992, was 
officially established as the symbol of the Republic of Uzbekistan. 
The use of a trauma like the ‘Uzbek Affair’ – a fresh experience that involved 
a large part of the elite emotionally against the central power in Moscow – is 
still implemented in Uzbek politics to garner popular legitimation. The USSR 
‘legalization season’ became a symbol of ‘restyled’ purge and unfair Soviet 
persecution against Uzbeks who “felt they had been blamed unfairly for the 
results of Moscow’s inflexible and unrealistic cotton procurement policies. 
[…T]hey resented their portrayal in the Soviet press as being temperamentally 
corrupt, a criticism that offended their sense of national honor.”213 In fact, since 
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1989 in Uzbekistan it has become common to interpret the cotton scandal (and 
the related scandals of child labor in cotton fields) as a normal consequence of 
colonialism or an error of planning policies. This interpretation is also 
presented by international scholars, such as Ahmed Rashid, who seems to 
understand, even to justify, the informal/shadow economy as the only way to 
survive under the inefficient USSR: 
the black economy [...] amounted to one third of the total economy in Central 
Asia [...and] corruption was [...] a safety valve to keep the system running and 
allow clan networks to operate to alleviate local problems, food shortages and 
unemployment.214 
Indeed, Karimov was able to promote himself as the father of the newly 
independent Uzbekistan who alone broke ties with this perverse ‘colonial 
system.’ At the same time he was still trying to keep – in the form of agreement 
– the same economic ties with Russia that he was narratively refusing.215 
Nevertheless, no other projects to reform the Union seemed to be credible and 
Karimov just followed the destructive course of the events.216 The USSR was 
                                                          
214 Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or Nationalism?, 66, 92. 
215 On 18 October 1991, the Soviet President Gorbachev and the leaders of Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia 
signed an agreement on the economic community. On 4 November, the republican 
leaders convened to abolish the soviet ministries except for defense, foreign affairs, 
railways, electric power and nuclear power while there was no agreement on the debt 
of the Soviet state that Uzbekistan did not want to cover. On 5 November 1991, 
Chernyaev noted in his diary: “The agenda included the question of implementation of 
the Economic Agreement, on which nothing has been done… The memorandum on 
external debt, to which M.S. referred to Madrid and in Lache, turned out to be signed 
only halfway… Mutalibov and Karimov declared that they don’t have to pay, it is the 
Center that has to pay them… And try as he might, Yavlinsky failed to convince them 
not to follow the Bolsheviks of 1917, who stated that the Tsar made the debts so he 
should pay them. They did not heed…” On 14 November, there was another prior 
agreement on the form of confederation and on 25 November 1991, during a meeting 
of the State Council, Karimov confirmed that besides the commitments of the Novo-
Ogorevo: “Prior to consideration of the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan, I can not be 
initialed.” Svetlana Savranskaya, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev. 1991. Donated by 
A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive” (Washington, D.C., 2011), 157; 
Gorbachev Fond, V Politburo TsK KPSS..., 749, 779; Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The 
American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 758. 
216 On 10 December 1991, Chernyaev noted in his diary: “At noon, M.S. spoke with 
Yeltsin. Kravchuk and Shushkevich did not come. Before that, he spoke with 
Nazarbayev. Then the three of them met. I don’t know what happened there. After that, 
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over and his political career would inexorably remain on the national front. 
Hence, during the campaign for the presidential election in autumn 1991, he 
gave a speech addressed ‘to all citizens of Uzbekistan’ in which he stated that 
[in the last months]: 
the popular festivals and traditions had been revived and thousands of people 
unjustly repressed were rehabilitated [...] The situation in Uzbekistan has been 
exasperating also because we have been the victim of colonial expansion of 
Tsarist Russia and the short-sighted policy of leaders of later ages, who have 
condemned us to distorted development and a one-sided economy. Our region 
has been transformed as the appendix of raw materials for the other industrial 
regions.217 
In this way, the Uzbek president reversed the previous narrative – which 
spoke of a republic that was fully contributing to the Soviet cause – through 
‘exploitation’ rhetoric, casting the cotton monoculture issues, such as the 
‘cotton scandal’, as a consequence of a colonial system. This ‘justification’ 
narrative was not only theoretical but also had political implications in terms 
of popular legitimation. In fact, at the fourth point of the political program 
presented by Karimov at the Supreme Soviet in November 1991, there was 
even the plan for a general ‘amnesty of those people that had been condemned 
during the so called ‘cotton affairs’.218 This point was in line with the revisionist 
approach towards the cotton affairs after the spring of 1989 when, as we have 
seen, the evidence made on confessions was reconsidered by the defendants 
and finally dropped.  
On 12 September 1989, the SM UzSSR established a higher commission to 
reconsider to rework over the cotton affairs (paxta ishi), analyzing more than 
40,000 documents and collaborating with the SC UzSSR for the rehabilitation 
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of almost 3,500 prisoners.219 Then, in 1990, more than 800 sentences 
connected with the cotton affairs were reexamined by Uzbek courts and in 
February 1991, the SC UzSSR examined and acquitted another 241 cases, 
rehabilitating 1,600 wrongly convicted and dispensing more than 1.5 million 
rubles in compensations.220 Finally, on 25 July 1991, the MJs of UzSSR and 
RSFSR signed an agreement of judicial cooperation - the first of this kind and 
before the Soviet collapse – that effectively became the legal basis for 
transferring those cases that were still under the jurisdiction of the SC USSR in 
Moscow. Hence, in the fall of 1991, Karimov ordered to transfer the latest 
grand trials and culprits - as Odilov,221 Usmankhodzhaev and Khudayberdyev - 
to Uzbekistan.222 The final amnesty was implemented four days before the 
presidential elections on 25 December 1991, the day on which the USSR itself 
and the darkest page of its recent history in the memory of Uzbeks were buried. 
By 1991 Karimov was reinstating many corrupt officials sacked in the mid-1980s, 
as well as repressing the Birlik movement more severely than informal groups 
were being repressed elsewhere in the USSR. This showed that despite a 
sustained campaign of severe criticism which developed in Uzbekistan during 
the 1980s and reached exceptional intensity during early 1988, the tradition of 
protecting failed officials remained strongly entrenched.223 
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On 29 December, the first post-Soviet Uzbek presidential elections 
confirmed Karimov with 87.1% of votes against the only admitted candidate 
Muhammad Salih, who  ran for Erk. Since that moment, Karimov continued to 
enforce the ideology of mustaqillik, victimization and proud for the renaissance 
of the Uzbek nation. However, Uzbekistan and Uzbek people remain still 
divided to judge the Soviet experience and one of the most sensitive topics of 
their contemporary history. 
Since independence, Karimov has continued to exploit those arguments to 
enforce the ideology of Mustaqillik, self-victimization and pride in the 
renaissance of the Uzbek nation to legitimate the new course of independent 
Uzbekistan represented by him. Therefore, self-victimization, criticism against 
the USSR – and its ‘colonial policies’ – and the rejection of the Soviet past gave 
a first base to the independence claims after 1989, considering in part the birth 
of the new nation as a people liberated from the Soviet system. Karimov’s 
policies of desovietization replaced the old communist ideology with the values 
of Mustaqillik, a name that became the key word used to designate emblematic 
places, such as the former Lenin square and the main roads of Tashkent, to 
destroy and replace and the symbols of Soviet memory. In order to advance 
this identity/legitimizing ideology and its pars destruens, even official Uzbek 
historiography started to invest in the self-victimization themes of 
‘repressions’, repeatedly referring to the ‘cotton affairs’ (‘pakhta ishi’) of the 
‘80s as the last stage of a long-running ‘Soviet terror’. Mustaqillik also became 
the main leitmotiv in the contemporary Uzbek academy and the key reference 
on which scholars interpret national scientific development. As Babadzhanov 
affirms: 
Mustaqillik became the fundamental value to be followed also in academic 
production. The structure to base scientific research remained the same as in 
Soviet times, even if the ideology has changed. In the introduction of every 
essay, the word Mustaqillik is one of the first to be mentioned. Before it was 
communism. In the second paragraph, there is a necessary cross-
reference/quotation of Karimov, whereas before we used Brezhnev, Andropov 
etc. In the third paragraph, there must appear references to the national 
ideological values of Mustaqillik, which replaced, of course, references to 
Marxism-Leninism.224 
                                                          
224 Personal interview with Prof. Bakhtiar Babadzhanov, Institute of Oriental 
Manuscripts, Tashkent, 26 June 2015. 
616 
 
Indeed, since mid-1989 the official historiographical narrative225 was also 
officially replaced by a new interpretation of the facts. The Institute of Party 
History at the CC CPUz was expressly ordered to change the tones of 
“demagogy, apology and dogmatism” of the previous years in order to “revise 
entrenched in the literature unilaterally, often biased in favor of the official 
assessment of the concept of many facts of the events of the past, many 
prominent figures of the Communist party etc.”, carrying out a 
historiographical narrative of ‘repressions’ (especially related to the Stalinist 
period). In reference to past historical works, the attempt to “distort the 
history of the country and the party, presenting it as a continuous chain of 
tragic mistakes, excesses, repressions and blames to the party”226 was 
condemned. Nowadays, the Uzbek historian Khurshida Yusunova carefully 
reconstructs the facts and provides an ‘Uzbek version’ according to which the 
cotton scandal was just a symptom of a wider disease of the Soviet Union. 
However, according to Yunusova, Uzbekistan became a scapegoat that was 
deflecting the attention from the real corruption in Moscow and in other 
regions of the empire.227 Even figures such as Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov 
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- presented in Uzbek historiography as muscovite ‘torquemadas’228 - are 
sometimes interpreted simply as Moscow’s puppets.229 Moreover, Abdullaev 
offers a version that denotes the “suffering of the Uzbek people”, affirming 
that – in the history of Soviet repressions and their “media manipulations”230 – 
Uzbekistan became an “experimental test site” (poligon) for these new forms 
of judiciary purges during the 5–6 years of the “cotton affair terror”. Indeed,  
the repressions in the ‘80s were against the national system and even against 
the Uzbek people themselves. However, society was neither cohesive nor 
immunized against those attacks. At the end of the story, these years 
consolidated society, forging anti-Russian, anti-imperial and independent 
passions. This period coincided with disaffection and disillusion towards the 
USSR, corresponding to the end of the communist ideology in Uzbekistan, 
because the Uzbek people were perceived as living in a colony whose requests 
were barely heard – and certainly not heeded – by the center […]. In this story, 
President Karimov was an independent figure who refused to obey Gorbachev’s 
orders, a patriot able to find a solution and to struggle against a stronger and 
larger enemy that wanted to reaffirm its imperial power over Uzbekistan. For 
Uzbek people, this story coincides with the last stage of a long-lasting colonial 
period.231 
This interpretation provides a clear perspective on the – nationalist and 
‘Mustaqillik biased’ – Uzbek contemporary historiography. Also the FATi’s 
deputy chairman, Prof. Shukhrat Mukhamedov affirmed that:  
Due to the cotton affair experience, Uzbekistan could find reasons and myths 
over its independence, understanding the USSR as a colonial, exploitative, and 
external power. During the long Soviet experience, Uzbekistan was clouded by 
an ideology that had concealed the need for independence from Russia and, 
despite some positive interpretations of the Brezhnev period, there was never 
effective autonomy. In fact, Rashidov could also be seen as subservient to 
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618 
 
Moscow! Thus, the myths about him are not for an inane independentist action 
but since he was a patriot that protected, in his way, the Uzbek people.232 
Thus, it is evident how even contemporary historiography gives an 
interpretation of the facts that contributes to consolidate the doctrine of 
Mustaqillik and its pars destruens, to legitimate the transition from USSR. In 
this purpose, there is also a museological case that has contributed to create 
the ‘Soviet memory trauma’ and to enforce the concept of Mustaqillik. The 
‘Museum in Memory of the Victims of Repression’, created in Tashkent by the 
initiative of President Karimov in 2002, has as its core mission the ‘moral 
rehabilitation’ of the victim’s honor. To some extent, it was conceived with the 
same political purposes of Napoleon when he opened the Louvre to promote 
a French national narrative. In Tashkent, the museum narrates a period of 
repressions that started in the pre-revolutionary Russian colonial period and 
assumed its worst shapes in Soviet times when “the repressions assumed a 
total dimension and were enforced at any level of society and individuals.”233 
Most of the exhibition is dedicated to the repression of the kulaks and jadids 
in the ‘30s, the great purges and GULAG system, the ethnic deportations during 
World War II, the cotton monoculture, and Aral Sea ecological disaster. Finally, 
there is a section dedicated to the ‘cotton affair’ that quotes a harsh 
commentary prepared by President Karimov, for visitors to read: 
Uzbek society never forgets the tragedies known as the ‘cotton affair’, ‘Uzbek 
affair’ and which were shameful slanders for us, the Uzbek people. Over that 
time, human rights and the rule of law were destroyed, thousands of blameless 
people were in jail and local people were slaughtered in great numbers. Islom 
Karimov. 
In the same ‘cotton affair’ room, a severe banner states: “The deceptions 
of the colonial regime were uncovered because of the will-power and 
resistance of President Islom Karimov. Our blameless people are thus justified 
and their rights restored.” The final hall is dedicated to the heroes and symbols 
of Uzbek independence and identity, including President Karimov, Amir Timur, 
Mirzo Ulugbek, Babur and, for this reason, it can be considered as an effective 
evidence of our suppositions. Hence, the museum is representing the three 
pillars – repressions, imposition of cotton monoculture and ecological disasters 
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- of the self-victimization narrative endorsed by Karimov. In the banners of the 
‘Museum in Memory of the Victims of Repression’ we can read: 
The Soviet government in its first period of its role in Uzbekistan had a policy of 
domination addressed to the cotton. In the 80s the harsh impact of this policy 
was not seen only in the fields of agriculture and the economy but it was also 
seen in the fields of social life and ecology. The productivity of earth decreased 
dramatically because of that period, increasing the state plan of cotton 
production. During this plan, using chemical elements for improving 
productivity destroyed the current rules of agro-techinique and crop rotation. 
Decreasing artificially the income from the cotton products by the center, 
bringing products such as wheat and food from outside, becoming worse social 
life and material life of rural people was the consequence of the cotton policy 
[…] the opening of new lands for cotton, using the water of Amu Darya, Syr 
Darya, Chichik and Zaravshan rivers unlimitedly brought the disaster of Aral Sea 
which was the biggest ecological tragedy in the 20th century. Consequently, the 
amount of water in the sea decreased by more than 60%. The sand and salt 
stones were flown to the air because of drying Aral Sea and this situation began 
to influence badly the nature in the region […] in the 80s the center began a new 
repression to Uzbek people called the ‘cotton affair.’ Because of this policy, 
Uzbek people had to accept many calumnies and thousands innocent people 
were jailed. I.B. Usmankhodzhaev and R.A. Nishanov, who were secretaries in 
those times, did not fight against this policy and the group of Gdlyan and Ivanov 
opened 25.000 criminal cases not always discussing them in the court. 
Consequently 4500 people were jailed and 3600 got different types of 
punishments. For officials in the CC CPUZ, 8 secretaries in the obkom and 20 
heads of ministries of internal affairs and 62 heads in different organizations 
were jailed. Different deputies who worked in the cities, raions and oblasts were 
jailed illegally and even 4 deputies of the Supreme soviet of USSR were jailed 
[when they were] in the building of the First Secretary in Uzbekistan. The 
terrible thing is that old men and women, pregnant women and women who 
had young children were imprisoned and using their wives and children to 
demonstrate their guilt and to make pressures.234 
The myth of resistance against colonial power (as the ‘cotton affair’ is 
presented) is a fundamental element of self-victimization aimed at 
consolidating and to commemorating the Mustaqillik ideology, and the two 
aspects – pars construens/pars destruens – are necessarily interrelated. The 
example of this museum is indicated in order to further articulate what this 
paper argues. Indeed, there is an official institution that represents the 
                                                          
234 The translations of the banners displayed at the ‘Museum in Memory of the Victims 
of Repression’ are in the final appendix. 
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contemporary history of Uzbekistan in a serious manner, mixing the critics 
against Soviet totalitarianism with anticolonial issues such as the two main 
obstacles of independence during the former regime. The lack of distinction 
between these two separate aspects strengthens inexorably the echo of 
criticism and creates a confusion of overlapped concepts. This misperception 
finds its endemic reason even in the strategic role that Uzbekistan covered 
within the Soviet system and it contributes to perfectly define the paradoxes 
over Mustaqillik in its pars construens/destruens, evidencing a self-
victimization towards those policies that had been implemented during Soviet 
period and that often persist in contemporary Uzbekistan. 
Thus, the policy of nationalities and their violent consequences, the 
imposition of cotton monoculture – narrated as a way to control Uzbekistan 
creating a bond of economic dependence235 – the related ecological disaster 
(as the Aral Sea Basin drying up) and the last ‘repressions’ during the ‘Uzbek 
affair’ become typical leitmotivs in the implementation of Mustaqillik, 
leveraging on wounded proud of Uzbek people, coming “closer of all to classical 
forms of decolonization narratives.”236 
7.3.2 A post-colonial ideology for a post-Soviet state? 
Mustaqillik and its historiographic self-victimizing pars destruens served to 
positively legitimate Karimov’s regime and undergird its stability, endorsing 
independence from USSR through a post-colonial-like narrative.237 However, 
these analytical categories can lead to misleading conclusions, considering the 
level of involvement of the UzSSR within the Soviet machine and the fact that 
most Uzbeks - especially the elite groups – still refrain from considering 
themselves ‘post-colonized.’ This lack of consensus over historical memory is 
due to the high levels of fragmentation within Uzbek society – divided among 
social classes, ethnic groups, power network (‘clans’), religion and regional 
cleavages – and to the general involvement of the Uzbek elite itself in the 
former nomenklatura. Indeed, the Soviet ‘colonial system’ was implemented 
                                                          
235 Abdullaev, “Uzbekistonda Paxta Yakkahokimligi va Uning Oqibatlari (1917-1991 
Y.y.),” 219. 
236 Abashin, “Nations and Post-Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” 89. 
237 The official historiography presents the independence as a long struggle for self-
determination against a system that deprived Uzbekistan of its political, economic and 
cultural independence. Dadabaev, Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia: 
Uzbekistan’s Soviet Past; Dilorom Agzamovna Alimova, Istoriya Kak Istoriya, Istoriya Kak 
Nauka (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 2008). 
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by the same local intelligentsia that, some years later, led the country towards 
independence. This underscores the absence of the typical social tensions 
between colonizers and indigenes in a country where Russian communities 
were fewer in number than in other parts of the ‘empire.’ This aspect 
demonstrates why – compared with the Baltic or Caucasus republics – cultural 
desovietization and nationalization processes in Uzbekistan was to many 
extents peaceful.  
Furthermore, the shift to Mustaqillik was even responding to the need to 
compensate for an identity trauma from ‘loss of status’. During Soviet times, 
Uzbeks perceived their identity-status as inextricably linked to the more 
general nuclear superpower status of the USSR. In this sense, there is also a 
sort of nostalgia for the Soviet era. Even if it is pointless to compare the history 
of such different contexts as Soviet Central Asia and decolonized countries, this 
paper has sought to bridge the literature gap on pars destruens by arguing how 
the rhetorical use of a post-colonial narrative is still effective in legitimizing the 
current regime at domestic and international levels, as for the recent ambitions 
of Uzbekistan in the third world block. In this field, a decolonization narrative 
somehow ‘works’. 
Moreover, Mustaqillik was appropriate to propose Uzbekistan as a ‘post-
Soviet’ entity. This common label is generally used for the 15 republics of the 
FSU and, sometimes, even for those non-USSR countries that were part of the 
communist bloc that have become ‘new democracies’. Concerning Uzbekistan, 
it is necessary to disaggregate this concept, analyzing the presence and the 
effectiveness of a transition ‘from Soviet’ that can justify the ‘post’ label. In 
fact, at a political level, opposition was endorsed in an ‘ornamental’ form, and 
the role of the security service remains strong in ruling and controlling the 
state. Also, the ruling elite of Republic of Uzbekistan came directly from the 
Soviet cadres.  
From this perspective, the political claim that wants to find a ‘colonial’ 
pattern of power would necessarily discuss the legitimacy of these institutions, 
of social and human capital and even the status of the current elite groups. Also 
the social services pillars – such as pensions, welfare state, free education and 
healthcare – and the institutions of Republic of Uzbekistan were forged on 
Soviet patterns as also the academy of sciences, the KGB (renamed SNB), the 
unions, the youth organizations, the government institutions and powers etc.; 
as even the economic system that remained mainly monopolistic and based on 
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extensive exploitation of natural resources. Modernization and secularism238 
were kept as pillars of the Uzbek state; the role of Russian language, symbols 
and culture remained as the main cultural platform among elite groups and it 
seems that the positive opinions about USSR are still higher in Central Asia than 
in other FSU Republics239 revealing how 1991 was more a formal – rather than 
substantial – date. Once we exclude the evidence of political, economic, 
institutional and even cultural evolutions in the aftermath of the Soviet 
collapse, we can easily conclude that the ‘post-Soviet transition’ was effective 
at least at an ideological level. Therefore, the ideological shift – from 
kommunizm to Mustaqillik – is the unique strong element that could justify the 
idea of ‘post’, and the self-victimization narrative had a strong role in the 
abovementioned process of ‘transformism.’  
Most likely, although the government in Tashkent has significantly 
endorsed this ‘post-Soviet’ version, the Uzbek leadership was not successful in 
endorsing a publicly shared ‘post-colonial trauma’; meanwhile, the repression 
narrative remains a sensitive topic only for those generations of Uzbeks who 
lived the ‘Gdlyan-Ivanov terror’ period. This issue is realistically too recent to 
be reconsidered and, probably, also the new President of Uzbekistan Shavkat 
Mirziyoyev will not undertake relevant moves to shift the Karimovian narrative 
in the short term. 
7.4 A case study for interpreting neo-patrimonialism 
As has emerged in the previous chapters, the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ is an 
emblematic case study that we have used to reconstruct and to interpret the 
crisis of the Soviet power system in the periphery of the empire and the 
political history of late USSR from a non-Muscovite perspective. In the previous 
chapters, we have seen the limits of the common interpretation of these facts 
– usually narrated as a sort of ‘mafiya’ novel - trying to discredit myths, 
misunderstandings, prejudices and historical falsehoods that I encountered 
during these three years of research. In the first chapter, we introduced a 
theoretical framework through which this story can be read: the Uzbek cotton 
                                                          
238 Sébastien Peyrouse, “La Gestion Du Fait Religieux En Asie Centrale: Poursuite Du 
Cadre Conceptuel Soviétique et Renouveau Factice,” Cahiers d’Asie Centrale 13–14 
(2004): 77–120. 
239 Research project 'Vospriiatie molodezh'iu novykh nezavisimykh gosudarsry istorii 
sovetskogo i postsovetskogo periodov', reported in Abashin, “Nations and Post-
Colonialism in Central Asia: Twenty Years Later,” 97. 
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affair as a crisis of patrimonialism in the Soviet system. Therefore, 
patrimonialism is a form of governance in which all power and benefits flow 
directly from the leader or the leading institution: in the Soviet case, this 
institutional figure was represented by the party in each level and territorial 
dimension.  
Hence, the party-led patrimonial system was aimed at including the political 
subjects in a pyramidal scheme that had kolkhozes/villages at the base and the 
Gensek at its vertex. To a large extent, patrimonialism was the effective system 
of the Soviet Union, relegating communism to an ornamental feature. Indeed, 
despite Marxism-Leninism being presented as a pillar of the Soviet power 
structure, its role has probably been over-estimated in many social sciences 
studies, and even in the historiography, which has often been too focused on 
the impact of an apparent ideological crisis on the collapse of the Soviet Union 
due to the defeat of the Cold War or to the rise of nationalism. Nevertheless, 
patrimonialism represents the effective case we have to analyze in order to 
determine the collapse of the party-led system within the country.  
As we have seen, communist ideology was too often no more than a 
rhetorical veil that was covering the effective patrimonial system of command 
and control: especially after the Stalin era and the end of the terror system that 
had previously characterized the first stage of the Bolshevik system (1917-
1953),240 patrimonialism became the backbone of the Soviet system. 
After the Stalinist era, local elite - involved in the Party and in the state 
administration - gained space in the formal power structures and also in the 
informal and non-transparent areas of negotiation. Apparently, the system 
remained centralized and hierarchical, but effectively it was defined by a 
network of informal relationships that became more and more relevant. Then, 
the patrimonial system persisted and even intensified during the era of 
stagnation characterized by stability of cadres.  
In this very moment, the Soviet patrimonial system enforced some of its 
key features: the local FS effectively had unlimited and direct power on the 
party and governmental apparatus; the system was based on prohibitions and 
concessions, and any authorization required a payment that could be in various 
forms; even the political offices and honors could be bought and were a 
resource in terms of material and status benefits; the administrative style was 
                                                          
240 Andrea Graziosi, L’Urss Di Lenin E Stalin. Storia dell’Unione Sovietica, 1914-1945 
(Bologna: Il mulino, 2007). 
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the base of the subordination between the leaders and the lower cadres. Also 
at a psychological level, the subordination and the respect for the leaders is 
expressed by gifts – that as we have seen have a seperate logic to bribes – that 
were aimed at creating a “moral credit”241 and at remarking the kinship 
between the two subjects: in this regard, the Churbanov case was emblematic 
when he confessed to receiving so many gifts for no other reason than being 
Brezhnev’s son in law. Indeed, the patrimonial system of governance is based 
on moral traditions for cooperative obedience that arose in the Soviet era. In 
the USSR, the wealth was accumulated - in money, jewelry, gold coins etc. - 
and not consumed in a non-market and closed system; rather, it was used to 
make other gifts to the superiors. Officially, these attitudes were stigmatized, 
being referred as clanovist (clanistic), mestnichestvo (localism), zastoya 
(stagnation), vzyatochnichestvo (bribery) and kumovstvo (nepotism) etc. as a 
negation of socialism. Nevertheless, these dynamics were the (informal) rule 
of Soviet politics and society.242 
Though this seemed to be a failure of the communist dream, in fact it was 
the very soul of the system that was co-opting through the nomenklatura and 
which determined the patronage relationships in a non-competitive system for 
struggle for scarce (or also inaccessible) goods, services and resources. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to use the term “neo-patrimonial” inasmuch this 
‘corruption’ – in its broader meaning - was not an exceptional situation of 
systemic malfunctioning but it was its normal modus operandi. Indeed, 
‘corruption’ was a constitutive aspect of USSR and the way in which the Soviet 
system actually operated. This huge machine claimed to be centralized to the 
maximum but – due to a lack of information and control instruments to be so 
– it had no alternative to recognizing a number of figures (while officially 
denying their existence) and to use a continuous informal negotiation between 
them. This is the key to understanding the relations between the center and 
periphery in USSR. The post-Soviet narrative provides both a ‘positive’ 
mandevillian interpretation of corruption as an endemic feature that greased 
the wheels in order to make the machine work; and a ‘negative’ connotation 
of a system that, to some extents, forced to steal and falsify as a matter of 
survival. On this regard, Dadabaev comments:  
Unrealistic plans and pressure from Moscow […] forced the Uzbek leadership to 
misreport and misappropriate the funds. In addition, the fact that a large part 
                                                          
241 Buttino, Samarcanda. Storie in Una Città Dal 1945 a Oggi, 32. 
242 Konstantin Simis, USSR - The Corrupt Society. The Secret World of Soviet Capitalism 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 
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of the funds obtained from the cotton affair were used for the construction of 
public facilities like the Metro and other buildings served as justification for 
many ordinary citizens that this was not the fault or structural problem of the 
government in general but some exceptional case of misunderstanding that 
needed to be handled administratively.243 
Hence, the history of the ‘Uzbek cotton affair’ becomes a test to evaluate 
the course of Soviet history and the changing power patterns: in the pre-
revolutionary period, Central Asia was considered to be a sort of ‘internal’ or 
‘light’ colony in which Russians maintained a relatively low profile; then, 
Bolshevism imposed the Sovietization of the political, economic, social and 
cultural framework recurring to the mass terror under Stalin. Then, Khrushchev 
denounced Stalinism and renounced terror, setting the bases of patrimonialism 
by creating a balance of central and local powers. Finally, under Brezhnev, the 
“social contract” enforced the system, leaving large autonomy to the local 
leaders who acted as viceroys and followed the patrimonial dynamics at a local 
level. Hence, Uzbek elites could not just drop the Soviet system off, since it was 
granting them consistent privileges. Nevertheless, the inefficiency of 
patrimonialism -  out of any logic of evaluation of professionalism and 
effectiveness of the work results244 - during the era of stagnation led the system 
close to the economic collapse, leading the next generation of leaders 
(Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev) to try to reform, to review the 
redistribution chain of much more scarce resources from the center to the 
periphery and to dismantle that social contract that the country was no longer 
able to maintain with the local proxies of Soviet power. 
Furthermore, ‘corruption,’ the ‘fight against the negative phenomena,’ the 
replacement of cadres and the witch-hunt within the party and state apparatus 
did not emerge during the cotton affairs only and were not a new phenomenon 
in Soviet history: these phenomena – and the related moralistic narrative - 
were typical instruments regulating political struggles among elite and 
legitimizing the party policy and also its coercive measures. However, the 
Uzbek cotton affair became so relevant because of its systemic dimension in a 
moment of transparency, when it assumed a huge media echo (due to the 
Gdlyan-Ivanov affair), becoming a manifestation of the Moscow intolerance 
                                                          
243 Dadabaev, Identity and Memory in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Uzbekistan’s Soviet Past, 
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244 Aleksey Georgievich Barabashev, “Krizis Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniya I Yego 
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towards patrimonialism and an attempt to de-patrimonialize the system. 
Despite the post-Soviet ‘repression’ labels not being commonly used, this set 
of radical and massive (thousands of cadres) but 'soft' (no summary executions) 
purges within the party and state characterized a period of uncertainty during 
the perestroika. At that moment, local elites started to be very resentful of the 
purges, maturing the idea of the intrusion of the center into their own affairs 
that was cracking down the compromise between Moscow and the Uzbek 
periphery; and so to develop a sense of impatience towards the Soviet 
establishment – and its local proxies as the ambitious Nishanov who was 
considered to be so - in order to protect themselves and their positions of 
privileges. 
Thus, perestroika in Central Asia arrived as a witch hunt against the local 
leaders instead of a reform of the working style based on managerial and 
efficiency criteria. According to Pikhoya, the crisis of patrimonialism, the 
purges and the anticorruption campaigns propagandized with great fanfare 
were phenomena connected with the struggle among elites competing for 
scarce resources. According to his reconstruction, since 1986 the volume of 
subsidies from the central budget to the regions sharply dropped. In this phase 
of budget ‘defitsit’ the redistributions at the base of the patrimonial system 
also dropped, causing the disruption of interactions between the local elites 
and central authorities, the economic crisis and the collapse of the productive 
system while determining a perfect storm and the growing discontent of the 
local elite that would be emphasized against the Soviet power.245 During the 
‘cotton affairs’ (1983-1989), the Uzbek elite groups exploited the situation and 
struggled among one another by following the moralistic course of events and 
complaining against the rival groups – during the ‘donos wars’ mentioned in 
chapter 4 – in order to discredit the adversaries and accredit them as effective 
perestroika supporters. In fact, participating actively in the ‘moralizing 
campaign’ offered certain advantages and was, at the same time, a way to be 
affiliated with the ruling establishment of the CPSU. 
After this period of internal struggles, the Uzbek elite began to show signs 
of impatience with the Moscow-led planned system, demanding greater 
autonomy246 within the Soviet planned system. Hence, they pressed the new 
leader Karimov to restore the social contract and demanded more benefits 
                                                          
245 Personal interview with Rudolf Germanovich Pikhoya, Moscow, 10 December 2015. 
246 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire : The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse 
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from the center – the reason for the negotiations in 1990-1991 – while 
remaining in a system that had enforced relevant welfares for them. The Uzbek 
cotton affair season appears as a contradiction in Gorbachev’s ‘liberal’ 
reformism attempts – that effectively never reached the UzSSR.247 
Nevertheless, the very essence of the perestroika change was in this massive 
and radical reshuffle of cadres. However, during glasnost the story of the Uzbek 
cotton affair was inexorably turned against Gorbachev’s regime that was seen 
as a corrupt one by the Gdlyan-Ivanov supporters and as a repressive, 
inquisitorial and even terroristic one by Uzbek nationalists. At that point of the 
story, the already weak party did not seem to elaborate a strong, effective and 
legitimate response to fight against patrimonialism and lost its battle.  
 “Gorbachev’s attempts to break “zemliachestvo” in Central Asia probably 
came decades too late”248 or maybe the Gensek was wrong to implement such 
a repressive policy in a more democratic environment and without bringing 
innovation in a delicate moment when the party was not united anymore and 
was under the continuous attacks of the opposition. In his memoirs, Gorbachev 
– who was warned about the developments of the Uzbeks affairs -  admitted: 
I myself assume some of the blame for having failed to launch an anti-corruption 
struggle early enough and on a proper scale. However, it is a fact that all 
attempts undertaken to that end were blocked by the opposition, which was 
already becoming enmeshed in the corrupt structures of our nascent business 
world, and which once in power provided a reliable cover for them.249 
Then, the Soviet state collapsed and the local elites could bargain directly 
with Tashkent and within the new framework of the independent Republic of 
Uzbekistan. By his side Karimov was able to restore a system that had secured 
stability and that led him to stay in power for another quarter of century, 
satisfying all the relevant political forces in the redistributive game and 
preventing them to vie with the Tashkent government and creating counter-
powers. In another Central Asian context, the patrimonial system crumbled 
and when resources became scarce the elite groups started to struggle among 
                                                          
247 On this regard, Ahmed Rashid comments: “no real modern, capitalist business elite 
has emerged in Central Asia.” Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, Islam or 
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248 Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 103. 
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one another. The Kyrgyz ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 is a clear example of it.250 In 
Uzbekistan, Karimov was able to avoid such scenario during his long reign. 
In fact, Karimov was able to consolidate his power, coopting the elites - 
instead of foment competition – and restoring a patrimonial system in the 
newly independent republic. We could draw a parallel with his predecessor 
Rashidov and his ‘transformistic’ attitude that enabled him to stay in power for 
more than three decades. The new Republic of Uzbekistan changed its name 
and reshaped its symbols, but had preserved those kinds of dynamics and 
informal institutions that were typical of Soviet times. After the Soviet collapse, 
“the abandonment of anticorruption measures in 1989 was followed by a 
dramatic expansion of local elites’ access to state rents across all regions. 
Under the guise of economic reform, a series of concessions to local elites in 
the easily 1990s opened new rent-seeking opportunities, facilitating the co-
optation of local elites.”251 In Karimov’s times, “linking local strongmen to 
patrons within the center remain intact over time, surviving Moscow's 
crackdown in the late 1980s and facilitating state security cohesion and the 
spread of coercive rent seeking across the country by the mid-1990s.”252  
Karimov had to rebuild a patrimonial system on a national basis that could 
face the emerging religious political alternative. As mentioned, he symbolically 
rehabilitated Rashidov, pardoned the ‘victims of repression’ and effectively 
reintroduced the pre-purges establishment. Karimov’s transformism and the 
restoration of so many feature of Soviet past – presented in a national face - 
defines what Jones Luong named “the continuity of change.”253 Nevertheless, 
the system is not immobile but is in a constant state of evolution and 
transformed itself in conjunction with the political opportunities pursued by 
the presidents who acted as a sort of supervisor over the patrimonial regime 
in what Malikov defined a “return to Feudalism.”254  
                                                          
250 Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in 
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Hence, Karimov restored a management that had its origins in the pre-
purges period255 enforcing an authoritarian regime256 - where the levels of 
individual freedoms were strongly compressed - that continued the USSR 
experience, coopting the loyal elites and replacing the threating ones.257 
However, the Karimov recipe was accepted because it appeared as the only 
solution that could guarantee peace and stability, avoiding clashes between 
the different ethnic groups and clans in a country that presents many internal 
potential crises and that is still trying to find its own identity in the globalized 
context. Even at an economic level, the system is still far from the efficiency of 
the free market regime and the economy remains hardly publicist, leaving just 
small margins to private initiative258 and persevering the substantial Soviet 
centralized/planned experience in a country that is trying to diversify its 
production but where cotton is still an important culture that is absorbing a 
                                                          
255 Pulat Nugmanov – the former deputy prime minister of installation and special 
construction work - was reconfirmed from Soviet times in the same posts. Also Bakhiyar 
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Business, 2012), 432. 
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great part of Uzbek resources259, while the problems we have seen seem to be 
similar also in today’s Uzbekistan. 260  
The pattern of neo-patrimonialism to read the Uzbek – and maybe the 
whole of Soviet – history is a new and challenging field that further research 
should deal with. The many studies using this new category in the analysis of 
post-colonial countries could help to define the theoretical framework of 
reference and to set the analysis of the political system of Uzbekistan and 
Soviet. Neo-patrimonialism is a very tenacious model that is able still to revive 
in the future in many societies and seems to be one of the main obstacles to 
the affirmation of effective democracy as in Uzbekistan as in the rest of the 
world. It is important not to underestimate a system that can potentially 
undermine the most important achievements of the 20th century - such as 
freedom, competition and democracy – by creating a political alternative that 
is potentially dangerous. Karimov’s strategy appeared dangerous and weak in 
many ways, and was criticized by many of those who hoped in an effective 
change. On this issue, Gdlyan – who probably represents one of the main 
protagonists of this story and apparently still keeps his idealistic attitude 
towards patrimonialism and corruption - commented: 
Karimov is a contradictory personality [...] instead of continuing the fight against 
corruption, he has recovered the old ways of protecting the clans' interests. And 
in essence, willing or unwilling, he sowed the large-scale corruption while the 
republic - after our mission - was once again in the grip of corruption. Secondly, 
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produced by the chemical industry and 290,000 tons of diesel fuel, or more than 30 
percent of domestic consumption, as well as other resources.” Bakhodyr Muradov and 
Alisher Ilkhamov, “Uzbekistan’s Cotton Sector: Financial Flows and Distribution of 
Resources,” 2014, 11. 
260 In the Uzbekistan it has been estimated that every year up to 2 million children work 
in the cotton fields. Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A New History of Global Capitalism 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 438; Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights and 
Cotton Campaign, “A Systemic Problem: State-Sponsored Forced Labour in Uzbekistan’s 
Cotton Sector Continues in 2012,” 2013. 
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a Karimov mistake was in enforcing his power under the new conditions and 
playing with Islam. He gave full rights to Islamic groups and encouraged [the 
recovery of] all old traditions that were so invigorated. And then, a few years 
later, when he realized that Islamists were against him, then he understood how 
far he went in his ventures. Hence, he stopped everything. Now, we do not see 
anymore those national costumes of the women - that were previously 
appreciated - pursuing a more secular approach. But it's too late, all these 
Islamist cells had been strengthened and have created the powerful Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan, which is now established in Afghanistan. 
[...Evidently,] the games of the country's leaders led to very different results. 
Gorbachev played and went bad, [...] and Karimov, who played with the corrupt 
and Islamists, has to face these factors that can ruin not only him, but also the 
republic. [...] These two factors have worked at some point to determine a new 
corrupt elite in Uzbekistan. While these two factors - corruption and games with 
Islam - were supposed to strengthen his power, on the contrary they had 
weakened his authority year by year.261 
Dangerous or not, this strategy seemed to be winning in the mid-long run 
and let Karimov to stay in power until his death in September 2016. It will be 
interesting to see if the new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, will welcome the 
challenge of modernity or will preserve a (Soviet) model of political, economic 
and social system that isolated the country in relation to the global challenges. 
We can only hope the best, and we hope that happens. 
To conclude this long story, Uzbekistan and the Uzbek people remain 
divided in judging the Soviet experience in general, and the ‘cotton affairs’ – 
one of the most sensitive topics of their contemporary history – in particular. 
These contradictions – in analyzing an issue that remains sensitive in both 
Russia and Uzbekistan – are indicative of the complexity of an as yet unresolved 
issue. An overall evaluation of the Soviet experience in Central Asia that can be 
shared by both Russians - who have perhaps most suffered and invested in the 
Soviet utopia - and Uzbeks - who still struggle to assert their own cultural 
identity devoid from past Soviet experience - remains elusive. Thus, the 
purpose of further research is to analyze the period of perestroika from the 
perspective of additional cases on the periphery, defining other social, 
economic, political and cultural elements that characterized the ‘traumatic’ 
transition to independent national statehood. 
                                                          
261 Personal interview with Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, Moscow, 17 October 2014. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Extract from the CC CPUz buro discussing the ‘Karimov affair’, 31 January 1984 
The CC CPUz received many letters complaining of serious violations in the cadres and 
about the fact that he promoted people who did machinations, bribes and thefts while 
the party was dissatisfied by the work of the organs and internal affairs. The former 
oblast prokuror O. Tursunov, the director of the oblast court U. Mingbayev, the former 
UVD executive A. Dustov, and the head of regional OBKhSS Muzaffarov worked together 
with Karimov and were friends. Now, 13 UVD managers had been arrested and from 
them had been seized large sums of money, valuables, gold, cars and other things for a 
value of more than 6 million rubles. A criminal trial has been instructed by the 
investigations of the prokuratura USSR [...] and in the oblast there is often a 
replacement of the cadres. Last year in the obkom, raikoms and gorkom apparatuses a 
third of workers, and in a kolkhoz a fifth of the directors was changed.1 Since 1982, the 
leaders of industry and sovkhozes, the cotton factories ‘Kagan’ and ‘Karakulsk’ (1980) 
and in the sovkhozes ‘Shurkul’ and ‘Mekhnatabad’ and sovkhoz ‘Frunze’, had also often 
been changed: in each of these, two directors have been changed but the production 
indexes did not improve. in the last 3 years in the oblast they  fired nine officials who 
failed to obtain good work and 6 employees of the nomenklatura who are 
compromised. For three years the rhythms of the increase in production was 5.3% 
compared to 7% that was expected by the plan, and for the last period of the plan, the 
industry productivity has fallen by 14% while [managers] make corrections of the 
production plan to the downside. From year to year, the plan on cotton fiber was not 
carried out. It was a waste that did not allow the surmounting of the plan. By 1983, 
throughout the oblast, the 1.5% of the plan was being achieved, realizing wastes for 
27,000 tons of raw cotton.2 […As well,] In 1983, the oblast did not realize the plan in the 
production of grapes, melons and watermelons while for potatoes only 45% of the plan 
is expected [to be produced].3 Considering the republic[an standards], in the [Bukhara] 
oblast the sales volume per capita is in tenth and the eleventh in terms of services. [...] 
On the safety of socialist ownership, the situation is particularly unfavorable in the state 
and cooperative trade and in the agriculture system. Material damages due to the 
deficiencies, theft and obsolescence of assets, only for nine months of last year are 
56,000 rubles in the state trade, 210,000 in consumer cooperatives and 180,000 in 
kolkhozes and sovkhozes. [...] There were falsifications on the preparation of food 
                                                                
1 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 164. 
2 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 165. 
3 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 166. 
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estimated for 45-63% of the total volume of a specimen of the 40 kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes that had been controlled.4 Construction of different types were built with 
many structural flaws. In 1981, in sovkhoz where there were herds of astrakhan were 
detected failures and losses for 377 thousand rubles, 2,300 head of cattle to 66 
thousand rubles and furs for 121 thousand rubles. In 1982 the collective farms had 
wasted more than 760 tons of oil products. Moreover, there were increasing reports of 
the Oblast by workers at CC CPSU unjust activity, abuse of managers, allocating state 
funds and facts of falsification and fraud. Half of the facts stated in the letters are 
confirmed by the checks. Only last year the CC CPSU from this oblast received 
complaints in 1.5 times more than in 1982. It should be noted that the anonymous 
letters last year were 9.1% and are now 16.2% [of the total letters]. For the last 3 years 
in the CC CPUz and the oblast workers more than a thousand letters and statements 
have come. In these it was said that A.K. Karimov has built a two-floors house with a 
pool and did a great celebration for his daughter's wedding with expensive gifts and 
gave to her a home. He also helped his son to buy a car.5 These alerts were also known 
before. In fact, after the earthquake, for the Karimov family was assigned a two-floors 
house with six rooms and an area of 104 square meters, that had a cost of 28,300 rubles, 
where before 13 people lived. To his son was given the Zhiguli car. These 
aforementioned defects in the economic and social development of the oblast are 
failures that have been in the work of organs of the MVD and are connected with the 
fact that the obkom party, his buro and personally its FS Karimov made no attention to 
the improvement of the work style and methods of the party organizations, and they 
were wrong in the selection and education of cadres, and did little monitoring on the 
execution of such decisions. It would be an expedient to discuss this complaint in buro 
CC CPUz.6 
 
Extract from the CC CPUz buro discussing the systemic dimension of the cotton 
scam, 23 April 1984 
According to CC CPUz resolutions of 9 September 1983 "on the amplification of the fight 
against counterfeiting, distortion in the accounting and fraud" and the resolution CC 
CPSU of 27 September 1983 on the "note of TsSU USSR on the fight against fraud and 
counterfeiting in the first half of 1983", the obkoms, TsSU UzSSR, the PCC, prokuratura 
and some ministries and institutions reported to the CC CPUz on the done work. The CC 
CPUz departments analyzed the information provided and think it is important to refer 
the following information to the CC CPUz. The amplification steps of the struggle against 
these negative phenomena were considered by the buros of the obkoms, gorkoms and 
raikoms and by the collegiums of ministries, institutions, and local ispolkoms. Much 
                                                                
4 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 167. 
5 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 168. 
6 Prot. 83/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2455, l. 169. 
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attention has been made – in the plenum of the party committees and in the meetings 
of its primary organizations during the discussion on the commitments arose from the 
decisions of the CC CPSU plenum in December 1983 – with regard to strengthening the 
state and planning discipline and proper accounting. The party's and soviets' organs 
have increased the demand for guilty officials in the falsifications and other violations 
of accounting. The culprits are brought to the party responsibility and much more often 
for their discipline. For falsifications and distortions of the state accounts, 16 leading 
communists were brought to the party responsibility. The Tashkent obkom has severely 
reprimanded the deputy director of the Tashkent executive committee for trade (I. 
Bader) for falsifications.7 Also the chairman of the Tashkent ispolkom G.M. Sarkisov, the 
director of the Almalyk gorispolkom (B.A. Agarkov), and the Samarkand obkom made a 
stern rebuke to the director of the oblast consumers' unit (A. Mardankulov) [...]. In 1983 
for falsifications and fraud throughout the republic, 77 people were brought to criminal 
responsibility. The prokuratura officially noticed to the officials on the inadmissibility of 
violations in the accounting and in 1983 were made 263 notifications. Last year it gave 
a greater attention to the proper accounting of cotton preparation and the individual 
attempts of exaggeration cotton [figures] in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the Jizzakh 
and Namangan oblasts where had been suppressed by obkoms and was given the main 
assessment on the unjust activities of the managers. For falsifications and fraud, were 
relieved from their posts and severely reprimanded the FS Shakhrisab raikom, the 
directors of the cotton cleaning factories in the Nishan and Shakhrisab raions8, of the 
Bukhara bread factory, of the tea factory of Samarkand, of the furniture factory in 
Andijan and many others. In the struggle against the above-mentioned violations 
participated also the workers of industries and institutions. [...] As a result of the fight 
against falsifications and fraud in the republic in the second half of 1983, compared to 
the same period of 1982, the cases of distortion of accounting decreased by 3 points in 
the total amount of the controlled organizations, and falsifications by 1.1 point.9 As is 
clear from the analysis that has been done by the organs of the party, soviets, organs of 
law enforcement and control, the work still does not meet the requirements of the CC 
CPSU. Decisions on this issue and did not lead to a radical improvement in the case; the 
fiddling facts and fraud are widespread and affect state organization and discipline. The 
economy in the second half of 1983 revealed distorted statements for 24.7 percent of 
the number of enterprises inspected. Higher than in the whole country, the deliberate 
falsifications spread in Syrdarya and Namangan oblasts. The heads of some ministries 
and departments, many production teams still have not taken effective measures to 
implement the instructions of the party hovering strictest order in public statements. 
During the controls on the reliability of registered materials and uninstalled equipment 
                                                                
7 Prot. 91/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2464, l. 21. 
8 Later was discovered that in 1984, the cotton processing factory of Shakhrisab inflated 
its productive data and emitted fake invoices in order to cover 22,000 tons of new 
existed raw cotton. PV, 20785, 112, 16 May 1985, p. 2. 
9 Prot. 91/1984, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 153, d. 2464, l. 22. 
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reported that by 1 January 1984, 429 enterprises and organizations for their 
underestimation and shelter from the registered materials and technical resources. In 
the Glavsredazirsovkhozstroya [principal Central Asian irrigational construction in 
sovkhozes], and in the ministries of water resources, construction, rural building, 
communications, energy, agriculture, Goskomvodstroya [State Committee for water 
engineering], Goskomselkhoztehniki [State Committee of agricultural technique] of the 
UzSSR were determined violations in the majority of enterprises inspected and in the 
organizations of the ministries of building assembling, of food industry and roads in the 
half of inspected organs. Some heads of enterprises and organizations, when faced with 
difficulties, instead of mobilizing teams on the implementation of the plan, toke the 
road of deception, fraud and additions. Such violations were identified in the consumers 
of Akhunbabaev area. The Tashkent administration "Stroyrembyt" attributed to the 
amount of 11,000 rubles illegally obtained and a half thousand rubles in premiums. The 
building has become a practice to commission facilities with large sub quality under 
letters of guarantee. The principal Tashkent construction enterprise over the past year 
presented for delivery in such a way as GUKS of the Tashkent gorispolkom reported on 
input from 113 residential buildings with a total area of 368,000 square meters. Just due 
to the additions reported on the implementation of the plan for the commissioning of 
housing management of capital construction of the SM Karakalpakstan, and the 
oblispolkoms of Samarkand and Syrdarya.10 In the organization of Dzhizakselstroy 
[Jizzakh agriculture construction] in 1982-1983, without performing housing 
construction plans, were received due to the additions about 60,000 rubles in 
premiums. In the Syrdarya factory for school-sports equipment of the ministry of local 
industry were attributed [non-existent] sales for 147,000 rubles. Some kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes farms bought from the cattle population without fattening delivered at the 
expense of implementation of the plan. For these purposes in Andijan last year were 
spent 9.3 million rubles to pay the collective farmers, and in the Kashka-Darya region - 
7 million. Employees of the Gosbank institutions insufficiently controlled the 
expenditure of money for other purposes. They continue to occur machinations in the 
delivery of butter for milk, especially in the farms of Khorezm, Navoi and Namangan 
oblasts. In 1983 were also recorded additions in the hectares of the areas. During the 
instrumental measurement of crops on farms of Karakalpak ASSR on the main crops of 
grain and forage crops were calculated 37,000 [extra] hectares, in Tashkent oblast 
9,600, in Jizzakh 18,300, in Kashkadarya 11,600 and in Surkhandarya 8,300 hectares. 
The spread of fiddling and fraud cases was facilitated by the fact that the ministries and 
departments do not take the necessary measures to strengthen the institutional 
control, which is usually did not reveal the gross violations in this case, little used 
accounting, audit and legal services for the detection and prevention of additions, often 
do not give such a principled assessment of the facts, and sometimes simply condoned 
the frauds. Some Party committees show a liberal attitude to the issues of additions and 
frauds, and do not make full use of the law to control the activities of the administration, 
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there are instances where perpetrators are not punished at all managers. In 
Kashkadarya, Navoi, Namangan regions in the second half of last year, the leaders 
responsible for distortions had been rarely punished [for their responsibilities]. State 
control organs do not fully utilize the right to suppress distortion of the facts reported 
to them, especially in the agriculture, construction, and consumer services.11 Especially 
disturbing are cases when the state engaged controllers who by deceit were controlling 
themselves. Last year, the following facts have been revealed even in statistical 
agencies. An analysis of the information received indicates that the Party committees 
do not make a high demand for employees of ministries and departments of the 
executive committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies of the guidance in strict order 
of accounting and reporting in the subordinate enterprises and organizations. Poor 
control the activities of the prokuratura office and other law enforcement agencies for 
the timely consideration of the materials of the additions, and other distortions of 
statements, the definition of the volume of the damage and its compensation, in dealing 
with the prosecution of frauds, and individuals forced into falsifications. Presented in 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan information regional Party committees, ministries 
and agencies in some cases are unself-character often embellish the situation, they can 
not see the program further concrete actions to eradicate this shameful phenomenon 
as the pripiski. It would be appropriate to forward this note to the obkoms, ministries 
and agencies, obliging them to work more actively to implement the resolutions of the 
CC CPSU and the CC CPUz in the fight against fraud and pripiski.12 
 
Extract from the CC CPUz buro discussing the ‘Kashkadarya affair’, 29 February 
1984 
in December 1983, a department of the OrgOtdel CPUz sent in the obkom of 
Kashkadarya, a memorandum on the serious violations of labor in the Chirakchinsk 
raikom and offered to consider the facts of the violations of the CPSU rules about the 
cadres' selection within the party and its principles, the education of cadres and other 
negative phenomena. It was indicated that in order to create an image of qualitative 
improvement of the Chirakchinsk raikom composition [refilling with new people] 
forgery and the staging of the results was allowed. During 1982-1983, were discovered 
six cases where members accepted as candidates for the CPSU - workers such as 
engineers and technical employees - were recorded in the documents and in the raikom 
buro decisions as mere 'workers'. Thus, in January 1982, a hydrotechnical manager of 
the "Moskva" canal, B. Yakhshyev, was accepted by the organization of the party as an 
employee and, on the buro of raikom of 15 February 1982, as a party worker. L. Turaev 
– secretary of the Komsomol at the kolkhoz 'Lenin' – was recorded in the documents as 
a blacksmith. Also S. Kenzhaeva – a kindergarten teacher of the kolkhoz 'Akhunbabayev' 
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–  was registered as a mechanizator. In addition, the secretaries of the raikom T.R. 
Tillaev and N. Eshonkulov violated the instructions of the CPSU on the register of 
members and candidate members of the CPSU because they have not filled in the 
questionnaire the points where it was required their social position. Then, shortcomings 
of work in the cadres had also been revealed: in the last two years in the rayon, three 
directors of sovkhozes were replaced – on a total of eight – and fired with the same 
formulation "for reasons of health."13 The people who have been convicted occupied 
the important posts in the past, such as A. Makhmadustov - head of a district unit of 
inter-kolkhoz, Ya. Pardaev – director of a sovkhoz specialized in citrus production, Kh. 
Zipiev – director of the legal department of the rayon's agroindustrial unit, and U. 
Akhmedov – the leader of the barracks of the rayon firemen. T. Khushmuratov - the 
director of the kolkhoz 'Akhunbabayev' – had defects in the work and violated the 
financial discipline. In 1982 he embezzled the salaries funds to 463,200 rubles and did 
not realize the plan on cotton, grain, vegetables, meat, milk and silk cocoons. He had 
been fired from his post and, with the consent of the obkom, he was assigned to work 
as an instructor of the organizational department of the raikom. The brother of the FS 
raikom, U. Razzakov, when he was the director of the sovkhoz 'Akhunbabayev' violated 
financial discipline. From January 1981 until June 1983, during the purchase of the 
livestock, sovkhoz has overpaid it for 260,000 rubles, and emitted false receipts on 
payment of the premiums of workers for more than 50,000 rubles. During the 
inspection, [extra] costs and shortcomings for a total of 206,000 rubles were estimated. 
Some managers accumulated money and started the construction of illegal dwellings, 
and these were the raikom secretary M. Alibayev, the chairman of the gorispolkom M. 
Babakulov,14 the chairman of the raion’s PPC E. Norbayev and the general inspector of 
the raion on the preparation and quality of agricultural production M. Suvorov and 
others. for more than eight months, the post of Secretary of the party committee of the 
sovkhoz 'Akhunbabayev' had been vacant during the selection of the candidate, but the 
raikom chose it under the pressures of a part of the people. The popular pressure 
sounded like a threat because if they chose their candidate A. Khudaibergenov, he 
would no longer report violations.15 
 
Report from the KGB department of Namangan to the FS Namangan obkom 
Radzhabov entitled ‘The history of a Kapo’ about the Odilov case, 24 August 1984 
The resolutions of the XVI plenum CC CPUz have caused the support and the large 
participation of the Namangan people [...] of which a great part was not satisfied for the 
measures that party has adopted to uproot the negative phenomena in the social and 
economic life, and they try to exacerbate the situation and to create nervousness and 
doubts over the obkom organizational work. The situation was exasperated in the oblast 
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after the Papski raikom plenum of 7 august 1984 where was criticized the activity of the 
former general director of the Agroindustrial complex Akhmandzhan Odilov. Believing 
in his impeccability and impunity and trusting in his false authority and ties that in the 
past saved him more than once, Odilov almost started to ignore the decisions of the 
party organs not so much in words but in facts, and started to contradict the decisions 
of the CC plenum. In this company where there was lawlessness and large-scale theft, 
corruption and forgery there was no access for the representatives of the supervisory 
organizations. Odilov himself went so far as to threaten physical violence in telephone 
conversations16 against the members of the oblast and rayon party managers. At the 
same time there were reports that Odilov and his affiliates had firearms and were saying 
to each other that were intended to protect the interests of their patron. It is all further 
exacerbate the situation and called for drastic measures to locate the negative 
phenomena and the possible agitations in the territory. [In order to enforce] the party 
organizational work in the Papski rayon, it was created an operative group. In the first 
days of work of this group, the forces were concentrated in the localization of negative 
processes and the prevention of possible terrorist actions. These measures made it 
possible to enlarge the information flow on the negative processes in the plans, 
intentions and [potential] measures of the Odilov's affiliates and also on the facts of his 
criminal activities. The inhabitants of the rayon and workers in the agro-industrial 
complex had explicative materials on the facts that have been mentioned above, and 
seized four guns held illegally and 1,420 bullets that were purchased by order of Odilov. 
Reports of violations of socialist law, crimes and evidence of sadism by Odilov and his 
affiliates are still arriving. The workers of this agro-industrial complex E. Kamparov and 
Yu. Zhureev declared that the beekeeper Kh. Abdurahmanov wrote a declaration that 
in the years 1983-1984 by the direct Odilov order, were collected 'taxes' for meat, eggs 
and [cooking] oil from the sovkhozes' workers. During payment of wages, he restrained 
30 rubles [from each worker] and from the beginning of 1984 salaries were not even 
paid and those who complained about this fact or other reasons were beaten. In order 
to control the situation in the agro-industrial complex, were not allowed criticisms 
about his criminal activity. Odilov resorted to terrorism and torture of workers and the 
humiliation of their human dignity as well as retaliation against unwelcome [people], 
using physical force, nagging and forced labor, the manufacture of incriminating 
materials, provocation and blackmail. In this way, yet in 1972 a group of kolkhoz workers 
in a statement to the Prosecutor General of the USSR said that after receiving beatings 
by Odilov, some people were crippled, and many people were forced to move in the 
kolkhoz and probably even the kolkhoznik Mamadzhon Khalimov17 and the police 
liutenant Buisin had been killed under Odilov's order. In the materials of the criminal 
case on the murder of the shepherd Akhmedov in 1981 are reported many facts about 
Odilov and his affiliates crimes that humiliate the constitutional rights of citizens. In 
these materials, it is possible to notice that Odilov, organizing the criminal group of his 
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neighbors, even went to the point of inflicting physical harm and to beat more than 30 
unwelcome workers. In this agroindustrial complex, Odilov has even organized the 
system of shadowing and dossier reporting about the unwelcome people. Dossiers like 
these represented violations of constitutional rights of Soviet citizens and [this practice] 
was maintained for many years. For example, the dossier about Amindzhanov is formed 
by five volumes and other materials, containing copies of the protocols of interrogations 
that were made by the police authorities, the recording of the answers during the 
hearings of the court and the official demands of Soviet organs that were made and 
were given on special request of the competent bodies. In the materials there are the 
data on the work of the Amindzhanov case and on the investigator Tursulov. Therefore, 
there is the criminal abuse of power by some [judiciary] workers that gave these 
confidential materials to a private citizen as Odilov. His and their guilt is exacerbated by 
the fact that documents accumulated in the dossiers were used for criminal purposes, 
blackmail, incitement to commit illegal acts, fabrication of fake criminal cases, 
provocations etc, therefore trampling on the Soviet constitution. On the realization of 
these dossiers, [we had been] told by S. Samsakov, a worker of the cadres department 
of the agroindustry complex, that for some months worked with M. Mirazimov who was 
in charge of producing these dossiers. About a week before Odilov's arrest, the most of 
these dossiers that are datable before the 1980, had been destroyed. Nowadays, some 
of these dossiers had been seized. Odilov had even practiced the 'primitive 
detachment', allocating unwelcome workers to the most difficult and often unpaid jobs: 
and so a veterinarian called Sobir Uminov for two years he was forced to work in the 
construction of a stone wall perceiving all this time 241 rubles.18 His only crime was that 
for two years had not gone on vacation for the holidays and when on the third year he 
has requested them, [he has been punished]. Similar facts are also reported in the 
declarations of Abdukhalil Zhumanov, Saib Samsakov, M. Raisakhiev. According to the 
data, in this agroindustrial complex more than 80 people had been harassed. Odilov and 
his sons, brothers, nephews tortured the workers with whips. Odilov more than once 
whipped the guard of the agroindustrial complex Mamadali Shumanov – and his brother 
– fabricating a case against him and getting his conviction. In November 1983, [Odilov] 
ordered to undress the worker Yuldashali Kuldashev and despite the cold he washed 
him down with the tube water. The workers [...] E. Kamparov and Yu. Zhuraev declared 
that, on the base of Odilov's order, have marked with a hot iron the face of Makhmud 
Khaidarov, the former director of the sovkhoz 'Kirgizston', and even a stigma on the 
right thigh of the guard of the sovkhoz 'Uzakov'. As the general agronom Makhmudzhon 
Raisakhiev wrote in his declaration, in August 1983 Nuridin, the son of Mukhtar 
Khamidov who lives in the village of Grumsarai, has been sodomized by Odilov with a 
bottle of vodka, presumably for ‘educational purposes’. The inhuman crimes of Odilov 
trample the honor and the dignity of workers, torture and murder by his order have 
caused anger and disturbance of citizens of the raion and the oblast. So on these 
operational results, the workers of his sovkhoz regarded these as 'fascist actions' and 
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he has been compared to Hitler. The operational results that we have received testify 
that Odilov tried to personally enrich himself and to affirm his unlimited private power 
in the raion, surrounding himself with people dependent on him – unprincipled, amoral 
and often with criminal records – with the help of which he did theft, machinations and 
falsifications on a large scale. Odilov has created a group which severely faced all those 
who criticized him or who were considered 'guilty'. Disposing of significant amounts of 
cash and other valuables, by the extensive use of all types of offer or simply bribing, [he] 
has created a wide network of 'reliable ties' who at critical moments had to guarantee 
with their official position his impunity. Of the many facts of this kind about the activity 
of Odilov19 testify following data. In the declaration of the group of kolkhoz workers to 
the General prosecutor USSR in 1972 it has been specified that yet at that time Odilov 
was illegally spending tens of thousands of rubles of kolkhoz money for his personal 
needs and he withheld a part of kolkhozniki [salaries]. According to investigative data 
of the years 1981-1982 on this agroindustry about the murder of the shepherd N. 
Akhmedov, it has been affirmed in the criminal case that in the agro-industrial complex 
there was the disguised theft of livestock, cotton, wool, squandering of kolkhozes and 
sovkhozes land and other crimes. Therefore, in the years 1979-1981 in the 
agroindustrial complex 969 cattle heads had been stolen, more than a thousand goats 
and sheep that were produced in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes of the neighbor raions. 
In the sovkhozes 'Naiman' and 'Ilich' the value of the stolen livestock amounted for more 
than 200,000 rubles. With money of sovkhoz were bought 'defitsitnii' [scarce, rare] 
goods before there was an increase of prices in these goods20 and in the warehouse of 
the agroindustrial complex had been seized these goods for a value of more than a 
million rubles and in the bottom of the warehouse were found 19 new cars of different 
brands and 20 motorcycles and the accountant Ezonali Kenzhaev has voluntarily given 
the money that was kept in his brother's house according to the orders of Odilov for a 
value of 118,648 rubles. Even the former accountant of the sovkhoz has declared that 
in the period 1979-1981, Odilov gave him 124,700 rubles to storage them. Then it was 
discovered that the factory that was producing shawls made an illegal production for 
150,000 rubles [...] and were discovered great deficiencies in cattle and goods in the 
sovkhozes. From the arrested people for this case, were witnessing Yu. Turaev, M. 
Shuraev, M. Mukhtarkhanov, Z. Turaev, A. Dzhunaev. From the received witness 
evidences' and seized, is indicated that Odilov was ordering to make expensive presents 
- for a value of about one million rubles and 12 cars of different brands - due to the 
funds that he illegally collected. These funds were sent to the top managers in 
Namangan, Tashkent and Moscow. Other money – that had been illegally collected – 
                                                                
19 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 87. 
20 In this way, he was determining a sort of rural investment-speculation. This means 
that he had connections in upper planning echelons that told him when a price was 
going to increase. To fight this situation, in Western world there were created antitrust 
agencies. In Soviet Union such institutes did not make any sense because the system 
was supposed to work out of the market and without possibility of machinations. 
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was spent for services of people that were attracted by Odilov to make them write 
anonymous [slandering-defamatory] letters and to make provocations against the 
former secretaries of the Namangan obkom. During the investigations have been 
discovered cases of illegal entrusting of sovkhozes' land to privates.21 However, at that 
time, Odilov, being the deputy of the SS USSR and member of the CC CPUz and abusing 
of his power, could create the conditions to prevent investigations [against him. Now] 
the hostages’ goods were returned and the criminal trial was concluded. Odilov with 
impunity violated Soviet law. On 24 November 198[missing, presumably 1983], a group 
of more than 100 people under Odilov's order has surrounded the building of the ROVD 
[provincial department of internal affairs] of Chust raion where were the documents of 
accountability that had been seized, in order to demand the return of documents and 
threatening violent actions. There, there were the Odilov's data where had been 
discovered the serious violations in his industries in 1982, however this did not stop 
Odilov's criminal activity. Thus, S. Ziyatov – the former director of sovkhoz 'Naubakhor'– 
and M. Madrakhimov - a manager of a department of the same sovkhoz –` under 
Odilov's order gave the land to privates in exchange for payments that were then given 
to the latter. About operative data, in the highland of Magar, there are presumably ten 
herds with 300-350 sheep and in the other parts of agroindustry there are horse herds 
and a great number of goats that behold to Odilov. In some [detected] messages, there 
are data about Odilov's dachas in mountain places and on the river Syrdarya. These are 
guarded by hunters and probably there, there is the most part of his material goods. 
The above mentioned activities enriched him and his affiliates and determined the fall 
of the agroindustry unit's productivity and its profitability, determining a big and serious 
economic damage to the state and to the material condition of the inhabitants of Papski 
raion, causing discontent. With impunity, for many years these Odilov's activities in a 
certain measure have undermined the faith of a part of the population towards the state 
organs. This point is also mentioned in the statement of Raisakhiev who wrote "Odilov's 
crime disturbed all the people. His impunity has caused distrust in the party, the court, 
the prokuratura and administrative bodies. I'm glad that he has been imprisoned." And 
the fact that testify that these words reflect the feelings of many residents of the raion 
is that, in some places, the news about Odilov's arrest has been celebrated and many 
workers of the agro-industrial complex22 express joy stating that this was a triumph of 
the Soviet power and of the justice, and have helped the representatives of the 
administrative organs to discover the crimes of the former director and to normalize 
the situation in the agro-industry. The prokuratura and the UVD are informed about the 
facts of Odilov's and his affiliates' criminal activities. In these organs  more than 15 
declaratory materials had been spent and the people linked to Odilov kept spreading 
rumors about that his arrest is a temporary measure, trying to scare the people on the 
return of the old order and adopt measures to attract a part of the inhabitants to join 
the initiatives to putting pressure on the judiciary organs to release the arrested. 
                                                                
21 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 88. 
22 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 105, l. 89 
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Odilov's wife and brothers Muksin and Davud are particularly active. The wife of the 
arrested has collected signs in order to promote a petition [letter] for justice. Many 
people renounced to sign it but some had signed for fear and on 20 August 1884 this 
letter had been presumably sent to the CC CPUz. Odilov's son Akbar who supposedly 
has firearms threatened to avenge his father and is hiding. Under these circumstances, 
the operating group forces direct a further identification of the antisocial behavior of 
the group and the suppression of possible terrorist actions and other hostile actions, 
the seizure of the weapons, the help in the investigation, the disclosure of witnesses 
and the discovery for information of Odilov's and his affiliates' criminal activities. 
[Signed, Kh. M. Mamatov, chairman of the Namangan UKGB]23 
 
The ‘Pupil of a dead’ – the donos against Rano Kh. Abdullaeva 
On 27 September 1984, a group of “ideological activists of Tashkent” addressed to 
Chernenko, Gorbachev, Romanov, and Solomentsev an anonymous letter where the 
amoralities of the secretary for ideology and of her son were denounced. The latter was 
accused of being an arrogant person with an amoral lifestyle based on alcoholism, his 
four cars, and luxury house restorations costing more than 30,000 rubles. According to 
the letter, the secretary promoted her friends in the ministry of education of the UzSSR 
and chose the cadres on the basis of zemlyachestvo and friendship. The letter also states 
that she herself was arrogant and did not have the modesty of real communists.24 The 
case was followed by the party, which asked Tashkent to shed light on the facts. In 
response, a memorandum of the CC CPUz to the CC CPSU sent on 5 October 1984, 
reported that Abdullaeva in 1980 received two apartments for her family of four people 
with a total area of 135 m2 and from 1983 her family lived in a private house of more 
than 100 m2 while her son did not have cars registered on his name. After the 
allegations, the party clarified the situation with her.25 The slanderous level of this letter 
was evident, considering the high level of bigoted moralism in many of these 
anonymous letters. However, given the frequency, the tone, and the contents of these 
letters, they seemed to be very carefully orchestrated campaigns of discrediting of 
individuals. On this case, on 16 October another letter arrived from the “group of labor 
veterans”, handwritten in very poor Russian, against Abdullaeva asking “how can she 
be an ideological manager when she [isn’t] able to establish order within her family” 
with a alcoholic and drug-addicted son who had car accidents and made parties with 
loud music where there were naked boys and girls. Then, this second letter denounced 
again that she put her friend as ministry of education UzSSR and organized a very 
expensive wedding for her two sons, inviting more than 350 people in expensive 
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24 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 115. 
25 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.116-117. 
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restaurants.26 And other anonymous letters arrived in the serious period with very low 
allegations against the ideological secretary that mimicked the tones of quarrels 
between neighbors.27 Another anonymous letter from a “group of party workers” 
arrived in the CC CPSU on 28 January 1985, stating that she is arrogant with employees, 
a miserable mother because her son is a criminal, and an unfaithful  wife because she 
put her lover at the head of AN UzSSR.28 Then, another anonymous – supposedly from 
somebody in the academy – letter addressed to Chernenko arrived on 22 February 1985 
describing Abdullaeva as Rashidov’s “pupil” and his “right hand”. “She follows 
Rashidov’s tradition of zemlyachestvo, protectionism, and arrogance”, and then 
denouncing the fact that she became doctor of science without attending university and 
joining the training of candidates of science.29 Again, on 15 April 1985 a very angry, 
sexist and racist letter30 from “the representative of the republic’s intelligentsia” to the 
Gensek Gorbachev added that “women in the top post in the party had been chosen 
not for their managerial qualities but on the amoral base of their lovers” and gave the 
example of Rano Abdullaeva who had been nicknamed “the idiot” by the people. The 
letter stated that a scholar who criticized her work was expelled from the academy and 
her son always used to change cars and had a great house. Then were reported the 
same story that she was half Bukharan and half Khorezmian and she was promoting 
people of those regions and her fiend as the top of education ministry.31 Finally, in a 
note to the CC CPSU (14 May 1985), Mogilnichenko declared that these allegations 
written in so many anonymous letters were fake and slanderous against Abdullaeva. 
Then, he observed how before June of the previous year - the month of the XVI plenum 
– nobody had ever sent a letter to criticize her. In that event she was responsible for 
sending to Uzbekistan party workers from the center. So, Mogilnichenko – as we doing 
too– was guessing who was behind those slanderous letters against a person that was 
retained as a firm figure who was not making compromises and discounts.32 However, 
besides the respectful trust that Moscow reserved for Abdullaeva, it was just a matter 
of months and she had to face the worst fate in the Uzbek affairs, when she was 
implicated for her relation with Rashidov and her role in the scam. As happened for 
Nasriddinova, also Abdullaeva was alleged with sex scandals, and other issues that were 
indicative of the level of bigotry and sexism in Uzbek politics. Abdullaeva then became 
a symbol of Rashidovism, who had to be hit and was at the center of a campaign 
                                                                
26 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.119-121. 
27 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.123-126. 
28 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.130-131. 
29 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.127-128. 
30 This letter was full of racism and anger from somebody who had problems with the 
ethnic minorities in the republic, stating that “in order to be relevant and to be eared in 
the party you have to be a Crimean Tatar, a Korean or an Uighur but not a Russian or an 
Uzbek.” RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.133-135. 
31 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.133-135. 
32 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.141-142 
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orchestrated with the sole but clear purpose of discrediting somebody very important, 
moved by those who had been anti-Rashidovian and marginalized from 1959. This is 
hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that from the end of 1984 the first complaints 
against the defunct FS CPUz started to arrive. An exemplary anonymous letter to the CC 
CPSU and CC CPUz, and arrived on 25 September 1984, stating that in the June 1984 
plenum, among the names of the culprits lack the name of the main responsible of this 
scam at republican scale: it was Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov who had never been 
mentioned as the main responsible party. During his reign, “corruption, theft, 
speculation, bribes, protectionism, falsifications, scam and distortion of reality that 
limited any manifestation of criticism… and these are not all the vices with which was 
infected the republic […] where a great part of people believed that it could be possible 
to live even without working […] So why has Rashidov been buried with all honors in the 
center of the capital? […] Rashidov was probably eating meat every day while the people 
had to take a kilogram per month with the ration book.”33The letter was thus prompting 
a polemic against a figure who, for better or for worse, was dead, asking to delete “those 
honors that he got with fraud and falsification”. So they asked the party to rebury 
Rashidov somewhere else and to forget a figure that was associated with the 
“Brezhnevism and its worst ugliness” –  as well as the scandals in the Ministry of fishing, 
Elizevski store etc. – and “to judge if not openly at least closely Rashidov’s activity in 
order to restore the faith in the party.”34  
 
The FS CPUz, I.B. Usmankhodzhaev memorandum n. 1-726 SS addressed to the CC 
CPSU, 30 April 1986 
As a result of the dedicated restitutive work of the party-organizational aktiv of the CC 
CPUz in collaboration with the CC CPSU, as well the ordinary process of criminal 
investigation, we can report the following. The unseemly role of the former FS CPUz Sh. 
Rashidov is clear. He is responsible for serious violations and abuses in his work with the 
cadres, for his retreat from Leninist norms of party life, [and for] widespread corruption, 
bribery, pripiski, and political expansion of the executives. Additionally, he is responsible 
for major flaws in the ideological and political life. Rashidov in 1959 became the FS CPUz 
[and stayed in that post] for a long time in power. Especially in the ‘70s, he planted a 
ceremonial atmosphere of self-praise, hymns in his addresses about the real and 
imaginary achievements of the republic, ignoring [the norms of] collegiality, criticism, 
and self-criticism. The selection of [cadres] was predominantly on the basis of kinship, 
zemlyachestvo, personal dedication, and often guided by selfish interests. As a result, 
many of the key positions in the Party, government, and economic bodies of the 
republic were filled with his close relatives. There were Rashidov’s relatives in the 
apparatus of the CC CPUz in various posts (eight); in the Jizzakh obkom five members of 
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34 RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll.144-147. 
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the buro,35 and three secretaries. All this [malfeasance] was known by the party 
activists, who encouraged its imitation. With the direct assistance of Rashidov, his 
grandfather Nasyrov was twice awarded with the title Hero of Socialist Labor – without 
sufficient reason – and his brother N. Rashidov, his daughter S. Rashidova, and his son 
in law A. Muminov became doctors of sciences. Rashidov himself is not an example of 
modesty. In nine oblasts, luxuriously furnished villas with large excesses were built, in 
which he rarely stayed to rest. For these unplanned estates he spent 10 million rubles. 
Believing in his infallibility, Rashidov put himself [above the law, resorting to illicit and] 
unsuitable means to achieve his ambitious goals. It was established that he was trying 
to create the appearance of well-being in the economy such that he encouraged and 
often orchestrated falsifications in the cotton sector of the republic. In the cotton 
blanks, annually there were additions totaling some 400 thousand tons of raw [cotton]. 
In the accounts of the state plan for milk, butter bought from the state trade and 
consumer cooperation was also computed. Livestock was purchased on the [black] 
market […] and sold to the state, as if it were produced by the public sector. All this had 
allowed him to become Hero of Socialist Labor twice, a winner of the Lenin Prize, and 
to create around his person a phony authority. He lost the sense of proportion and 
modesty […even in his] literary works. [Unjustifiably] his works have been repeatedly 
republished in Uzbek, Russian, and other languages in high print runs.36 The people who 
created the appearance of prosperity were held in high esteem and received 
undeserved rewards. [And these…] unseemly things were going on for the sake of 
Rashidov himself. For a long time, he was shielded from criticism, led away from the 
punishment, allowed anti-Party and anti-state actions of the former first secretary of 
the obkoms of Kashkadarya (Gaipov) and Bukhara (Karimov), the MVD (Yakh'yaev), the 
general director of the Papski agroindustrial association (Odilov), a pander and personal 
confidant, now arrested, [and] the former chief of cadres of the Central Committee T. 
Umarov. As a result of the criminal investigations, it emerged that Rashidov received 
expensive gifts and hundreds of thousands of rubles in bribes from employees of the 
leading party, soviet, and economic organs. With the connivance of Rashidov, the state 
was robbed […] and bribery took on vast and dangerous proportions in the country. The 
caused great material damage to the state, estimated at billions of rubles. After 
enforcing the [proper] measures, the perpetrators were [finally] been brought to the 
party and state to be held responsible, and thousands of people convicted under 
criminal law. In the context of lack of control and permissiveness, deep moral decline 
and degeneration of the leading cadres resulted. The Republican Party organization – 
with the help of the CC CPSU – endorsed measures to cleanse the Party and state organs 
from those officials who embarked in the direction of additions, fraud, and bribery. 
During 1984-1985, for these reasons 172 employees within the nomenklatura of the CC 
CPSU and 1813 - or 45.7 per cent - within the [lists] of the CC CPUz had been removed 
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from their posts.37 Of 65 obkom secretaries, 52 were replaced, including 11 FSs. 408 
new raikom and gorkom secretaries – 70% of the total – were appointed, of which 149 
were in fact FSs. Additionally, 46 chairmen and deputy chairmen of oblispolkoms were 
changed. 29 officials from the Central Committee, 232 deputies of the Supreme and 
local Soviets, and from the ranks of the CPSU 6653 individuals were ousted for all the 
negative phenomena. About Rashidov’s unseemly role, during the current difficult 
situation in the republic, the party organs received many letters from authors who 
believe that his name should not have been assigned to streets, enterprises, and 
institutions. The basic assessments on the personality of Rashidov were given at the XXI 
Congress CPUz. The congress strongly condemned the vicious style and methods of 
leadership of Sh. Rashidov, which directly contributed to the emergence and spread of 
serious shortcomings and negative phenomena. Under the suggestion of [the congress’] 
delegates, the CC CPUz was instructed to suggest a revision of the decision to 
perpetuate his memory. Based on the above facts, and taking into account the decisions 
of the XXI CPUz Congress, the CC CPUz  requests cancellation of the decision of the CC 
CPSU and SM USSR n. 1227 of 23 December 1983 “to commemorate the memory of Sh 
Rashidov”, according to which Usbekistanskaya street in Tashkent was renamed 
Prospekt ‘Sharaf Rashidov’ and a memorial plaque on the building n. 68 in G. Lopatin 
street in Tashkent was installed. [Additionally, the order we seek cancelled had] the 
name of Sh. Rashidov assigned at the Samarkand State University, to the Tashkent 
textile complex, to the regional library of Jizzakh,38 to the sovkhoz “Madaniat” in the 
Karauzyak raion of the Karakalpakstan ASSR. Finally, it was scheduled to build a 
memorial monument of Sh. Rashidov and to assign his name to one of the ships under 
construction. At the same time, it might be necessary to consider the question of 
depriving Sh. R. Rashidov of his two Hero of Socialist Labor awards and his Lenin Prize 
award, as well as the cancellation of the pension and welfare status of his widow and 
his children. According to the decision of local authorities, Rashidov’s [body] was buried 
in the center of Tashkent, near a branch of the Central Lenin Museum. The CC CPUz is 
requesting that he be reburied in the municipal cemetery. [Signed Usmankhodzhaev]39 
 
CPSU memorandum to the Central Committee P-206, 5 May 1986 
To the CC CPSU. “About the note of the comrades Chebrikov V.M. and Rekunkov A.M.” 
As requested we report that the note of the comrades Chebrikov V.M. and Rekunkov 
A.M has been considered. The note correctly reported that in the Uzbek SSR serious 
shortcomings of the party leadership took place, as did the perversion of the Leninist 
principle of selection, placement, and training of cadres, the weakening of state 
discipline and socialist legality, which had an extremely negative impact on the situation 
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in the economy. This has led to widespread corruption and bribery, and to the moral 
and political degradation of the leading cadres. Among them were some members of 
the buro and secretaries of obkoms, some senior officials of the CC CPUz, ministers, 
chairmen of oblispolkoms and their deputies, heads of a number of city and regional 
leadership, economic cadres, many senior officials of the law enforcement organs. The 
desire to create the appearance of prosperity led to widespread state fraud. As has now 
been found, for example, in the main commodity of the republican economy – cotton – 
up to 400,000 tons of raw cotton were falsely added annually. At the expense of the 
state plan for the sale of milk, collective and state farms resold butter purchased in the 
system of state trade and consumer cooperation as if it were milk. Cattle – which the 
state did not feed – was also purchased on the market was resold to the state as if it 
was grown in the public sector. As a result, for the period from 1978 to 1983, the country 
suffered material damage amounting to more than three billion rubles.40 The party 
organizations of the republic are working to improve the situation, to clean the party, 
government, and state organs from compromised persons and to strengthen all areas 
from top to bottom with honest and principled workers. They were particularly active 
after the June 1984 XVI plenum of the CC CPUz. The departments of the CC CPSU 
accorded to the CC of the republican party an all-round assistance. In Uzbekistan, in the 
last two years, from the 65 obkom had been replaced 52 officials, including 11 of the 13 
FSs. [As well] had been appointed 406 - or 70% - of the gorkom and raikom secretaries, 
of which 149 - or 76.8% - FSs. 46 (56.8%) chairmen of oblispolkoms and their deputies 
were changed, as well as 160 of the 234 chairmen of city and raion executive 
committees. Those who have pursued the way of abuse, economic fouling, violations of 
the CPSU Charter and Soviet laws are liable to strict party and also criminal liability. 
From the CC [CPUz] had been ousted 29 people, and from obkoms, gorkoms and 
raikoms 269. Dismissed from the deputies of the Supreme and local soviets 232, 
excluded from the CPSU 6653, prosecuted for criminal malfeasance 21,369 people. 
Significant personnel changes were made in the apparatus of the Communist Party, in 
the republican ministries and in the departments. For this purpose, the CC CPSU sent 55 
experienced workers of the CC [CPSU] apparatus and of the party committees from the 
RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus.to Uzbekistan to support the leading party and soviet work. 
Much attention is paid to strengthening reliable people of the law enforcement 
agencies. Replaced also were almost the entire leadership of the prokuratura, the MVD, 
the SC and the MJ, as well as their41 organs in the field and most of the judges. For the 
managerial and operational work in these bodies had been sent 190 people from other 
regions of the country until the end of this year, intending to send another [group of] 
220 specialists. To assist in the investigation of the largest embezzlement and abuse of 
the UzSSR were detached a hundred of experienced prosecutors and police 
investigators, some of them from the central offices. In order to review the incoming 
cases in a timely and qualitative manner, the staff and members of people’s courts and 
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oblasts’ courts had been [numerically] increased. This was also done to decide whether 
to change the jurisdiction of some criminal categories. The prokuratura USSR, the MVD 
USSR, the SC USSR and the MJ USSR are on-site to constantly assist law enforcement 
agencies of the republic and to take measures to improve the style and methods of their 
activity. The work of cleaning the party, soviet, and economic agencies of Uzbekistan 
continues. It is implemented under the control department of the CC CPSU. So as to 
improve state control over the observance of the rule of law in economic relations and 
to increase the efficiency of the prosecutor's supervision, the solution has been 
provided in the plan of action to implement the Resolution of the XXVII Congress of the 
CPSU and the line of the Political report to the CC Congress (P3/42 of 24 March 1986). 
The prokuratura USSR, the MJ USSR, the SC USSR, the legal department of the presidium 
of the SS USSR with the participation of the department of the administration of the CC 
CPSU are currently preparing such proposals. In accordance with the plan, in the current 
year we are also preparing and42 submitting to the CC CPSU proposals aimed at 
improving the state arbitration to strengthen the prescribed discipline.43 
 
The Decree of the CC CPUz and SM UzSSR, n. 282-21 (4 June 1986) implemented 
the decree n. 617 of the CC CPSU and SM USSR of 22 May 1986 “on the 
cancellation of the decree of the commemoration of Sh. R. Rashidov”: 
 
1 to delete the decree n. 9 of 5 January 1984 on the commemoration of Rashidov; 
2 to approve an action plan to implement the decree of the CC CPSU and SM USSR of 
22 May 1986 “on the cancellation of the decree of the commemoration of Sh. R. 
Rashidov”; 
3 to restore the names that were in effect until January 5, 1984 of the textile factories 
in Tashkent, the library of the Jizzak oblast, the sovkhoz of Karauzyak raion that were 
named after Rashidov. The Tashkent gorispolkom would rename Prospekt Sharaf 
Rashidov in Prospekt Uzbekistankii; 
4 to compel the obkoms of Karakalpakya, Jizzak, Samarkand, Tashkent to review the 
resolutions previously adopted on this matter and to take the necessary measures 
arising from this decree; 
5 to compel the SM of the Karakalpak ASSR, the oblispolkoms of Jizzak and Samarkand 
and the Tashkent gorispolkom to conform road signs and other place names44 as well 
as office supplies in the economic organizations and institutions to remove Rashidov’s 
name completely from them. 
6 in accordance with the decree of the SM USSR of 26 May 1986, No. 618-182, [to 
rescind the financial support to the family of Sh. R. Rashidov] the decree of the CC CPUz 
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of 5 January 1984, n. 82/20 and the decree of the SM UzSSR of 19 January 1984 n. 16-
3. 
7 to instruct the SM UzSSR to decide on pension support for Sh. Rashidov's widow and 
bring it in line with the housing conditions of her family.45 
 
Memorandum “Information for the party activities on Sh. R. Rashidov”, CC CPUz 
buro, 4 June 1986: 
During the improvement of the situation in the republic and in the course of criminal 
investigations of officials, it was revealed that the FS of the CC CPUz, Sh. R. Rashidov 
is personally responsible for deviations from the Leninist norms of party life, 
distortions in working with cadres, spreading corruption in the republic, forgery, 
fraud and serious flaws in the ideological and political life of the republic. Having 
been for a long time in the post of FS of the CC CPUz, he planted in the country an 
atmosphere of splendor and self-congratulation, he ignored collegiality, criticism 
and self-criticism, and encouraged fraud against the state and “mestnichestvo” 
[localism]. According to his conscience, the cadres were placed in general on the 
basis of kinship, zemlyachestvo, personal loyalty and often out of greed. So many of 
the key positions in the organs of the party, of the Soviets and of agriculture in the 
republic were occupied by relatives and people close to him. Unfairly the pandering 
persons and persons charged by him who have committed serious violations had 
been honored and thus avoided criminal liability. In order to create an appearance 
of well-being in the economy and by Rashidov's promotion, during the 1978-1983 
period in the republic 4.548 million tons of non-existent cotton was falsified, for 
which kolkhozes and sovkhozes received 2.866 billion rubles of which with, the 
pretext of salaries, had been paid 1.178 billion rubles.46 A significant portion of these 
funds was used to bribe various officials. Now only because of criminal charges 
more than 22,000 people are accused. The organization of the Republic Party had 
taken measures to clean up the party organs, the Soviets and the state from the 
people who have taken the road of fraud, falsification of data, corruption and for 
this reason 172 workers who were part of the CC CPSU nomenklatura were 
removed, 1813 who were in the nomenklatura of the CC CPUz of which there were 
52 of the 65 obkom secretaries, and 408 – or 70% – of the gorkom and raikom 
secretaries. Believing in his infallibility, Rashidov was put beyond the control and 
with the unworthy means he created around him a phony authority, trying to give 
undeserved honors and awards. According to statements and witnesses of the 
workers and the former managers under investigation, Rashidov systematically 
obtained expensive gifts and bribes. Rashidov's party activities have undermined 
the faith of the people of the republic in the power of Soviet law and social justice, 
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resulting in significant material damage to the state, holding back economic 
development and bringing a significant part of managing cadres to moral decline 
and degeneration. The party organs received many letters on the unseemly role of 
Rashidov and on the current difficult situation in the country and the authors of 
these letters feel that streets, institutions, and companies should not bear his name. 
The principled assessment of Rashidov's personality had been discussed at the XXI 
Congress of the CPUz.47 The congress has widely considered the style and methods 
of Rashidov's vicious leadership, which contributed to emergence and 
dissemination of such shortcomings and phenomena and the CC CPUz delegates 
submitted a proposal to repeal the decree of the CC CPSU for the commemoration 
of Rashidov [referred to the CC CPSU and SM USSR decree of 23 December 1983 on 
the commemoration of Rashidov]. The presidium of the SS USSR on 2 June 1986 has 
also revoked the part dedicated to the construction of a bronze bust of Rashidov in 
its decree of 4 November 1977. The SM USSR has revoked the decree of 25 
November 1983 “for the material support of Rashidov's family” [signed by A. Petrov, 
director of the protocol sector of the general department of CC CPUz].48 
 
Memorandum of the Buro CC CPUz to SM UzSSR, 24 July 1986: 
The major episodes of falsification intensified mainly in the years 1980-1982. This 
policy did not have a local-private nature, but came from the top leadership of the 
republic [...] Estimates suggest that in the period 1978-1983 the material damage 
to the state amounted to more than 4 billion rubles and during this period data 
[additions] of 4.5488 million tons of cotton never harvested were falsified, thus 
leading to a sum of 2.8667 billion rubles being paid in vain. Of this,1.178 billion had 
been paid in false wages. [For these facts], about 22,000 people had been 
condemned. [...] During the investigations, it emerged that one of the organizers of 
the scam was N.A. Khudayberdyev, chairman of the SM UzSSR.49 [...] according to 
the testimony of Usmanov, the former head of MCC UzSSR, Khudayberdyev and 
Rashidov promoted this campaign of falsification of the cotton harvest volume. They 
forced the leaders of the party, soviets, and agricultural organs to implement the 
plans at all costs. Khudayberdyev admitted his responsibility for the events and that 
these forgeries have caused great material damage to the state. [...] to cover the 
defects of the financial and agricultural assets, he disposed of the state budget 
[corrupted with public money]. In the period 1978-1984, he spent just for these 
things 305 million rubles of state funds.50 Like Rashidov, he was from Jizzakh and 
gave more funding to the development of his native oblast. For Jizzakh alone six 
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decrees of the government were made in the period 1978-1983. [...] Abusing his 
power, he had illegally invested with public budget funds to maintain and renovate 
the dacha of Rashidov at a cost of 366,000 rubles. He also exceeded in spending on 
outside missions. His visit in Mongolia alone cost the republic 306,000 rubles of 
which some 6,981 rubles were spent on souvenirs and liquor. These anti-state 
activities have caused damage to the interests of the republic and restrained its 
economic development, undermining people's faith in the power of Soviet law and 
social justice, and causing a great material damage to the cadres. [Signed A. Petrov, 
director of the protocol sector of the general department of the CC CPUz].51 
 
Nishanov’s speech in Tashkent for the commemoration of the 117th anniversary of 
Lenin's birth (22 April 1987):  
[Sharafrashidovshchina became] synonymous with intrigue and blasphemy, 
hypocrisy and ambiguity, disgrace and corruption, nonsense rhetoric and self-
celebration. From the tribunes, solemn appeals of honesty, decency and 
responsibility were pronounced, but in reality corruption and fraud were the key 
results. From the tribunes the obligation to respect the choice of the Leninist 
principles for cadres was professed, but at the same time the leaders of the people 
were surrounded by their trustees, careerists, and people with connections and the 
sale of offices for profit was rife. From the tribunes the call for criticism was also 
professed but those who tried to speak out against the methods of leadership and 
against lawlessness were severely persecuted with sophisticated techniques. From 
the tribunes there were statements about modesty, but at the same time there was 
the unbridled self-promotion of honors, and the construction of luxury hotel 
residences with special access for the new Uzbek khan with the party card, gold 
stars and awards were encouraged. From the tribunes, the call for truth was 
professed, but in fact in the most shameless manner falsification of reports that 
inflated reality by up to six million of cotton ‘mountains’ occurred […] The lovers of 
this false documentation praised the Rashidovian technique of forgery and were like 
heroes, creating a false impression that they, with their golden hands, personally 
gathered the white gold themselves. The nature and scale of the negative 
phenomena which wreaked havoc in the republic are well known. Many officials – 
including those in high ranks - were involved in criminal and the party punishments. 
We remember how V.I. Lenin spoke with anger about officials who have taken the 
road of corruption, against fraudsters and other villains, noting that all the forces 
must be engaged in a relentless struggle against these people and must use an iron 
fist, moving against them more severe judgments, and treating them in a way that 
everyone will remember for years […Only then ,] the fight against them will be 
completed. We must always do as Lenin taught us; that is, not to accept any 
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deviation from the letter of our laws. We are aware that only through the 
integration of the CC CPSU, under its leadership and with its daily help, was it 
possible to extend the fight to eradicate these negative phenomena in the republic 
and to make order and to achieve a decisive improvement. In this direction, much 
has been done. But we should continue this hard work thoroughly and pursue 
relentlessly the eradication process without negative compromises, and the 
complete elimination of the causes of [possible] revival of these intolerable events. 
We must enable an exchange of cadres between the republics to strengthen 
international attitude of the cadres and the enrichment of the experience of the 
party and the state work. This is the Leninist tradition and now it has been reborn.52 
 
Letters to the CC CPSU against Radzhabov (1984): 
After the XVI plenum (1984) many letters started to arrive in the Moscow and 
Tashkent CCs, denouncing the malfeasance of the newly appointed Radzhabov. For 
example, a letter sent from a 'participant at the XVI plenum CPUz' to Ligachev, to 
the Genprokuror, and to the director of the CPC CPSU Solomentsev denounced how 
still in August 1984 there were intrigues, falsifications, scams, violation of state and 
party discipline in Namangan after the arrival of Radzhabov. According to the letter, 
Radzhabov supported an atmosphere of toadyism. He also advanced the career of 
jeopardized people, such as his deputies Temkin – with whom he worked in Bukhara 
– and Nugmanov – who had an illicit trade of cars and was sponsored by Radzhabov 
in becoming the minister for the assembly works. Nugmanov had a reputation for 
drunk driving, and had on one occasion been in a serious accident. He even sold his 
car Gaz-24 to his toady and bribegiver Shadskikh, the director of a car storage, for 
5,000 rubles. When Radzhabov was minister for agricultural building, he inflated the 
value of (unrealized) works by more than 50 million rubles, receiving form the state 
15 million rubles. Then, he undertook machinations within the ministry where he 
also managed a trade of job places. He also supported the appointment of 
jeopardized figures, such as Averbakh – who became deputy minister – and who 
could thereby be removed only thanks to the intervention of the USSR minister G.A. 
Karavaev. As well, Temkin was removed by Karavaev but, thanks to Radzhabov, he 
went to direct a department in the SM UzSSR after which he was even allowed to 
become the second secretary of the Namangan obkom and first deputy chairman 
of the oblast's oblispolkom. He was corrupt and speculated in cars and apartments 
and, every week, went to his friend Radzhabov with the official car to look after his 
apartment and his sons. In two ministries, Radzhabov did huge damage to the state 
for hundreds million rubles, and bought his apartment and cars with public funds. 
"During his speeches in the plenums, he was always praising Rashidov when he was 
still alive." He even helped the director of Stroidetal' V. Baratov to restore 
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Radzhabov’s apartment and gave him a monthly bribe of 5000 rubles. When he was 
arrested, Radzhabov helped to liberate him. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 82-85. 
Another letter - from "a raion activist" sent to Ligachev, to the Genprokuror 
Rekunkov, and to Solomentsev arrived at the CC CPSU on 10 August 1984 – 
denounced his dangerous connections, in which Samarakhan Karimov, manager of 
the Kassansaiski raion in the Namangan oblast was denounced on account of 
corruption and falsification. He had obtained more than 10 million rubles with which 
he created his criminal network and built up his own authority. He lied to the party 
for not admitting the conviction his father had been given (10 years’ imprisonment) 
and showed the house of his brother –instead of his own – to Osetrov and to 
Radzhabov. He was most responsible for tolerating report-padding to the tune of 
several million rubles and the failure to declare goods for about 10 million rubles 
found during police controls. But Radzhabov ordered the case to be covered up in a 
raion where kolkhozes and sovkhozes had accumulated more than 100 million 
rubles in debts. His friend Nazyrov, built a house for him for a cost of 70,000 rubles 
and spent 30,000 just for furniture. He spoke with Radzhabov in Tajik in order in 
order to show his nationality. Hence, it seems that letter's author wanted to 
highlight a sort of ‘Tajik group’ based on mestnichestvo. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, 
ll. 87-89. Another letter sent from a 'group of communists of the general housing 
industry at the ministry of housing of the UzSSR' declared in a letter sent to 
Chernenko on 27 September 1984 that Radzhabov bought the post of FS Namangan 
obkom for 200,000 rubles. As well, Pravda was sending to the CC CPSU dozens of 
anonymous letters in September 1984 denouncing Radzhabov. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, 
d. 49, ll. 97-111. In the aftermath of these donos, the CC CPUz informed Moscow 
about the situation in the oblast, defending Radzhabov as an honest worker. On 26 
October 1984, the CC CPUz informed the CC CPSU about the controls on these 
complaints, reporting that Temkin did not have any car registered in his name and 
that he had lived in an apartment that was assigned to his family from 1974. 
Additionally, the illegal trade of cars by G.K. Shadskikh – who was expelled from the 
party by a decision of the Tashkent gorkom buro was confirmed. However, the 
purchase of Nugmanov's car was not reported, and the latter had no responsibility 
for the accident. However, Buratov was discovered violating the party discipline, 
reprimanded and fined with a month’s salary. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, ll. 93-94. In 
response, also Mogilnichenko confirmed more than once his innocence. In a 
memorandum to the CC CPSU dated 5 November 1984, K. Mogilnichenko, deputy 
director of the party organizational work department of the CC CPSU, confirmed 
that the work of Radzhabov as FS Namangan since January 1984 was well done and 
he was a serious and principled manager. RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 113. Then, in 
a memorandum of K. Mogilnichenko, on 15 January 1985 about the mentioned 
letters about Radzhabov the comment of Usmankhodzhaev is reported. The latter 
defined these letters as "slanderous" and figures such as Karimov had showed their 
commitment to improve the situation in the party, fulfilling the plan for more than 
three years on all the agriculture and industrial production. He also commented that 
654 
 
Karimov had, in fact, declared the story of his father, who was, anyway, released. 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 90, d. 49, l. 95. 
 
Extract of Nishanov’s speech at the IX plenum (30 January 1988) 
Aitmuratov supervised the issues of the development of the agro-industrial complex 
and he tolerated falsifications and frauds. [However,] the CC CPUz buro did not 
strictly vindicated [these facts] and he was sent to another place of leadership in 
the republican gosagprom. Finally, he was removed and sentenced. [Also] K. 
Akhmedov, the former chairman of Gosplan UzSSR, overlooked and tolerated 
[negative phenomena... Similarly,] the former obkom FSs of Kashkadarya (Gaipov), 
Surkhandarya (Karimov), Khorezm (Khudaibergenov) and Tashkent (Musakhanov) 
originally were dismissed with high pensions. And the former first secretary of 
Bukhara, Karimov, was a convicted criminal and [yet] was appointed as vice-minister 
of land improvements and irrigation under Khudaibergenov from the end of 1984. 
Furthermore, by the initiative of the buro CC [CPUz], he was [even] awarded the 
prize of Hero of Socialist Labor but the CC CPSU has not approved this proposal. [...] 
At the XVI plenum the activities of the Karakalpak obkom were also criticized. 
However, at the recommendation of the CC buro, the former FS Kamalov was sent 
across the border to work on a management post. Then, a great damage to the 
education of the cadres was done by the former candidate to the buro CC, and 
former director of the OrgOtdel Orlov who was an affiliate and a faithful companion 
of Rashidov.53 And with his criminal activity he endorsed the demoralization of the 
executives’ workers. But he was sent into retirement with a high pension at the 
recommendation of the buro CC [CPUz]. However, now he has been condemned. 
The political promiscuity and the indecision of the buro CC [CPUz] was more evident 
towards the former secretary of the CC R. Kh. Abdullaeva. It took three and a half 
years to understand the real face this masked “activist” who, under the guise of 
perestroika, pursued a voluntarist [arbitrary] and vicious ideological line [...] Then, 
the phenomena of forgery, fraud and abuse of power were revealed in the Tashkent 
oblast where the FS obkom was Musakhanov, who has now been condemned. 
Together with him, the current members of the buro CC CPUz V.A. Antonov and T.A. 
Alimov worked in the oblast's leadership. They also carry moral responsibility for 
the fraud. However, we did not hear about judgments of their unprincipled 
positions within the so-called “Tashkent falsifications' technology” [tashkenskaya 
tekhnologia propisok]. How was this lack of principles possible even in the CC CPUz 
buro? Why was no hard position towards the perpetrators and those responsible 
for the negative phenomena not assumed? This liberalism and connivance was 
transmitted to other committees of the republican party. Among the eliminated 
[figures] for the negative phenomena, 45 former officials of the CC nomenklatura 
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and 110 of the obkom nomenklatura still continue to have management positions. 
In the oblasts of Jizzakh, Surkhandarya, and Tashkent, a quarter of these leaders 
have been dismissed for abuses and other phenomena. None of the obkom, 
gorkom, and raikom committees had the courage to [Impeach] some leaders guilty 
of corruption and other phenomena […]. And, as before, there are the phenomena 
of shuffling of cadres from one place to another54 and there are cases of abuse of 
power by the raikom FSs. The subjectivity in the choice of the cadres has been 
noted, for example, by the FS Karakalpak obkom K. Salykov. [Finally,] the deputy 
chairman of the SM UzSSR, G. Sakhritdinov, the deputy chairman of Gosplan UzSSR, 
A. Makhmudov, and the minister, A. Azimbekov, were dismissed from their posts a 
few days ago. And buro CC CPUz member and chairman of the SM UzSSR G. Kh. 
Kadyrov has tried to mitigate their guilt. Everything has been done in vain because 
his position forces him to be principled and courageous [...]. It is necessary to fight 
without compromise regarding the negative phenomena and their consequences.55 
 
Memorandum to the Gensek Mikhail Gorbachev from the investigators for 
particularly important cases of the General Prokuratura USSR T.Kh. Gdlyan and 
N.V. Ivanov, 11 April 1986.56 
Dear Mikhail Sergeevich! We consider our duty to address you on the issue of extreme 
importance. Its positive decision refers to your exclusive competence, because it is 
primarily concerned with the FS CPUz Usmankhodzhaev IB and other senior party 
leaders and law enforcement agencies. The issue proceeds as follows. The Prokuratura 
USSR, with the active participation of the KGB investigated a criminal case of bribery of 
a number of officials of the Uzbek SSR. During the investigation, officers of the CC CPUz, 
of the regional, city and district committees, as well as of the MVD UzSSR and others 
were brought to justice and arrested. It was found that over the last ten years in the 
country are widely used and have become widespread bribery, embezzlement, and 
other self-registry abuses. For example, a mass-scale bribery has been evidenced by 
such facts. FS of the Gizhduvan raikom (in the Bukhara region) S. Rakhimov overlaid 
"tax" from collective farm chairmen, state farm directors, heads of trade and economic 
organizations of the district, getting from them bribes worth more than 600,000 rubles. 
The FS of the Bukhara obkom, A.K. Karimov, also regularly received bribes in the form 
of a "tax" from all the FSs of the [local] raikoms and from the majority of the heads of 
regional and district institutions and organizations. During the search on Karimova, 
valuables worth over 6,000,000 had been seized, including 130 kg of gold items. The 
manager of the CC CPUz, T. Umarov, consistently received large bribes from many 
secretaries of provincial, city and district committees and from economic managers. A 
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similar situation has been observed in the system of the MVD and other departments. 
[To evaluate] on how deeply graft is entrenched in the region, [the value of] gold, money 
and manufactured goods [is worth] in the amount of about 20,000,000 rubles. Fully 
sharing your concern about the situation in Uzbekistan, which has sounded from the 
podium of the Party Congress, we would like to inform you about a very serious 
problem, a positive decision which, in our view, will greatly contribute to the overall 
improvement of the situation in the republic. The investigation established that a 
characteristic feature of the prevalence of acquisitive crime in Uzbekistan was the fact 
that the[se events] were made with the direct participation of the leadership of the 
republic headed by Rashidov Sh.R., Usmanhodzhaev I. B., Osetrov T.N., Salimov A.U. and 
others. Without any exaggeration to say that they were the organizers and inspirers [of 
the crimes]. This was done, of course, with the aim of rampant greed, promotion 
through bribery and creation of the appearance of welfare in the country. 
Usmanhodzhaev I.B. received bribes in the period 1974-1984 - when he was chairman 
of the Namangan oblispolkom, FS Andijan obkom, Chairman of the Presidium of the SS 
UzSSR and the FS CPUz - as it was established in their confessions and in the evidence 
given by Karimov A.K. and Baltaev P.P. - secretaries of the Bukhara obkom, T. Umarov - 
director manager of the CC CPUz, Asatov U. - chairman of the Navoi oblispolkom, Iliadi 
Ya.A. - FS FS Karshi gorkom, Rakhimov S. - FS Gizhduvan raikom, Yakhyayev Kh.Kh. - 
Chairman of the MVD UzSSR, Makhamadzhanov Ya. - head of the Namangan UVD, 
Khvan M.G. - chairman of the kolkhoz 'Politotdel' in the Tashkent region and hero of 
socialist labour, Sharipov A. - prosecutor of the Andijan oblast, Gaziev Kh. - people's 
judge, and many others. They pointed out the specific circumstances of 
Usmanhodzhaev I.B. obtaining bribes totaling more than 500,000 rubles. In addition, 
Usmanhodzhaev I.B. was one of the deceptors of the state in the procurement of raw 
cotton. Thus, the head of the MCC [UzSSR] B. Usmanov said that after the death of Sh. 
Rashidov, in December 1983 Usmanhodzhaev I.B. personally gave to him and to the 
chairman of the SM UzSSR Khudayberdiyev N.D. an indication for adding to the state 
reports 240,000 tons of raw cotton [for a value] in the amount of more than 
183,000,0[00] rubles. This fact has been confirmed by Khudaiberdiyev N.D. and other 
officials. This has been also evidenced by the conclusion of the planning and economic 
expertise that only in 1983 in the Uzbek SSR determined 991,700 tons of [non-existing] 
raw cotton, for which [the state] had illegally paid to cotton farmers more than 
757,000,000 rubles, of which 286,000,000 had been stolen. As can be seen from the 
materials of the criminal case, also the second secretary of the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan Osetrov T.N. received bribes for a long time [In fact,] lasted since 1968, when 
he worked at the CC CPSU. The bribes given to Osetrov had been reported by the party 
and economic managers: Umarov T., Karimov A.K., Baltaev R.R., Rakhimov S., Sharipov 
A., Khvan M.G. Also Salimov A.U., chairman of the Presidium of the SS UzSSR, the FS of 
the Tashkent and Khorezm obkoms - Musakhanov M. and Khudaibergenov M., as well 
as other leaders were involved in bribery. Characteristically, Usmanhodzhaev I.B., 
Osetrov T.N., Salimov A.U. engaged in bribery in I983-I985, after the death of Rashidov 
Sh.R., when respectively their leading position changed in terms of quality. For example, 
the last revealed bribes received by Osetrov T.N. refers to the fall of 1985. Bribery was 
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also revealed for the second secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia Vladimir 
Smirnov, formerly head of the sector of the CPSU Central Committee, and for the former 
executive employees of the CC CPSU Brovin G.D. and others. In a speech at the Party 
Congress, the Secretary of the CC CPSU com. E.K. Ligachev noted that the MVD is out of 
criticism. The case file indicates that this circumstance contributed to the widespread 
bribery among the responsible employees of the MVD of the USSR. Thus, in the course 
of the investigation, it was proved the evidence that Churbanov Yu.M., as chief of 
political department of the MVD USSR and then the first deputy Minister of MVD USSR, 
received bribes from Yahyaev Kh.Kh. - Minister of the MVD UzSSR, Kahramanov T.Kh. 
and Begelman P.B. - deputy ministers of MvD UzSSR, Norbutaeva Kh. - head of the 
Kashkadarya UVD, Dzhamalov D.D. - head of the Tashkent oblast UVD, Norov M.S. - head 
of the Bukhara oblast UVD, Mahamadzhanov Ya. - head of the Namangan UVD, Urunov 
A.S. - head of the OBKhSS of the Tashkent city UVD, Karimov A.K. - FS of the Bukhara 
obkom, T. Umarov - director manager of the CPUz and others. Thus, only by the 
testimony of these persons who have held up the arrest of senior positions in the party 
and MVD apparatus of the Uzbek SSR, Churbanov received as bribes more than 670,000 
rubles. He and other senior officials of the central apparatus of the MVD USSR, instead 
of providing practical assistance in trips to Uzbekistan, contributed to the spread of 
corruption and decay on a great part of officials of the republican MVD. Although, this 
is not a complete list of those entirely involved in bribery, it is a clear indication that the 
rebirth of [this phenomenon] in the higher ranks workers of the party and state 
apparatus has a threatening nature and can significantly weaken our position. Currently, 
the criminal charges brought against officials of district, city and regional units, 
however, the main culprits of the incident, which bear full responsibility for the tragedy 
of Uzbekistan, is left behind. A giant danger is that these state criminals were able to 
concentrate in their hands all powers of the region where live up to 17 million people. 
Trampled one of the fundamental principles of Soviet legislation, according to which 
everyone is equal before the law. In this context, [we] should also consider the principle 
of equity, which in this case did not fully prevailed yet. The situation is aggravated by 
the fact that workers are well aware that the current leaders of the Republic are 
involvement in crime, and therefore there is a vacuum of trust - or rather, the absence 
of any trust in the authorities for them. Perhaps even now it is difficult to evaluate all 
the negative consequences that entails to fight this injustice. Any indecision and 
hesitation whatever reasons they were not motivated, and especially leaving criminals 
in their current situation, the main part of the country's population will be regarded as 
another patronage of anti-social elements from senior management, as the case was in 
the past. The results that we have on the case are entitled to inform you with factual 
information about the true state and reveals: in the course of the investigation, because 
of this case alone, you will be able to make an objective judgment on the merits of the 
raised issues. It seems that until now you have not given complete information on the 
extent, that in recent years occurred in Uzbekistan, and the role of the senior officials 
who, as dangerous criminals, remained in their posts of responsibility. We are 
completely aware that appealing to you personally, [rather than] calling the most 
extreme irritation of those who by virtue of their office had long before the XXVII 
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Congress of the CPSU been in the party, basically put before the leadership of the party 
these issues for their timely decision. Informing of the foregoing, we would ask you to 
find a way and take us for an objective report on the case. The investigators for 
particularly important cases of the General Prokuratura USSR T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. 
Ivanov. 
 
Memorandum from the investigators Telman Kh. Gdlyan and Nikolai V. Ivanov to 
the Gensek M.S. Gorbachev and to the chairman of the SM USSR N.I. Ryzhkov, 5 
November 1986. 
In March 1986, we had already written you about the corruption of Uzbek managers 
and of the central organs in Moscow. After that, we had been informed that you had 
ordered to make controls about these facts and to refer about these facts. We had been 
called in the CC CPSU by Com. V.A. Abolentsov, deputy director of the administrative 
organs department that thanked us for promoting these principal issues and he had 
contested that they will resolve positively all the problems in short times. However, 
after some months, we had been sure that these issues were not resolved and but 
everything is done to hinder the investigations and thus to clear from penal 
responsibility those state criminals. In these circumstances, and not having any support, 
we had been forced to personally call for help in July 1986 to you, Mikhail Sergeevich, 
because without your approval, such important issues that touch state-party interests 
cannot be resolved. In this moment, we had concluded that you were not informed 
about the largest information about this case, and this forced us to write you again. The 
need of this plea is linked to: 1- the reception of many other witnesses about the guilts 
of these persons; 2- the obstacles to persecute them for criminal responsibility; 3- the 
absence of the necessary support by CC CPSU, because without this [element] it is 
impossible to persecute this very difficult and actual case until the end. In the previous 
report, among the people that had been accused: first Secretary of CPUz, I.B. 
Usmankhodzhaev; second secretary of CPUz, T.N. Osetrov; Chairman of presidium of 
supreme soviet UzSSR, A.U. Salimov; first secretaries of57 Tashkent and Khorezm obkom 
party M.M. Musakhanov and M.Kh. Khudaibergenov; second secretary of CC of the CP 
Moldavia V.I. Smirnov, that before was working as manager of the organizational-party 
department of CC CPSU, first deputy minister of MVD USSR Yu. M. Churbanov and many 
other managers. During the investigations, it was confirmed the implication in the 
corruption of deputy director of the organizational-party department of CC CPSU K.N. 
Mogilnichenko, the manager for the agriculture sector in CC CPSU B.M. Istomin, the 
deputy director of the organizational-party department of CC CPSU I.E. Ponomarev, the 
instructor of the same department M.L. Ishkova, the secretaries of CC CPUz R. Kh. 
Abdullaeva, E. Ajtmuratov; the Chairman of Soviet Ministrov UzSSR N. D. 
Khudayberdyev, first secretaries of the obkom N.T. Turapov (Kashkadarya), I.D. 
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Dzhabbarov (Bukhara), V.P. Esin (Navoi), N. radzhabov (Namangan) and K.K. Kamalov 
(Karakalpak); the minister of MVD UzSSR N.I. Ibragimov and his deputy M.N. Sultanov, 
deputy director of HQ of MVD USSR V.N. Kriventsov, the manager of cadres of MVD 
USSR I.F. Mel'nik and others. Nowadays the issue is not about the ascertainment of 
guilts of Usmankhodzhaev, Osetrov, Churbanov, Smirnov and other, but it consists in 
those people by which it depends the solution to prosecute these cases, because they 
don't want to resolve this problem. The judicial evaluation of their criminal activity is 
univocal and their guilt has been totally defined. For example, it was confirmed that Yu. 
M. Churbanov toke bribes from 13 people for a total of 700.000 rubles, and 
Usmankhodzhaev from 14 people for a sum of more than a million and 200 thousand 
rubles. New evidences appear about these responsible workers taking bribes because 
their criminal activity had been pursued for several years. The, if in March 1986 we 
informed you that Osetrov toke bribes from 7 people, nowadays the number of people 
taking bribes had been doubled and obviously, the sum [of bribes] increased. An analog 
situation, was for other people that toke bribes and that used their responsible position 
for mercenary aims and to own wealth. The more characteristic personality in this 
framework is58 I.B. Usmankhodzhaev. Being a criminal creature of the group of A. Odilov 
- now under arrest for bribes and multimillion theft - he was contributing of the cadres’ 
cleavage in the Republic, falsification and corruption, using his higher state-party 
position in the interest of his accomplices. It is relevant to remember that, when in 1983 
he became first secretary of CC CPUz, Usmankhodzhaev was pursuing the [informal] 
party-line to fraud the state with falsification, corruption and other negative facts. Just 
in November-December 1983, under his order, it was falsified the public account for 
240.000 ton of raw cotton for a sum of more 183 million rubles. During the 
investigations, the first secretaries of Khorezm and Bukhara obkom M.Kh. 
Khudajbergenov and A.K. Karimov, the secretary of the Bukhara obkom R.R. Baltaev, 
the manager of the CC CPUz aktiv T.U. Umarov, the deputy chairman of the presidium 
of SS UzSSR G.M. Orlov, the manager of the Navoi oblispolkom U. Asatov, the raikom 
secretaries A.Ya. Iliadi and S. Rakhimov, the minister of MVD UzSSR Kh.Kh. Yakh'yaev, 
the managers of the Navoi and Namangan UVD T. Khaitov and Ya. Makhamadzhanov, 
the director of the kolkhoz "Politotdel" and Hero of socialist labor M.G. Kvan and many 
others - admitted that they gave him bribes in high sums. The cynicism, the falsehood 
and the level of moral decadence of this trouble manager are surprising. For example, 
without feeling disgusted for anything, in December 1983 he took a bribe for 500.000 
rubles from the FS Khorezm obkom M.Kh. Khudaibergenov to promote his candidature 
to the award of hero of socialist labor, and the last of his bribes was received for 20.000 
in the hall ‘Georgevski’ [in the Kremlin] during the session of the Supreme Soviet of USSR 
in November 1985. Evidently, in the period when perestroika [became] active in the life 
of our society, corrections of errors, this person - was not just a travel companion but 
he was an obstacle in the execution of the new line of the party: following his mercenary 
aims, he has desecrated those symbols and places holy for soviet people. After these 
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concrete facts about the criminal activity of I.B. Usmankhodzhaev, a question appears: 
can a person like this to direct the republic?59 According to us, the answer must be frank: 
his continued presence at such high place is in flagrant contradictions with the 
indication of the XXVII congress of CPSU. Then, [we can] put the question: who can 
protect these degenerated, dangerous state criminal and also the internal enemies of 
our socialist society? However, even they, having a responsible position, consciously 
they degenerate employees by involving them in their criminal activities aimed for 
personal wealth, and then they had caused irreparable damage in the sectors of 
economy, politics, ideology and moral abutment of society. Their potential dangers, and 
especially those who are working now, are much more dangerous than our open and 
external enemies. Unfortunately, we have to see that the criminals have protectors. 
Firstly, they are those workers of the apparatus of CC CPSU, that were related to 
Uzbekistan and were taking bribes from criminals. For example, the first secretaries of 
the of Bukhara and Khorezm obkoms, A.K. Karimov and M.Kh Khudaibergenov and even 
a manager of internal affairs of CC CPUz T.U. Umarov had affirmed that they gave bribes 
to K.N. Mogilnichenko. Bribes from Uzbekistan had been received even by the CC CPSU 
workers B.M Istomin, M.L. Ishkiv, I.E. Ponomarev, V.I. Smirnov. Just for this reason, they 
are not interested to give objective information about the real situation in the republic 
to the heads of CC CPSU. Having fear for their personal safety, they provided 
disinformation and exonerate their accomplices. Just these facts explain the position of 
K.N. Mogilnichenko that, in December 1985, was informed with materials of 
investigation about corruption of Usmankhodzhaev and his entourage. However, he did 
nothing to protect the party from these criminals. Second, the criminals had protectors 
who [in turn] became accomplices in their criminal activity because they didn't do 
anything and assumed their personal responsibility in the resolution of the criminal 
prosecution issues. Paradoxically, these people were the Genprokuror USSR, A.M. 
Rekunkov, and his deputy, O.V. Soroka. For objectivity, we must say that the principal 
disorganizer role in the investigations60 in Uzbekistan was imputable to O.V. Soroka. He 
- we don't know why - was during the last 3 years misinforming the Genprokuror of 
USSR, leading the decisional process to damage the realization of state interests. Being 
a cautious and emotional person, A.M. Rekunkov had been negatively influenced by his 
deputy and he didn't want personally to deal with these actuals affairs even if we tried 
several times to give him objective information. The real situation in Uzbekistan and in 
Moscow is much more complicated and dramatic as it appears to A.M. Rekunkov, O.V. 
Soroka and some others. They don't want to see in the eyes of truth and consciously 
they recede from the solution of many crucial problems that represent the important 
interests of party and state. Evidently, the heavy of the past prevails on them and they 
don’t believe in the reality of positive changes in the country. They will to "remain in 
trenches", acting according to the principle of "nevertheless, nothing happens" and to 
do not take personal responsibility are definitive factors in their behavior. In the 
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meanwhile, the interests in the country, especially at nowadays level of our 
development claim urgent solutions of all the issues of matured problems, all the 
inherited problems, even including such detestable fact which we express in this report. 
The investigations of criminal cases in Uzbekistan with all the evidences confirms these 
conclusions. Somebody has to take the responsibility to resolve [this] difficult situation. 
Three years ago in Uzbekistan, had been found the people that uncompromisingly and 
in party-style toke the responsibility to uproot corruption in the republic, not fearing 
the risks of persecution and public dishonor. Thanks to the hard position that had the 
manager of KGB UzSSR, L.N. Melkumov, his first deputy V.N. Logunov and others 
workers of public security and despite the opposition of Sh.R. Rashidov and his criminal 
entourage, it was possible to open and to investigate over this criminal case. It is not a 
secret that all these people had been dismissed from their positions for disobedience 
and they had been harrassed. Maybe, this example negatively influenced the behaviors 
of A.M. Rekunkov and O.V. Soroka during the investigations of the case, but even if is it 
so, this cause cannot be a justification for them. 61 Furthermore, considering that 1986 
is not 1983, when in the face of the new leadership they could always find 
comprehension and support. The persecutions, that were in the first stage of the 
investigations of this case, were even against our investigative group. The criminal 
groups feared to be discovered and were provoking us, artificially heating the spirits 
around the investigations, and there was even an attempt to rid of us, creating an 
impossible climate to normally work in the republic. The situation was aggravated by 
the fact that in the face of our superiors we could not find the necessary support, and 
we received the indications from Soroka to do not enlarge the case and to limit the 
investigations with those 8 culprits that had been arrested by KGB organs in April-June 
1983. But already at the end of that year, the investigations revealed the evidences that 
the responsible workers of the party and the management of MVD UzSSR were involved 
in bribing, and this information was communicated to com. O.V. Soroka. However, this 
study approach of objective truth caused him extreme irritation and hanger, ordering 
again to not expose the criminal organizers and to stop the collection of evidence 
against them. We have refused to get his illegal request. After that, blackmails to be 
removed from the head of investigations until the possibility of being fired from organs 
of prokuratura arrived. Com. O.V. Soroka has an analog position until now. Meeting this 
fierce resistance by his side, we had continued the comprehensive and deep 
investigations anyway and we showed to our chiefs the facts, when we had met many 
evidences about the bribery for any organizer of crimes in a sum of since 500.000 until 
800.000 rubles. In these circumstances O.V. Soroka was impotent to refuse arrests and 
detentions even if, every time, he showed his displeasure together with threats. 
However, after giving the sanctions, he was always against the realization of arrests [and 
this situation] led to the suicide of the minister of MVD UzSSR K. Ergashev, of his first 
deputy G.I. Davydov and the First Secretary of Kashkadarya obkom, R.G. Gaipov. For 
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example, in August 1984, when there were sanctions for the arrest of62 Ergashev, in the 
whole week we had no possibility to arrest him, because every day O.V. Soroka was 
indicating to do not realize this sanction, providing several reasons, even if we had 
advised about the possibility of suicide and knowing the situation and having the 
operative information. Hitherto, he is hindering the professional and operative 
realization of the most important investigation activities as arrests, searches ecc., that 
unavoidably could cause that dangerous criminal can commit suicide and escape from 
investigations or even committing terroristic actions. What it has been done on this 
particular case - that does not have any analogy with the judiciary investigative practice 
- was against the will of our leadership. This is applied especially for the inculpation and 
for the prosecution of the ‘criminal procession’ and the withdraw of accumulated values 
for a cumulative sum of 26 million rubles. The most intolerable situation was around a 
case at the end of 1985, when we gave the information to A.M. Rekunkov and O.V. 
Soroka about the criminal activity of I.B. Usmankhodzhaev and others, that became 
assimilated by party leadership in order to make argued decisions at the XXVII congress 
CPSU. But even in this case, they did not show the political intransigency and they did 
not inform you about the unchallengeable evidence about the criminal guilt of these 
workers. In answer to our position by gen prokuror of USSR, it came the punishment 
[for us]. He had in his safe all the materials of investigations proving the guilts of I.B. 
Usmankhodzhaev and his companions. [However,] on January 2 1986 in front of all 
members of investigative management he put in doubts the work of the investigative 
group, proceeding with a cascade of threats to us. Like this, he gave a lesson to his 
subordinates that everybody of them will have the same destiny if they will be 
disobedient. Our attempts to explain that he was misinformed on many main aspects, 
were not considered by him, refusing to implement our objective argumentation on 
which we were insisting. Our written appeal to him did not give any effect, and it was 
put an argument of the need of criminal responsibility63 of the organizers of the 
managers of criminal groups in Uzbekistan and in Moscow. Even this time, he did not 
want to accept and rather listen his subordinates. We have to note, that for 3 years 
during the investigations on this difficult case, the com. A.M. Rekunkov met us just once 
and even accidentally. Since that moment, all the work on covering criminals has been 
paralyzed due to the light hand of com. A.M. Rekunkov. In this stage, com. O.V. Soroka, 
to put it mildly, toke the peculiar position, trying to coax us, to end our activity on 
unveiling the organizers of criminal groups. Under the guise of false benevolence, he 
tried to convince that we have understood in an unfair way the political situation of the 
moment and everything that is done by us constitutes as a suicide, and the solution to 
end the investigations is to go out of this dangerous zone, before that the dramatic 
events start for the whole prokuratura. After having realized our incorruptibility, Com. 
Soroka went on further sabotage of the investigations, as emerged in a banning the 
travels of a leader of the investigative group in Uzbekistan, and substantially putting 
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him under home arrest, to complicate even more this case. Even he, without any reason, 
has refused twice in giving sanctions to arrest the minister of MVD of UzSSR Ibragimov 
N.I. and his deputy Sultanov M.N., that have been the corruptors of Usmankhodzhaev 
I.B. and his affiliates. Furthermore, he has declared that in an open and categoric way 
that Usmankhodzhaev I.B., Osetrov T.N., Churbanov Yu.M. and Smirnov V.I. will be 
never trialed for the penal responsibility, and this position, according to his words, will 
be defended anyway. The negative role of our executives appeared also during other 
investigations of crimes in Uzbekistan. For example, the investigation on the so-called 
‘cotton affair’ has been done in such a way that to the penal responsibility had been 
prosecuted more than twenty thousands "secondary" people, meanwhile the main 
organizers of these massive crimes in the departments of oblast of the republic are still 
apart, saving millionaire wealth that had been acquired with the help of their 
subordinates, that for their guilt are now on the dock. Analogically, it was conducted 
the investigation on the case of the former director of the Papski agroindustrial 
company in the Namangan oblast, A. Odilov, famous millionaire, corruptor,64 and 
plundered that has corrupted many executives in Uzbekistan and in Moscow. 
Nevertheless, all these patrons-corruptors remained apart from their deserved 
punishments. And even after the XXI congress of CC CPUz, when from the tribunes was 
recalled the rebuke to the Prokuratura of USSR for lack of criminal responsibility of 
Odilov’s corrupters nothing drastic was achieve to activate the investigation in this 
direction. In this way, the usual line of reluctance is always traced, for deepening the 
investigation on all these cases and for bringing to the criminal responsibility all the 
criminal organizers. It is regrettable that our colleagues of the investigations have 
reached a compromise with their conscience and have proven malleable and have 
softened these cases avoiding direct confrontation with their leadership and ensuring a 
peaceful life. These 3 years of investigation have convinced us that the "intransigency" 
of our executives is just towards the secondary and tertiary offenders and is totally 
absent when we consider the main criminals. We do not agree with their decision to 
bring to criminal responsibility several hundred people on our case that had been forced 
with hard pushing to give bribes to their executives. Basically, they had been their 
victims and they did not have any other choice to survive and stay afloat in those 
unbearable circumstances, when beginning from Rashidov and ending up with 
executives of the rayon department, [they] had extorted bribes from their subordinates. 
We are convinced that the arrests of so many people without considering the level of 
their guilt and the real situation in which they were making guilts, is erroneous and 
politically harmful. This huge mass in [these] places knows better than every prokuror 
the names of the main criminals, and even know that due to them they had been 
conducted into these crimes. For this, prosecuting a part while another is left freedom, 
will determine the explosion of the discontent that is already now effective, with 
hundreds of people that surround the raikom, obkom and CC CPUz demanding for 
justice in the choose of their destiny. Without denying their guilts, they put the issue on 
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the responsibility of those who turned them into criminals. And nobody still now cannot 
give them a proper answer on these issues.65 The danger of this phenomenon consists 
in, considering these injustices and these people with their numerous clan, in turning 
these figures in anti-Soviet people, as they are convinced that injustice is done in the 
name of the Soviet government. For example, on the basis that each of these 
prosecuted twenty thousand people on the case of cotton has 100 relatives (this figure 
is underestimated), then it will happen 'that more' than two million of the population 
will automatically be opposed to the acts of state justice. But this is a brilliant proof of 
the destructive work by the administrative bodies in the fight against organized crime, 
when the roots that originated this phenomenon consciously (rather than criminally) 
remain untouchable, and yet all punitive efforts are towards collateral side and 
discovering that the evil again born, speaking in philosophical categories, and the good 
is transformed into its opposite, causing the damage to our public interests. Who need 
this "task"? Only our enemies external and internal. The experience has the examples 
of the different behaviors during the resolution of similar situation. In particular, during 
the mass unrests where even thousands of people participate, nobody has never put 
the argumentation to bring to [criminal] responsibility of all offenders. Naturally, 
[someone] identify the organizers and the more active participant of this crime that are 
responsible for their actions and all the other who had been involved in these unrests 
are exonerated. This rule is fully applicable to Uzbekistan. The tragedy of this republic 
with a population of 18 million people, it has no counterpart in the country according 
to the degree of social decomposition of society. And full responsibility for the incident 
would be held by the republic's leaders their henchmen in the place, and hit their 
"scapegoats". We categorically are against the unjustified mass repressions in this 
region, considering their full political and legal insolvency and extremely negative 
consequences for the improvement of the social situation in the country. Thus, the 
activity of our executives, voluntarily and involuntarily, objectively coincide with the 
position of the criminal group of Usmankhodzhaev I.B.. In what is it expressed? Firstly, 
everything possible is done to leave the main criminals66 in their high job along with 
stolen wealth, and not to punish them for the serious crimes that have been made by 
them to the state. Secondly, everything is directed to attract the major possible number 
to criminal cases from the social group that was forced by their management to install 
these criminal cases, thus becoming among the people that are called criminals. And, 
finally, thirdly the executives of Prokuratura of USSR and the group of Usmankhodzhaev 
I.B. are in the role of "active fighters" in the struggle against organized crime in 
Uzbekistan, that satisfies both, regardless of the fact that all the main problems 
discovered during the investigation in the republic will remain unresolved. The activity 
of these figures is distinguished only by targets and motives of their behavior. If the 
workers of prokuratura demonstrate hesitation - that proceeds together with their lack 
of principles - they do not want to assume risks and personal responsibilities, in order 
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to do not provoke anger and irritation of the defenders of this criminal group, and 
Usmankhodzhaev I.B. with his companions try to show himself as an honest and 
principled leader in order to cheat the party leadership, save the post and stay out of 
anti-party and anti-state responsibilities. This explains the fact that the largest criminal 
cases under investigation in Uzbekistan, deliberatively have not been merged into one 
[singular case], in order to professionally correct the tactic and strategy of all the 
investigations, because otherwise the great extent of the great extent of the criminal 
activity would be clear [involving] those that today are unreasonably protected. 
Everything was done with the knowledge and the planning of com. Soroka O.V., who 
was and will remain one of the main obstacles to the success of investigations of these 
criminal cases on Uzbekistan, assuming the main decision on key issues. In our opinion, 
it is not possible to keep the situation in this way. We are very worried about the 
conditions of [those] cases in Uzbekistan that had been discovered during the 
investigations. [These cases] require an immediate solution and a correct evaluation, 
whatever is the negative effect of these drastic measures67 to uproot corruption that 
has overwhelmed the republic from to bottom. Naturally, partial measures will not give 
the expected results as it was already in the 60s and 70s in Uzbekistan. Without a 
cardinal solution, the social illness in form of corruption with all the consequences was 
repeated in the 80s. The recidivist [phenomenon] is again inevitable, and whether now 
there will be not token the general measure that could stop and create objective 
conditions to uproot this antisocialist phenomenon in future. We are far to think that 
the Genprokuror USSR and his deputy, having all the complete information, do not 
understand the intensity of this problem. In their concrete actions, [we] do not feel 
[their] concrete concern that should be characteristic of such high state figures. You 
cannot really look indifferently at what is happening in the country at this qualitatively 
new stage of our development through the lens of their own peace and prosperity. Does 
that not explain that in three years com. Rekunkov never went to Uzbekistan and did 
not try personally on the spot to deal with crime in this hot part of the country. For our 
part, we have done everything possible to uncover the whole conglomerate of crime, 
show the mechanism of criminal connections, regardless of the official position of 
persons were involved in this [scheme]. In more than three years, we sought to 
investigate thoroughly and objectively and put those concerns to management, to 
enable them to take the right decisions for the community. We are honestly and 
conscientiously fulfill their duties and we have nothing to reproach. Despite three years 
of terror and defamation, we do not have deserted or retreated for someone to benefit 
consciously chosen position. But we have also seen in the fact that the responsible 
officials, whose competence includes resolution of questions raised by us in every way 
and do not want to essentially lead to the collapse of the case. In this context, it should 
be considered the position of Comrade. Rekunkov AP and Soroka OV which, through 
artificial dismemberment of a single case want to suspend the active course of the 
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further investigation of the exposure of the remaining principal perpetrators as68 this 
has already occurred in the so-called cotton affair. Do not be a professional, but enough 
to have a general idea of the investigation to reach a conclusion about the true 
intentions of our management of the collapse of the case. Today, the question is as 
follows: the end of the preliminary investigation or in-depth study for those who are on 
the right is the inspirer and organizer of these terrible crimes to the state. In other 
words, the question of whether or not to pull the abscess of the social organism? With 
all the negative consequences that are inevitable in moral and political terms, the giant 
benefits of surgery is that these bold steps will inevitably lead to a dramatic cleansing 
of the party and the state apparatus from the corrupting recurrence both in the present 
and in the future. In our view, we have no other alternative. Any other solution would 
inevitably lead to more negative social impacts, provided that we take into account that 
in the new stage of our development, we can not allow the differences of words from 
the case, otherwise commit mistakes of the past, for which now have to pay a high price. 
Trying to escape from a direct confrontation with those who are still standing at the 
helm, and those who are now excluded from work, but thanks to his connections and 
support more able to deliver a lot of trouble, our leadership chose the path of least 
resistance and its practical steps to objectively help the most odious criminals escape 
just punishment. This, in particular, explained by the illegal actions of the Prosecutor 
General of the USSR, which gave an indication to inform Usmankhodzhaev IB the 
testimony incriminating him of bribery. Another sample of similar action by the com. 
Rekunkov A.M. It refers to Churbanov! Contrary to logic and the foundations of 
elementary tactics of the investigation, on its direct request, but without our 
participation, he was summoned for questioning, where he was informed about existing 
in against him. Bare and weakened so consequently, he ordered the recall Churbanov 
Y.M. and to invite him to compensate the amount of illicit enrichment, although the 
interrogation categorically denied his involvement to bribes.69 Now they have been 
given a new team to conduct between bribers and Churbanov Y.M. confrontations ssked 
about what the need for this investigation, he said, "Let’s think again." Com. Rekunkov 
A.M. expressed the view that such in the same way a consequence of the former 
received a second secretary CC CPUz Osetrov T.N., whose guilty of bribery is proved. Of 
course, it begs the question, who benefits and why is it done? It seems to us that it is 
not necessary to have exceptional mental ability, honestly and truthfully admit that all 
this is done in favor of the criminals, and ultimately these illegal actions are intended to 
bring them to suicide, that is, to commit murder without trial, but our hands. With all 
of our intolerance of bribe-takers, we naturally cannot participate in this vandalism, 
because in addition to the iniquities of these actions are immoral. To one of those 
familiar with the materials of the investigation, there is no doubt that evidence has been 
collected in the case against them. Therefore, the question is whether to give consent 
to attract them to justice, and not to engage in a tragicomedy that does no credit to the 
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Prosecutor's Office of the USSR. In this situation lies another tragic outcome. Who will 
take the responsibility to ensure that these state criminals, knowing with a light hand 
of our leadership of the risks they face and being in agony before severe punishment, 
do not commit any terrorist act against the person or body. Do not dramatize the 
situation, but in the exodus from common sense, we would like to pre-empt the possible 
consequences of, to put it mildly reckless action that can lead to very undesirable 
results. In defense of this banal situation, we present a single argument. People of such 
a high rank official, accused of taking bribes in the amount of about one million rubles, 
and nothing more than wait for the mercy of the law severely punished for bribery. This 
ruthless, but at the same time simple worldly logic available to any reasonable person, 
in a moment of discriminatory culture,70 can be decisive and will push them in 
unpredictable actions. This is the real situation prevailing today around us investigated 
the case. Due to the exclusivity and importance of the situation, we decided to appeal 
to the Deputy for help, because only your personal intervention is able uniquely to the 
end, in the party to resolve all issues. Whatever the consequences for making a contact 
"audacity" on the part of our leadership and other individuals, we considered it their 
duty honestly and openly explain the essence of the events, because this position is 
based on our internal party conviction. The investigator for particularly important cases 
of the General Prosecutor of the USSR T.Kh. Gdlyan. The investigator for particularly 
important cases of the General Prosecutor of the USSR Ivanov N.V. Moscow, November 
5th, 1986.71 
 
Inquiry of Gdlyan and Ivanov, after the arrest of Churbanov (1987) 
The USSR Prosecutor's Office investigated the criminal case against the responsible 
officials of the Uzbek SSR and the central departments in Moscow. It showed impressive 
dimensions of corruption in Uzbekistan, which has affected the majority of the officials 
of the republic's leadership to the district level. Even an ordinary member of the party 
during the investigation were removed value exceeding one million rubles, and at first 
the secretary of the party accepting bribes in the millions. Withdrawal of the case values 
in the amount of 26 million rubles, only a small part of what officials took possession 
middle managers. Upcoming withdrawal values confirm this conclusion. Ideological 
inspirers and organizers of bribery in the region were the first secretary of the 
Communist Party of Uzbekistan, kandi¬dat a member of the Soviet Politburo Sh 
Rashidov, and then his successor Usmanhodzhaev and, used., The second secretary of 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Osetroff TN Secretaries CC Abdullayev AD and 
Aitmuratov E., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the AU UeSSR 
Salimov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR Khudaiberdiyev JD, first 
secretaries of provincial Party of Uzbekistan Dkabbarov ID, Musakhanov MM, Esin VP 
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Turapov NT and others. Perennial preotupnaya activities of these persons is largely due 
not only to mutual responsibility in the region, but also the support that these criminals 
at the expense of large bribes were patrons in the face of the CPSU Central Committee 
and other central authorities in Moscow. Only a small part of the organizers revealed 
bribery currently privlenena prosecuted and arrested. This is the second secretary of 
the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Osetroff TN, per¬vye secretaries of Bukhara, 
Khorezm and Karakalpakstan regional Party Karimov AK, Khudaibergenov MH, K. 
Kamalov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR 
Orlov GM , mi¬nistr Internal Affairs Yahyayev HH and other leaders of the party and the 
law enforcement agencies. January 14, 1987 in Moscow was arrested by one of the 
patrons of the Uzbek government korrupirovannogo Churbanov Yuri Mikhailovich, born 
in 1936 As established by the investigation, he, being a deputy and first deputy Minister 
of Internal Affairs of the USSR, in the 1975-1984 biennium. repeatedly received bribes 
from subordinates and dependents.72 As explained Churbanov only by senior officials of 
the party and the law enforcement agencies of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, he 
received bribes worth more than 800,000 rubles., Including 50,000 rubles. the first 
secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Usmanhodzhaeva IB Incidentally, the 
amount of bribes received by Usmanhodzhaevym IB, now amounts to more than 
1,250,000 rubles. and leaving it to such a high position can not but cause concern, 
50,000 rubles. Predseda¬telya by the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek SSR 
Hudaybertsieva ND, 25,000 rubles. the second secretary of the Communist Party of 
Uzbekistan Osetrova TN, 30,000 rubles. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Uzbek SSR Salimov AU. From the testimony of Churbanov follows that he 
received bribes for the appointment or promotion of it, for the assignment of the rank 
of general and other services in all other regions of the country: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Russian Federation, as well as in Moscow. 
Among those who gave him bribes Churbanov have 29 ministers of internal affairs of 
the Union and autonomous republics of their deputies, 59 chiefs of regional police 
department, 8 employees of the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, 20 first secretaries of provincial Party and other senior officials. Most of the 
bribes he received when traveling on business trips. For example, when you visit the 
Sakhalin region, as follows from the explanatory Churbanova, he was the first secretary 
of the regional party committee Leonova PA 60.000-70.000 rubles. for assisting in his 
transfer to work in the central regions of the RSFSR. This transfer took place in 1978, 
Leonov was elected the first secretary Kalinin regional party. Total Churbanov 
indications he had received bribes amounting to about two million rubles. Some facts 
of bribery worth over 700,000 rubles. I was confirmed in the case file. The rest of the 
Churbanov facts to be checked. The investigation was ongoing. An investigator for 
particularly important cases of the General Prosecutor of the USSR T.X.Gdlyan An 
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investigator for particularly important cases under the Prosecutor General of the USSR 
N.V.Ivanov. January 26, 1987 Moscow73 
 
Conclusion of the Presidium of the SS USSR Commission (19 May 1989) 
[...] In April 1983 the Uzbek KGB initiated a criminal action against Akhat Muzafarov, the 
head of the OBKhSS [Department for the Struggle Against the Theft of Socialist Property] 
office of the Bukhara oblast executive committee, who was under arrest for being 
caught in the act of taking a bribe. The case was transferred in September 1983 to the 
USSR Procuracy for further investigation, where an investigatory group headed by 
Telman Kh. Gdlyan had been formed. At one time 200 or more people worked in this 
group. And in the five years that it investigated cases in Uzbekistan, some 70 persons 
were charged with criminal offenses. Nineteen cases went to court, and 40 persons 
were convicted of crimes [...] In the materials, letters and complaints of citizens, 
including statements of investigatory and procuracy workers, it is confirmed that in 
attempting to artificially broaden the circle of those accused of corruption, comrade 
Gdlyan and the investigators who were under his influence embarked on a path of gross 
violations of the norms of legality. They widely employed smear tactics in making 
unfounded accusations of bribery, forcing suspects and witnesses into giving so-called 
"inculpatory" evidence on the basis of groundless arrests, blackmail, and intimidation, 
without properly specifying the circumstances of their acts. . . Gdlyan, Ivanov and the 
investigators associated with them frequently insulted those being held, assaulted their 
dignity, threatened them with execution by shooting, and constantly sought to 
introduce the idea that to avoid the supreme punishment and receive a minimal term 
of imprisonment they needed only confess to the accusations made and testify against 
the "higherups," that is, certain leaders in the republic and the country. Regarding the 
latter point, they were presented with an already-prepared program of testimony, 
including sums of bribes and a list of officials to whom bribes were supposedly given [...] 
[M]any of those arrested later retracted their coerced false testimony, but this 
information was not included in the records of the investigatory proceedings. 
Moreover, investigators adopted urgent measures to restore the influence they had lost 
over some of the accused. Thus, for instance, on June 14, 1987 Orlov, who had been 
interrogated, issued two statements addressed to the former USSR Procurator General 
Rekunkov in which he said he had given false testimony against Usmankhodzhaev, 
Osetrov, and Ishkov. The next day he was called by Ivanov and interrogated intensely 
for six hours. According to Orlov, they promised to release him on his own recognizance 
if he would stick to his previous testimony. They also suggested that he tear up the 
statements that he had sent the day before, which had not gone to where he sent them 
but were in the hands of the investigators […] [T]o exert psychological pressure on those 
being interrogated, a common practice was to take their relatives into custody. In the 
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case of Karimov, the former secretary of the Bukhara oblast Communist Party 
organization, 16 of his relatives were arrested and held for periods ranging from 5 to 8 
months. Similar acts were committed with regard to the kin of Usmankhodzhaev, 
Musakhanov, Kalamov and others. In many of these instances the criminal cases were 
later dropped for lack of evidence. Some of those questioned stated that they had been 
subjected to physical and psychological violence. More than 20 citizens gave statements 
asserting that investigators from the Gdlyan group frequently made illegal arrests. 
Myianov, a resident of the city Karsha, was held in custody for 2 years and 4 months, R. 
Karimov for about 3 years, and N.R. Akhadova, who was pregnant, for 20 days. In these 
and many other instances the cases were later dropped for lack of evidence […] [T]here 
is evidence of gross departures from the law by some of the investigators from the 
Gdlyan group in conducting searches of the homes of accused persons and their 
relatives. which were carried out for the purpose of finding valuables and other 
property. In the corresponding procedural documents the seized valuables and objects 
were not always accounted for, their identifying characteristics not indicated, and 
money not always counted. The inspection of valuables was frequently carried out 
several days after it was seized. . . [O]n Gdlyan's order personal savings of relatives of 
suspects were seized. . . [I]nvestigators Gdlyan and Ivanov. in spite of constitutional 
norms concerning the independence of the court and its subordination only to the law, 
improperly involved themselves in court proceedings in cases they had investigated. In 
particular, they tried to influence the presiding judge and the prosecutor, as well as 
witnesses, in the Muzafarov case. which was heard by the Uzbek Supreme Court. For 
these violations they both were punished by the USSR Procurator General in February 
1986. In spite of this, Gdlyan and Ivanov later tried to influence the USSR Supreme Court 
in 1988 in the case against Churbanov and others. And after the sentence had been 
handed down they issued abusive denunciations of the members of the USSR Supreme 
Court that were not supported by the evidence, employing the mass media for this 
purpose […]74 
 
Letter of I.B. Usmankhodzhaev to Ye.K. Ligachev 23 January 199075 
To Ye. K. Ligachev, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee: 
Esteemed Yegor Kuzmich! This is being sent to you by Inomzhon Buzumkovich 
Usmankhodzhaev, former first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central 
Committee, who has now been sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment. First of all, 
I ask your forgiveness a thousand times for everything that has happened. You must 
know—-and I say this sincerely—that I never even considered accusing you of anything, 
of humiliating you, or implicating you in a crime. The investigators Gdlyan and Ivanov 
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needed that, and they got it. I was a victim of the political intriguers Gdlyan and Ivanov, 
who tried to fabricate accusations that a number of Party and soviet figures committed 
crimes. As a result of their illegal actions—blackmail, the threat to execute me and 
arrest members of my family and relatives, I hoped to save the honor of my family and 
relatives and feared for their lives. I was not responsible for my actions, but I was 
compelled to implicate people not guilty of anything at all, including myself. Later, when 
1 came to my senses, in literally a few days, 1 retracted my false testimony about giving 
you and others bribes. But despite that, the above-mentioned investigators continue to 
make a hue and cry and sling mud at decent people who arc guilty of nothing. Once 
again 1 proclaim, fully aware of my words, that it is ail a lie! It is high time for these 
investigators, who have completely lost their souls, these opportunists, to be called on 
the carpet and the force of the law to be used against them. Esteemed Yegor Kuzmich! 
I’ve been imprisoned for over a year now and have suffered a great deal. I had never 
been in this situation before. My conscience continues to torment me and I suffer 
sleepless nights and great anxiety. While I was under pressure from the investigators 
and started down the path of deception, I implicated innocent people, including you, 
Yegor Kuzmich. I will curse that day my whole life. So with all my heart I ask you again 
and again to forgive me. I also deeply apologize to K. N. Mogilnichenko, V. I. Bessarabov, 
I. Ye. Ponomarev, and all the officials in the division with whom I worked on such friendly 
terms and with such mutual respect. Apologizing once more, Respectfully yours, 
Usmankhodzhaev. 
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Kʻartashyan, Albert Isaki. Daṛe Chakatagrer: Detektiv, Kʻnnichʻi Oȑ ragritsʻ. Yerevan: Iravunkʻ, 2010. 
Kunaev, Dinmukhamed Akhmetovich. O Moem Vremeni: Vospominaniya. Almaty: Dauir, 1992. 
Kunaev, Dinmukhamed Akhmetovich. Ot Stalina Do Gorbacheva: V Aspekte Istorii Kazakhstana. 
Almaty: Sanat, 1994. 
Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich. Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin: The Memoirs Of Yegor Ligachev. Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996. 
Ligachev, Yegor Kuzmich. Predosterezhenie. Moskva: Pravda Internėshnl, 1998. 
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